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Mostrando postagens com marcador Oliver Stuenkel. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Oliver Stuenkel. Mostrar todas as postagens

sexta-feira, 9 de dezembro de 2016

Rumo a um mundo sinocentrico? - Palestra de Oliver Stuenkel (NAO PERCAM)

A palestra anunciada abaixo vai ser transmitida ONLINE pelo canal YouTube da Funag. Anunciaremos o link oportunamente.
Por enquanto, sintam-se convidados para um debate importante sobre se o mundo será ou não chinês, e se ele já é "pós-ocidental".
Veja aqui: http://www.funag.gov.br/index.php/pt-br/component/content/article?id=1331
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O presidente da Funag, embaixador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima, e o Diretor do Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais (IPRI), Paulo Roberto de Almeida, convidam para a palestra-debate com o professor de Relações Internacionais da FGV-SP Oliver Stuenkel, no auditório Paulo Nogueira Batista, no próximo dia 13/12, às 16:00hs
Stuenkel, colaborador regular de diversas publicações na área de relações internacionais e autor de vários livros – entre eles The Brics and the Future of Global Order (2015) e do recentemente publicado Post-Western World (2016) – falará sobre “Rumo ao mundo sinocêntrico? - As transformações globais e suas implicações para o Brasil”.


Nota curricular: 
Oliver Stuenkel é Professor de Relações Internacionais da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) em São Paulo, onde coordena a Escola de Ciências Sociais e o MBA em Relações Internacionais. Tem graduação pela Universidade de Valência, na Espanha, Mestrado em Políticas Públicas pela Kennedy School of Government de Harvard University, e Doutorado em Ciência Política pela Universidade de Duisburg-Essen, na Alemanha. É autor de três livros, entre eles Post-Western World: How Emerging Power Are Remaking Global Order (2016, Polity) e colunista da revista Americas Quarterly.  

A more complete CV: 

Oliver Della Costa Stuenkel is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in São Paulo, where he coordinates the São Paulo branch of the School of History and Social Science and the executive program in International Relations. He is also a non-resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin and a member of the Carnegie Rising Democracies Network. His research focuses on rising powers; specifically on Brazil’s, India’s and China's foreign policy and on their impact on global governance. He is the author of IBSA: The rise of the Global South? (Routledge Global Institutions, 2014), BRICS and the Future of Global Order (Lexington, 2015) and Post-Western World (Polity, 2016) (Amazon Author Page).
Seu artigo mais recente:

http://www.postwesternworld.com/2016/12/05/benefits-americas-quarterly/

   

XI

How Trump Benefits China in Latin America (Americas Quarterly)

BY OLIVER STUENKEL | DECEMBER 5, 2016 Growing Chinese engagement in the region will test Latin America's ability to adapt.
http://americasquarterly.org/content/how-trump-benefits-china-latin-america
The timing was perfect, and the symbolism could not have been stronger. A mere week after Donald Trump’s upset victory stunned the world, Xi Jinping traveled to Lima for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and projected China as a bastion of stability, predictability and openness. With the U.S. increasingly skeptical of globalization, Xi promised that China would stand up for free trade. Faced with an emerging global leadership vacuum, Beijing was quick to recognize a window of opportunity. Compared with the abrasive U.S. president-elect, the Chinese president, with his avuncular charm, seemed to have a soothing effect on …

terça-feira, 6 de dezembro de 2016

Rumo ao mundo sinocentrico? - palestra de Oliver Stuenkel no IPRI (Brasilia, 13/12/2016)


O presidente da Funag, embaixador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima, e o Diretor do Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais (IPRI), Paulo Roberto de Almeida, convidam para a palestra-debate com o professor de Relações Internacionais da FGV-SP Oliver Stuenkel, no auditório Paulo Nogueira Batista, no próximo dia 13/12, às 16:00hs
Stuenkel, colaborador regular de diversas publicações na área de relações internacionais e autor de vários livros – entre eles The Brics and the Future of Global Order (2015) e do recentemente publicado Post-Western World (2016) – falará sobre “Rumo ao mundo sinocêntrico? - As transformações globais e suas implicações para o Brasil”.


Nota curricular: 
Oliver Stuenkel é Professor de Relações Internacionais da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) em São Paulo, onde coordena a Escola de Ciências Sociais e o MBA em Relações Internacionais. Tem graduação pela Universidade de Valência, na Espanha, Mestrado em Políticas Públicas pela Kennedy School of Government de Harvard University, e Doutorado em Ciência Política pela Universidade de Duisburg-Essen, na Alemanha. É autor de três livros, entre eles Post-Western World: How Emerging Power Are Remaking Global Order (2016, Polity) e colunista da revista Americas Quarterly.   

Mister Trump parece facilitar as coisas para a China na America Latina - Oliver Stuenkel

Oliver Stuenkel deve fazer uma palestra no IPRI (Funag, Brasília), que estou dirigindo, no próximo dia 13/12, quando deve falar, justamente sobre a possível "sinização" do Brasil, da América Latina, do mundo (o que vier antes...).
Vou informar mais detalhadamente.
Este artigo parece preparar o terreno para o debate.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Web Exclusive

How Trump Benefits China in Latin America

Growing Chinese engagement in the region will test Latin America's ability to adapt.
Xi jinping
Anderson Riedel (flickr - Michel Temer) November 7, 2013 CC by 2.0

The timing was perfect, and the symbolism could not have been stronger. A mere week after Donald Trump’s upset victory stunned the world, Xi Jinping traveled to Lima for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and projected China as a bastion of stability, predictability and openness. With the U.S. increasingly skeptical of globalization, Xi promised that China would stand up for free trade. Faced with an emerging global leadership vacuum, Beijing was quick to recognize a window of opportunity. Compared with the abrasive U.S. president-elect, the Chinese president, with his avuncular charm, seemed to have a soothing effect on the gathering in the Peruvian capital.
No region in the world will remain unaffected by the unprecedented combination of the United States as a source of uncertainty and China as a potential stabilizer. The consequences for Latin America, however, are particularly important, as the recent political shift in the region has led to a growing consensus that greater openness to trade is a prerequisite to economic recovery. While trade negotiators in Brasília and Buenos Aires may have hoped for a deal with Europe or the United States, Beijing increasingly looks like the only partner offering a meaningful opportunity, building on already existing free-trade agreements with Costa Rica, Peru and Chile. Similarly, when it comes to attracting investors to modernize the region’s rotten infrastructure, no country offers as much as the Middle Kingdom. China, free to promote alternative trade deals now that Trump promised he would pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), faces a world of opportunities in Latin America.
This trend may be accelerated if U.S. policy toward the region resembles that of former President George W. Bush. During his presidency, more pressing short-term priorities elsewhere (such as the “war on terror”) caused Washington to largely turn away from Latin America, allowing China to boost its influence. Much suggests a similar scenario will materialize again over the next four years. Chinese trade with Latin America has grown more than 20-fold over the past fifteen years. Xi announced that Chinese companies will invest a quarter of a trillion dollars in the region over the next decade, diversifying from traditional industries such as mining, oil and gas to areas like finance, agriculture and infrastructure (energy, airports, ports and roads).
Yet for Latin America, Beijing’s growing engagement is a mixed blessing. As China increasingly focuses on value-added goods, it now purchases fewer commodities from Latin America but sells more to the region, causing Latin America’s trade deficit with China to increase. Countries like Brazil face a risk of deindustrialization and face direct competition as they seek to export to its neighborhood. Chinese imports are affecting, among others, industrial machinery, textiles, footwear and clothing, while copper, iron, oil and soybeans account for the greatest share of the region’s exports to China. Many new projects that China may finance (such as the Trans-Amazonian Railway from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean) would help integrate the region, but also enhance Latin America’s dependence on China, in addition to posing threats to the environment and creating relatively few jobs.
Lack of preparedness
China’s growing influence is remarkable, but it should not come as a surprise. Brazil's former Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira argued as early as 1974 that China "had consolidated itself as an emerging power," urging then-President Ernesto Geisel to normalize diplomatic relations with the country. And yet, particularly in Brazil, the lack of preparedness and knowledge about China on most policy-making levels is remarkable. During debates in Brasília, comments often reveal a worrying degree of ignorance of Chinese affairs. Yet governments are not the only ones to blame. Thinkers both left and right of the ideological spectrum are often stuck in a 20th century Western-centric worldview, still regarding the United States as the source of most good and evil. The left still regards U.S. meddling in the region as the most urgent concern at a time when Chinese clout in capitals like Caracas now exceeds Washington’s influence even in countries that are seen as pro-U.S., such as Colombia. Mostly through the China Development Bank, Beijing now lends far more to the region than the World Bank.
Oblivious to these trends, it is not uncommon to witness dinner party debates among left-of-center Brazilian intellectuals about whether the Lava Jato corruption investigation and former President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment are actually schemes by the FBI to destroy Petrobras (as a professor at USP, a leading university, recently argued in a newspaper interview).
All the while, Brazil’s Foreign Minister José Serra is said to have only a vague understanding of Asia, and was recently unable to name the members of the BRICS grouping during an interview. Add to that the absence of sinologists and Brazilian foreign correspondents based in China, the result is a disturbing unpreparedness for an increasingly Asia-centric world.
Designing a regional strategy
What is to be done? For starters, while Peru, Chile and others have already begun to adapt to new realities, foreign ministries in the region should coordinate their positions regarding China better to avoid competing for Chinese largesse, which will lead to a race to the bottom. That involves discussing and possibly aligning legislation regarding Chinese investments, transnational environmental rules for Chinese-financed projects that cross borders, and cohesive policies regarding bigger questions such as China’s role in the World Trade Organization.
This discussion should also include a broad debate, all ideological passions aside, about how the emerging global competition between Washington and Beijing can be used to the region’s advantage. That requires being as knowledgeable about domestic affairs in Beijing as in Washington, which, given the opacity of China, requires a far greater diplomatic presence than most countries possess today.
Considering the influence China already has on Latin American economics and politics (for example, the current situation in Venezuela is impossible to understand without making sense of China’s role as a lender), the lack of a regional debate over how to grapple with the implications of multipolarity is remarkable. The longer policy makers in the region wait, the smaller their capacity to learn to operate in the new environment.
--
Stuenkel is a contributing columnist for Americas Quarterly and teaches International Relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo. He is the author of The BRICS and the Future of Global Order (2015) and the Post-Western World (2016).
Any opinions expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of Americas Quarterly or its publishers.

segunda-feira, 8 de dezembro de 2014

Livros sobre Politica Externa brasileira: Matias Spektor e Oliver Stuenkel

Duas obras recém-publicadas de professores do Centro de Relações Internacionais, sediado no CPDOC/FGV, Matias Spektor e Oliver Stuenkel.

18 Dias: Quando Lula e FHC se uniram para conquistar o apoio de Bush
Matias Spektor
288 páginas | 16cm x 23cm | Brochura
Livro físico | ISBN 978-85-3900-581-9| R$36,90
EBook | ISBN 978-85-3900-601-4 | R$23,66

18 dias é a história por trás da ofensiva diplomática de Lula e FHC para quebrar a resistência do governo norte-americano ao PT nas eleições de 2002. O livro revela uma faceta desconhecida dos bastidores do poder: o papel da política externa durante uma troca de comando no Palácio do Planalto.

India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA): The Rise of the Global South
Oliver Stuenkel
198 páginas | 5in x 8 in | Brochura
Capa dura | ISBN 978-11-3878-908-1|$128,25
Um volume da série Global Institutions

​Este livro oferece a mais completa síntese das origens e trajetória do foro que veio a marcar uma década de coalizões Sul-Sul. Em linguagem clara, analisa criticamente o impacto do grupo no ordenamento global.

quinta-feira, 4 de dezembro de 2014

No One’s World, by Charles A. Kupchan - Resenha de Oliver Stuenkel

Acabo de receber este livro, que comprei de segunda mão, no Abebooks, bem barato, a despeito de ser relativamente recente.
Concordo, em grande medida, com a resenha abaixo de meu colega acadêmico e de Academia.edu, que fui buscar nessa plataforma, mas sempre insisto em que as pessoas, autores ou resenhistas, sempre fazem certa confusão em torno da política externa do Brasil, ao dizer, por exemplo: o Brasil fez isto, ou o Brasil fez aquilo. Sempre sou tentado a corrigir, dizendo: não foi o Brasil, foi o PT, ou foi Lula. O exemplo citado é o famoso "acordo nuclear" turco-brasileiro-iraniano", rejeitado imediatamente pelo P5+1, pois não preenchia os mínimos requerimentos solicitados pelos membros do CSNU mais a Alemanha, quanto às garantias de desenvolvimento pacífico da energia nuclear.
Foi o Brasil que fez esse acordo? Duvidoso que o Itamaraty se engajasse, por vontade própria, nesse assunto, que foi conduzido quase solitariamente pelo chanceler de Lula a pedido deste, que talvez aspirasse a qualquer outra coisa que não apenas o acordo nuclear em questão.
Bem, ainda vou ler o livro, e depois opinar.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Book review: 


No one’s world: the West, the rising rest and the coming global turn
Charles A. Kupchan
New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 272 p.
International Affairs, vol. 89, n. 4, 2013, p.1025-1027


What will replace the western world order once the United States is no longer capable of exercising global leadership? Will China’s rise be ‘unpeaceful’ and prove to be disruptive, as John Mearsheimer argues, or will rising powers support today’s system that is ‘easy to  join and hard to overturn’, as G. John Ikenberry predicts? Who will rule the world once the United States’ reign ends, and what will such a world look like? Is it a ‘post-American world’, a ‘Chinese world’, or simply a western world order under non-western leadership? 

Rejecting such predictions, Charles Kupchan predicts that tomorrow’s world will ‘belong to no one’. Before elaborating on this claim, the author briskly moves through centuries of history to explain why the West was quickly able to develop economically and leave other, tradition-ally successful, regions behind, thus initiating western global dominance. While the world had historically been compartmentalized, with each region operating according to cultur-ally particular and exclusive principles, the author argues that Europe’s rise helped create one single global system: as European powers conquered the world, ‘they also exported European conceptions of sovereignty, administration, law, diplomacy, and commerce’ (p. 65) — thus creating what we now call the ‘western world order’. Kupchan writes that ‘remaking the world in its own image was perhaps the ultimate exercise of Western power’ (p. 66). 

The West’s capacity to define modernity caused generations of non-western thinkers to argue about whether there was a dierence between modernization and westernization. Kupchan shows that in a few decades, at least three BRIC countries will be among the world’s five leading economies, and he predicts that there will be multiple versions of modernity. Not only do the characteristics of Brazil’s, India’s and China’s rise dier markedly from Europe’s, but their cultural DNA is dierent, too, he argues. 
This is hardly news; the author fails to explain how internal peculiarities aect countries’ strategy vis-à-vis the global system. His assertion that ‘much of Latin America has been captivated by left-wing populism’ and that this represents ‘an alternative to the West’s brand of liberal democracy’ is controversial (p. 90). What exactly are the characteristics of the ‘West’s brand of liberal democracy’? Is Brazil’s democratic system fundamentally dierent from, say, Portugal’s?
  
The author speaks of the ‘West’ as if it were a cohesive bloc, a somewhat misleading idea to begin with. For example, he writes that Brazil’s then President Lula’s decision in 2010 to meet Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to negotiate Iran’s nuclear programme serves as proof that Brazil will not accept the western global order. Turkey’s quarrels with Israel are supposedly evidence of Turkey’s drift away from the West. Yet such views find little support among policy-makers and analysts in Brazil and Turkey. Equally controversially, Kupchan argues that India’s voting behaviour in the UN shows that ‘its interests and status as an emerging power are more important determinants of its foreign policy than its democratic institutions’ (p. 143), thus implying that the United States’ democratic institutions are somehow more important to US policy-makers than the national interest. 

Yet the history of US foreign policy is littered with instances when strong partnerships with non-democratic regimes were established to promote US national interest—not at least in the Middle East where Saudi Arabia remains an important US ally. This highly US-centric argument paradoxically shows how dicult it will be for policy-makers in Washington to adapt to a truly multipolar world in which the United States will be one among several large actors. 

Kupchan thus interprets emerging countries’ independent foreign policy strategies as evidence that they will undermine today’s global order, all the while overlooking the fact that despite their growing strength, there is little evidence that countries such as China seriously challenge the norms and rules that undergird today’s system. In the final chapter, Kupchan lays out a series of interesting ideas about how the new world order could appear. He argues that ‘the West will have to embrace political diversity rather than insist that liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of government’. He rightly observes that ‘even as the West does business with autocracies … it also delegitimizes them in word and action’ (p. 187). Kupchan argues that while such a pro-democracy stance  may be morally compelling, it was simply not pragmatic and made unnecessary enemies in the emerging world. He declines, however, to specify at which degree of a dictator’s nastiness the West should switch from cooperation to condemnation. 

No one’s world is sprinkled with interesting insights, yet the ground Kupchan covers is vast, forcing him often to remain superficial and to rely on sound bites when commenting on other countries’ domestic aairs. ‘The world’, he writes, ‘is headed toward a global dissensus’ (p. 145). The prediction that we will live in a world with competing narratives (rather than a convergence towards a western narrative) is an important starting point. Yet Kupchan could oer a more rigorous analysis of what these competing narratives might look like. 

Oliver Stuenkel, Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brazil

sábado, 30 de agosto de 2014

Eleicoes 2014: a politica externa de Marina Silva - Oliver Stuenkel

What Would a Marina Presidency Mean for Brazilian Foreign Policy?


marina
Marina Silva and her advisers faced a formidable challenge. After Eduardo Campos' tragic death on August 13, Marina Silva, Campos' running mate, suddenly turned into the best placed candidate to defeat President Dilma Rousseff in the upcoming elections. While other candidates had months to hone their arguments, Marina's team had merely days to finalize the document that lists her policy proposals. Contrary to 2010, when she was seen as a protest candidate, she has now turned into a serious contender, and the first option for many of those who are dissatisfied with the way the country is goverrned.
International issues will not be decisive in this election, of course. Voters care most issues such as health care, education, public transport, public security, the fight against corruption and the economy. And yet, compared to previous elections, foreign policy issues are set to play a more important role in weeks leading up to the election on October 5, underlining a growing notion among voters that the way Brazil relates to the world directly impacts their well-being. While security issues such as the Crimean Crisis are unlikely to matter much, candidates will have to explain their proposals on topics around Mercosur, possible trade agreements with the EU and the US and the rise of China. The more likely a victory by Marina seems, the more will people seek to understand her ideas about Brazil's foreign policy.
The 12 pages of her program dedicated to foreign policy (pp.28-40) provide interesting insights, some of which are analyzed below.
Trade
As big regional negotiations such as one between the EU and United States advance, one cannot but notice the prospect of a world divided into trade blocs. Brazil will have to make up its mind about which strategy to pursue. In the case of the negotiations with the EU, this involves making a decision about whether to take a highly protectionist and rather unpredictable Argentina along or whether to pursue a two-speed solution, temporarily leaving Argentina behind. According to her program, Marina would opt for the latter option of the "two-speed Mercosur" to facilitate the conclusion of trade negotiations with the European Union, among others. She argues that focusing on the WTO is fully compatible with seeking other regional and bilaratal trade deals. That seems reasonable, and even Brazil's current government has been increasingly open about its willingness to negotiate without Argentina. Marina Silva is also supportive of the ongoing process to fully liberalize trade between the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur, and calls for Brazil to make regional integration its top priority.
Regional leadership
Similar to her arguments made during the campaign four years ago, when Marina Silva said that Brazil had a "key role in mediating between the different regional interests" through exercising "respectful and supportive leadership" in the region, the 2014 program reads as a commitment to play a more active role in the neighborhood. While she frequently mentions defending human rights and democracy in South America, her program does not suggest a reckless idealistic position that may endanger strategic interests. Over the coming days and weeks, she will certainly have to say how she would deal with the ongoing political crisis in Venezuela.
Global governance
Contrary to critics who argue that Marina Silva would radically change course, there are signs that she could seek to reemphasize the importance of foreign policy after a relatively lacklustre performance under Dilma Rousseff. Notably, she stresses that both Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula contributed to strengthening Brazil's international projection, and has repeatedly argued, since 2010, in favor of reforming the international system  - such as the UN Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank -  to increase its legitimacy and provide Brazil with more responsibility. Furthermore, as globally recognized environmental leader, Marina Silva has repeatedly argued that Brazil had the potential to assume international leadership in the debate about environmental sustainability. It is in this context that her proposals are most innovative - ranging from engaging with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and strengthening the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO). A more sophisticated strategy in the Amazon will also please nationalists, many of whom worry about Brazil's limited capacity to control its Western borders.
Despite expressing her desire to improve ties to the United States, Marina's proposals do not imply weakening Brazil's ties to the Global South - to the contrary, the explicitly refers to the BRICS grouping and the importance of Brazil-Africa ties. That will make it difficult for supporters of Lula's foreign policy to attack her approach. Nothing suggests that Marina would seek to undo his notable achievements (or, for that matter, Dilma's main achievement, Brazil's laudable internet governance initiative).
Her proposal to promote Brazilian culture more systematically on a global scale - she mentions learning from European institutions such as the Alliance Française, the British Council and the Goethe Institute - deserve attention and hint to a welcome willingness to introduce new ideas to strengthen Brazil's international visibility. In the same way, she suggests modernizing the Rio Branco Institute, Brazil's diplomatic academy, and further strengthening the dialogue between Itamaraty and civil society.
Putting foreign policy back at the center? 
Finally, and most importantly, Marina Silva argues that Dilma Rousseff did not sufficiently value Brazil's Foreign Ministry. And indeed, under no other Brazilian leader in recent history has the Foreign Ministry - historically above the political fray - been so secondary. As a result, Brazil's foreign policy under Rousseff has been far more hesitant and passive than during the presidencies of Cardoso and Lula.
Naturally, in the coming weeks Marina Silva will have to explain how some of her ideas would play out in practice. And yet, her program suggests that Marina would pursue an activist foreign policy, built on the notion that established countries' dominance in the global conversation is highly counterproductive and unlikely to produce sustainable solutions to the world's most pressing issues such as climate change, financial volatility, human rights and nuclear proliferation.
More than ever before, Brazil's stronger voice - be it in the UN Security Council, during climate change negotiations, as a mediator in Venezuela, as a defender of democracy in Guinea Bissau, or as an agenda setter on internet governance - is needed to create a richer and more balanced global debate. That requires a President unafraid of taking courageous decisions and occasionally generating international controversy.
Read also:
Marina’s foreign policy
What would Aécio do?
Brazil’s top 10 foreign policy challenges in 2014

terça-feira, 29 de julho de 2014

Eleicoes 2014: a politica externa de Aecio Neves - Oliver Stuenkel

Brazil Post (Huffington Post), 
AECIO


A próxima campanha presidencial no Brasil deverá incluir uma discussão sobre como cada candidato pretende defender os interesses do Brasil no exterior. A atuação internacional do Brasil é muito maior hoje do que em qualquer momento de sua história, tornando o tema um elemento-chave da estratégia global de qualquer governo. As tropas brasileiras estão no Haiti, o Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento do Brasil (BNDES) empresta dinheiro a nível internacional, o Brasil aumentou o número de suas embaixadas na África e participou da criação dos grupos BRICS e UNASUL.
Esta forte presença internacional levanta questões importantes. Por exemplo, o que o foco direcionado do Brasil na África tem realmente alcançado na última década? Fazer parte do grupo BRICS pode aumentar a influência global do Brasil? Como podemos convencer os nossos vizinhos de que a ascensão do Brasil é boa para eles também? Qual é a visão a longo prazo do Brasil para a região? Qual é a função da ajuda brasileira ao desenvolvimento, da UNASUL e do Mercosul nesta visão regional? Como o Brasil pode melhor promover a estabilidade política e econômica na América Latina? Como o Brasil deveria lidar com a instabilidade na Venezuela e as violações de direitos humanos em Cuba?
Diante disso, todos os candidatos devem ser capazes de criticar a política externa do Brasil durante a presidência de Dilma Rousseff. Em comparação com FHC e Lula, que deixaram suas marcas no compromisso internacional do Brasil, a política externa da presidente tem sido uma política sem brilho. Diplomatas estrangeiros lamentam privadamente que ela não parece se importar muito com questões internacionais. Enquanto os Ministros das Relações Exteriores de FHC e Lula prosperavam, o Itamaraty foi rebaixado por Rousseff, e foi dado pouco espaço para o Ministro Patriota tomar iniciativa. O atual Ministro das Relações Exteriores, Figueiredo, parece ter maior acesso à Presidente, mas ele dificilmente é um de seus principais assessores. Os discursos de Dilma na Assembleia Geral da ONU, grandes oportunidades de articular a visão do Brasil, não foram inspiradores.
O que Aécio Neves, candidato do Partido da Social Democracia do Brasil (PSDB) faria se ele fosse eleito presidente? De todos os candidatos, é o ex-governador de Minas Gerais que articulou a crítica mais forte à atual política externa dos últimos governos. Sob as presidências tanto de Lula quanto Rousseff, Aécio argumenta que o Brasil tem mantido laços excessivamente cordiais com regimes autoritários como Cuba e Irã e tem feito muito pouco para promover os direitos humanos e a democracia. Da mesma forma, ele argumenta que convidar Chávez da Venezuela para participar do Mercosul foi um erro. Finalmente, segundo Aécio, o Brasil errou ao aceitar expropriações de refinarias da Petrobras na Bolívia - dando a entender que a resposta do Brasil foi, em grande parte, determinada por simpatias ideológicas do governo com o esquerdista Evo Morales da Bolívia.
Em questões internacionais, ele parece acreditar que a ênfase do Brasil em fortalecer os laços com outras potências emergentes e África foi mal concebida, com tendências ideológicas e não necessariamente a serviço do interesse nacional brasileiro.
Aécio Neves, portanto, não apenas critica a política externa do governo, mas também oferece alternativas relativamente claras: o Brasil deve deixar de cultivar laços estreitos com Cuba, Venezuela e outros governos de esquerda na região e adotar um tom mais crítico a esses países. Deve também condenar abertamente as violações de direitos humanos em Cuba e pedir a libertação de todos os presos políticos do governo Castro. O Brasil pode ainda gastar menos tempo estreitando os laços com o Sul Global e buscar consolidar sua relação com os Estados Unidos.
No entanto, mesmo sendo de alguma maneira construtiva, sua crítica é baseada no pressuposto maior que toda a política externa do Brasil baseia-se em fundamentos ideológicos puramente de esquerda - uma reivindicação questionável considerando que a política externa mudou relativamente pouco quando o presidente Lula assumiu, em 2002, em comparação com o governo anterior. Nem o presidente Itamar Franco, nem Fernando Henrique Cardoso criticaram Fidel Castro abertamente (mesmo que Luiz Felipe Lampreia tenha uma vez insistido em conhecer uma figura da oposição durante uma viagem a Cuba). Na mesma linha, o primeiro presidente a propor a participação da Venezuela no Mercosul foi FHC. As estreitas relações do Brasil com a Venezuela durante a última década podem ser explicadas por interesses econômicos do Brasil, não por uma forte ligação ideológica. Dilma Rousseff desprezou o estilo abrasivo de Hugo Chávez e critica a gestão econômica do presidente Maduro.
Por fim, diversificar parcerias e construir uma presença diplomática mais forte no mundo em desenvolvimento - que gerou muitos benefícios para o Brasil - também foi uma iniciativa de Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Lula, de maneira muito habilidosa, continuou e intensificou a estratégia. A participação brasileira no grupo do BRICS é uma estratégia pragmática e, contrário ao que argumentam alguns comentaristas conservadores, não motivada por questões ideológicas ("Os benefícios do grupo BRICS para o Brasil"). A política externa atual do Brasil pode ser menos ideológica do que algumas das críticas de Aécio Neves sugerem. A decisão de Lula de negociar com o Irã em 2010 foi muito mais uma tentativa (correta, ao meu ver) de fortalecer a projeção global do Brasil do que uma prova de alinhamento com Mahmoud Ahmadinejad - embora os radiantes sorrisos de Lula com o presidente do Irã, fazendo manchetes em todo o mundo, podem, de fato, ter enviado uma mensagem errada para o público global.
Tudo isso não significa que toda a crítica de Aécio seja equivocada. Por exemplo, ele tem razão em apontar que os laços com os Estados Unidos chegaram a um ponto baixo no final do segundo mandato de Lula, mesmo que o Ministro Patriota, no governo Dilma tenha conseguido normalizar boa parte das relações antes do escândalo de espionagem desfazer a sua obra. Aécio Neves criticou a decisão de Dilma de cancelar a visita de Estado, dizendo que não ter ido à Casa Branca pode ter feridos interesses comerciais. Diante do contexto político do escândalo de espionagem, porém, a decisão da Presidente cancelar sua viagem foi razoável, e parece pouco provável que interesses comerciais sofreram como consequência.
Quanto à abordagem regional da Aécio, duas questões se destacam. Primeiro de tudo, uma postura mais assertiva pró-direitos humanos e pró-democracia poderia conduzir Estados menores a ver o Brasil como um hegemon regional? Como Aécio teria certeza de que criticar o governo venezuelano não afetaria os interesses comerciais sólidos do Brasil lá? Afinal, mesmo a Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP) apoiou a entrada da Venezuela no Mercosul, e os laços estreitos de Lula com Chávez protegeram os investimentos brasileiros contra a interferência política na Venezuela até o momento. Por outro lado, isso parece impedir que o Brasil desempenhe um papel construtivo como mediador-chave, uma vez que a Venezuela enfrenta um conflito interno profundo. Mais importante ainda, ele não só criticaria abusos de direitos humanos cometidos por governos de esquerda (como Venezuela e Cuba), mas também por governos conservadores, como do ex-presidente Uribe?
Em segundo lugar, como exatamente ele pretenderia influenciar a política de Cuba? Considerando que um embargo dos EUA não desestabilizou o regime cubano, nem o tornou mais liberal, isolar Cuba é a estratégia correta para o Brasil? Como defenderia os interesses econômicos brasileiros na ilha? Isso remete a uma das questões mais complexas nas relações internacionais: Como os países democráticos liberais devem lidar com os países não democráticos? Devemos procurar mudá-los através envolvimento com eles (como as diferentes vertentes de pensamento liberal sugerem) ou do isolamento? Ou devemos nos abster de influenciar assuntos internos de outros países (o que reflete uma abordagem mais realista)?
Ainda assim, não é claro em que medida Aécio prevê uma "política externa pragmática" (termo que ele usa frequentemente) baseada em interesses estratégicos e econômicos do Brasil ou uma política externa mais orientada por valores que promovem a democracia e os direitos humanos (mesmo que arrisque ferir interesses empresariais brasileiros). Se for o último, o termo "pragmático" parece estar fora do lugar. Nesse caso, ele teria que explicar como ele lidaria com crescentes laços econômicos do Brasil com cleptocracias como Angola ou a Guiné Equatorial, ou com ditaduras como a China.
Como a atuação internacional do Brasil aumentará na próxima década, e como o bem-estar dos cidadãos brasileiros será cada vez mais afetado pela estratégia de política externa do Brasil, discutir profundamente estas questões é fundamental - independentemente do apoio ou não à linha de argumentação de Aécio Neves, é preciso fortalecer o debate sobre a política externa e obrigar cada candidato a defender a sua estratégia.
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quinta-feira, 26 de junho de 2014

Brics meetings and summits: much ado about almost nothing? - Oliver Stuenkel, Alan Beattie

A despeito de todo o hype em volta dos Brics, não consigo perceber o que de novo, de interessante, de útil, de benéfico para a humanidade, ou para si mesmos, o grupo que não é um grupo, mas uma coisa indefinida, pode trazer de realmente de diferente para este nosso planetinha redondo.
OK, eles são mais do que reuniões de cúpula, e também tem reuniões especializadas.
Mas, estas seriam coisa mais substantiva do que meros encontros de burocratas, de alguns acadêmicos conformistas, que se reunem to talk and talk?
O que vai sair de positivo para os seus povos, e para a humanidade, de todos esses encontros?
Apenas dizer: Oi pessoal, nós estamos aqui, nós existimos, não se esqueçam de nós, OK? Tragam os seus fotógrafos, nós vamos soltar uma declaração conjunta logo, logo, confirmando que existimos, estamos aqui, fazemos alguma coisa, nos reunimos, escrevemos declarações, etc. etc. etc...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Post-Western World - BRICS: There Is More Than Just the Summits
Oliver Stuenkel - 08 Jun. 2014

When BRICS leaders come together in Fortaleza in mid-July, analysts from around the world will have a quick look at the dynamics during the meeting and the 6th summit declaration, and then offer their view on the future of the grouping. Yet believing that the yearly summits make up the entire BRICS' edifice would be mistaken. The BRICS leaders summits are an important symbolic expression of political commitment, but what truly matters is the ongoing intra-BRICS cooperation that takes place throughout the year.

A brief look at BRICS-related meetings this year shows that intra-BRICS consultation and cooperation takes place continuously. In February, the first BRICS Science Technology and Innovation Ministerial Meeting took place in Cape Town. Ministers decided to strengthen cooperation in five fields: climate change and natural disaster mitigation (led by Brazil), water resources and pollution treatment (led by Russia), geospatial technology and its applications (led by India), new and renewable energy, and energy efficiency (led by China) and astronomy (led by South Africa).

In early March, the inaugural BRICS seminar on population matters took place, where participants discussed ways to address the challenges associated with demographic phenomena and processes, including migration, declining fertility rates, rising life expectancy, ageing population and changes in production and consumption patterns.

A week later, the 6th BRICS Academic Forum took place in Rio de Janeiro, bringing together scholars from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to discuss their research. Largely due to China's participation, these meetings tend to suffer from a boring whiff of officialdom, making truly innovative/contrarian academic ideas unlikely to be voiced, but still they serve an important purpose: To connect academic communities which have historically been disconnected from each other.

At the end of March, the BRICS Foreign Ministers met on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, issuing a high-profile statement opposing restrictions on the participation of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the G-20 Summit in Australia in November 2014.

A day later, on March 25th 2014, the BRICS Seminar on Systems of Innovation and Development took place in Brasília, as a direct result of the meeting of Ministers of Science and Technology in February.

In early April, BRICS Finance Ministers met on the sidelines of an IMF/World Bank gathering in Washington DC, in which they discussed preparations for the BRICS-led development bank, a U$ 100 billion contingency reserve arrangement and the forthcoming Summit in Fortaleza in Brazil. In late April, a public seminar meant to inform the Brazilian public about the upcoming Summit took place in Fortaleza.

In mid-May, the 4th Meeting of the BRICS Cooperatives took place in Curitiba (Brazil), and less then a week later, the BRICS Ministerial Meeting on the sideline of the 67th World Health Assembly (WHA) occurred. There, the side event on “Access to medicines: challenges and opportunities for developing countries” was organized by the BRICS countries.

Merely organizing a never-ending string of meetings will not create sustainable cooperation, skeptics will argue. That is true, and the impact of several of the gatherings listed above may not have the desired outcome. Only time will tell in how far these meetings can generate more sustainable cooperation. But they do show that intra-BRICS cooperation is indeed taking place in many different areas. Those who criticize the BRICS concept can no longer just take a quick glance at the yearly leaders' summits; rather, intra-BRICS cooperation has, over the past years, grown far too complex to be easily dismissed.

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Post-Western World - BRICS Summit is Chance to Strengthen Brazil’s Global and Regional Ties
Oliver Stuenkel - 11 Jun. 2014

The BRICS are not a group. - Martin Wolf, Financial Times

It’s time to bid farewell to the Brics.- Philip Stephens, Financial Times

Lack of unity is symptomatic of the BRICS members’ underlying incompatibilities. - Joe Nye, Harvard University

Since its first Summit, in 2009, BRICS has consolidated its position as a positive force for the democratization of international relations and for the enhancement of existing institutions of international governance. It has also forged an impressive partnership carrying out cooperation initiatives in more than 30 areas between its members. -  2014 BRICS Summit website

One month before the 6th BRICS, the Brazilian government has finally launched a website providing ample information about past summits, leaders declarations, and main areas and topics of dialogue between the BRICS countries. For the first time, journalists quickly find out about intra-BRICS cooperation without hours of tedious research through non-functioning websites. Together, this information goes some way to establish a counter narrative against the general global consensus that the BRICS grouping is a weird and useless aberration set to fall into oblivion. Irrespective of who is right, the website will undoubtedly contribute to turning the debate into a more informed one, particularly since continuous intra-BRICS cooperation is virtually unknown outside a small group of specialists.

Reading the leaders declarations since 2009 provides interesting insight into how intra-BRICS cooperation has advanced over the past five years - even though, as Ambassador Graça Lima, Brazil's summit sherpa, pointed out during a press briefing, the grouping's institutionalization is still low.

While the World Cup will inevitably crowd out a broad discussion about the BRICS Summit, global attention is assured. The 2014 BRICS Summit will be one of the most important meetings of global leaders this year, bringing together the West's no.1 enemy, the leader of the soon-to-be greatest economy, the leader of Latin America's largest country, Africa's most powerful (though increasingly embattled) leader, and the man who is supposed to bring India back on track, the latter on his first trip outside of Asia. The summit will be dominated by the creation of the BRICS Development Bank, and the lingering question of whether the institution may challenge existing Bretton Woods institutions, a powerful symbol of Western-led global order.


In addition, Brazil's decision to invite all South American leaders to meet Xi, Modi, Zuma and Putin after the summit as part of an "outreach" is a shrewd attempt to position itself as the region's leader and representative. If structured in the right way, the summit marathon in mid-July would not only help strengthen Brazil's ties to the world's leading emerging economies, but also show its neighbors that Brasília has a regional project that involves connecting the entire continent to the world.
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A BRICS bank: can it outdo the World Bank?
by Alan Beattie
beyondbrics (Financial Times), Jun 19, 2014

As a coordinated entity, the BRICS grouping of emerging markets has produced little except inspiring the name of a widely-read blog.

Next month, the five governments – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – are planning to erect an actual edifice amid the swirling mists of rhetoric with the launch of a development bank dedicated to filling some of the gigantic hole in the financing of infrastructure and growth in fast-growing emerging economies.

The BRICS are seeking to avoid some of what they say are the faults of the World Bank and regional development banks – too much rich country dominance and too many conditions attached to lending. But that leaves the exact function and operation of the BRICS bank open to a great deal of political jockeying and uncertainties over how it is run.

That much more low-cost finance is needed in the emerging and developing world is hardly in doubt. Two former World Bank chief economists, Nick Stern and Joseph Stiglitz, say that (registration required) the contribution to infrastructure finance from multilateral development banks and overseas aid is likely to be $40-$60bn a year for the next few years, only 2-3% of the estimated $2tn annual need.

They might have added that the environmental and human resettlement safeguards adopted by the World Bank after decades of lobbying by (mainly western-based) NGOs have made its infrastructure lending complex and expensive for borrowers. Hostility to the effects of big dams, for example, means the bank has only a handful of large hydropower projects worldwide.

Development banks already run by emerging markets have stepped into the breach with varying degrees of opacity and indifference to collateral damage.

China, for example, honed its use of the huge China Development Bank (CDB) on its own infrastructure, including the much-criticised Three Gorges Dam, which the World Bank declined to finance on environmental and human rights grounds. It has since sent it out to do China’s mercantile and foreign policy bidding abroad. The CDB, which now lends far more than the World Bank, routinely hands out low-interest loans, particularly in Africa, conditioned less on development need than on the desire to secure natural resources and promote Chinese exports – and to encourage governments to de-recognise Taiwan at the UN.

Other emerging market countries’ development banks are much more transparent, but still attract credible criticism for not going far enough. Global Witness, the campaigning NGO, last week launched a broadside against BNDES, the Brazilian development bank that is partly funded by the national Treasury. BNDES funded some of the World Cup stadia that have been widely accused in Brazil of benefiting politically well-connected companies, running way over cost and and having little lasting growth impact. BNDES argue that they finance SMEs as well as large companies, but it is hard to believe that a heavily subsidised development bank, rather than fundamental reform of capital markets and lower long-term market interest rates, is what Brazilian businesses really need.

Even plurilateral development banks have yet to match the transparency standards of their multilateral cousins. The Andean Development Corporation (CAF), which brings together sixteen central and South American emerging economies (plus Spain and Portugal), now finances more infrastructure in Latin America than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank together, but also attracts accusations (link in Spanish) of opacity and low lending standards.

Satisfying these demands while recognising political realities will be a difficult task for the BRICS bank. Who runs the institution and how it makes lending decisions have yet to be revealed, but it is inevitable that some raw politics will be involved.

The creation of the bank has revealed how delicate are these negotiations. China, which could easily finance an institution several times the size of the BRICS bank on its own, and whose high credit rating will be enormously helpful, had to be persuaded to accept a minority shareholding. Essentially, Beijing is gaining greater credibility for international cooperation at the cost of a greater implicit financial contribution and more constraints on its action. How far it is prepared to accept the latter to gain the former remains to be seen.

Although Beijing will not be able to use the bank to buy political favours as it does with the CDB, there will be some quiet but fierce struggles if one of the BRICS feels its own interests are being threatened. Nor is China likely to be very happy if it ends up simply subsidising the borrowing of other emerging markets – including BRICS nations like India – whose companies may compete with Chinese businesses for export markets.

Jim O’Neill, the former Goldman Sachs chief economist who invented the BRIC classification, suggests the bank approve loans based on their ability to help borrowers to achieve benchmarks for governance, education and access to technology. It is an interesting idea, but probably a quixotic one. Many governments correctly take “governance” in this context as a euphemism for combating corruption, and regard loans with governance conditions attached as intrusive political meddling. Given the emerging markets want to escape what they consider to be the challenge to their sovereignty from World Bank conditionality, they – particularly China – are unlikely to want it to re-emerge in their own development institution.

The BRICS bank certainly has an opportunity to make a considerable difference. There is an unoccupied niche in governance as well as in financing. It ought be possible to be more transparent than the likes of BNDES and CAF without being choked by bureaucracy like the World Bank.

By agreeing to finance a joint development bank, the BRICS have committed to a greater degree of scrutiny than going it alone. Pooling money and credit ratings may produce financing greater than the sum of its parts. But it seems hopeful rather than certain that a joint venture of five disparate countries – whose own governance is frequently murky – will do the same for the transparency of the new bank and its decisions to whom, and for what, to lend.
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Can the BRICS avoid the “Power South vs. Poor South” Dynamic?
Oliver Stuenkel
Post-Western World, 20 Jun. 2014

Bridging the gap between the Global North and Global South was one of the key ambitions when global leaders created the G20 in response to the global financial crisis of 1997-99. In the same way, supporters of the BRICS and IBSA groupings have often argued that such outfits would strengthen the voice of the developing world in global affairs.

Yet the past decade has also seen the emergence of a new division: That of the "Power South" against the "Poor South", as Amitav Acharya argues in his recent book. Countries' quest for status as an "emerging power", he argues, can undermine its regional engagement. There is always a temptation to "leapfrog" their unglamorous neighborhood in order to pursue to global glitz and prestige that BRICS and G20 membership brings.

Contrary to previous developing country clubs like the Bandung Conference and its offshoot, the Non-Aligned Movement, which were broad and inclusive, the new outfits are exclusive and plagued by questions about their legitimacy and capacity to represent the developing world. Nations represented at Bandung, including Nehru's India, Mao's China, and Nasser's Egypt, had few illusions about achieving global power status, whether individually or collectively. The BRICS, on the contrary, harbor an individual aspiration to project power globally. The more powerful they become, the more pressing are worries in smaller developing countries about whether the BRICS of the G20 can still represent their interests? Or have countries like Brazil, India and China long joined a global oligarchy that knows little about the challenges small poor countries face?

At the same time, none of the BRICS countries enjoy broad regional support - quite to the contrary, in almost all cases, the BRICS countries' immediate neighbors are most skeptical of the emerging powers' leadership ambitions. Paradoxically, the BRICS' leadership ambitions are more recognized and even openly demanded on a global scale than regionally. The key challenge, then, of each BRICS country is how to show that their individual rise is good for their neighborhood, too.

Finally, the issue raises an important question several emerging powers have to face: How important is regional support to sustain a credible leadership ambition on a global scale? Put differently, is it necessary to be recognized as a regional leader before projecting influence globally?

These are important questions as Brazil prepares the BRICS-South America Summit in Brasília, which will take place shortly after the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza. The decision to invite the continent's leaders is a shrewd one; yet Brazil should use this golden opportunity to articulate a clearer regional vision and answer pressing questions: What should UNASUR look like ten years from now? How does it think about South America's place in a global economy increasingly divided by big trade blocs? What should be the future of the South American Defense Council? And how should the region think about and respond to China's growing presence?


Organizing the summit marathon in the second half of July is a formidable logistical and diplomatic challenge. Yet if Dilma Rousseff is able to articulate a clear vision to the many participants, it would be a considerable success of a President who is generally thought to have neglected foreign policy since taking office in January 2011.

sábado, 8 de fevereiro de 2014

Ajuda ao desenvolvimento: tem alguma importancia? - o caso do Fundo IBSA (Oliver Stuenkel)

A matéria abaixo tenta ser generosa e positiva em relação ao Fundo IBSA.
A realidade é que a ajuda ao desenvolvimento vem sendo realizada nas últimas cinco décadas, em montantes equivalentes a dezenas de bilhões de dólares anuais, sem resultados muito visíveis.
A África está melhor hoje em função dessa ajuda, ou através de comércio e investimentos?
O fato é que os países que mais crescerão no mundo nas últimas décadas, com destaque para a China e a Índia, o fizeram com base em sua integração nos circuitos produtivos da economia mundial, ou seja, graças à globalização, não por causa de qualquer ajuda ao desenvolvimento.
Seria muito difícil de compreender isso?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

South-South cooperation: Does the IBSA Fund matter?
By Oliver Stuenkel
Post-Western World, 27 de janeiro de 2014

Ten years ago, leaders from India, Brazil and South Africa, which had just launched the trilateral IBSA grouping, decided to join forces as so-called "emerging donors" and established the IBSA Fund, which would come to symbolize their efforts to promote "South-South cooperation". For the past ten years, policy makers involved in the IBSA process frequently and proudly point to the IBSA Fund's great success. Yet what exactly is the IBSA Fund? More importantly, does it matter?

The IBSA Facility Fund for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger was created in 2004 and became operational in 2006. Countries decided to contribute an annual amount of US $ 1 million. According to the IBSA governments, the Trust Fund operates through a demand-driven approach. Governments of developing countries requesting support by this fund initiate discussions with focal points appointed among IBSA countries’ officers around the world. These focal points then submit proposals to the IBSA board of directors for review. If a proposal receives a favorable review, UNDP’s Special Unit for South-South Cooperation, which acts as the Fund's  manager and board of directors’ secretariat, initiates contact with a potential executing agency to advance a project formulation, and to facilitate the project’s implementation.

IBSA projects are executed through partnerships with the UN’s Development Program, national institutions or local governments. Important concerns of IBSA partners in the design of their projects include capacity building among projects’ beneficiaries, build-in project sustainability and knowledge sharing among Southern experts and institutions.

Despite its small size, the IBSA Fund received the 2010 MDG (Millennium Development Goals) Award for South-South Cooperation by the NGO “Millennium Development Goals Awards Committee”. In 2012 the Fund earned the "South-South and Triangular Cooperation Champions Award", given by the United Nations for its innovative approach.

The IBSA Fund finances or has financed projects in Haiti, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Burundi, Palestine, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Sierra Leone. Until today, a series of small projects in developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia have been implemented. For example, in Burundi, the IBSA Fund supported, until 2012, a project to increase the government’s capacity to combat HIV/ AIDS. In Cape Verde, a public health center was reformed and modernized in 2008. In Guinea Bissau, an agricultural project was implemented until 2007. In a second phase, operationalized by 2011, the project was expanded. In Haiti, a waste collection project was supported in Port-au-Prince, finalized in 2011. A sports complex has been completed and inaugurated in 2011 in Ramallah under the IBSA Fund. In 2012, the refurbishment of a hospital in Gaza began.

At this point, projects in Cape Verde (Desalinization to increase access to drinking water and provide water for agriculture), Cambodia (medical services for children and adolescents with special needs), Guinea Bissau (farming, solar energy), Laos (irrigation), Palestine (support for a hospital, center for people with special needs), Sierra Leone (leadership training), Vietnam (agriculture).

While such cooperation is notable, even IBSA-enthusiasts must admit that the amounts involved remain extremely small compared to existing development institutions. While policy makers officially hail the IBSA Fund as a centerpiece of the grouping, former diplomats concede that a lack of political will is the only way to explain why the fund remains so small – in particular when considering that all IBSA members spend far larger amounts on bilateral development and humanitarian aid.

Rajiv Bhatia, who served as India's High Commissioner to South Africa from 2006-09, commented that “IBSA assistance is too limited, with each member-state contributing just $1 million annually. Surely, they can afford to be more generous. If IBSA truly wants to make a difference, it should step up its assistance, expedite its decision-making and undertake more projects.”

Governments point out in response that the IBSA Fund is meant to develop “new paradigms” and can thus be successful even while maintaining its small size. Yet several development experts who are not involved in the IBSA Fund pointed out that unless the funds’ size increases, it is virtually impossible to judge its scalability – i.e., in how far others can learn from and copy the IBSA Fund’s strategy.

As a consequence, several observes have called on the fund to be expanded if it is to be taken seriously. Lyal White argues that, if countries committed more financial resources, the Fund could become IBSA’s “flagship and its interface with the developing world.” He recommends that a greater part of Brazilian, Indian and South African bilateral aid should be incorporated into an enlarged IBSA development fund.

Notably, civil society organizations have criticized the IBSA Fund for its lack of transparency. Laura Waisbich of Conectas, a Brazilian human rights NGO, argues that

apart from the annual report which retrospectively gives broad details of projects undertaken by the IBSA Fund, there is very little information on IBSA projects. The website dedicated to the Fund shields any information of relevance, with passwords. An interested citizen has no access to information on - the selection process of projects, the projected timeline, details of sub-contractors, impact assessment reports, target beneficiaries, overall project assessment, etc.

Waisbich writes about a conversation with Vrinda Choraria, from the Delhi-based Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, who had argued that

this lack of information on the Fund is frustrating as even a recent exercise of filing formal requests under the respective information laws, by organisations based in the three countries elicited no relevant information. (..) It is perplexing that a Fund that the three countries promote as a symbol of cooperation and assistance should be shrouded in such secrecy.

Finally, she reports that an information request to the UN Office for South-South Cooperation in United Nations Development Programme, which manages the IBSA fund, under its information disclosure policy, did not provide the information that was sought.

The incapacity of civil society to monitor and assess the impact of IBSA Fund projects reduces the buy-in of NGOs and public opinion makers, which directly impacts the grouping’s image in India’s, Brazil’s and South Africa’s civil society. On the IBSA Fund’s website, a project description affirms that a project in Guinea Bissau was “received positively in the local oficial press” - yet inviting independent NGOs to visit and evaluate the projects would certainly enhance trust in the IBSA Fund.


The IBSA Fund - one of the IBSA groupings few elements that produced tangible results - is a great idea that may not only alleviate poverty, but also enhance the debate about innovative ways of poverty reduction and South-South cooperation in more general. Yet in order to make a serious contribution in the global debate, IBSA governments should dramatically enhance financial support, and make the Fund's operation more transparent.