Incontornável Bin Laden na imprensa americana
The Washington Post, May 3, 2011
Obama: ‘The world is safer . . . because of the death of Osama bin Laden’
The Obama administration presented new details Monday about the death of Osama bin Laden, portraying the spiritual leader of al-Qaeda as a reclusive figure who had lived in relative luxury and whose final moments had finally exposed his cowardice.
Al-Qaeda affiliates poised to produce new leaders
NAIROBI — With the death of Osama bin Laden, the future of al-Qaeda remains murky, facing a potential contest for the network’s leadership between leaders of the group’s old guard and those heading newer, ambitious franchises in Africa and the Middle East, according to terrorism experts.
Failure to discover bin Laden’s refuge stirs suspicion over Pakistan’s role
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Even in a neighborhood of roomy modern residences, the three-story white house stood out. The home, down the street from an elite Pakistani military academy, was eight times as large as others nearby. Its razor-wire-topped walls were higher. Its occupants acted mysteriously, neighbors said, burning trash rather than placing it outside.
Afghans worry bin Laden’s death could weaken U.S. resolve
KABUL — The U.S. military has killed thousands of insurgents in Afghanistan that have done far more in the daily work of war than Osama bin Laden ever could hidden in his walled white house in a Pakistani military town. Taliban shadow governors, bomb-builders, would-be suicide attackers have all fallen at an unprecedented pace in recent months.
terça-feira, 3 de maio de 2011
Bin Laden inflation - New York Times
Todos os editoriais, matérias de fundo e artigos de fundo, no New York Times desta terça-feira, dia 3 de maio de 2011
Abaixo uma amostra.
OP-ED COLUMNIST
What Drives History
By DAVID BROOKS
History isn't always driven by deep historical forces. Sometimes inexplicable individuals step in and take the reins. Just look at Osama bin Laden.
OP-ED COLUMNIST
4 Questions He Leaves Behind
By JOE NOCERA
Is the world a safer place with Osama bin Laden dead?
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Bin Laden's Dead. Al Qaeda's Not
By RICHARD A. CLARKE
Killing Bin Laden does not end the terrorist threat, nor does it remove the motivation of Al Qaeda's supporters.
OP-ED COLUMNIST
The Post-Bin Laden World
By ROGER COHEN
The leader of Al Qaeda dies as a new Arab world of pluralism, self-expression and representative government is coming to life.
Abaixo uma amostra.
OP-ED COLUMNIST
What Drives History
By DAVID BROOKS
History isn't always driven by deep historical forces. Sometimes inexplicable individuals step in and take the reins. Just look at Osama bin Laden.
OP-ED COLUMNIST
4 Questions He Leaves Behind
By JOE NOCERA
Is the world a safer place with Osama bin Laden dead?
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Bin Laden's Dead. Al Qaeda's Not
By RICHARD A. CLARKE
Killing Bin Laden does not end the terrorist threat, nor does it remove the motivation of Al Qaeda's supporters.
OP-ED COLUMNIST
The Post-Bin Laden World
By ROGER COHEN
The leader of Al Qaeda dies as a new Arab world of pluralism, self-expression and representative government is coming to life.
One Foot in the Region; Eyes on the Global Prize - Matias Spektor
One Foot in the Region; Eyes on the Global Prize
BY MATÍAS SPEKTOR
Americas Quarterly, Spring 2011 issue
In an era of new global threats, Brazil and the U.S. need to collaborate.
Read any Brazilian foreign policy college textbook and you will be surprised. Global order since 1945 is not described as open, inclusive or rooted in multilateralism. Instead, you learn that big powers impose their will on the weak through force and rules that are strict and often arbitrary.
In this world view, international institutions bend over backwards to please their most powerful masters. International law, when it is used by the strong, is less about binding great powers and self-restraint than about strong players controlling weaker ones. After finishing the book, you couldn’t be blamed for believing that the liberal international order has never established the just, level playing field for world politics that its supporters claim.
This intellectual approach is responsible for the ambiguity at the heart of Brazilian strategic thinking. On one hand, Brazil has benefited enormously from existing patterns of global order. It was transformed from a modest rural economy in the 1940s into an industrial powerhouse less than 50 years later, thanks to the twin forces of capitalism and an alliance system that kept it safe. On the other hand, the world has been a nasty place for Brazil.
Today, it is one of the most unequal societies in the world. Millions still live in poverty and violence abounds. In 2009, there were more violent civilian deaths in the state of Rio de Janeiro alone than in the whole of Iraq.
No doubt a fair share of the blame belongs to successive generations of Brazilian politicians and policymakers. But some of it is a function of the many inequities and distortions that recur when you are on the “periphery” of a very unequal international system.
The result is a view of global order that vastly differs from perceptions held by the United States. Take, for instance, Brazilian perceptions of “international threats.” Polls show that the average Brazilian worries little about terrorism, radical Islam or a major international war. Instead, the primary fears concern climate change, poverty and infectious disease. Many Brazilians, in fact, fear the U.S., focusing in particular on the perceived threat it poses to the natural riches of the Amazon and the newfound oil fields under the Brazilian seabed.
Perceptions matter enormously. It is no wonder that the Brazilian military spends a chunk of its time studying how Vietnamese guerrillas won a war against far superior forces in jungle battlefields. Nor should it be a surprise that Brazil is now investing heavily in the development of nuclear-propulsion submarines that its admirals think will facilitate the nation’s ability to defend oil wells in open waters.
But Brazil is nowhere near being a revolutionary state. While its leaders believe that a major transition of global power is currently underway, they want to be seen as smooth operators when new rules to the game emerge. Their designs are moderate because they have a stake in preserving the principles that underwrite Brazil’s emergence as a major world player. They will not seek to radically overturn existing norms and practices but to adapt them to suit their own interests instead.
Could Brazilian intentions change over time? No doubt. Notions of what constitutes the national interest will transform as the country rises. Brazil’s international ambitions are likely to expand—no matter who runs the country.
Three factors will shape the way national goals will evolve in the next few years: the relationship with the U.S., Brasilia’s strategies for dealing with the rest of South America, and Brazil’s ideas about how to produce global order.
When it Comes to the U.S., Lie Low
Brazilian officials are used to repeating that to be on the U.S. “radar screen” is not good. In their eyes, being the source of American attention poses two possible threats. It either raises expectations in Washington that Brazil will work as a “responsible stakeholder” according to some arbitrary criteria of what “responsible” means, or it turns Brazil into a target of U.S. pressure when interests don’t coincide. As a result, there is a consensus among Brazilians that a policy of “ducking”—hiding your head underwater when the hegemonic eagle is around—has served them well.
Whether this judgment is correct or not is for historians to explore. But the utility of a policy based on such a consensus is declining fast. You cannot flex your diplomatic muscle abroad and hope to go unnoticed. Furthermore, being a “rising state” is never a mere function of concrete things, such as a growing economy, skilled armies, mighty industries, a booming middle class, or a functional state that is effective in tax collection and the provision of public goods. The perception of other states matters just as much. And nobody’s perception matters more than that of the most powerful state of all: the United States.
Brazil’s current rise is therefore deeply intertwined with the perception in Washington that Brazil is moving upwards in global hierarchies. Securing the acceptance or the implicit support of the U.S. while maintaining some distance will always be a fragile position to maintain. But as Brazil grows more powerful, it will be difficult to accomplish its global objectives without the complicity—and the tacit acceptance—of the United States.
For Brazil this means that the “off the radar” option will become increasingly difficult.
Not the Natural Regional Leader
Brazil accounts for over 50 percent of South America’s wealth, people and territory. If power were a product of relative material capabilities alone, Brazil would be more powerful in its own region than China, India, Turkey or South Africa are in theirs.
But Brazil is not your typical regional power. It has sponsored layers of formal institutions and regional norms, but its leaders recoil at the thought of pooling sovereignty into supranational bodies. Yes, Brazil has modernized South American politics by promoting norms to protect democracy and to establish a regional zone of peace, but its efforts at promoting a regional sense of shared purposes have been mixed and, some say, halfhearted at best.
Brazilian public opinion and private-sector business increasingly doubt the benefits of deep regional integration with neighbors, and plans for a South American Free Trade Zone have gone asunder. And yes, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 1998 to 2007, Brazil spent far more on its armed forces than Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela combined. Yet, Brazil’s ability to project military power abroad remains minimal.
The end result is that many challenge the notion that Brazil is a regional leader. From the perspective of smaller neighboring countries, it remains a country that is too hard to follow sometimes. If you are sitting on its borders, as 10 South American nations do, you find it difficult to jump on its bandwagon.
This is problematic for Brazil. As a major and growing regional creditor, investor, consumer, and exporter, its own economic fate is interconnected with that of its neighbors. Crises abroad impact its banks and companies at home as never before. Populism, ethnic nationalism, narcotics trafficking, guerrilla warfare, deforestation, unlawful pasturing, economic decay, and political upheaval in neighbors will deeply harm Brazilian interests.
Whether, when and how Brazil will develop the policy instruments to shape a regional order beneficial to itself remains to be seen. But curiously enough, Brazilian leaders do not normally think their interests in South America might converge with those of the United States. On the contrary, Brazil in the twenty-first century has geared its regional policies to deflect, hedge, bind, and restrain U.S. power in South America to the extent that it can. This is not to say that Brazil is a stubborn challenger of U.S. interests in the region. That would be silly for a country whose success depends on the perception of economic gain and regional stability.
But it means that future generations of Brazilians might discover that if they want to unlock some of the most pressing problems in the region, perhaps they will have to reconsider their attitude towards the United States...
BY MATÍAS SPEKTOR
Americas Quarterly, Spring 2011 issue
In an era of new global threats, Brazil and the U.S. need to collaborate.
Read any Brazilian foreign policy college textbook and you will be surprised. Global order since 1945 is not described as open, inclusive or rooted in multilateralism. Instead, you learn that big powers impose their will on the weak through force and rules that are strict and often arbitrary.
In this world view, international institutions bend over backwards to please their most powerful masters. International law, when it is used by the strong, is less about binding great powers and self-restraint than about strong players controlling weaker ones. After finishing the book, you couldn’t be blamed for believing that the liberal international order has never established the just, level playing field for world politics that its supporters claim.
This intellectual approach is responsible for the ambiguity at the heart of Brazilian strategic thinking. On one hand, Brazil has benefited enormously from existing patterns of global order. It was transformed from a modest rural economy in the 1940s into an industrial powerhouse less than 50 years later, thanks to the twin forces of capitalism and an alliance system that kept it safe. On the other hand, the world has been a nasty place for Brazil.
Today, it is one of the most unequal societies in the world. Millions still live in poverty and violence abounds. In 2009, there were more violent civilian deaths in the state of Rio de Janeiro alone than in the whole of Iraq.
No doubt a fair share of the blame belongs to successive generations of Brazilian politicians and policymakers. But some of it is a function of the many inequities and distortions that recur when you are on the “periphery” of a very unequal international system.
The result is a view of global order that vastly differs from perceptions held by the United States. Take, for instance, Brazilian perceptions of “international threats.” Polls show that the average Brazilian worries little about terrorism, radical Islam or a major international war. Instead, the primary fears concern climate change, poverty and infectious disease. Many Brazilians, in fact, fear the U.S., focusing in particular on the perceived threat it poses to the natural riches of the Amazon and the newfound oil fields under the Brazilian seabed.
Perceptions matter enormously. It is no wonder that the Brazilian military spends a chunk of its time studying how Vietnamese guerrillas won a war against far superior forces in jungle battlefields. Nor should it be a surprise that Brazil is now investing heavily in the development of nuclear-propulsion submarines that its admirals think will facilitate the nation’s ability to defend oil wells in open waters.
But Brazil is nowhere near being a revolutionary state. While its leaders believe that a major transition of global power is currently underway, they want to be seen as smooth operators when new rules to the game emerge. Their designs are moderate because they have a stake in preserving the principles that underwrite Brazil’s emergence as a major world player. They will not seek to radically overturn existing norms and practices but to adapt them to suit their own interests instead.
Could Brazilian intentions change over time? No doubt. Notions of what constitutes the national interest will transform as the country rises. Brazil’s international ambitions are likely to expand—no matter who runs the country.
Three factors will shape the way national goals will evolve in the next few years: the relationship with the U.S., Brasilia’s strategies for dealing with the rest of South America, and Brazil’s ideas about how to produce global order.
When it Comes to the U.S., Lie Low
Brazilian officials are used to repeating that to be on the U.S. “radar screen” is not good. In their eyes, being the source of American attention poses two possible threats. It either raises expectations in Washington that Brazil will work as a “responsible stakeholder” according to some arbitrary criteria of what “responsible” means, or it turns Brazil into a target of U.S. pressure when interests don’t coincide. As a result, there is a consensus among Brazilians that a policy of “ducking”—hiding your head underwater when the hegemonic eagle is around—has served them well.
Whether this judgment is correct or not is for historians to explore. But the utility of a policy based on such a consensus is declining fast. You cannot flex your diplomatic muscle abroad and hope to go unnoticed. Furthermore, being a “rising state” is never a mere function of concrete things, such as a growing economy, skilled armies, mighty industries, a booming middle class, or a functional state that is effective in tax collection and the provision of public goods. The perception of other states matters just as much. And nobody’s perception matters more than that of the most powerful state of all: the United States.
Brazil’s current rise is therefore deeply intertwined with the perception in Washington that Brazil is moving upwards in global hierarchies. Securing the acceptance or the implicit support of the U.S. while maintaining some distance will always be a fragile position to maintain. But as Brazil grows more powerful, it will be difficult to accomplish its global objectives without the complicity—and the tacit acceptance—of the United States.
For Brazil this means that the “off the radar” option will become increasingly difficult.
Not the Natural Regional Leader
Brazil accounts for over 50 percent of South America’s wealth, people and territory. If power were a product of relative material capabilities alone, Brazil would be more powerful in its own region than China, India, Turkey or South Africa are in theirs.
But Brazil is not your typical regional power. It has sponsored layers of formal institutions and regional norms, but its leaders recoil at the thought of pooling sovereignty into supranational bodies. Yes, Brazil has modernized South American politics by promoting norms to protect democracy and to establish a regional zone of peace, but its efforts at promoting a regional sense of shared purposes have been mixed and, some say, halfhearted at best.
Brazilian public opinion and private-sector business increasingly doubt the benefits of deep regional integration with neighbors, and plans for a South American Free Trade Zone have gone asunder. And yes, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 1998 to 2007, Brazil spent far more on its armed forces than Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela combined. Yet, Brazil’s ability to project military power abroad remains minimal.
The end result is that many challenge the notion that Brazil is a regional leader. From the perspective of smaller neighboring countries, it remains a country that is too hard to follow sometimes. If you are sitting on its borders, as 10 South American nations do, you find it difficult to jump on its bandwagon.
This is problematic for Brazil. As a major and growing regional creditor, investor, consumer, and exporter, its own economic fate is interconnected with that of its neighbors. Crises abroad impact its banks and companies at home as never before. Populism, ethnic nationalism, narcotics trafficking, guerrilla warfare, deforestation, unlawful pasturing, economic decay, and political upheaval in neighbors will deeply harm Brazilian interests.
Whether, when and how Brazil will develop the policy instruments to shape a regional order beneficial to itself remains to be seen. But curiously enough, Brazilian leaders do not normally think their interests in South America might converge with those of the United States. On the contrary, Brazil in the twenty-first century has geared its regional policies to deflect, hedge, bind, and restrain U.S. power in South America to the extent that it can. This is not to say that Brazil is a stubborn challenger of U.S. interests in the region. That would be silly for a country whose success depends on the perception of economic gain and regional stability.
But it means that future generations of Brazilians might discover that if they want to unlock some of the most pressing problems in the region, perhaps they will have to reconsider their attitude towards the United States...
A razao de Estado contra o juramento de Hipocrates (Bahrain)
Aliás, não se trata bem de razão de Estado, e sim de ditadura estatal sobre o simples cumprimento do dever elementar de todo e qualquer médico, em qualquer lugar do mundo, e qualquer época, de socorrer qualquer ser humano padecendo de qualquer tipo de enfermidade, acidente, ou ameaça a sua segurança física. Inacreditável que isso esteja ocorrendo.
Um caso para o Conselho de Direitos Humanos da ONU, se ela ainda serve para algo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Bahrain doctors to be tried for helping protesters
Foreign Policy, May 3, 2011 (Yahoo News)
MANAMA, Bahrain – Several doctors and nurses who treated injured anti-government protesters during months of unrest in the Gulf kingdom have been charged with acts against the state and will be tried in a military court, the justice minister said Tuesday.
Khaled bin Ali Al Khalifa said the charges against 23 doctors and 24 nurses include participating in attempts to topple the island's Sunni monarchy and taking part in illegal rallies.
The announcement is the latest in the Sunni rulers' relentless pursuit of Shiite opposition supporters after weeks of street marches demanding greater freedoms, equal rights and an elected government in Bahrain.
Separately, two former parliament members of the country's main Shiite party Al Wefaq were arrested Monday night, according to a senior party leader, Abdul-Jalil Khalil.
Al Wefaq has been the leading political backer of Bahrain's uprising, inspired by revolts in Tunisia and Egypt earlier this year.
Bahrain's Sunni rulers declared martial law on March 15 to crush the Shiite revolt. Hundreds of protesters, opposition leaders, human rights activists and lawyers have been detained since emergency rule was imposed. Dozens of doctors, nurses and other medical staff have also been arrested.
At a press conference on Tuesday, the justice minister read the charges against the 23 doctors and the 24 nurses, which also include "promoting efforts to bring down the government" and "harming the public by spreading false news."
International rights groups say Bahrain is targeting medical professionals who treated injured demonstrators at the Salmaniya medical center, which was later overrun by the military.
At least 30 people have died since the protests in Bahrain began in mid February. Among the dead are also four opposition supporters who died in custody, including a blogger.
On Thursday, four anti-government protesters were convicted of killing two policemen during the protests and sentenced to death by a military court. Three other demonstrators got life sentences.
The military took over the state-run Salmaniya hospital in March, and doctors and patients said soldiers and police had conducted interrogations and detentions inside the complex.
Physicians for Human Rights said in a report last month that at least 32 health care professionals have been detained since Bahrain declared martial law. The report by the U.S.-based group detailed attacks on physicians, medical staff and patients "with weapons, beatings and tear gas."
Um caso para o Conselho de Direitos Humanos da ONU, se ela ainda serve para algo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Bahrain doctors to be tried for helping protesters
Foreign Policy, May 3, 2011 (Yahoo News)
MANAMA, Bahrain – Several doctors and nurses who treated injured anti-government protesters during months of unrest in the Gulf kingdom have been charged with acts against the state and will be tried in a military court, the justice minister said Tuesday.
Khaled bin Ali Al Khalifa said the charges against 23 doctors and 24 nurses include participating in attempts to topple the island's Sunni monarchy and taking part in illegal rallies.
The announcement is the latest in the Sunni rulers' relentless pursuit of Shiite opposition supporters after weeks of street marches demanding greater freedoms, equal rights and an elected government in Bahrain.
Separately, two former parliament members of the country's main Shiite party Al Wefaq were arrested Monday night, according to a senior party leader, Abdul-Jalil Khalil.
Al Wefaq has been the leading political backer of Bahrain's uprising, inspired by revolts in Tunisia and Egypt earlier this year.
Bahrain's Sunni rulers declared martial law on March 15 to crush the Shiite revolt. Hundreds of protesters, opposition leaders, human rights activists and lawyers have been detained since emergency rule was imposed. Dozens of doctors, nurses and other medical staff have also been arrested.
At a press conference on Tuesday, the justice minister read the charges against the 23 doctors and the 24 nurses, which also include "promoting efforts to bring down the government" and "harming the public by spreading false news."
International rights groups say Bahrain is targeting medical professionals who treated injured demonstrators at the Salmaniya medical center, which was later overrun by the military.
At least 30 people have died since the protests in Bahrain began in mid February. Among the dead are also four opposition supporters who died in custody, including a blogger.
On Thursday, four anti-government protesters were convicted of killing two policemen during the protests and sentenced to death by a military court. Three other demonstrators got life sentences.
The military took over the state-run Salmaniya hospital in March, and doctors and patients said soldiers and police had conducted interrogations and detentions inside the complex.
Physicians for Human Rights said in a report last month that at least 32 health care professionals have been detained since Bahrain declared martial law. The report by the U.S.-based group detailed attacks on physicians, medical staff and patients "with weapons, beatings and tear gas."
Brazil-China: What’s Next After Rousseff’s Visit? - Matías Spektor (Americas Quarterly, web)
WEB EXCLUSIVES
Brazil-China: What’s Next After Rousseff’s Visit?
April 25, 2011
by Matías Spektor
The author of a forthcoming AQ article on Brazilian foreign policy assesses President Rousseff’s mid-April trip to China and what needs to happen to increase mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation.
Matías Spektor will have a feature article in the Spring 2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, to be released May 2, titled "One Foot in the Region; Eyes on the Global Prize."
President Dilma Rousseff’s five-day trip to China in mid-April yielded modest but palpable progress in a trade relationship that is now Brazil’s most important and quickly expanding. But challenges lurk in the short to medium term.
During the visit China agreed to let Brazil’s Embraer sell up to $1.4 billion worth of regional jets and assemble a luxury aircraft line (but there was no progress on the divisive issues of procurement and intellectual property). China also granted licenses to three Brazilian suppliers to sell pork; this while turning down 10 other Brazilian applicants.
The Chinese government also announced that China-based Foxconn has plans to invest some $12 billion in Brazil for a new iPad assembly plant in São Paulo that might eventually develop components as well. If this materializes, then thousands of Brazilian engineers and about 100,000 workers would benefit. Yet the initial excitement quickly wore off once commentators recalled similar Chinese announcements in the past that never materialized. Others pointed out Brazil lacks the human resources to make the plan happen even if the monies are forthcoming.
Politically, the two sides agreed to disagree. The Chinese did not endorse Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council, while the Brazilians did not recognize China as a market economy. Hot issues like currency warfare, the future of Doha and Copenhagen, and human rights were kept firmly on the side.
Despite some of the successes, the President’s trip reinforced the challenges of Brazil lacking a China policy. In the past, it could afford to live without one. But with increasing ties, a real need has emerged to develop an operational framework to make sense of China and to build the tools to implement it. A rising China has pulled Brazil into its orbit in powerful ways that are hard to resist or reverse.
The predicament that results is clear: either Brazil develops the skills to influence the overall direction of China’s pull—securing some degree of choice—or it is overcome by the sweeping force of structural change. Here is an opportunity for Brazil to learn to take advantage of the global power transition currently benefiting China; if not, its leaders will become hostage to the growing influence of vocal domestic fearmongers.
A Policy Wanted
From a Brazilian perspective China matters for two major reasons. First, trade is bringing the two together fast, but it is equally resulting in a widening gap and a vastly unequal economic interdependence. So far, with a strong Chinese economy, the trend has paid off for Brazil. But many fear ever deeper dependence on China (and its whims) and warn of disaster should Chinese economic growth stall.
Second, many in Brazil believe a rising China is paving the way for a better, fairer, more multipolar world where China will help to mitigate U.S. arrogance. China’s success might equally help reopen the debate about state-society relations that the Washington Consensus and the “end of history” thesis had hoped to shut down.
At the same time, China on the rise will force the issue of global institutional reform onto the agendas of the powerful states of the industrialized North that cling to the structures developed post-World War II. Without China ascending, Brazil would not be a member of clubs like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China) or the G20 in which to enjoy its newfound status.
The challenge now is to develop policy tools so that Brasilia can navigate and manipulate Beijing to its own advantage. The onus here is on Brazil. If unsuccessful, Brazil may find itself in the awkward position of pining for the global configurations of the past.
Four Hurdles
Brazil’s China policy faces four major hurdles: unequal power, clashing interests, diverging visions of global order, and the voice of fearmongers at home.
Power relations between China and Brazil are a tale of inequality. Both are rising, but China is going much faster. China can do things to Brazil that Brazil cannot do to China. Yes, interdependence means the two become more dependent on one another. But the trend here is uneven. Bilateral negotiations highlight how Brazil is putting forward demands that China can afford to ignore or only partially accept while doing so at a pace of its own choosing. This is compounded by an asymmetry of attention: Brazilians worry about China with reason while China can afford by and large to simply ignore Brazil.
National interests have taken their own separate directions. Consider international trade, finance, nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, institutional reform or climate change: China and Brazil simply find it hard to agree. They even have had trouble reaching common language to frame the issues. For all their instrumental use of notions of multipolarity, soft balancing against U.S. hegemony, South-South solidarity, and their tacit alliance on some multilateral negotiations, there is little common ground.
Neither do the two countries share a common vision. Rhetoric apart, Chinese leaders have a greater stake in existing patterns of global governance. They surely have many qualms about the current state of the world. But since Chinese leaders are happier about their share of power and voice than their Brazilian colleagues, they are likely to turn deaf ears on Brazilian demands for a common reformist front. Here’s where the hopes for South-South communion turn sour. The issue of UN Security Council reform illustrates the point: on Brazil’s single largest proposal for adapting global governance architecture, China is not willing to move. And it is not pressed to worry either.
The China-Brazil disconnect is on full display in two regions where Brazil is now seeking to demonstrate global reach: South America and Portuguese-speaking Africa. In one, Brazil is seeking to show the powers of its own indigenous capitalism, and in the other, its growing diplomatic responsibilities. Both regions have witnessed the phenomenal, fast-pace expansion of Chinese commerce and influence. But the Chinese push in directions that Brazilians often find counterproductive or outright challenging.
Brazilian frustration with the goods China has to offer also coexists with suspicion about its intentions—a spark for anti-China voices at home. They are not a lobby (yet), but have helped shape public attitudes and expectations.
A recurring argument here is that Chinese demand for Brazilian commodities (instead of higher value products) will hurt the indigenous industrial complex that has modernized Brazil. Another is that Chinese land purchases in Brazil are threats to sovereignty over national natural resources. And yet another warns against Chinese direct investment. The argument here is that such investment—politically driven and controlled by an autocratic state—may well conceal spurious geopolitical objectives that will be detrimental to Brazil.
Under normal circumstances, officials in Brasilia could ignore those voices. But due to the lack of institutions to frame Brazil-China relations, they should worry. After all, they lack the tools to control damage or build an agenda that is positive and mutually beneficial.
A continuing challenge is that Brazil’s leaders generally have a hard time making sense of the Chinese political system and have little access to China’s circles of power and influence. The embassy in Beijing remains understaffed and only a handful of officials have the language skills and knowledge to effectively negotiate in a Chinese setting. Academic engagement is practically non-existent and there are no centers of Chinese studies in Brazil to train new generations on the history, politics and culture of that country. Social connections do not help either: existing levels of people expanding ties between the two countries are tiny.
While the obstacles are plenty, none of these trends is irreversible. If she were to act now, President Rousseff could begin to transform the relationship in her first term.
President Rousseff and the large contingent of businesspeople and officials that accompanied her to China should take a moment to pause and take stock of how much Brazil stands to benefits from its China relationship if this growing bilateral inequality persists. There is opportunity for both countries to benefit from their partnership, but the task at hand is figuring out how to do so before it becomes too late.
But even with the signing of 22 cooperation agreements earlier this month in China, Brazil still is at a disadvantage. Without effective channels and tools to make itself heard in Beijing, Brazil will find it extremely hard to reap the potential benefits of jumping on the Chinese bandwagon. Perhaps more important, without a clear China policy, Brazil will increasingly find itself crippled and unequipped to resist mounting Chinese pressure in whatever form it may take.
Brazil-China: What’s Next After Rousseff’s Visit?
April 25, 2011
by Matías Spektor
The author of a forthcoming AQ article on Brazilian foreign policy assesses President Rousseff’s mid-April trip to China and what needs to happen to increase mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation.
Matías Spektor will have a feature article in the Spring 2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, to be released May 2, titled "One Foot in the Region; Eyes on the Global Prize."
President Dilma Rousseff’s five-day trip to China in mid-April yielded modest but palpable progress in a trade relationship that is now Brazil’s most important and quickly expanding. But challenges lurk in the short to medium term.
During the visit China agreed to let Brazil’s Embraer sell up to $1.4 billion worth of regional jets and assemble a luxury aircraft line (but there was no progress on the divisive issues of procurement and intellectual property). China also granted licenses to three Brazilian suppliers to sell pork; this while turning down 10 other Brazilian applicants.
The Chinese government also announced that China-based Foxconn has plans to invest some $12 billion in Brazil for a new iPad assembly plant in São Paulo that might eventually develop components as well. If this materializes, then thousands of Brazilian engineers and about 100,000 workers would benefit. Yet the initial excitement quickly wore off once commentators recalled similar Chinese announcements in the past that never materialized. Others pointed out Brazil lacks the human resources to make the plan happen even if the monies are forthcoming.
Politically, the two sides agreed to disagree. The Chinese did not endorse Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council, while the Brazilians did not recognize China as a market economy. Hot issues like currency warfare, the future of Doha and Copenhagen, and human rights were kept firmly on the side.
Despite some of the successes, the President’s trip reinforced the challenges of Brazil lacking a China policy. In the past, it could afford to live without one. But with increasing ties, a real need has emerged to develop an operational framework to make sense of China and to build the tools to implement it. A rising China has pulled Brazil into its orbit in powerful ways that are hard to resist or reverse.
The predicament that results is clear: either Brazil develops the skills to influence the overall direction of China’s pull—securing some degree of choice—or it is overcome by the sweeping force of structural change. Here is an opportunity for Brazil to learn to take advantage of the global power transition currently benefiting China; if not, its leaders will become hostage to the growing influence of vocal domestic fearmongers.
A Policy Wanted
From a Brazilian perspective China matters for two major reasons. First, trade is bringing the two together fast, but it is equally resulting in a widening gap and a vastly unequal economic interdependence. So far, with a strong Chinese economy, the trend has paid off for Brazil. But many fear ever deeper dependence on China (and its whims) and warn of disaster should Chinese economic growth stall.
Second, many in Brazil believe a rising China is paving the way for a better, fairer, more multipolar world where China will help to mitigate U.S. arrogance. China’s success might equally help reopen the debate about state-society relations that the Washington Consensus and the “end of history” thesis had hoped to shut down.
At the same time, China on the rise will force the issue of global institutional reform onto the agendas of the powerful states of the industrialized North that cling to the structures developed post-World War II. Without China ascending, Brazil would not be a member of clubs like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China) or the G20 in which to enjoy its newfound status.
The challenge now is to develop policy tools so that Brasilia can navigate and manipulate Beijing to its own advantage. The onus here is on Brazil. If unsuccessful, Brazil may find itself in the awkward position of pining for the global configurations of the past.
Four Hurdles
Brazil’s China policy faces four major hurdles: unequal power, clashing interests, diverging visions of global order, and the voice of fearmongers at home.
Power relations between China and Brazil are a tale of inequality. Both are rising, but China is going much faster. China can do things to Brazil that Brazil cannot do to China. Yes, interdependence means the two become more dependent on one another. But the trend here is uneven. Bilateral negotiations highlight how Brazil is putting forward demands that China can afford to ignore or only partially accept while doing so at a pace of its own choosing. This is compounded by an asymmetry of attention: Brazilians worry about China with reason while China can afford by and large to simply ignore Brazil.
National interests have taken their own separate directions. Consider international trade, finance, nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, institutional reform or climate change: China and Brazil simply find it hard to agree. They even have had trouble reaching common language to frame the issues. For all their instrumental use of notions of multipolarity, soft balancing against U.S. hegemony, South-South solidarity, and their tacit alliance on some multilateral negotiations, there is little common ground.
Neither do the two countries share a common vision. Rhetoric apart, Chinese leaders have a greater stake in existing patterns of global governance. They surely have many qualms about the current state of the world. But since Chinese leaders are happier about their share of power and voice than their Brazilian colleagues, they are likely to turn deaf ears on Brazilian demands for a common reformist front. Here’s where the hopes for South-South communion turn sour. The issue of UN Security Council reform illustrates the point: on Brazil’s single largest proposal for adapting global governance architecture, China is not willing to move. And it is not pressed to worry either.
The China-Brazil disconnect is on full display in two regions where Brazil is now seeking to demonstrate global reach: South America and Portuguese-speaking Africa. In one, Brazil is seeking to show the powers of its own indigenous capitalism, and in the other, its growing diplomatic responsibilities. Both regions have witnessed the phenomenal, fast-pace expansion of Chinese commerce and influence. But the Chinese push in directions that Brazilians often find counterproductive or outright challenging.
Brazilian frustration with the goods China has to offer also coexists with suspicion about its intentions—a spark for anti-China voices at home. They are not a lobby (yet), but have helped shape public attitudes and expectations.
A recurring argument here is that Chinese demand for Brazilian commodities (instead of higher value products) will hurt the indigenous industrial complex that has modernized Brazil. Another is that Chinese land purchases in Brazil are threats to sovereignty over national natural resources. And yet another warns against Chinese direct investment. The argument here is that such investment—politically driven and controlled by an autocratic state—may well conceal spurious geopolitical objectives that will be detrimental to Brazil.
Under normal circumstances, officials in Brasilia could ignore those voices. But due to the lack of institutions to frame Brazil-China relations, they should worry. After all, they lack the tools to control damage or build an agenda that is positive and mutually beneficial.
A continuing challenge is that Brazil’s leaders generally have a hard time making sense of the Chinese political system and have little access to China’s circles of power and influence. The embassy in Beijing remains understaffed and only a handful of officials have the language skills and knowledge to effectively negotiate in a Chinese setting. Academic engagement is practically non-existent and there are no centers of Chinese studies in Brazil to train new generations on the history, politics and culture of that country. Social connections do not help either: existing levels of people expanding ties between the two countries are tiny.
While the obstacles are plenty, none of these trends is irreversible. If she were to act now, President Rousseff could begin to transform the relationship in her first term.
President Rousseff and the large contingent of businesspeople and officials that accompanied her to China should take a moment to pause and take stock of how much Brazil stands to benefits from its China relationship if this growing bilateral inequality persists. There is opportunity for both countries to benefit from their partnership, but the task at hand is figuring out how to do so before it becomes too late.
But even with the signing of 22 cooperation agreements earlier this month in China, Brazil still is at a disadvantage. Without effective channels and tools to make itself heard in Beijing, Brazil will find it extremely hard to reap the potential benefits of jumping on the Chinese bandwagon. Perhaps more important, without a clear China policy, Brazil will increasingly find itself crippled and unequipped to resist mounting Chinese pressure in whatever form it may take.
Liberdade de imprensa em debate - Instituto Millenium (FAAP, SP)
Um fórum do qual estou participando em São Paulo. Devo falar sobre "que modelo de país desejamos ter no Brasil", com meu colega e amigo cientista político e professor da UnB Paulo Kramer e o economista Paulo Guedes, num debate mediado pelo jornalista Helio Gurovitz.
Depois informo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Liberdade de imprensa tem fórum em São Paulo
Gabriel Manzano
O Estado de S. Paulo, 02 de maio de 2011
Encontro reúne, entre outras personalidades, a iraniana Mina Ahadi, conhecida por defender compatriota de morte por apedrejamento
Marcado por seminários e debates em muitos países, o Dia Mundial da Liberdade de Imprensa reúne nesta terça-feira, 3, em São Paulo, militantes de direitos humanos, cientistas políticos, economistas e jornalistas no 2.º Fórum Democracia e Liberdade - que o Instituto Millenium promove na Faap, em Higienópolis, entre 9 e 18 horas. A iraniana Mina Ahadi, conhecida por sua defesa da compatriota Sakineh Ashtiani - que esteve ameaçada de morrer por apedrejamento - é uma das convidadas ilustres. Outro é o presidente da Human Rights Foundation, Javier El-Haje, conhecido defensor de jornalistas ameaçados em todo o mundo.
Os dois participam, ao lado do presidente do instituto, Paulo Uebel, do painel Democracia, Liberdade & Direitos Humanos. É a primeira vez que a advogada iraniana - que vive exilada na Alemanha - vem ao País, mas ela já deixou sua marca em recente entrevista, na qual afirmou que a presidente Dilma Rousseff melhorou muito a posição brasileira sobre o Irã, mas "pode fazer muito mais".
Um debate sobre jornalismo e democracia reunirá Claudio Weber Abramo, diretor da ONG Transparência Brasil, os jornalistas Roberto Gazzi, diretor de desenvolvimento editorial do Estado, e Eugênio Bucci, e o empresário Hélio Beltrão, do Instituto Mises, como mediador. Mais três painéis abordarão temas como "capitalismo de Estado e liberdade", o "modelo" brasileiro e a cidadania, tendo debatedores como Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Alexandre Schwartsman, Demétrio Magnoli e Taís Gasparian.
Repressão online. Para comemorar a data, o Comitê para a Proteção dos Jornalistas (CPJ) divulgou nesta segunda-feira, 2, em Nova York, um detalhado estudo - As 10 Ferramentas dos Opressores da Internet - em que denuncia "os assombrosos níveis de sofisticação" que os governos autoritários utilizam contra sites, programas de computador e blogueiros. O levantamento detalha casos em países como Irã, Bielo-Rússia, China, Etiópia e Cuba. "Vemos, talvez, apenas o início da repressão online", diz o autor do estudo, Danny O’Brien.
Depois informo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Liberdade de imprensa tem fórum em São Paulo
Gabriel Manzano
O Estado de S. Paulo, 02 de maio de 2011
Encontro reúne, entre outras personalidades, a iraniana Mina Ahadi, conhecida por defender compatriota de morte por apedrejamento
Marcado por seminários e debates em muitos países, o Dia Mundial da Liberdade de Imprensa reúne nesta terça-feira, 3, em São Paulo, militantes de direitos humanos, cientistas políticos, economistas e jornalistas no 2.º Fórum Democracia e Liberdade - que o Instituto Millenium promove na Faap, em Higienópolis, entre 9 e 18 horas. A iraniana Mina Ahadi, conhecida por sua defesa da compatriota Sakineh Ashtiani - que esteve ameaçada de morrer por apedrejamento - é uma das convidadas ilustres. Outro é o presidente da Human Rights Foundation, Javier El-Haje, conhecido defensor de jornalistas ameaçados em todo o mundo.
Os dois participam, ao lado do presidente do instituto, Paulo Uebel, do painel Democracia, Liberdade & Direitos Humanos. É a primeira vez que a advogada iraniana - que vive exilada na Alemanha - vem ao País, mas ela já deixou sua marca em recente entrevista, na qual afirmou que a presidente Dilma Rousseff melhorou muito a posição brasileira sobre o Irã, mas "pode fazer muito mais".
Um debate sobre jornalismo e democracia reunirá Claudio Weber Abramo, diretor da ONG Transparência Brasil, os jornalistas Roberto Gazzi, diretor de desenvolvimento editorial do Estado, e Eugênio Bucci, e o empresário Hélio Beltrão, do Instituto Mises, como mediador. Mais três painéis abordarão temas como "capitalismo de Estado e liberdade", o "modelo" brasileiro e a cidadania, tendo debatedores como Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Alexandre Schwartsman, Demétrio Magnoli e Taís Gasparian.
Repressão online. Para comemorar a data, o Comitê para a Proteção dos Jornalistas (CPJ) divulgou nesta segunda-feira, 2, em Nova York, um detalhado estudo - As 10 Ferramentas dos Opressores da Internet - em que denuncia "os assombrosos níveis de sofisticação" que os governos autoritários utilizam contra sites, programas de computador e blogueiros. O levantamento detalha casos em países como Irã, Bielo-Rússia, China, Etiópia e Cuba. "Vemos, talvez, apenas o início da repressão online", diz o autor do estudo, Danny O’Brien.
Reflections on Brazil's Global Rise - Celso Amorim
O Brasil costuma ser um país superlativo, até exagerado nos motivos de engrandecimento: sempre fomos, ou ainda somos, os maiores, nisso ou naquilo, geralmente em produção e exportação de uma série de produtos, os maiores em futebol, em graça, beleza, simpatia, enfim, grandes num pouco de tudo o que é positivo, e isso até por necessidade psicológica de reforçar o que temos,ou teríamos, de bom, face a tantas mazelas sociais e problemas persistentes (desigualdades sociais, corrupção, dificuldades de reformar estruturas e instituições defasadas, etc.).
Agora somos grandes também no mundo, na política externa, na inserção internacional.
Eu até diria que o nosso "PIB diplomático" é maior do que o PIB material, econômico, e certamente muito maior do que o "PIB militar", e todos ficam menores ante o "PIB futebolístico" e quem sabe até o "PIB das modelos fashion".
Mas, acho que ninguém bate a "superlatividade" diplomática tal como expressa neste artigo do ex-chanceler: somos grandes, ou pelo menos acreditamos que somos.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Reflections on Brazil's Global Rise
BY CELSO AMORIM
Americas Quarterly, Spring 2011 issue
The man who led Brazil into its new global era discusses his diplomatic vision and Brazil-U.S. relations.
This is the first article I have written since leaving the foreign ministry of Brazil. As someone who was very active in formulating foreign policy during what might be called “the Lula era” (and still without the benefit of much hindsight), it is an opportunity to begin taking stock of what has been achieved so far. The most remarkable fact about Brazilian foreign policy in recent years has been Brazil’s new and more prominent stance in the international arena. To be sure, this qualitative change, which resulted in The Economist describing Brazil as “a diplomatic giant,” is not solely—or even principally—due to foreign policy.
In recent years, Brazil has grown economically while keeping inflation under control, improved income distribution and, above all, strengthened its democracy. Who could have predicted after years of military dictatorship, immediately followed by the impeachment of the country’s first popularly-elected president, that Brazil’s next three heads of state would be an intellectual who fought against the dictatorship, a labor leader routinely labeled as a dangerous revolutionary, and now a woman who once was a political prisoner?
These changes have had a major impact on Brazil’s stance toward other countries and also on how other countries view Brazil. As I said in a recent interview, Brazilian foreign policy may not have created the wave, but it learned how to ride it. It should come as no surprise that international interest in Brazilian foreign policy has increased notably in recent years, culminating with the 2010 elections.
A professor interviewed by Le Monde in the period leading up to the presidential vote called the Lula administration’s diplomacy “imaginative.” Others have been less generous. Either way, it cannot be said that Brazil’s foreign policy in recent years has been ineffective or has maintained a low profile.
But to what extent and why has its foreign policy contributed to that prominence?
Some of the factors are objective and others subjective. Let us begin with the latter. Brazil, like many other developing nations, especially in our hemisphere (a term I am ambivalent about, which I’ll come back to later), historically suffered from a lack of self-esteem. “We cannot;” “We must be careful;” “This is very dangerous.” These and other similar statements were most often heard every time a bolder-than-usual leader brought forth some truly innovative diplomatic initiatives.
This occurred during the “independent foreign policy” of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart. It was next seen—military rule notwithstanding—during the Geisel-Silveira period. And it again manifested itself, in a more emphatic fashion, during President Lula’s administration. We had a preconceived notion of our place in the world and our ability to influence international events. In fact, if anything, non-Brazilian analysts were more aware of the discrepancy between the country’s size (territorial, demographic, economic, etc.) and its position in the world. I remember reading an article in the International Herald Tribune during President Itamar Franco’s administration, saying that Brazil “punched below its weight.”
The Gloves Come Off
From the first months of President Lula’s mandate, when his administration courageously opposed the Iraq invasion, we demonstrated that Brazil’s new foreign policy would not be timid or overly cautious. This change of attitude and posture did not occur overnight. It was the result of a lengthy process of democratic maturation and increased self-confidence on the part of the Brazilian people. The process of change, the subterranean shift and currents, if you will, had started some time before and culminated in the election of an ex-lathe operator as president. The “yes we can” slogan used in Barack Obama’s campaign could just as easily have explained the sentiments of most voters who cast their ballots for Lula in 2002.
Our foreign policy captured this state of mind and tried to translate it into concrete actions that could affect the course of regional and world events. In doing so, we changed the international agenda. One example of this is the one-time plan of the United States to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Rarely has a policy priority of the greatest power in the hemisphere been taken off the agenda because of the firm stance of another country. We don’t need WikiLeaks to know that Brazilian resistance prevented what was an essentially unbalanced trade negotiation process—based on the then-outdated ideas of the “Washington Consensus”—from becoming reality.
Contrary to what many believe, Brazil did not obstruct the FTAA. It simply sought to redefine the terms of the agreement. We believed that it was necessary for us to maintain the autonomy to make decisions about our own development model. And we almost achieved it at the Ministerial Conference in Miami in October 2003. Based on a “three-track approach,” our compromise would have allowed the FTAA to concentrate on aspects of market access and some basic common trade rules, while leaving more complex subjects such as intellectual property and agricultural subsidies to the World Trade Organization (WTO). U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and I had agreed on a common outline. But this simplified version, dubbed by some critics as “FTAA light,” ran into the opposition of the most ideological defenders of the original version of the FTAA. Although we came close to a compromise, we eventually could not agree. Few today remember this, but as head of the Brazilian delegation, I spent more time trying to convince our friends in Venezuela not to block consensus than arguing with my U.S. counterpart, Zoellick (though Venezuela eventually just submitted a note of reservation). We were also criticized by members of the business sector in Brazil and by Brazilian media. Nevertheless, by sticking to our principles rather than giving into the original rigid model, we preserved our policy development options.
At first, Brazil led this fight almost alone. Little by little, we gained support from others, above all from our partners in Mercosur: Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Events since have proven many of the criticisms at the time to be misguided. Even without the FTAA—or perhaps precisely because of the absence of one—Brazil has experienced sustained growth, expanded its foreign trade, become a major recipient of direct investment, and has itself become a major source of investment in other countries. Moreover, the financial crisis that rocked the U.S. economy at the end of the decade and the minimal effect it had on the Brazilian economy justified our growth model and the choices we made to concentrate more on our domestic market and to diversify trade partners. Personally, though, the most significant and gratifying validation was the award I was presented by Latin Trade in Miami exactly seven years after the 2003 Ministerial meeting.
In August 2003, shortly before that meeting, the Lula administration first asserted itself in the global arena during the WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancún, Mexico. There, in the midst of discussions to reduce global trade barriers, we worked with other developing countries in an unprecedented joint political-diplomatic effort that averted a protectionist treaty. The draft agreement that was presented by the chairman of the WTO Council for discussion at the Ministerial conference would have, if approved, preserved huge subsidies to European and U.S. farmers. Those subsidies would have harmed developing countries and limited their ability to grow, including some very poor West African cotton producers (known as the “Cotton Four”).
Our success resulted in the formation of a new grouping in the WTO, with a specific mandate to negotiate on agricultural matters. This group, which came to be known at the meeting as the G-20 nations (not to be confused with the G-20 of leading economies), after its original membership, had a great influence on the negotiating process in Cancún and beyond.
As a result of our position, we faced enormous criticism; some even depicted us as enemies of a multilateral trade agreement. Curiously, several of those critics, especially in Brazil, later accused us of being obsessed with a global agreement to the detriment of bilateral or regional arrangements involving developed countries.
To be sure, we have not been able to conclude the Doha Round of WTO negotiations. But that failure stems largely from ineffective leadership in the richer nations, not from real economic needs. I am confident that there will be a successful conclusion to the round, and when that happens, it will no longer be possible to treat the interests of poor countries or of developing countries as mere footnotes.
Promoting Regional Solidarity and Asserting Global Status
Cancún and Miami were two events that had symbolic importance for Brazilian foreign policy. Concurrent with these two processes (one regional, the other global, but both involving the most powerful nation on earth), Brazilian diplomacy was working to promote South American solidarity and integration. A great deal of President Lula’s personal efforts (and mine as well) were dedicated to this objective, with remarkable results in the economic, commercial, infrastructural, and political spheres. Our main goal is to transform South America into a true “Peace Zone”—a goal Brazil is gradually achieving.
I emphasize these facts not only for the practical results they produced—reflected in trade and investment figures—but also because they are unprecedented. Rarely, if ever, during my approximately 45 years of diplomatic life (from which I should subtract seven during which I was busy performing other government functions) have I observed such dramatic change in such a short span of time. In the early days of the Lula administration, Brazil’s foreign policy was marked by an essentially defensive agenda in the FTAA and the WTO—a situation we reversed in only one year. At the same time, we also managed to place South American regional integration at the forefront of Brazilian diplomacy. We restored confidence in Mercosur and initiated the process that led to the creation of the 12-member Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which includes the whole continent from Colombia to Argentina.
The basis of UNASUR is a series of economic and trade agreements, but it also has a strong political component. That political role proved to be of central importance during recent crises, both internal (Bolivia, Ecuador) and between countries (Colombia-Venezuela). But our “diplomatic activism”—in the best sense of the word—was not restricted to South America. At the Sauipe Summit in Bahia, all the Latin American and Caribbean nations convened to discuss cooperation plans aiming at greater development and political understanding across the region.
In broader terms, in the first years of the administration, we strengthened—and in some cases established—strategic partnerships with China, India, Russia, and South Africa. As a result, we created new channels of cooperation among developing nations, such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum—a mechanism for cooperation and political consultation involving India, Brazil and South Africa. Another channel was the establishment of a summit process involving Arab countries and South America and, separately, African countries and South America. On the economic front, our designation as a member of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) has become an essential reference point for us, while it has given our four nations a new economic and political status. Another group of emerging nations, BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), has also played a leading role in the international negotiations on climate, with our support and encouragement. Relations with other nations with growing influence in their regions, including Turkey, have brought new and somewhat unexpected opportunities for political action.
Our work with countries across the global South has helped to strengthen the perception of Brazil as a nation whose interests and influence go beyond its own region. This, in addition to our growing strength in the areas of trade, economics and the environment, has contributed to the European Union’s decision to make Brazil a strategic partner and to the establishment of a dialogue with the U.S. to work together on global issues.
Analysts and government officials from several countries, including the U.S., have noted Brazil’s arrival as a global player—though only time and other factors, including subjective ones, will confirm the permanence of our newfound status. Most of the comments have been positive. But one notices a natural ambivalence from some, especially in the United States. If Brazil continues on its current path, it will be the first time that another country in the Americas becomes a global player. To be sure, in terms of “hard power” Brazil cannot compete with the United States. This is obviously true in military terms, where the supremacy of the U.S. is undeniable. Furthermore, in economic terms, the differences between the GDPs of the U.S. and Brazil remain large. In other spheres, too, the gap is considerable.
Nevertheless, Brazil’s presence has been felt on a number of issues and in various regions. In May 2010, working with Turkey, we drafted the Tehran Declaration, in which the Iranian government committed to abide by the objectives originally proposed by the U.S. and its allies and accepted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This was no small achievement and was applauded by, among others, Mohammed El-Baradei, the former IAEA chief. The commitment by Iran to remove 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium to a third country (Turkey) within one month (before Iran would receive the corresponding amount of fuel), even if it was considered insufficient by some, demonstrated our potential influence in promoting a peaceful and negotiated approach to the international deadlock.
The sanctions against Iran agreed to one month later in the UN Security Council effectively quashed the possible benefits of the agreement in the short run. But it is my firm belief that our approach remains valid, as implicitly recognized in some of the statements of the so-called P5+1 (the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany).
More recently, the Brazilian government’s decision to recognize the Palestinian state triggered a series of similar acts by other Latin American countries. The gesture even contributed to some European countries reviewing their stance.
Given Brazil’s new willingness to act on the international stage, it is natural that it would raise concern in some quarters. The official and unofficial statements by U.S. authorities have been mostly positive in nature, but the unease is palpable. It is possible that the Brazilian action undertaken with Turkey toward Iran has caused some discomfort in Washington DC. The agreement obliged the U.S. government to explain, not always convincingly, its reasons for refusing an agreement that met all of the points raised in President Obama’s letter to President Lula less than three weeks earlier.
But Brazil’s increasing resourcefulness and independence will benefit the United States. On a number of occasions, Brazil’s stance has permitted a consensus that seemed impossible in the face of more radical positions. This was what happened at the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly meeting in June 2009 in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, when the decision was made to revoke Cuba’s suspension from the OAS. In other matters, such as Haiti or the conflicts involving Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, Brazil’s firm yet sensible position has been a steadying factor that has helped mitigate—if not fully eliminate—tensions and conflicts. Brazil’s influence in the region derives from its own economic and geographic weight, but is also influenced by its role in the international arena.
Leafing through old clippings in my files, I came across a photo taken at the U.S. State Department in which former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, a minister from Guinea-Bissau and I are signing a tripartite agreement to help strengthen the Guinean parliament. I believe that was the first trilateral cooperation agreement involving Brazil, the U.S. and an African nation. More recently, our two countries signed another agreement, this time with Senegal, regarding ethanol production (just as we had done with other countries in the Caribbean and Central America).
Actions such as these, which benefit poorer countries, do not just bring immediate gains to the local populations; they also serve the cause of stability and development, provided they respect each nation’s priorities and autonomy. In the case of many African nations, where tremendous need coexists with enormous potential, structured cooperation between Brazil and the U.S. could bring real benefits and make strong strategic sense. During President Rousseff’s inauguration, I briefly shared the idea with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who seemed open to it.
Of course, we will not always be in agreement, but even in those cases where we disagree, Brazil and the U.S. will have more to gain from dialogue than confrontation. The fact that there are two—not just one—powers with global reach in our macro-region (the word “hemisphere” has echoes of the Cold War era, which do not bring back good memories) will be beneficial for all and will help strengthen the position of our countries and the values we defend.
PostScript (written on January 31, 2011)
This text was originally sent to the editors of Americas Quarterly before two important facts were known (one of them more of a process than a fact): the announcement made by President Barack Obama that he would visit Brazil (as well as Chile and El Salvador) in March, and the spreading unrest in various Arab nations following the demonstrations that brought about the fall of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt.
When commenting on the announcement of the visit, several U.S. government officials stressed the global reach of their relationship with Brazil. On the other hand, there has been no lack of criticism by U.S. pundits regarding the direction of Washington’s relations with Arab nations. Is it not time to use Brazil’s good relationship—and that of other South American countries—with the Arab world to begin a new dialogue that promotes the values we share while respecting the rhythms and processes of each country? In this, Brazil can serve as an effective broker or third party in negotiations. Moreover, the example of Tunisia is doubly illuminating: first, because it occurred endogenously, without being externally induced through sanctions or other pressures; and second, because it occurred in a country whose leader was considered an ally in the war on terror. Perhaps a less Manichean and more nuanced view of reality, such as the one Brazil and other South American countries have shown, would be useful in dealing with these thorny situations, especially in the Middle East. We may have finally reached a time to move beyond dialogue to a global strategic partnership.
============
No mesmo número da Americas Quarterly:
Americas Quarterly: The New Brazil and the Changing Hemisphere
Spring 2011
It’s time to rethink how both obvious and subtle changes are making the region more diverse, its future more unpredictable, and policy challenges more complex. This was shown by President Obama’s trip to three Latin American countries in March, and it comes at a time when trends such as migration, the declining influence of the United States and in the majority of countries a convergence toward more market-oriented economic models are promoting demographic and economic integration.
The Spring issue of Americas Quarterly—released on May 2, 2011— explores the political, economic and demographic forces that are changing the Americas.
Current and former government officials, scholars, and activists look at what national and international shifts over the past few decades, including the rise of Brazil, will mean for the hemisphere’s future. In his first article since leaving office, former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim candidly shares his views on Brazil’s place in the world and his efforts to assert its diplomatic agenda, while Matías Spektor of Fundação Getulio Vargas analyzes prospects for greater U.S.-Brazilian collaboration. Beyond Brazil, Jorge Heine of the Balsillie School of International Affairs and Indian Ambassador R. Viswanathan discuss India’s growing interests in an evolving region, while this issue’s charticle looks at the mission and operation of President Chávez’ ALBA coalition. In the U.S., Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis points out how immigrants are the key to future economic growth.
Also, AQ interviews Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Li Jinzhang on his country’s plans as it increases economic and political ties with the region, Omar Everleny Pérez and José Antonio Ocampo debate whether Cuba’s economic reforms will succeed, Alejandro Grisanti of Barclays Capital Inc. analyzes Venezuela’s oil policies, and Robert Maguire of Trinity Washington University looks at the challenges ahead for Haitian President-elect Michel Martelly.
In This Issue:
BRAZIL RISES
Reflections on Brazil’s Global Rise
CELSO AMORIM
The man who led Brazil into its new global era discusses his diplomatic vision and Brazil-U.S. relations.
One Foot in the Region, Eyes on the Global Prize
MATÍAS SPEKTOR
In an era of new global threats, Brazil and the U.S. need to collaborate.
The Opportunities and Challenges for President Dilma Rousseff
ROBERTO SETUBAL
Political will is necessary to face a new generation of policy issues.
(neste link)
Agora somos grandes também no mundo, na política externa, na inserção internacional.
Eu até diria que o nosso "PIB diplomático" é maior do que o PIB material, econômico, e certamente muito maior do que o "PIB militar", e todos ficam menores ante o "PIB futebolístico" e quem sabe até o "PIB das modelos fashion".
Mas, acho que ninguém bate a "superlatividade" diplomática tal como expressa neste artigo do ex-chanceler: somos grandes, ou pelo menos acreditamos que somos.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Reflections on Brazil's Global Rise
BY CELSO AMORIM
Americas Quarterly, Spring 2011 issue
The man who led Brazil into its new global era discusses his diplomatic vision and Brazil-U.S. relations.
This is the first article I have written since leaving the foreign ministry of Brazil. As someone who was very active in formulating foreign policy during what might be called “the Lula era” (and still without the benefit of much hindsight), it is an opportunity to begin taking stock of what has been achieved so far. The most remarkable fact about Brazilian foreign policy in recent years has been Brazil’s new and more prominent stance in the international arena. To be sure, this qualitative change, which resulted in The Economist describing Brazil as “a diplomatic giant,” is not solely—or even principally—due to foreign policy.
In recent years, Brazil has grown economically while keeping inflation under control, improved income distribution and, above all, strengthened its democracy. Who could have predicted after years of military dictatorship, immediately followed by the impeachment of the country’s first popularly-elected president, that Brazil’s next three heads of state would be an intellectual who fought against the dictatorship, a labor leader routinely labeled as a dangerous revolutionary, and now a woman who once was a political prisoner?
These changes have had a major impact on Brazil’s stance toward other countries and also on how other countries view Brazil. As I said in a recent interview, Brazilian foreign policy may not have created the wave, but it learned how to ride it. It should come as no surprise that international interest in Brazilian foreign policy has increased notably in recent years, culminating with the 2010 elections.
A professor interviewed by Le Monde in the period leading up to the presidential vote called the Lula administration’s diplomacy “imaginative.” Others have been less generous. Either way, it cannot be said that Brazil’s foreign policy in recent years has been ineffective or has maintained a low profile.
But to what extent and why has its foreign policy contributed to that prominence?
Some of the factors are objective and others subjective. Let us begin with the latter. Brazil, like many other developing nations, especially in our hemisphere (a term I am ambivalent about, which I’ll come back to later), historically suffered from a lack of self-esteem. “We cannot;” “We must be careful;” “This is very dangerous.” These and other similar statements were most often heard every time a bolder-than-usual leader brought forth some truly innovative diplomatic initiatives.
This occurred during the “independent foreign policy” of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart. It was next seen—military rule notwithstanding—during the Geisel-Silveira period. And it again manifested itself, in a more emphatic fashion, during President Lula’s administration. We had a preconceived notion of our place in the world and our ability to influence international events. In fact, if anything, non-Brazilian analysts were more aware of the discrepancy between the country’s size (territorial, demographic, economic, etc.) and its position in the world. I remember reading an article in the International Herald Tribune during President Itamar Franco’s administration, saying that Brazil “punched below its weight.”
The Gloves Come Off
From the first months of President Lula’s mandate, when his administration courageously opposed the Iraq invasion, we demonstrated that Brazil’s new foreign policy would not be timid or overly cautious. This change of attitude and posture did not occur overnight. It was the result of a lengthy process of democratic maturation and increased self-confidence on the part of the Brazilian people. The process of change, the subterranean shift and currents, if you will, had started some time before and culminated in the election of an ex-lathe operator as president. The “yes we can” slogan used in Barack Obama’s campaign could just as easily have explained the sentiments of most voters who cast their ballots for Lula in 2002.
Our foreign policy captured this state of mind and tried to translate it into concrete actions that could affect the course of regional and world events. In doing so, we changed the international agenda. One example of this is the one-time plan of the United States to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Rarely has a policy priority of the greatest power in the hemisphere been taken off the agenda because of the firm stance of another country. We don’t need WikiLeaks to know that Brazilian resistance prevented what was an essentially unbalanced trade negotiation process—based on the then-outdated ideas of the “Washington Consensus”—from becoming reality.
Contrary to what many believe, Brazil did not obstruct the FTAA. It simply sought to redefine the terms of the agreement. We believed that it was necessary for us to maintain the autonomy to make decisions about our own development model. And we almost achieved it at the Ministerial Conference in Miami in October 2003. Based on a “three-track approach,” our compromise would have allowed the FTAA to concentrate on aspects of market access and some basic common trade rules, while leaving more complex subjects such as intellectual property and agricultural subsidies to the World Trade Organization (WTO). U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and I had agreed on a common outline. But this simplified version, dubbed by some critics as “FTAA light,” ran into the opposition of the most ideological defenders of the original version of the FTAA. Although we came close to a compromise, we eventually could not agree. Few today remember this, but as head of the Brazilian delegation, I spent more time trying to convince our friends in Venezuela not to block consensus than arguing with my U.S. counterpart, Zoellick (though Venezuela eventually just submitted a note of reservation). We were also criticized by members of the business sector in Brazil and by Brazilian media. Nevertheless, by sticking to our principles rather than giving into the original rigid model, we preserved our policy development options.
At first, Brazil led this fight almost alone. Little by little, we gained support from others, above all from our partners in Mercosur: Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Events since have proven many of the criticisms at the time to be misguided. Even without the FTAA—or perhaps precisely because of the absence of one—Brazil has experienced sustained growth, expanded its foreign trade, become a major recipient of direct investment, and has itself become a major source of investment in other countries. Moreover, the financial crisis that rocked the U.S. economy at the end of the decade and the minimal effect it had on the Brazilian economy justified our growth model and the choices we made to concentrate more on our domestic market and to diversify trade partners. Personally, though, the most significant and gratifying validation was the award I was presented by Latin Trade in Miami exactly seven years after the 2003 Ministerial meeting.
In August 2003, shortly before that meeting, the Lula administration first asserted itself in the global arena during the WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancún, Mexico. There, in the midst of discussions to reduce global trade barriers, we worked with other developing countries in an unprecedented joint political-diplomatic effort that averted a protectionist treaty. The draft agreement that was presented by the chairman of the WTO Council for discussion at the Ministerial conference would have, if approved, preserved huge subsidies to European and U.S. farmers. Those subsidies would have harmed developing countries and limited their ability to grow, including some very poor West African cotton producers (known as the “Cotton Four”).
Our success resulted in the formation of a new grouping in the WTO, with a specific mandate to negotiate on agricultural matters. This group, which came to be known at the meeting as the G-20 nations (not to be confused with the G-20 of leading economies), after its original membership, had a great influence on the negotiating process in Cancún and beyond.
As a result of our position, we faced enormous criticism; some even depicted us as enemies of a multilateral trade agreement. Curiously, several of those critics, especially in Brazil, later accused us of being obsessed with a global agreement to the detriment of bilateral or regional arrangements involving developed countries.
To be sure, we have not been able to conclude the Doha Round of WTO negotiations. But that failure stems largely from ineffective leadership in the richer nations, not from real economic needs. I am confident that there will be a successful conclusion to the round, and when that happens, it will no longer be possible to treat the interests of poor countries or of developing countries as mere footnotes.
Promoting Regional Solidarity and Asserting Global Status
Cancún and Miami were two events that had symbolic importance for Brazilian foreign policy. Concurrent with these two processes (one regional, the other global, but both involving the most powerful nation on earth), Brazilian diplomacy was working to promote South American solidarity and integration. A great deal of President Lula’s personal efforts (and mine as well) were dedicated to this objective, with remarkable results in the economic, commercial, infrastructural, and political spheres. Our main goal is to transform South America into a true “Peace Zone”—a goal Brazil is gradually achieving.
I emphasize these facts not only for the practical results they produced—reflected in trade and investment figures—but also because they are unprecedented. Rarely, if ever, during my approximately 45 years of diplomatic life (from which I should subtract seven during which I was busy performing other government functions) have I observed such dramatic change in such a short span of time. In the early days of the Lula administration, Brazil’s foreign policy was marked by an essentially defensive agenda in the FTAA and the WTO—a situation we reversed in only one year. At the same time, we also managed to place South American regional integration at the forefront of Brazilian diplomacy. We restored confidence in Mercosur and initiated the process that led to the creation of the 12-member Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which includes the whole continent from Colombia to Argentina.
The basis of UNASUR is a series of economic and trade agreements, but it also has a strong political component. That political role proved to be of central importance during recent crises, both internal (Bolivia, Ecuador) and between countries (Colombia-Venezuela). But our “diplomatic activism”—in the best sense of the word—was not restricted to South America. At the Sauipe Summit in Bahia, all the Latin American and Caribbean nations convened to discuss cooperation plans aiming at greater development and political understanding across the region.
In broader terms, in the first years of the administration, we strengthened—and in some cases established—strategic partnerships with China, India, Russia, and South Africa. As a result, we created new channels of cooperation among developing nations, such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum—a mechanism for cooperation and political consultation involving India, Brazil and South Africa. Another channel was the establishment of a summit process involving Arab countries and South America and, separately, African countries and South America. On the economic front, our designation as a member of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) has become an essential reference point for us, while it has given our four nations a new economic and political status. Another group of emerging nations, BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), has also played a leading role in the international negotiations on climate, with our support and encouragement. Relations with other nations with growing influence in their regions, including Turkey, have brought new and somewhat unexpected opportunities for political action.
Our work with countries across the global South has helped to strengthen the perception of Brazil as a nation whose interests and influence go beyond its own region. This, in addition to our growing strength in the areas of trade, economics and the environment, has contributed to the European Union’s decision to make Brazil a strategic partner and to the establishment of a dialogue with the U.S. to work together on global issues.
Analysts and government officials from several countries, including the U.S., have noted Brazil’s arrival as a global player—though only time and other factors, including subjective ones, will confirm the permanence of our newfound status. Most of the comments have been positive. But one notices a natural ambivalence from some, especially in the United States. If Brazil continues on its current path, it will be the first time that another country in the Americas becomes a global player. To be sure, in terms of “hard power” Brazil cannot compete with the United States. This is obviously true in military terms, where the supremacy of the U.S. is undeniable. Furthermore, in economic terms, the differences between the GDPs of the U.S. and Brazil remain large. In other spheres, too, the gap is considerable.
Nevertheless, Brazil’s presence has been felt on a number of issues and in various regions. In May 2010, working with Turkey, we drafted the Tehran Declaration, in which the Iranian government committed to abide by the objectives originally proposed by the U.S. and its allies and accepted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This was no small achievement and was applauded by, among others, Mohammed El-Baradei, the former IAEA chief. The commitment by Iran to remove 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium to a third country (Turkey) within one month (before Iran would receive the corresponding amount of fuel), even if it was considered insufficient by some, demonstrated our potential influence in promoting a peaceful and negotiated approach to the international deadlock.
The sanctions against Iran agreed to one month later in the UN Security Council effectively quashed the possible benefits of the agreement in the short run. But it is my firm belief that our approach remains valid, as implicitly recognized in some of the statements of the so-called P5+1 (the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany).
More recently, the Brazilian government’s decision to recognize the Palestinian state triggered a series of similar acts by other Latin American countries. The gesture even contributed to some European countries reviewing their stance.
Given Brazil’s new willingness to act on the international stage, it is natural that it would raise concern in some quarters. The official and unofficial statements by U.S. authorities have been mostly positive in nature, but the unease is palpable. It is possible that the Brazilian action undertaken with Turkey toward Iran has caused some discomfort in Washington DC. The agreement obliged the U.S. government to explain, not always convincingly, its reasons for refusing an agreement that met all of the points raised in President Obama’s letter to President Lula less than three weeks earlier.
But Brazil’s increasing resourcefulness and independence will benefit the United States. On a number of occasions, Brazil’s stance has permitted a consensus that seemed impossible in the face of more radical positions. This was what happened at the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly meeting in June 2009 in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, when the decision was made to revoke Cuba’s suspension from the OAS. In other matters, such as Haiti or the conflicts involving Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, Brazil’s firm yet sensible position has been a steadying factor that has helped mitigate—if not fully eliminate—tensions and conflicts. Brazil’s influence in the region derives from its own economic and geographic weight, but is also influenced by its role in the international arena.
Leafing through old clippings in my files, I came across a photo taken at the U.S. State Department in which former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, a minister from Guinea-Bissau and I are signing a tripartite agreement to help strengthen the Guinean parliament. I believe that was the first trilateral cooperation agreement involving Brazil, the U.S. and an African nation. More recently, our two countries signed another agreement, this time with Senegal, regarding ethanol production (just as we had done with other countries in the Caribbean and Central America).
Actions such as these, which benefit poorer countries, do not just bring immediate gains to the local populations; they also serve the cause of stability and development, provided they respect each nation’s priorities and autonomy. In the case of many African nations, where tremendous need coexists with enormous potential, structured cooperation between Brazil and the U.S. could bring real benefits and make strong strategic sense. During President Rousseff’s inauguration, I briefly shared the idea with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who seemed open to it.
Of course, we will not always be in agreement, but even in those cases where we disagree, Brazil and the U.S. will have more to gain from dialogue than confrontation. The fact that there are two—not just one—powers with global reach in our macro-region (the word “hemisphere” has echoes of the Cold War era, which do not bring back good memories) will be beneficial for all and will help strengthen the position of our countries and the values we defend.
PostScript (written on January 31, 2011)
This text was originally sent to the editors of Americas Quarterly before two important facts were known (one of them more of a process than a fact): the announcement made by President Barack Obama that he would visit Brazil (as well as Chile and El Salvador) in March, and the spreading unrest in various Arab nations following the demonstrations that brought about the fall of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt.
When commenting on the announcement of the visit, several U.S. government officials stressed the global reach of their relationship with Brazil. On the other hand, there has been no lack of criticism by U.S. pundits regarding the direction of Washington’s relations with Arab nations. Is it not time to use Brazil’s good relationship—and that of other South American countries—with the Arab world to begin a new dialogue that promotes the values we share while respecting the rhythms and processes of each country? In this, Brazil can serve as an effective broker or third party in negotiations. Moreover, the example of Tunisia is doubly illuminating: first, because it occurred endogenously, without being externally induced through sanctions or other pressures; and second, because it occurred in a country whose leader was considered an ally in the war on terror. Perhaps a less Manichean and more nuanced view of reality, such as the one Brazil and other South American countries have shown, would be useful in dealing with these thorny situations, especially in the Middle East. We may have finally reached a time to move beyond dialogue to a global strategic partnership.
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No mesmo número da Americas Quarterly:
Americas Quarterly: The New Brazil and the Changing Hemisphere
Spring 2011
It’s time to rethink how both obvious and subtle changes are making the region more diverse, its future more unpredictable, and policy challenges more complex. This was shown by President Obama’s trip to three Latin American countries in March, and it comes at a time when trends such as migration, the declining influence of the United States and in the majority of countries a convergence toward more market-oriented economic models are promoting demographic and economic integration.
The Spring issue of Americas Quarterly—released on May 2, 2011— explores the political, economic and demographic forces that are changing the Americas.
Current and former government officials, scholars, and activists look at what national and international shifts over the past few decades, including the rise of Brazil, will mean for the hemisphere’s future. In his first article since leaving office, former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim candidly shares his views on Brazil’s place in the world and his efforts to assert its diplomatic agenda, while Matías Spektor of Fundação Getulio Vargas analyzes prospects for greater U.S.-Brazilian collaboration. Beyond Brazil, Jorge Heine of the Balsillie School of International Affairs and Indian Ambassador R. Viswanathan discuss India’s growing interests in an evolving region, while this issue’s charticle looks at the mission and operation of President Chávez’ ALBA coalition. In the U.S., Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis points out how immigrants are the key to future economic growth.
Also, AQ interviews Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Li Jinzhang on his country’s plans as it increases economic and political ties with the region, Omar Everleny Pérez and José Antonio Ocampo debate whether Cuba’s economic reforms will succeed, Alejandro Grisanti of Barclays Capital Inc. analyzes Venezuela’s oil policies, and Robert Maguire of Trinity Washington University looks at the challenges ahead for Haitian President-elect Michel Martelly.
In This Issue:
BRAZIL RISES
Reflections on Brazil’s Global Rise
CELSO AMORIM
The man who led Brazil into its new global era discusses his diplomatic vision and Brazil-U.S. relations.
One Foot in the Region, Eyes on the Global Prize
MATÍAS SPEKTOR
In an era of new global threats, Brazil and the U.S. need to collaborate.
The Opportunities and Challenges for President Dilma Rousseff
ROBERTO SETUBAL
Political will is necessary to face a new generation of policy issues.
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