CARTA AS FORÇAS ARMADAS: É A CONSTITUIÇÃO, ESTÚPIDO!! -JAMIL CHADE e KAKAY

 CARTA AS FORÇAS ARMADAS: É A CONSTITUIÇÃO, ESTÚPIDO!!

JAMIL CHADE e KAKAY 

Senhores militares,

Neste fim de semana, vocês poderão definir o destino da democracia no Brasil. E, portanto, de milhões de brasileiros. Vimos, nos últimos dias, como a campanha de Jair Bolsonaro tentou tumultuar o processo eleitoral no país, bombardeou a sociedade com desinformação e intensificou o ódio.

Alguns de seus porta-vozes chegaram a falar sobre a possibilidade de adiar o segundo turno, o que na prática seria um golpe. Quem tem a ousadia de defender essa tese desconhece que seria necessário mudar o artigo 77 da Constituição Federal. Contudo, uma das características desses golpistas é desprezar a ordem constitucional. Sem usar subterfúgio, é outra tentativa de romper com a institucionalidade democrática.

Por mais que ocupem os microfones de rádios amigas ou façam circular a ideia nas redes sociais, tais forças autoritárias sabem que essa fraude apenas pode prosperar se contar com a disposição, ajuda logística e manobra dos senhores.

Portanto, qualquer adesão a esse movimento não fará vocês cúmplices de um ataque contra a democracia. Mas protagonistas de um pesadelo. Clemenceau teria dito que a guerra é um assunto sério demais para ser deixado aos generais. Imaginem, então, o sonho democrático.

É fundamental saber que não existe golpe dentro das normas constitucionais. Todo golpe é contra a Constituição e o povo. A recente tentativa do presidente da República de fazer uma subleitura vulgar do artigo 142 da Constituição, querendo dar às Forças Armadas o papel de tutoras da nação, foi rechaçada com veemência pela sociedade e, honra se faça, pelas próprias forças armadas.

Certamente não é de hoje que se debate o papel dos militares numa democracia. Platão já fazia isso. Por séculos, era o exército que determinava a fonte de poder de um soberano. Mas, ironicamente, sua ameaça.

Uma vez estabelecida uma democracia, uma das mágicas nas entrelinhas das leis é a de proteger o estado de políticos com ambições militares. E, claro, de generais com ambições políticas.

Em países onde houve uma transição entre ditaduras e regimes democráticos, foi o fortalecimento de normas que definem o papel das forças armadas que conseguiu desmontar eventuais pretextos e gatilhos para que militares justificassem uma tomada do poder. E, cumpre deixar claro, a transição no Brasil se deu com muito conforto para as forças armadas. Para alguns, com um exagerado conforto.

Ao longo do século 20, vimos como forças armadas de alguns dos governos mais sanguinários da história conseguiram promover uma dolorosa transição e reforma em direção a valores democráticos. Talvez um dos grandes exemplos tenha sido na Alemanha, com a democratização da missão do Bundeswehr.

Em alguns locais, os soldados podem ter amplos direitos políticos. Em outros, como na Espanha pós-franquista, militares não podem sequer se filiar a um partido, o que seria considerado já um ato político.

Mas há um consenso: nenhuma democracia pode de fato se qualificar como consolidada até que as forças armadas daquele país estejam verdadeiramente sob um controle democrático.

As insinuações de ruptura institucional por parte do comandante em chefe têm que ter o repúdio não só da sociedade civil, mas especialmente das Forças Armadas. A Constituição que nos rege é uma só e todos devemos obediência a ela.

Não se trata apenas de um "controle civil" sobre as forças armadas. Afinal, os senhores e nós sabemos que uma ditadura pode muito bem ter, em seu posto de suposto comando, um fantoche civil para camuflar quem, de fato, mantém as rédeas de um país.

Senhores,

A democracia vai muito além do voto, da urna e das instituições. Na base, ela é um pacto pelo qual aceitamos a tolerância e a confiança como registros de uma convivência. Uma espécie de cultura que prevê a derrota, que considera a oposição como legítima e necessária.

Um sistema onde o vitorioso se compromete a defender aqueles que não votaram por ele e aplicar políticas que melhorem suas vidas, da forma que eles queiram vivê-las.

Um golpe, portanto, não é apenas uma manobra com impacto político. Mas um tsunami nas regras que regem hoje a sociedade brasileira. A abertura de um processo perigoso de retirada de direitos, de esperança e de sonhos. A instauração do medo permanente, da desconfiança e da vitória do ódio em nosso cotidiano.

Na realidade, qualquer golpe é contra a dignidade das Forças Armadas, que deve fazer cumprir a Constituição, mesmo e principalmente, contra quem detém o poder e ousa usurpá-lo.

Portanto, escrevemos essa carta para fazer um apelo direto: não ousem respaldar um golpe.

O país precisa dos senhores, mas justamente dentro do mandato que o pacto da sociedade estabeleceu. Assumam a democracia como a maior arma que a nação brasileira pode ter. Qualquer tentativa de ruptura constitucional deve unir a sociedade e as forças armadas no absoluto respeito à constituição da república.

A história será implacável e não poupará nenhum dos senhores caso optem por outro caminho.

Saudações democráticas,

Jamil Chade e Antônio Carlos de Almeida Castro, Kakay

Pequena reflexão sociológica sobre o Brasil - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Pequena reflexão sociológica sobre o Brasil

 

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor

(www.pralmeida.org; diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

Nota sobre a escolha eleitoral que deveremos fazer nesta data.

 

 

Segundo Ludwig von Mises, o capitalismo é uma espécie de ditadura do consumidor: gostou do produto, pela qualidade-preço, continua comprando, do contrário simplesmente o rejeita.

Na democracia, é o eleitor que é o ditador circunstancial e momentâneo, e toma a mesma atitude do consumidor: aprova ou rejeita o “produto” oferecido. 

Temos essa oportunidade hoje, de exercer esse poder temporário.

O Brasil me parece ser um país ainda capitalista, mas há controvérsias. Eu, na verdade, o prefiro bem mais capitalista, ou seja, com ampla liberdade para escolher o que vou consumir.

Você está contente com o que lhe foi oferecido nos últimos quatro anos?

Acho que foi bom, está bem, pretende continuar assim? Acredita que o Brasil melhorou, ficou mais alegre e confiante?

Pretende renovar sua confiança no atual produto ou quer experimentar outra coisa?

Este é o seu dia consumidor-eleitor: pense, compare, exerça o se fugaz direito de ser um pequeno ditador de sua própria vida e do destino do país em que vive.

Eu já pensei, segui o itinerário do país nestes quatro anos e conclui que o “capitalista” de plantão é um total inepto, nada do que fez melhorou minha vida ou a do país: democracia, bem-estar, meio ambiente, civilidade, atenção aos mais pobres, respeito pela vida humana.

Olhando objetivamente constato que ficamos menos solidários, destruimos o meio ambiente, deixamos crianças passar fome, a educação se deteriorou, a civilidade diminuiu, a dignidade da vida humana deixou de ser respeitada.

O Brasil ficou mais dividido do que jamais o foi, e não creio que se possa construir uma nação com base em fraturas de tal magnitude.

Dotado desse poder que me é conferido momentaneamente pelo nosso ainda frágil capitalismo-democrático, pretendo trocar de produto e o faço conscientemente.

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4261: 31 outubro 2022, 1 p.

 

 

Congresso Mundial de Ciência Politica: Hugo Supo, Os populismos

27th World Congress of Political Science

27ième Congrès mondial de science politique

27o Congreso Mundial de Ciencia Política

15-19 JULY 2023  |  BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

https://wc2023.ipsa.org/wc/congress-theme

Los populismos en el siglo XXI

Convenor
Dr. Hugo Suppo

Type

Open Panel

Language

Spanish

Format

In Person

Chair

Dr. Hugo Suppo

Discussants

Dr. Carlos Dominguez Avila

Description

El siglo XXI será el siglo de los populismos según algunos autores. Fenómeno celebrado por unos y satanizado por otros, de difícil precisión conceptual, el populismo suscita interminables debates sobre su “esencia” y sus causas y, sobre todo, sus consecuencias para los sistemas democráticos. También suscita muchas preguntas: ¿es una estrategia política?, ¿es un instrumento de movilización?, ¿es una ideología?, ¿es una ética democrática?, ¿es un discurso?, ¿es un estilo de comunicación simple?
Con el tiempo, se desarrollaron múltiples enfoques teóricos y tipologías, principalmente a través de estudios de casos. Como resultado de esta falta de delimitación clara del populismo como concepto y fenómeno, existe un impasse teórico con profundas implicaciones políticas. Sin embargo, independientemente del enfoque interpretativo o normativo que se utilice, el populismo debe entenderse como una especie de respuesta a los problemas contemporáneos, particularmente por su alta capacidad de penetración en diversos ámbitos y temáticas: partidos políticos, movimientos sociales, nacionalismo, fascismo,  política, identidades, género, religión, medios y migraciones. Por tanto, el objetivo de este panel es ofrecer, desde una perspectiva multidisciplinar, una actualización de las reflexiones sobre el populismo en el siglo XXI – llamado, por algunos autores, neopopulismo para diferenciarlo del populismo "clásico".

Session

LOC04 International Relations and Foreign Policy | Relaciones Internacionales y política exterior

LOC06 Latin American Politics | Política latinoamericana

representation.

The 2023 IPSA World Congress will be an onsite event with a limited number of virtual-only panels.

História: Crise dos mísseis soviéticos em Cuba: o dia mais perigoso do mundo - Tom Blanton (H-Diplo)

 

National Security Archive: The Cuban Missile Crisis @ 60: The Most Dangerous Day

by Michael Evans

Joint Chiefs: “The president has a feeling that time is running out”

Cascade of human errors, nuclear-armed flashpoints on October 27 nearly started World War III by accident

JFK: “always some SOB who doesn’t get the word”

By Tom Blanton

Washington, D.C., October 27, 2022 - The most dangerous 24 hours of the Cuban Missile Crisis came on Saturday, October 27, 1962, 60 years ago today, as the U.S. moved closer to attacking Cuba and nuclear-armed flashpoints erupted over Siberia, at the quarantine line, and in Cuba itself—a rapid escalation that convinced both John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev to strike the deal that would stop events from further spiraling out of control.

The surviving notes of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on that day, October 27, depict a six-and-a-half-hour cascade of crises where human error, miscalculation, reckless deployment of nuclear weapons, and testosterone ruled the day. The JCS notes from October and November 1962, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and published today by the National Security Archive, are all that survive after the Chiefs’ decision, in the 1970s, to destroy the tapes and transcripts from over two decades of JCS meetings.

The notes depict how top U.S. military officials reacted to the unfolding crisis in real time, including the shootdown of a U-2 spy plane over Cuba that afternoon—seen as a major escalation—while at the same time the JCS were unaware that U.S. naval forces were dropping grenades on a Soviet sub armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo near the quarantine line. As they continued to prepare for a full-scale invasion of Cuba, JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor told the Chiefs that President Kennedy was “seized with the idea of trading Turkish for Cuban missiles” and “has a feeling that time is running out.”

Today’s posting features the JCS notes along with photographs and additional context about the most dangerous day of the missile crisis, and the sequence of events that persuaded both Kennedy and Khrushchev to reach the trade that would ultimately end the superpower confrontation.

READ THE DOCUMENT

READ THE DOCUMENT

Book Review: Wallace J. Thies. Why Containment Works: Power, Proliferation, and Preventive War - Dorle Hellmuth (H-Diplo)

A contenção funciona? Talvez de um país grande a um país pequeno. Entre os EUA e a China dificilmente funcionará.

H-Diplo Review Essay 455, Hellmuth on Thies, Why Containment Works

by christopher ball

H-Diplo REVIEW ESSAY 455

27 October 2022

Wallace J. Thies. Why Containment Works: Power, Proliferation, and Preventive War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020  ISBN13: 9781501749483

https://hdiplo.org/to/E455
Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Andrew Szarejko | Production Editor: Christopher Ball

Review by Dorle Hellmuth, The Catholic University of America

In Why Containment Works, Wallace Thies convincingly shows that there was never a need for the 2003 invasion of Iraq had Bush administration policymakers stuck to the containment and deterrence concepts that had been utilized during much of the Cold War. But this powerfully argued book is not merely about the contentious Iraq invasion that has been much debated elsewhere; Thies makes a compelling case for containment as an invaluable policy tool, and one that is easier to craft and sustain than commonly thought. 

In a world where states’ military assets rely on finite resources, Thies contrasts two vastly different strategic outlooks—theories of victory—of how these military resources are best utilized strategically: The Bush Doctrine which centered on action-oriented preventive use of force versus the more nuanced, long-term application of containment. 

Thies defines containment strategy “as a form of managed conflict that seeks to prevent the target state from overturning the local, regional, or global distribution of power” (vii). It is a long-term approach which is often slow and requires a lot of patience, and in true George Kennan fashion, the containing state will focus on defending vital interests and tailor its responses accordingly. In short, it is best understood as a game of “move and countermove” (10). Containment also defies more traditional, clearcut measures of success aimed at the immediate elimination of a threat: A containment policy is deemed successful as long as the target state does not manage to do anything that the container state would consider unacceptable. But that’s precisely what might make it less appealing to policymakers or the public, and a seeming relict of the Cold War: It is grey as opposed to black and white; drawn out instead of quick; often more passive rather than about initiative. It is not designed to win conclusively, but rather to live with problem states. 

As the contest is fluid and the various moves and countermoves are often staged simultaneously, a containment strategy may “seem disjointed, reactive, overtaken by events,” (10) improvised, or even worse, the containing state may appear in over its head and outplayed by the target state. There is room for error and failure, to be sure: Containing states might become exasperated and randomly rush on to the next tactic(s); upcoming elections might create pressures for action; or containment policies might resemble too much of a watered-down compromise to be effective. Most of the time, however, there is much potential, vast room for creativity, and remarkable versatility: “A containment policy is bounded only by the imagination and the resourcefulness of those who set it in motion and then carry it out,” (18) Thies explains. What is more, policy options available to the container state usually increase when containment works. Generally involving a mix of “threats (verbal and nonverbal), sanctions or rewards, and if need be, forceful actions,” containment resembles “the art of thwarting an adversary’s plots and schemes, and not just once but again and again” (7). In the case of pre-2003 invasion Iraq, the US containment toolbox came with no less than five different options: United Nations WMD inspections of Iraqi offices and suspected WMD facilities; UN control of oil revenues and imports; multinational naval interdictions of WMDs and ballistic missile technology; and the enforcement of no-fly zones over Northern and Southern Iraq which, starting in 2001, also featured US and British airstrikes against Iraqi command-and-control centers near the capital as well as numerous other military targets. 

Chapter 1 (fittingly titled Preventive War vs. Containment) develops the conceptual framework of the book. What policy prescriptions flow from the 2002 Bush Doctrine when viewed as a theory of victory, and how do they compare to an alternative theory of victory based on containment and deterrence? According to the Bush Doctrine, containment and deterrence had run its course in a world with “unbalanced dictators” (2), “outlaw regimes” (3), rogue states in possession or pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and “shadowy terrorist networks” (3) without country allegiances, putting a high prize on the proactive, unilateral, and preventive use of swift and decisive force.  

Having examined the claims that make up the Bush Doctrine, Thies argues the opposite: Containment and deterrence are neither outdated, weakened, nor unsustainable concepts; buying time and wait-and-see approaches are often preferable to (rushing into) action; defense is the preferable, often superior choice to offense (precisely because superpowers like the US can rely on seemingly infinite supplies of resources against often smaller states and wear them down over time, usually without the use of military force); and preventive wars do not hold answers for the many unresolved issues and uncertainties that follow military strikes and invasions. Thies’s ‘anti-Bush Doctrine’ thus boils down to four essential factors: the willingness to 1., engage in a long-term contest against a target state via constant moves and countermoves; 2., relinquish the initiative as it often reduces the need for fighting in the first place; 3., identify potential allies and build coalitions; while being able to 4., rely on the innovative and tenacious nature of democracies (Thies is especially partial to the US separation of powers system, whose features, he argues, bring about such vetted policymaking that only the best policy ideas can survive). In fact, creating and sustaining a long-term containment strategy is not as difficult as conventional wisdom might suggest because relinquishing the initiative to the target state is “an effective way of thwarting an opponent’s plots and schemes”; regional allies increasingly threatened by the target state will opt to assist the US; and democratic containing states are especially well equipped to negate the “rise of would-be hegemons” (19) due to their resourcefulness and staying power. 

Chapters 2 to 6 are devoted to testing these claims as part of five case studies from the Cold and post-Cold War world, each spanning at least two decades: the containment of Libya (1979-2003), the dual containment of Iraq and Iran (1981-2003), the containment of Iraq (1980-2003), the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the ongoing containment of Iran (since 1979). Thies measures containment success by whether the US was able to block aggressive actions by Libya, Iraq, and Iran, including “support for terrorist or other military operations,” (46) or whether those countries’ quest for nuclear weapons ceased or significantly decreased. Because the United States can rely on such a massive array of resources, there usually is no need to resort to blunt force let alone preventive war, allowing for a more cost-effective and variable approach when dealing with smaller states. 

Based on evidence obtained in the five case studies, Chapter 7 reappraises containment by revisiting Thies’s alternative claims – the powerful value of ‘move and countermove’ amid constant bargaining; the willingness to relinquish the initiative because it forces the dreadful responsibility of having to fire the first shot and start a war upon the target state; the importance of attracting regional allies; and the sustaining strengths and ingenuity of (especially presidential) democracies – further reiterating that containment works best under the aforementioned conditions. Like chapter 1, the final chapter is peppered with examples, anecdotes, and debates from the Cold War, essentially tying the Cold War and post-Cold War lessons of containment together. 

Why Containment Works offers rigorous analysis, meticulously researched case studies, and a crisp, succinct structure. Thies pays close attention to the many fascinating nuances, or ‘nooks and crannies,’ that have made up US containment strategy during the Cold War and after, against especially smaller regional states, Iraq, Iran, and Libya, but also vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China. Another major strength of the book is that Thies explores the different arguments presented by containment optimists and pessimists from all possible angles. 

Above all, Thies’s findings come with crucial policy implications and should give US decisionmakers pause. When contemplating the next preventive war, containment should be considered first – because, under the right circumstances, it can work and has worked so many times. This has particular relevance for the ongoing Iranian nuclear dilemma, which continues to haunt the United States and the international community. Thies’s analysis of US containment of Iran ends in 2016, and President Trump withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear agreement in 2018. While the US and Iran have returned to the negotiation table under President Biden, the future of the Iran nuclear deal remains unclear, and the Iranian nuclear program is arguably further along than ever. Preventive military action is likely bound to become a hot button issue once again in the foreseeable future. 

Even if Thies portrays the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate of the Iranian nuclear program or the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in too much of a positive light, the bottom line remains: Fifteen years later, there is no Iranian bomb, and Iran was willing to restrain its ambitions by conceding to the 2015 nuclear deal. Furthermore, containment does not have to end even if Iran were to go nuclear. While Thies does associate containment success with Iran’s not having produced a nuclear weapon, the historical record, according to Thies, still suggests a nuclear Iran could be contained and deterred like the Soviet Union and others before.

As the scope of any book is naturally limited, this excellent work comes with only few potential weaknesses that may best be considered avenues for further research. Since the Bush Doctrine placed such importance on preventing the next terrorist attack by striking first, such future research might examine under which circumstances terrorist networks and/or insurgent groups can be contained. Even more, what would an assessment of contemporary US policies involving larger adversaries, such as a resurgent, bellicose Russia and an increasingly assertive China, tell us about the potency of containment?  Even if the United States has a larger containment arsenal, and therefore more policy options, than any other opponent, presidential democracy in the US has been in decline in recent years; this leads to questions as to whether US democracy is still robust enough – and still allowing for only the best ideas to become policy despite significant political polarization -- to weather drawn-out cat-and-mouse-games that make up containment contests with large states?

Having said that, the book fills a crucial gap precisely because it demonstrates the overall value of containing smaller states, both during and after the Cold War, as well as containment during the Cold War (against a fellow superpower, the Soviet Union, and major regional player, China). In other words, this is an invaluable contribution to the literature on containment theory. I have no doubt that this exquisite book will become a must-read standard work, alongside John Lewis Gaddis’ Strategies of Containment^[1] (2005) widely considered the seminal work on the Cold War containment of the Soviet Union. While several other noteworthy works since 9/11 have concentrated on the global war on terror, ^[2] Thies’s book offers a refreshing take on containment against traditional state opponents and challenges pre- and post-9/11. Thies’s comprehensive account of U.S. containment practices involving five different countries also goes beyond other recent books with a more limited focus on Iran.^[3]

On a more personal note, I consider this book Wallace Thies’s final masterpiece. A leading NATO specialist and scholar (Why NATO Endures and Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO),^[4] Thies sadly passed away in July 2020. When he told me about the manuscript that would turn into Why Containment Works a few months before his retirement, Thies humbly referred to his book project as a compilation of lecture notes (accumulated during decades of teaching international relations classes at The Catholic University of America). This book clearly goes above and beyond that. As a former doctoral student and colleague of Wallace Thies, I am incredibly grateful that his critical analysis will continue to inspire and assist current and future policymakers and students of IR theory. I highly recommend this book to any decisionmaker involved in the crafting or implementation of containment policies, as well as any serious student of containment strategy. 

Dorle Hellmuth is Associate Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America and the author of Counterterrorism and the State (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). Her research and teaching interests include (counter)terrorism and -radicalization; political violence; NATO; transatlantic security; and US foreign policy. 

  

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[1] John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[2] Ian Shapiro, Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008; Jonathan Stevenson, Counter-terrorism: Containment and Beyond, Adelphi Paper 367 (London: Routledge: 2005).

[3] Kenneth Pollack, Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy (London: Schuster & Schuster, 2013); Ehud Eilam, Containment in the Middle East (Sterling, VA: Potomac Books, 2019). 

[4] Wallace Thies, Why NATO Endures (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2009); Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (London: Routledge: 2015).

Russia faz conscrição forçada de estrangeiros Tadjik para enviá-los lutar na Ucrânia - Francesca Ebel (WP)

Mercenários, é tudo o que restou a Putin para levar avante a sua guerra insana. 

Mass shooting in Belgorod exposes Russia’s forced mobilization of migrants 

By  Francesca Ebel

The Washington Post, October 29, 2022 at 1:00 a.m. EDT

A poster showing a soldier with the slogan “Glory to the Heroes of Russia” in front of the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow, on Oct. 18. (Yuri Kochetkov/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock.

Ehson Aminzoda seemed to be following the path of many Central Asian immigrants in Russia — initially working as a bricklayer after arriving in Moscow earlier this year, then at a local restaurant, saving his modest earnings in hope of returning to his native Tajikistan to marry. On Oct. 10, he headed out to meet friends, and was seen leaving the Lyublino subway station in southeast Moscow. Then, he disappeared.

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Five days later, according to Russian authorities, Aminzoda, 24, was in Belgorod, just 24 miles from the Ukrainian border, where he and another man, Mehrob Rakhmonov, 23, allegedly opened fire at a military training base, killing nine and injuring 15 others. The alleged shooters were also killed.

The Russian defense ministry said the shooting took place during a training session for a group of volunteers “who wished to participate in the military operation in Ukraine.” Russian authorities quickly branded the incident a terrorist attack, deliberately highlighting the nationality of the alleged gunmen, who were Tajik.

Officially, little else has been disclosed about the shooting, which has been overshadowed by the ongoing death and destruction of Russia’s war in Ukraine.But rights activists and relatives of the alleged gunmen believe they were forcibly conscripted. They said the mere presence of the two Tajik men at the base in Belgorod points to pervasive abuses against migrant workers in Russia and to long-simmering ethnic tensions, which have worsened as a result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chaotic and much-criticized military mobilization.

While many men of fighting age have fled Russia to avoid being sent to fight in Ukraine — creating a new, reverse migration of Russians to Central Asian countries, including Tajikistan — some migrants in Russia have been swept into the ranks of the Russian military despite having no obligation to serve.

Some appear to have volunteered to fight, potentially induced to enlist by a new law offering a “fast track” to Russian citizenship for foreigners who sign a one-year military contract.

In other cases, advocates say, men seeking help from Russia’s Federal Migration Service were tricked into signing military papers, while still other migrants have been caught up in the botched mobilization drive and illegally issued draft orders despite not being Russian citizens.

It is unclear how Aminzoda ended up in Belgorod, which is a major staging ground for the war in Ukraine. Relatives said they have no idea.

“How he ended up in Belgorod, we do not know,” Firuz Aminzoda, a brother of the alleged gunman told Radio Ozodi, RFE/RL’s Tajik service. “My brother was not a terrorist, and he did not have such thoughts. He [was] an ordinary immigrant who wanted to work and build his life.” He emphasized that Ehson Aminzoda was not a Russian citizen and therefore not eligible to be mobilized.

Ksenia Sobchak, Russian star linked to Putin, fled using Israeli passport

The alleged Belgorod shooters disappeared around the same time that authorities in Moscow began raiding offices and hostels, and grabbing men off the streets in what appeared to be a mad push to reach the mobilization’s targets. (On Friday, defense minister Sergei Shoigu declared it completed).

Shortly before Putin issued his mobilization decree on Sept. 21, the Russian military opened a recruitment office at Moscow’s main migrant service center. Since the opening of that center, lawyers and activists say they have been inundated with pleas for help from migrants who say they have been detained, coerced or tricked into signing up for the army.

A policeman in St. Petersburg accompanies a group of migrant laborers on their way to renew work permit in April 2020. (Dmitri Lovetsky/AP)

Videos on social media from Ukraine also appear to show Russian prisoners of war who claim they are workers from Central Asia and were sent to fight because they did not have their documents in order.

Valentina Chupik, the director of Tong Jahoni, a nonprofit organization that helps Central Asian migrants in Russia, said she has received at least 70 requests for assistance from migrants, some saying they were beaten and tortured.

According to Chupik, who is based Yerevan, Armenia, after being deported from Russia, one man from Kazakhstan was bundled into a van, where police beat him, electroshocked his genitals, and forced him to sign a draft order.

The Washington Post could not independently verify Chupik’s account. The alleged victim has fled back to Kazakhstan and could not be reached.

But other migrants from Central Asia living in Russia said in interviews that they were detained by the police and pressured to enlist. They spoke on the condition of anonymity because of security risks.

A 35-year-old food deliveryman from Uzbekistan who has lived in Russia for 15 years, said that when he went to the migrant center officials marked his passport, fingerprinted him, and without explanation announced that he had just signed a contract to serve.

The man said he refused and left the center. He was then apprehended by the police who tried to intimidate him into signing the documents. He was released and is now trying to leave Russia.

“When I first heard the words of ‘mobilization,’ I didn’t feel anything, because my situation is far worse than any mobilization drive in Russia,” the man said. “Here, the attitude toward migrants is very harsh.”

He added: “I would never fight on a foreign land and for the sake of foreign people.”

A second man, a 36-year-old dual Russian-Tajik citizen who works as an electrician and gives legal advice to other migrants in Moscow, said that he was detained during a raid by the police at the construction site where he works, on account of his ethnic Caucasian appearance. The man said he was brought to a police wagon where officers threatened to beat him and forced him to sign the summons.

“I’m not going to serve, I am against it,” he said, adding that he was trying to leave Russia as soon as possible. “Why take someone else’s land for yourself in the first place?”

“But if they catch me again, I will have to serve,” he said. “It’s either that or years in prison.”

Lawyers said that the Russian authorities are using several methods to pressure migrant workers to enlist including falsifying criminal cases against them, promising money, and threatening deportation.

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Karimjon Yorov, a Moscow-based lawyer and human rights activist helping Tajik migrants, said that some migrants had signed up voluntarily, drawn by the promise of money or citizenship but that others have had their residency permits canceled if they refused to enlist.

Chupik called the heavy-handed methods “a bunch of crimes rolled into one.”

“Firstly, it is mercenarism, which is prohibited by Russian law,” Chupik said. “Secondly, when a person is forced into military service, this is already, of course, a crime, and this is coercion to commit the crime of mercenarism. Thirdly, violent crimes have reportedly been committed including the abuse of authority and torture.”

Chupik said that forcing migrants to fight in a war was just the latest example of cruelty and injustice that they face living in Russia, where they are always in an “extreme position of oppression.”

“Naturally, in a war, they are the first victims, because they are defenseless,” Chupik said. “Who will come out for them at a rally? Who will defend them? To whom can they complain so that their voice is heard?”

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Military analysts say that a disproportionate number of Russian fighters in the war in Ukraine are ethnic minorities from regions outside the main cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, including Buryatia in Siberia, and Chechnya and Dagestan in the North Caucasus. These regions have suffered heavy casualties.

Putin had long resisted declaring a mobilization in part to avoid the war being felt by middle class Russians from Moscow and St. Petersburg who are more likely to criticize and resist. Following September’s decree, however, protests broke out in Dagestan and Yakutia, and governors in several regions acknowledged that many men were mobilized by mistake.

A recent report from the Institute of the Study of War, a U.S.-based research group, found that the shooting in Belgorod was likely a consequence of the Kremlin’s “continual reliance” on ethnic minority communities to bear the burden of mobilization.

“Ethnic minorities that have been targeted and forced into fighting a war defined by Russian imperial goals and shaped by Russian Orthodox nationalism will likely continue to feel alienation, which will create feedback loops of discontent leading to resistance followed by crackdowns on minority enclaves,” the report stated. “The Belgorod shooting is likely a manifestation of exactly such domestic ramifications.”

Details about the shooting remain scarce. Russian media and war-focused Telegram channels have reported that it may have been set off by a dispute between volunteer fighters who were being trained at a shooting range and a senior officer who made disparaging remarks about Allah.

“I think that we will not know the truth about the shooting or shooters for a while, if ever, as this is not in the interests of the military or the state” said Yorov, the lawyer and rights activist. “But the Russian authorities will surely make life even harder for migrants in Russia, especially Muslims.”

Fortaleza de papel: uma vida através dos livros - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Fortaleza de papel: uma vida através dos livros

  

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor

(www.pralmeida.org; diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

Esquema de obra sobre a minha trajetória intelectual, misturando leituras de livros e episódios de vida.

 

Comecei a elaborar, quatro anos atrás, um esquema do que poderia ser um relato, de tipo memorialístico, centrado em fases de minha vida, mas sempre através de livros, obras que eu fui lendo, ao longo dos anos, e outras obras que foram sendo publicadas em cada um dos anos, sem que eu necessariamente as tenha lido, naquele momento, ou mesmo depois, mas que marcaram o mercado editorial ou os debates culturais naqueles anos sequenciais. O esquema é tentativo, inclusive porque não foi terminado em julho de 2018, tendo ficado incompleto nos capítulos específicos a cada uma das partes. Transcrevo, portanto, as grandes divisões desse projetado relato, mudando aqui e ali algumas poucas palavras. Não se trata de um esquema devidamente preparado, e sim notas rápidas num caderninho de bolso, apenas um registro a ser desenvolvido posteriormente, o que nunca cheguei a fazer. Vale apenas como reflexo de minha preocupação em registrar para a posteridade, e eventual benefício de descendentes familiares e curiosos, uma espécie de síntese de minha formação intelectual, que foi feita basicamente por meio de leituras, livros, de revistas, de jornais, mas também por meio de viagens de todos os tipos, uma intensa observação do mundo, com reflexões a cada momento, das quais comecei a deixar registro apenas tardiamente.

 

Fortaleza de papel: uma vida através dos livros

 

[Brasília, 11/07/2018]

 

Apresentação: por que uma trajetória através de livros e por que a fortaleza?

            Palavras voam, escritos permanecem

 

            Parte I – Origens e formação (1949-1961)

1. Uma casa sem livros (1949-1955)

            Origens familiares, a pobreza como cenário natural

2. A descoberta da escrita: uma biblioteca para brincar (1956-1957)

            Biblioteca Infantil Municipal Anne Frank

3. Devorando a biblioteca: os atraentes objetos de desejo (1957-1961)

            Como me tornei um rato de biblioteca

 

            Parte II – Consolidação do conhecimento (1962-1970)

4. Construindo minhas vantagens comparativas (1961-1962)

            Leituras e contato com os problemas do mundo

5. Navegando na escrita, nas leituras, nas viagens (1962-1965)

            A experiência fundamental do Ginásio Vocacional Oswaldo Aranha

6. Autonomia no estudo (1966-1968)

            A definição política e por uma trajetória de vida

7. O ingresso na universidade e o ativismo nas sombras (1969-1970)

            Os anos de chumbo, a resistência e a decisão de partir

 

            Parte III – Engajamento (1970-1977)

8. Oceanos à frente (1970-1971)

            Contando comigo mesmo, sem um roteiro preciso

9. Um longo exílio na Europa (1971-1977)

            Cadernos e mais cadernos de leituras em bibliotecas; viagens

 

            Parte IV – Le Grand Tournant (1977-1999)

10. A decisão de voltar ao Brasil (1977)

            Um doutoramento interrompido; trabalho acadêmico e nova carreira

11. Uma súbita ascensão à elite do mandarinato (1977-1985)

            Ingresso na carreira; reversão de expectativas, vida familiar, doutoramento

12. Maturidade intelectual e profissional (1986-1992)

            Dois grandes postos na carreira, o aprendizado na prática, o aprofundamento 

13. Nascimento de um escrevinhador (1992-1996)

            A especialização nos estudos, as primeiras obras de peso

14. Uma dupla militância: diplomática e acadêmica (1996-1999)

            Defendendo ideias e participando do debate público

 

            Parte V – Racionalidade e maturidade (2000-2006)

15. A democracia na América (1999-2003)

            Um segundo grande aprendizado, reforçando convicções, valores e princípios

16. Uma experiência no mandarinato oficial (2003-2006)

            Núcleo de Assuntos Estratégicos da PR, de um governo muito confuso

 

            Parte VI – Travessia do deserto (2006-2016)

17. Um deserto para chamar de seu (2006-2010)

            De volta a uma biblioteca e à profissão de escrevinhador 

18. O Oriente é vermelho: um estágio na China (2010)

            Estada em Xangai, leituras e viagens

19. Um novo exílio, acadêmico e turístico (2011-2012)

            Aulas em Paris, viagens por toda a Europa

20. De volta à América (2013-2015)

            Mais escritos, mais viagens, novas reflexões

 

            Parte VII – Retomada do prazer intelectual (2016-2022)

21. O trabalho ideal: pensando a diplomacia (2016-2018)

            Ativismo editorial e intelectual na direção do IPRI

22. Uma pequena travessia em mar revolto (2019-2021)

            Uma sucessão de livros sobre o bolsolavismo diplomático

23. Da liberdade dos antigos e dos modernos (2022-?)

            De volta à fortaleza de papel: a diferença que o estudo faz

 

Conclusões: minha trajetória intelectual, uma tentativa de síntese

 

Linha do tempo, profissional e acadêmica

Principais obras publicadas

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4269: 11 julho 2018, 29 outubro 2022, 3 p.