Hoje mesmo, ao conversar com um jornalista, eu evocava a tremenda ironia que existe ao se constatar, no Brasil, uma tendência a que os debates relevantes para o País, como os de política econômica, não se façam com relação à situação do futuro de sua economia e da sociedade no quadro da globalização, mas em direção do passado, de volta ao protecionismo e ao dirigismo dos anos do regime militar, e talvez até da era Vargas.
Eu mencionava a republicação pelo Ipea, certamente bem-vinda, do famoso debate entre Eugenio Gudin e Roberto Simonsen, em 1945, em torno das melhores para guiar a economia brasileira no pós-guerra, insistindo o primeiro, economista de corte neoclássico, nos bons fundamentos da economia e nos ganhos de produtividade, solicitando o segundo. industrial de sucesso, planejamento indicativo e dirigismo estatal, com controle dos vetores mais relevantes, sobretudo no setor externo. Pois bem: não contente em republicar esse debate, com um clara torcida pelo segundo, o Ipea também publicou um outro volume, conectado a esse, de "estudos" em torno das questões principais, mas deformando claramente as posições de Gudin, como se ele fosse contra a industrialização e o desenvolvimento do Brasil.
Tanto Gudin estava certo que a agricultura se converteu hoje no setor mais dinâmico da economia brasileira, exatamente como ele dizia que deveria ocorrer antes até de 1945. Parece incrível, mas como dizia outro economista, Roberto Campos, mas o Brasil é um país que não perde a oportunidade de perder oportunidades. Foi preciso mais de meio século para se demonstrar que Gudin estava correto, e que o segredo de nosso desenvolvimento estava nos ganhos de produtividade, não nesses "estímulos" estatais que só criam empresários rentistas, que vivem de subsídios públicos e de proteção.
O artigo abaixo confirma que temos a incrível capacidade de voltar ao passado.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Saudades dos anos 80
Alexandre Schwartsman
Folha de S. Paulo, Quarta-feira, 18 de agosto de 2010
Dá uma sensação que beira a desesperança quando empresários pedem o fechamento da economia
Eu até poderia me surpreender, mas, como economista trabalhando no Brasil há mais tempo do que quero confessar, sinto que não tenho esse direito. Mesmo assim, quando líderes empresariais vêm a público pedir o fechamento da economia brasileira às importações, bate uma sensação que beira a desesperança.
Depois de anos de uma bem-sucedida (ainda que limitada) experiência de aumento da integração comercial do país, resta ainda quem abertamente defenda o retorno à situação que vivemos por mais de 50 anos, cujos resultados foram a estagnação da produtividade, o baixo crescimento e a elevação da concentração de renda.
O caso mais patológico foi, é claro, a malfadada política de reserva de mercado para informática, proposta por expoentes da corrente ironicamente autodenominada "desenvolvimentista", que gerou uns poucos ricos às expensas de consumidores e de empresas obrigados a pagar, por produtos de baixa qualidade, preços muito superiores aos praticados no exterior.
Todavia, esse é apenas o exemplo mais doentio do caso do amor da indústria nacional com o protecionismo. Há meros 20 anos, as importações equivaliam a 5,5% do PIB, dos quais quase a metade correspondia a petróleo e derivados, cuja produção doméstica era insuficiente.
Sob tais circunstâncias, os incentivos para a inovação eram mínimos e, consequentemente, o crescimento da produtividade foi medíocre, quando não negativo.
Dado, porém, que é precisamente o aumento da produtividade o fator crucial para a expansão sustentada do produto ao longo de muitos anos, também não se estranha o baixo dinamismo da economia brasileira por mais de 20 anos, que coincidiu, não por acaso, com o fim do processo de urbanização do país.
Por fim, a restrição às importações também permitiu a elevação das margens de lucro dos setores protegidos, cuja contrapartida é a redução do salário real. Posto de outra forma, a proteção beneficiou os setores intensivos em capital, implicando elevação do retorno sobre este à custa da redução do rendimento do trabalho, ou seja, maior concentração de renda.
E é a esse estado de coisas que alguns pretendem retornar, justificando que a elevação das importações teria prejudicado o crescimento da produção local. Isso no contexto de elevação da produção industrial superior a 16% e de um provável aumento do PIB na casa dos 9% na primeira metade do ano.
De fato, caso nossas projeções para as contas nacionais estejam corretas, a demanda doméstica deve ter crescido cerca de 10% no primeiro semestre deste ano, ou um pouco mais de R$ 150 bilhões (a preços de 2010).
Já as importações medidas em reais, deduzindo combustíveis, cresceram (também a preços de 2010) em torno de R$ 35 bilhões, um aumento de 30%, valor consistente com a experiência dos últimos anos.
Em outras palavras, mais de três quartos do crescimento da demanda doméstica foram atendidos pela produção local.
Isso se traduziu em forte redução da ociosidade na economia. No segundo trimestre deste ano, por exemplo, o nível de utilização da capacidade na indústria atingiu 82,7%, nível superado, por pouco, apenas no período entre o quarto trimestre de 2007 e o terceiro de 2008.
Já a taxa de desemprego caiu abaixo de 7% no último trimestre, o valor mais baixo da série. Ambas as observações sugerem que a economia se encontra bastante próxima do seu limite e que, portanto, as importações desempenham papel crucial para complementar a oferta doméstica num quadro de elevada demanda interna.
Se isso é verdade, o que poderia explicar esse acesso de nostalgia?
Quero crer que não seja um caso de sadismo, que sente saudade da estagnação econômica e da queda do salário real.
Provavelmente, não deve ser mais do que a percepção de que as importações limitam bastante o poder de certas indústrias de impor seus preços; é ruim para seus lucros, mas muito bom para o Brasil.
ALEXANDRE SCHWARTSMAN, 47, é economista-chefe do Grupo Santander Brasil, doutor em economia pela Universidade da Califórnia (Berkeley) e ex-diretor de Assuntos Internacionais do Banco Central. Escreve às quartas-feiras, quinzenalmente, neste espaço.
quarta-feira, 18 de agosto de 2010
Haiti: "dívida" da independencia deveria ser devolvida pela Franca
Caso interessante. O Brasil também pagou pela sua independência, no que se constituiu o início de nossa dívida externa, que durante quase 200 anos representou um problema para o Brasil. O Haiti já se libertou há muito tempo dessa dívida, e não é apenas por isso que continuou subdesenvolvido. Mas, caberia uma investigação a respeito do caso.
Un appel pour que la France rembourse à Haïti la dette de son indépendance
Le Monde avec AFP, 16.08.2010
Dans une lettre ouverte au président Nicolas Sarkozy, publiée lundi 16 août dans le quotidien Libération, un groupe d'intellectuels et de responsables politiques appelle la France à rembourser à Haïti 17 milliards d'euros, une estimation des sommes qui furent exigées par Paris en échange de l'indépendance, obtenue en 1804, de son ancienne colonie. Cet appel est notamment signé par le linguiste américain Noam Chomsky, le philosophe français Etienne Balibar, ou encore les eurodéputés écologistes Daniel Cohn-Bendit et Eva Joly.
"Considérant les besoins financiers criants de ce pays dévasté par le terrible séisme du 12 janvier, nous vous pressons donc, monsieur le président, de restituer à Haïti, la première république noire de l'histoire, la dette historique de son indépendance", écrivent les signataires.
"UNE DETTE ILLÉGITIME"
Ils rappellent qu'après l'indépendance d'Haïti, le roi Charles X (1824-1830) imposa aux Haïtiens de payer à la France 90 millions de francs or, sous la menace d'une invasion militaire et d'une restauration de l'esclavage. "Cette indemnité a fait ployer des générations de Haïtiens sous le poids d'une dette illégitime, dette que la nation haïtienne n'a fini de payer qu'en 1947", ajoutent-ils.
Les signataires se présentent comme un "groupe de soutien au comité pour le remboursement immédiat des milliards envolés" d'Haïti. Ce comité est à l'origine de la mise en ligne, le 14 juillet dernier, d'une parodie du site Internet du ministère des affaires étrangères français, sur laquelle était faussement annoncé un remboursement de ces sommes. Le site a également mis en ligne lundi le texte de la pétition ainsi que la liste de la centaine de signataires.
============
Lettre ouverte au président français Nicolas Sarkozy
• Open letter to Nicolas Sarkozy (English version)
Le 16 août, 2010
Dans une lettre ouverte publiée aujourd'hui dans le quotidien français Libération, plus de 90 écrivains, universitaires de renom et autres personnalités mondialement connues demandent publiquement au gouvernement français de restituer les 90 millions de francs or extorqués par la France à Haitï à la suite de son indépendance.
Parmi les signataires, on retrouve le linguiste du MIT Noam Chomsky, la journaliste Naomi Klein, les écrivains Eduardo Galeano et Ariel Dorfman, le professeur de l'Université de Princeton Cornel West, les philosophes français Alain Badiou, Étienne Balibar et Jacques Rancière, ainsi que plusieurs membres du Parlement européen, incluant le militant altermondialiste José Bové. Des membres de l'Assemblée nationale de France et du Québec, de même que Walden Bello, écrivain et membre élu de la Chambre des représentants des Philippines, ont également signé la lettre.
* * *
Le gouvernement français a indiqué qu’il envisageait de poursuivre en justice le Comité pour le Remboursement Immédiat des Milliards Envolés d’Haïti (CRIME) pour le canular inspiré des Yes Men dans lequel la France promettait, le 14 juillet dernier, la restitution de la dette historique d’Haïti.
Nous croyons que l’idéal d’égalité, de fraternité et de liberté cher à la France serait beaucoup mieux servi si, au lieu de dilapider les fonds publics dans des poursuites contre les auteurs du canular, le gouvernement français commençait à rembourser à Haïti les 90 millions de francs or qui lui furent extorqués suite à son indépendance.
Cette “dette de l’indépendance”, aujourd’hui évaluée à bien plus que les 17 milliards d’euros promis dans la fausse annonce du 14 juillet dernier, a forcé de manière illégitime un peuple s’étant libéré de l’esclavage par son indépendance à payer doublement pour sa liberté. Imposée sous menace d’invasion militaire et de la restauration de l’esclavage par le roi français Charles X afin de dédommager les anciens colons propriétaires d’esclaves pour perte “de propriété”, cette indemnité a fait ployer des générations d’Haïtiens sous le poids d’une dette illégitime, dette que la nation haïtienne n’a fini de payer qu’en 1947.
La France n’est pas le seul pays qui a une dette envers Haïti. Après 1947, Haïti a contracté des dettes auprès des banques commerciales et des institutions financières internationales sous la dictature de Duvalier, lequel a ainsi puisé des milliards dans les fonds publics. Les besoins vitaux et les aspirations au développement de générations entières d’Haïtiens ont par le fait même été sacrifiés pour rembourser ces dettes. Inclure Haïti dans les Pays Pauvres Très Endettés (PPTE) et annuler une partie de sa dette actuelle ne réparent pas les dommages financiers encourus par ses dettes récentes.
De plus, en 2000, des prêts de la Banque interaméricaine de développement (BID) s’élevant à 150 millions de dollars et devant servir à payer des infrastructures de base ont été bloqués illégalement par le gouvernement américain en guise de pression politique. Cela aussi fit des dommages économiques et humains considérables. Voilà pourquoi ces institutions et gouvernements devraient être tenus responsables pour les méfaits commis envers l’économie et la société haïtienne.
En 2003, quand le gouvernement haïtien demanda le remboursement de l’argent extorqué à Haïti, le gouvernement français a participé a son renversement. Aujourd’hui, le gouvernement français répond à la même demande du CRIME en le menaçant de poursuites judiciaires. Il s’agit à n’en pas douter de réponses inadéquates à une demande qui est moralement, économiquement, et légalement inattaquable. Considérant les besoins financiers criants de ce pays dévasté par le terrible séisme du 12 janvier dernier, nous vous pressons donc, monsieur le Président, de restituer à Haïti, la première république noire de l’histoire, la dette historique de son indépendance.
(signatures)
Un appel pour que la France rembourse à Haïti la dette de son indépendance
Le Monde avec AFP, 16.08.2010
Dans une lettre ouverte au président Nicolas Sarkozy, publiée lundi 16 août dans le quotidien Libération, un groupe d'intellectuels et de responsables politiques appelle la France à rembourser à Haïti 17 milliards d'euros, une estimation des sommes qui furent exigées par Paris en échange de l'indépendance, obtenue en 1804, de son ancienne colonie. Cet appel est notamment signé par le linguiste américain Noam Chomsky, le philosophe français Etienne Balibar, ou encore les eurodéputés écologistes Daniel Cohn-Bendit et Eva Joly.
"Considérant les besoins financiers criants de ce pays dévasté par le terrible séisme du 12 janvier, nous vous pressons donc, monsieur le président, de restituer à Haïti, la première république noire de l'histoire, la dette historique de son indépendance", écrivent les signataires.
"UNE DETTE ILLÉGITIME"
Ils rappellent qu'après l'indépendance d'Haïti, le roi Charles X (1824-1830) imposa aux Haïtiens de payer à la France 90 millions de francs or, sous la menace d'une invasion militaire et d'une restauration de l'esclavage. "Cette indemnité a fait ployer des générations de Haïtiens sous le poids d'une dette illégitime, dette que la nation haïtienne n'a fini de payer qu'en 1947", ajoutent-ils.
Les signataires se présentent comme un "groupe de soutien au comité pour le remboursement immédiat des milliards envolés" d'Haïti. Ce comité est à l'origine de la mise en ligne, le 14 juillet dernier, d'une parodie du site Internet du ministère des affaires étrangères français, sur laquelle était faussement annoncé un remboursement de ces sommes. Le site a également mis en ligne lundi le texte de la pétition ainsi que la liste de la centaine de signataires.
============
Lettre ouverte au président français Nicolas Sarkozy
• Open letter to Nicolas Sarkozy (English version)
Le 16 août, 2010
Dans une lettre ouverte publiée aujourd'hui dans le quotidien français Libération, plus de 90 écrivains, universitaires de renom et autres personnalités mondialement connues demandent publiquement au gouvernement français de restituer les 90 millions de francs or extorqués par la France à Haitï à la suite de son indépendance.
Parmi les signataires, on retrouve le linguiste du MIT Noam Chomsky, la journaliste Naomi Klein, les écrivains Eduardo Galeano et Ariel Dorfman, le professeur de l'Université de Princeton Cornel West, les philosophes français Alain Badiou, Étienne Balibar et Jacques Rancière, ainsi que plusieurs membres du Parlement européen, incluant le militant altermondialiste José Bové. Des membres de l'Assemblée nationale de France et du Québec, de même que Walden Bello, écrivain et membre élu de la Chambre des représentants des Philippines, ont également signé la lettre.
* * *
Le gouvernement français a indiqué qu’il envisageait de poursuivre en justice le Comité pour le Remboursement Immédiat des Milliards Envolés d’Haïti (CRIME) pour le canular inspiré des Yes Men dans lequel la France promettait, le 14 juillet dernier, la restitution de la dette historique d’Haïti.
Nous croyons que l’idéal d’égalité, de fraternité et de liberté cher à la France serait beaucoup mieux servi si, au lieu de dilapider les fonds publics dans des poursuites contre les auteurs du canular, le gouvernement français commençait à rembourser à Haïti les 90 millions de francs or qui lui furent extorqués suite à son indépendance.
Cette “dette de l’indépendance”, aujourd’hui évaluée à bien plus que les 17 milliards d’euros promis dans la fausse annonce du 14 juillet dernier, a forcé de manière illégitime un peuple s’étant libéré de l’esclavage par son indépendance à payer doublement pour sa liberté. Imposée sous menace d’invasion militaire et de la restauration de l’esclavage par le roi français Charles X afin de dédommager les anciens colons propriétaires d’esclaves pour perte “de propriété”, cette indemnité a fait ployer des générations d’Haïtiens sous le poids d’une dette illégitime, dette que la nation haïtienne n’a fini de payer qu’en 1947.
La France n’est pas le seul pays qui a une dette envers Haïti. Après 1947, Haïti a contracté des dettes auprès des banques commerciales et des institutions financières internationales sous la dictature de Duvalier, lequel a ainsi puisé des milliards dans les fonds publics. Les besoins vitaux et les aspirations au développement de générations entières d’Haïtiens ont par le fait même été sacrifiés pour rembourser ces dettes. Inclure Haïti dans les Pays Pauvres Très Endettés (PPTE) et annuler une partie de sa dette actuelle ne réparent pas les dommages financiers encourus par ses dettes récentes.
De plus, en 2000, des prêts de la Banque interaméricaine de développement (BID) s’élevant à 150 millions de dollars et devant servir à payer des infrastructures de base ont été bloqués illégalement par le gouvernement américain en guise de pression politique. Cela aussi fit des dommages économiques et humains considérables. Voilà pourquoi ces institutions et gouvernements devraient être tenus responsables pour les méfaits commis envers l’économie et la société haïtienne.
En 2003, quand le gouvernement haïtien demanda le remboursement de l’argent extorqué à Haïti, le gouvernement français a participé a son renversement. Aujourd’hui, le gouvernement français répond à la même demande du CRIME en le menaçant de poursuites judiciaires. Il s’agit à n’en pas douter de réponses inadéquates à une demande qui est moralement, économiquement, et légalement inattaquable. Considérant les besoins financiers criants de ce pays dévasté par le terrible séisme du 12 janvier dernier, nous vous pressons donc, monsieur le Président, de restituer à Haïti, la première république noire de l’histoire, la dette historique de son indépendance.
(signatures)
Joaquim Nabuco em Yale e Wisconsin: livro da Bem-te-vi
Um livro de que participei, no capítulo Wisconsin, está sendo lançado nesta quinta-feira, dia 19 de agosto, no Rio de Janeiro, conforme convite abaixo.
David K. Jackson (Yale) e Severino Oliveira (Wisconsin), organizadores:
Conferências sobre Joaquim Nabuco (Yale e Wisconsin)
Rio de Janeiro: Editora Bem-te-vi, 2010
Participarão do lançamento os organizadores e grande parte dos autores, mas não poderei estar presente, pois estou a 15 mil kms de distância.
Para compensar minha ausência dou conhecimento de parte do meu capítulo no livro.
Meu capítulo tem este título:
O Brasil e os Estados Unidos antes e depois de Nabuco: uma avaliação de desempenho relativo no plano do desenvolvimento social
Transcrevo os parágrafos iniciais:
A participação de dois grandes países no mundo moderno
O objetivo principal deste ensaio é o de oferecer uma visão comparada do desempenho relativo, em termos de realizações materiais e intelectuais, da sociedade e da economia dos Estados Unidos, por um lado, e do Brasil, por outro, no espaço dos últimos cem anos. O ponto de partida é dado pela releitura da avaliação geral feita pelo Embaixador Joaquim Nabuco sobre a contribuição dos Estados Unidos – uma designação que ele não usa em seu ensaio original, adotando o termo usado pelos próprios americanos, de “América” – à civilização mundial, na sua aula inaugural preparada para a abertura do ano acadêmico de 1909 na Universidade do Wisconsin em Madison.
Em sua ‘Madison lecture’ – cujo título exato é “The Share of America in Civilization”, publicado oportunamente na The American Historical Review (15.1 [1909] 54-65) – Nabuco apresentou o que ele entendia serem as mais importantes contribuições dos Estados Unidos à civilização moderna, que listou assim: imigração, democracia, igualdade de condições sociais para todas as classes da Nação, iniciativa individual, competição e, finalmente, educação, ou melhor, o sistema americano de educação, baseado na autonomia do indivíduo, ou self-reliance. Ele notou, também, o papel da ciência e da inovação no desenvolvimento da civilização contemporânea; mas considerou que, naquele momento, os Estados Unidos não estavam totalmente preparados para desafiar as realizações européias nesses terrenos.
No que se refere ao Brasil e a América Latina, ele comentou, en passant, que os países ibéricos ainda não estavam preparados para desempenhar um grande papel na disseminação da civilização: “É ainda muito cedo para falar da parte reservada à América Latina na história. Ainda não nos foi dada a ordem para entrar no palco; as peças de Deus são muito longas; seus atos são eras inteiras.” (Nabuco, “The Share…”, p. 64). Ele reconhecia as dificuldades que enfrentavam esses países, referiu-se a algumas de suas contribuições, como a participação na Segunda Conferência da Paz da Haia e o vôo de Santos-Dumont, e elogiou a postura pacifista da Constituição brasileira de 1891, única no mundo ao recusar a guerra de conquista.
Este ensaio examinará o ponto de partida dos Estados Unidos e do Brasil, no momento da independência, seguirá seus respectivos processos de desenvolvimento econômico ao longo do século 19 – testemunhado por Nabuco – e estenderá essa avaliação para os cem anos seguintes ao seu discurso. Obviamente, taxas de crescimento do PIB e indicadores nacionais de renda per capita representam abordagens parciais, incompletas e insuficientes aos caminhos divergentes de modernização seguidos pelos Estados Unidos e pelo Brasil durante o “longo século 20”, isto é, aquele que se estende da última década do século anterior até nossa própria época. Provavelmente, mais importante do que as realizações materiais foram: a construção institucional, ou seja, a qualidade da democracia; a natureza meritocrática do sistema educacional, que premia o desempenho individual e a competição saudável; e aquele traço de caráter e de organização institucional especificamente Anglo-Saxão, que sequer possui um equivalente hispânico, chamado accountability (prestação de contas, ou ‘responsabilização’ no desempenho de qualquer cargo público).
David K. Jackson (Yale) e Severino Oliveira (Wisconsin), organizadores:
Conferências sobre Joaquim Nabuco (Yale e Wisconsin)
Rio de Janeiro: Editora Bem-te-vi, 2010
Participarão do lançamento os organizadores e grande parte dos autores, mas não poderei estar presente, pois estou a 15 mil kms de distância.
Para compensar minha ausência dou conhecimento de parte do meu capítulo no livro.
Meu capítulo tem este título:
O Brasil e os Estados Unidos antes e depois de Nabuco: uma avaliação de desempenho relativo no plano do desenvolvimento social
Transcrevo os parágrafos iniciais:
A participação de dois grandes países no mundo moderno
O objetivo principal deste ensaio é o de oferecer uma visão comparada do desempenho relativo, em termos de realizações materiais e intelectuais, da sociedade e da economia dos Estados Unidos, por um lado, e do Brasil, por outro, no espaço dos últimos cem anos. O ponto de partida é dado pela releitura da avaliação geral feita pelo Embaixador Joaquim Nabuco sobre a contribuição dos Estados Unidos – uma designação que ele não usa em seu ensaio original, adotando o termo usado pelos próprios americanos, de “América” – à civilização mundial, na sua aula inaugural preparada para a abertura do ano acadêmico de 1909 na Universidade do Wisconsin em Madison.
Em sua ‘Madison lecture’ – cujo título exato é “The Share of America in Civilization”, publicado oportunamente na The American Historical Review (15.1 [1909] 54-65) – Nabuco apresentou o que ele entendia serem as mais importantes contribuições dos Estados Unidos à civilização moderna, que listou assim: imigração, democracia, igualdade de condições sociais para todas as classes da Nação, iniciativa individual, competição e, finalmente, educação, ou melhor, o sistema americano de educação, baseado na autonomia do indivíduo, ou self-reliance. Ele notou, também, o papel da ciência e da inovação no desenvolvimento da civilização contemporânea; mas considerou que, naquele momento, os Estados Unidos não estavam totalmente preparados para desafiar as realizações européias nesses terrenos.
No que se refere ao Brasil e a América Latina, ele comentou, en passant, que os países ibéricos ainda não estavam preparados para desempenhar um grande papel na disseminação da civilização: “É ainda muito cedo para falar da parte reservada à América Latina na história. Ainda não nos foi dada a ordem para entrar no palco; as peças de Deus são muito longas; seus atos são eras inteiras.” (Nabuco, “The Share…”, p. 64). Ele reconhecia as dificuldades que enfrentavam esses países, referiu-se a algumas de suas contribuições, como a participação na Segunda Conferência da Paz da Haia e o vôo de Santos-Dumont, e elogiou a postura pacifista da Constituição brasileira de 1891, única no mundo ao recusar a guerra de conquista.
Este ensaio examinará o ponto de partida dos Estados Unidos e do Brasil, no momento da independência, seguirá seus respectivos processos de desenvolvimento econômico ao longo do século 19 – testemunhado por Nabuco – e estenderá essa avaliação para os cem anos seguintes ao seu discurso. Obviamente, taxas de crescimento do PIB e indicadores nacionais de renda per capita representam abordagens parciais, incompletas e insuficientes aos caminhos divergentes de modernização seguidos pelos Estados Unidos e pelo Brasil durante o “longo século 20”, isto é, aquele que se estende da última década do século anterior até nossa própria época. Provavelmente, mais importante do que as realizações materiais foram: a construção institucional, ou seja, a qualidade da democracia; a natureza meritocrática do sistema educacional, que premia o desempenho individual e a competição saudável; e aquele traço de caráter e de organização institucional especificamente Anglo-Saxão, que sequer possui um equivalente hispânico, chamado accountability (prestação de contas, ou ‘responsabilização’ no desempenho de qualquer cargo público).
Security Council: Brazil's elusive quest
Brazil Seeking Security
By Stewart Patrick,
Council on Foreign Relations
The National Interest, July 7, 2010
In spring 2010, Brazil made a quixotic effort with Turkey to mediate the West’s long-running conflict with Iran. Although this gambit failed—“We got our fingers burned,” Foreign Minister Celso Amorim confided to The Financial Times—the affair underscored Brazil’s determination to play on the global stage. Ironically, the ploy may also have harmed Brazil’s chances for a UN Security Council seat.
After two decades of galloping growth, Brazil has joined the top rank of emerging powers, just behind China and India. Its diplomatic ambitions have kept pace. Under flamboyant President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil has flexed its muscles within the BRIC coalition, barged into Middle East diplomacy, secured a place in the G20, shaped global climate and trade negotiations, and demanded greater clout within the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
But one prize eludes Brasilia—permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Sixteen years after Amorim formally declared its candidacy, Brazil’s campaign remains stalled by resistance from the permanent five and regional rivals in Latin America. Brazil currently occupies one of the council’s rotating, two-year seats—for a record tenth time—but this has been a poor consolation prize.
Brazil’s meteoric rise presents a quandary for President Obama, who is committed to renovating global institutions to harness rising powers. “The international architecture of the 20th century is buckling,” his new National Security Strategy declares. “International institutions must more effectively represent the world of the 21st century, with a broader voice—and greater responsibilities—for emerging powers.”
Obama’s reform agenda presumably includes enlarging the UN Security Council, the world’s most important (and arguably outdated) institution. And yet, U.S. officials remain wary of opening this Pandora’s box, given the hurdles to securing an actual Charter revision and fears that new members will dilute U.S. influence and weaken council enforcement.
The biggest wild card in council expansion is how new permanent members will behave. Ideally, rising powers would assume new responsibilities and cast off outdated ideologies. But Brazil’s unpredictable behavior suggests that emerging powers may not sing from Washington’s sheet music, even if they are democracies.
Brazil’s candidacy has been a bone of contention since World War II, when the Big Three debated who should join them as veto-wielding permanent members. Churchill ultimately won agreement on liberated France, which Stalin had dismissed as “charming but weak.” Roosevelt secured support for Chiang Kai-shek’s China, on the grounds that they needed at least one Asian member.
Roosevelt also lobbied hard for Brazil. Beyond rewarding the country’s participation in the war, he was impressed by its massive size, resources and potential. He worried that a council without a permanent Latin American member would undermine hemispheric solidarity, and that a dissatisfied Brazil might quit the UN altogether—just as it had left the League of Nations when denied a seat on the League Council.
Other U.S. officials were skeptical. Brazil was in no way a great power, and treating it as one would undermine the council’s credibility. Moreover, Brazil’s selection would antagonize its Spanish-speaking neighbors, while emboldening other regional powers to make similar claims. Despite Roosevelt’s support, Brazil’s bid was ultimately thwarted by London and Moscow.
A lifetime later, these historical debates—over Brazil’s great-power status, relationship to Latin America, potential contributions to global security and likely behavior as a permanent member—remain relevant.
Brazil is still not Latin America’s natural representative. Lula has pursued regional diplomacy, but few South American countries recognize Lusophone Brazil as their leader. Brasilia got little hemispheric support for its energetic council bid in 2004–2005, and Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela will surely oppose any future efforts. More fundamentally, the issue of regional representation is more appropriately addressed in the council’s elected membership, leaving permanent status to great powers able to guarantee global order.
The question remains, however, whether Brazil is a great power. Brazil has obvious strengths, ranking fifth globally in area and population, and eighth in the size of its economy (which has world-class agriculture, aerospace and biofuels sectors). Recent discoveries place it in the top ten in proven oil and gas reserves, and it has amassed huge foreign-exchange holdings. Its environmental assets include massive mineral deposits, rich biodiversity and the largest renewable freshwater resources on earth. Despite the economic crisis, Brazil will probably grow 5 percent in 2010.
And then there are Brasilia’s enviable “soft power” resources. An open, vibrant and multiethnic democracy, Brazil is widely admired as a champion of the developing world and equitable globalization. The Itamaraty, the country’s sophisticated diplomatic corps, speaks with pride of Brazil’s “diplomatic GDP,” and the country has expanded its global presence by opening scores of embassies and consulates since the turn of the century.
What is striking about Brazil’s great-power claims is that they are framed almost entirely in economic (and, to a lesser degree, cultural) terms. Whereas the other BRICs have invested in hard power, Brazil has traditionally devalued its military, instead emphasizing multilateral cooperation within international institutions. This posture is partly a happy accident of geography, which left Brazil the biggest player in a peaceful U.S. sphere of influence. Insulated from the Hobbesian aspects of global anarchy, Brazil was long free to focus on development at home and conflict resolution abroad.
Brasilia’s military power is growing but remains modest. It has nearly three hundred thousand military personnel, ranking fifteenth globally. Its $15.3 billion military budget represents only 2.65 percent of U.S. defense spending. Although it has one aircraft carrier, Brazil has limited capacity to project force abroad. This low military profile seems inconsistent with the responsibilities of a permanent member.
Peacekeeping is Brazil’s most visible contribution to world security. Nearly one thousand three hundred Brazilian troops are deployed in Haiti, where it leads the MINUSTAH mission. Still, Brazil ranks only fourteenth among UN troop contributors, well behind India, Nigeria, Egypt and others. It provides less than 1 percent of the UN’s regular budget—and only 0.2 percent of its peacekeeping budget. In sum, Brazil’s investments in international security are useful, but not impressive.
As important as what Brazil brings to the table is how it would behave as a permanent member. Would it be a stalwart champion of international security? Or would it be an unreliable partner that plays to the galleries? The answers to date are not necessarily comforting.
As Brazil emerges on the world stage, it is increasingly whipsawed between its dual identity as a major global player and as a card-carrying member of the Group of 77. Lula aspires to contribute to global peace, but his attachment to South-South solidarity makes him reluctant to back effective enforcement actions that are a cornerstone of world order.
This duality has some potential advantages, allowing Brazil to broker compromises on issues like climate change between the global North and South. But this split personality raises fundamental questions about whether Brazil, as a permanent member of the Security Council, would be willing to make hard decisions on core matters of peace and security.
Most damaging to Brazil’s Security Council bid is a growing perception in Washington that Lula’s foreign policy is driven by anti-Americanism. To be sure, Brazil and the United States have never been bosom buddies, as Brazil has sought to insulate itself from U.S. hegemony. But the Lula government has adopted a revisionist global agenda often antithetical to Washington’s own. This confrontation runs counter to the long-term interests of both parties, which are far more aligned than opposed.
Also problematic is Brazil’s absolutist position on the principle of nonintervention. Under Lula, Brazil has repeatedly invoked the mantra of state sovereignty to resist U.S.-supported enforcement action against governments that commit gross human-rights abuses like Burma, Sudan and Zimbabwe.
Lula’s public embrace of Iran as a “great partner” is particularly worrisome. Brazil’s misadventure—and its recent vote against a fourth round of UN sanctions—has increased doubts about Brazil’s determination to prevent nuclear proliferation. (This is somewhat ironic, as Brazil is a member in good standing of all major nuclear regimes, it is a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America, and it is prevented by its constitution from developing an atomic arsenal.)
Before spearheading movement on council enlargement, Washington must be confident that any new permanent members will behave as responsible stakeholders. “Permanent,” after all, is quite a long time. Brazil today seems more comfortable with being a global power than assuming the mantle of a global leader.
In six months, Lula and his outsized personality will be gone. This transition will give his successor the opportunity to chart a less erratic foreign-policy course.
“Brazil is not a serious country,” Charles de Gaulle once cruelly said. If it is serious about UN Security Council reform, Brasilia will need to take a more vigorous line against violators of UNSC resolutions, including those guilty of gross human-rights violations or nuclear proliferation. Brazil will also have to reconsider is historic support for state sovereignty and noninterference in light of the UNSC’s troubling docket.
Stewart Patrick is a senior fellow and director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations
By Stewart Patrick,
Council on Foreign Relations
The National Interest, July 7, 2010
In spring 2010, Brazil made a quixotic effort with Turkey to mediate the West’s long-running conflict with Iran. Although this gambit failed—“We got our fingers burned,” Foreign Minister Celso Amorim confided to The Financial Times—the affair underscored Brazil’s determination to play on the global stage. Ironically, the ploy may also have harmed Brazil’s chances for a UN Security Council seat.
After two decades of galloping growth, Brazil has joined the top rank of emerging powers, just behind China and India. Its diplomatic ambitions have kept pace. Under flamboyant President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil has flexed its muscles within the BRIC coalition, barged into Middle East diplomacy, secured a place in the G20, shaped global climate and trade negotiations, and demanded greater clout within the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
But one prize eludes Brasilia—permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Sixteen years after Amorim formally declared its candidacy, Brazil’s campaign remains stalled by resistance from the permanent five and regional rivals in Latin America. Brazil currently occupies one of the council’s rotating, two-year seats—for a record tenth time—but this has been a poor consolation prize.
Brazil’s meteoric rise presents a quandary for President Obama, who is committed to renovating global institutions to harness rising powers. “The international architecture of the 20th century is buckling,” his new National Security Strategy declares. “International institutions must more effectively represent the world of the 21st century, with a broader voice—and greater responsibilities—for emerging powers.”
Obama’s reform agenda presumably includes enlarging the UN Security Council, the world’s most important (and arguably outdated) institution. And yet, U.S. officials remain wary of opening this Pandora’s box, given the hurdles to securing an actual Charter revision and fears that new members will dilute U.S. influence and weaken council enforcement.
The biggest wild card in council expansion is how new permanent members will behave. Ideally, rising powers would assume new responsibilities and cast off outdated ideologies. But Brazil’s unpredictable behavior suggests that emerging powers may not sing from Washington’s sheet music, even if they are democracies.
Brazil’s candidacy has been a bone of contention since World War II, when the Big Three debated who should join them as veto-wielding permanent members. Churchill ultimately won agreement on liberated France, which Stalin had dismissed as “charming but weak.” Roosevelt secured support for Chiang Kai-shek’s China, on the grounds that they needed at least one Asian member.
Roosevelt also lobbied hard for Brazil. Beyond rewarding the country’s participation in the war, he was impressed by its massive size, resources and potential. He worried that a council without a permanent Latin American member would undermine hemispheric solidarity, and that a dissatisfied Brazil might quit the UN altogether—just as it had left the League of Nations when denied a seat on the League Council.
Other U.S. officials were skeptical. Brazil was in no way a great power, and treating it as one would undermine the council’s credibility. Moreover, Brazil’s selection would antagonize its Spanish-speaking neighbors, while emboldening other regional powers to make similar claims. Despite Roosevelt’s support, Brazil’s bid was ultimately thwarted by London and Moscow.
A lifetime later, these historical debates—over Brazil’s great-power status, relationship to Latin America, potential contributions to global security and likely behavior as a permanent member—remain relevant.
Brazil is still not Latin America’s natural representative. Lula has pursued regional diplomacy, but few South American countries recognize Lusophone Brazil as their leader. Brasilia got little hemispheric support for its energetic council bid in 2004–2005, and Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela will surely oppose any future efforts. More fundamentally, the issue of regional representation is more appropriately addressed in the council’s elected membership, leaving permanent status to great powers able to guarantee global order.
The question remains, however, whether Brazil is a great power. Brazil has obvious strengths, ranking fifth globally in area and population, and eighth in the size of its economy (which has world-class agriculture, aerospace and biofuels sectors). Recent discoveries place it in the top ten in proven oil and gas reserves, and it has amassed huge foreign-exchange holdings. Its environmental assets include massive mineral deposits, rich biodiversity and the largest renewable freshwater resources on earth. Despite the economic crisis, Brazil will probably grow 5 percent in 2010.
And then there are Brasilia’s enviable “soft power” resources. An open, vibrant and multiethnic democracy, Brazil is widely admired as a champion of the developing world and equitable globalization. The Itamaraty, the country’s sophisticated diplomatic corps, speaks with pride of Brazil’s “diplomatic GDP,” and the country has expanded its global presence by opening scores of embassies and consulates since the turn of the century.
What is striking about Brazil’s great-power claims is that they are framed almost entirely in economic (and, to a lesser degree, cultural) terms. Whereas the other BRICs have invested in hard power, Brazil has traditionally devalued its military, instead emphasizing multilateral cooperation within international institutions. This posture is partly a happy accident of geography, which left Brazil the biggest player in a peaceful U.S. sphere of influence. Insulated from the Hobbesian aspects of global anarchy, Brazil was long free to focus on development at home and conflict resolution abroad.
Brasilia’s military power is growing but remains modest. It has nearly three hundred thousand military personnel, ranking fifteenth globally. Its $15.3 billion military budget represents only 2.65 percent of U.S. defense spending. Although it has one aircraft carrier, Brazil has limited capacity to project force abroad. This low military profile seems inconsistent with the responsibilities of a permanent member.
Peacekeeping is Brazil’s most visible contribution to world security. Nearly one thousand three hundred Brazilian troops are deployed in Haiti, where it leads the MINUSTAH mission. Still, Brazil ranks only fourteenth among UN troop contributors, well behind India, Nigeria, Egypt and others. It provides less than 1 percent of the UN’s regular budget—and only 0.2 percent of its peacekeeping budget. In sum, Brazil’s investments in international security are useful, but not impressive.
As important as what Brazil brings to the table is how it would behave as a permanent member. Would it be a stalwart champion of international security? Or would it be an unreliable partner that plays to the galleries? The answers to date are not necessarily comforting.
As Brazil emerges on the world stage, it is increasingly whipsawed between its dual identity as a major global player and as a card-carrying member of the Group of 77. Lula aspires to contribute to global peace, but his attachment to South-South solidarity makes him reluctant to back effective enforcement actions that are a cornerstone of world order.
This duality has some potential advantages, allowing Brazil to broker compromises on issues like climate change between the global North and South. But this split personality raises fundamental questions about whether Brazil, as a permanent member of the Security Council, would be willing to make hard decisions on core matters of peace and security.
Most damaging to Brazil’s Security Council bid is a growing perception in Washington that Lula’s foreign policy is driven by anti-Americanism. To be sure, Brazil and the United States have never been bosom buddies, as Brazil has sought to insulate itself from U.S. hegemony. But the Lula government has adopted a revisionist global agenda often antithetical to Washington’s own. This confrontation runs counter to the long-term interests of both parties, which are far more aligned than opposed.
Also problematic is Brazil’s absolutist position on the principle of nonintervention. Under Lula, Brazil has repeatedly invoked the mantra of state sovereignty to resist U.S.-supported enforcement action against governments that commit gross human-rights abuses like Burma, Sudan and Zimbabwe.
Lula’s public embrace of Iran as a “great partner” is particularly worrisome. Brazil’s misadventure—and its recent vote against a fourth round of UN sanctions—has increased doubts about Brazil’s determination to prevent nuclear proliferation. (This is somewhat ironic, as Brazil is a member in good standing of all major nuclear regimes, it is a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America, and it is prevented by its constitution from developing an atomic arsenal.)
Before spearheading movement on council enlargement, Washington must be confident that any new permanent members will behave as responsible stakeholders. “Permanent,” after all, is quite a long time. Brazil today seems more comfortable with being a global power than assuming the mantle of a global leader.
In six months, Lula and his outsized personality will be gone. This transition will give his successor the opportunity to chart a less erratic foreign-policy course.
“Brazil is not a serious country,” Charles de Gaulle once cruelly said. If it is serious about UN Security Council reform, Brasilia will need to take a more vigorous line against violators of UNSC resolutions, including those guilty of gross human-rights violations or nuclear proliferation. Brazil will also have to reconsider is historic support for state sovereignty and noninterference in light of the UNSC’s troubling docket.
Stewart Patrick is a senior fellow and director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations
Estranho conselho: nao se deixar levar pela globalizacao...
Não sei exatamente o que os países latino-americanos deveriam fazer para seguir ao pé da letra o conselho do presidente uruguaio: talvez fechar o país aos intercâmbios externos, controlar o câmbio e os fluxos de capitais, proteger as indústrias nacionais, conceber e implementar políticas setoriais que não dependam da interface externa do país, enfim, fazer tudo o que for humanamente possível para insular o país das crises externas e da competição externa.
Mas, espera aí: tudo isso já foi feito e implementado no Brasil e na América Latina durante anos e décadas. Acho que não deu certo, do contrário os países da região seriam verdadeiras potências econômicas e não essas economias periclitantes e erráticas como foram durante muitos anos.
Os países só deslancharam, realmente, quando se liberaram de todas essas políticas protecionistas e dirigistas, como no Chile e no próprio Brasil.
Parece que tem gente que quer fazer o Brasil e a América Latina retornarem para trás.
Enfim, alguns já conseguiram, como sabemos quem são...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Uruguay: Mujica exhorta a Latinoamérica a no dejarse manejar por la globalización
Infolatam
Asunción, 16 de agosto de 2010
El presidente de Uruguay, José Mujica, abogó hoy por la cohesión latinoamericana y exhortó a los países a no dejarse manejar por la globalización, tras reunirse con el mandatario paraguayo, Fernando Lugo, en el Palacio de López, sede gubernativa, en Asunción.
“Somos absolutamente conscientes de que tenemos que juntarnos en esta época inevitable de la globalización lo más posible para manejarla y no que esta nos maneje”, expresó Mujica durante un breve discurso, en el último día de su primera visita oficial a Paraguay, único país del Mercosur al que no había viajado.
Mas, espera aí: tudo isso já foi feito e implementado no Brasil e na América Latina durante anos e décadas. Acho que não deu certo, do contrário os países da região seriam verdadeiras potências econômicas e não essas economias periclitantes e erráticas como foram durante muitos anos.
Os países só deslancharam, realmente, quando se liberaram de todas essas políticas protecionistas e dirigistas, como no Chile e no próprio Brasil.
Parece que tem gente que quer fazer o Brasil e a América Latina retornarem para trás.
Enfim, alguns já conseguiram, como sabemos quem são...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Uruguay: Mujica exhorta a Latinoamérica a no dejarse manejar por la globalización
Infolatam
Asunción, 16 de agosto de 2010
El presidente de Uruguay, José Mujica, abogó hoy por la cohesión latinoamericana y exhortó a los países a no dejarse manejar por la globalización, tras reunirse con el mandatario paraguayo, Fernando Lugo, en el Palacio de López, sede gubernativa, en Asunción.
“Somos absolutamente conscientes de que tenemos que juntarnos en esta época inevitable de la globalización lo más posible para manejarla y no que esta nos maneje”, expresó Mujica durante un breve discurso, en el último día de su primera visita oficial a Paraguay, único país del Mercosur al que no había viajado.
Iran: the case for caution - Foreign Policy
A matéria abaixo deve ser lido em explícita conexão com um outro post aqui colocado:
Iran: The Point of No Return - The Atlantic
domingo, 15 de agosto de 2010
The Weak Case for War with Iran
BY FLYNT LEVERETT, HILLARY MANN LEVERETT
Foreign Policy, August 11, 2010
Jeffrey Goldberg's new article in the Atlantic is deeply reported -- and deeply wrong about the Middle East. But it's his misunderstanding of America that is most dangerous of all.
Amid widespread skepticism that sanctions will stop Tehran's nuclear development and grudging, belated recognition that the Green Movement will not deliver a more pliable Iranian government, a growing number of commentators are asking the question, "What does President Obama do next on Iran?"
For hawks, the answer is war. Last month, in The Weekly Standard, Reuel Marc Gerecht made the case for an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear targets. With the publication of Jeffrey Goldberg's "The Point of No Return" in the Atlantic, the campaign for war against Iran is now arguing that the United States should attack so Israel won't have to.
To be sure, Goldberg never explicitly writes that "the United States should bomb Iran." But he argues that, unless Israel is persuaded that Obama will order an attack, "there is a better than 50 percent chance that Israel will launch a strike by next July." And Goldberg's Israeli interlocutors readily acknowledge that the United States could mount a far more robust air campaign against Iranian nuclear targets than Israel could. A much more limited Israeli strike "may cause Iran to redouble its efforts-this time with a measure of international sympathy-to create a nuclear arsenal [and] cause chaos for America in the Middle East," he acknowledges. Goldberg believes the Obama administration understands that "perhaps the best way to obviate a military strike on Iran is to make the threat of a strike by the Americans seem real." But there is a clear implication that, if threat alone does not work, better for the United States to pull the trigger than Israel.
Goldberg's reporting on Israeli thinking about Iran -- reflecting interviews with "roughly 40 current and past Israeli decision makers" -- including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu -- is exemplary. Unlike Gerecht, Goldberg does not skirt the potentially negative consequences of war. But Goldberg's reporting also reveals that the case for attacking Iran -- especially for America to attack so Israel won't -- is even flimsier than the case Goldberg helped make for invading Iraq in 2002, in a New Yorker article alleging that "the relationship between Saddam's regime and Al Qaeda is far closer than previously thought."
Goldberg's case for war on Iran starts with the Holocaust -- and a view of the Islamic Republic as a latter-day Third Reich, under ideologically obsessed, anti-Semitic leadership to which "rational deterrence theory ... might not apply." Israelis across the political spectrum have bought the argument that Iran is an "existential threat," he writes. But, as Goldberg himself acknowledges, this is not true. He recounts his realization of the "contradiction" captured in a photograph of Israeli fighter planes flying over Auschwitz that he saw "in more than a dozen different offices" at Israel's defense ministry:
"If the Jewish physicists who created Israel's nuclear arsenal could somehow have ripped a hole in the space-time continuum and sent a squadron of fighters back to 1942, then the problem of Auschwitz would have been solved in 1942. In other words, the creation of a serious Jewish military capability-a nuclear bomb, say, or the Israeli air force-during World War II would have meant a quicker end to the Holocaust. It is fair to say, then, that the existence of the Israeli air force, and of Israel's nuclear arsenal, means axiomatically that the Iranian nuclear program is not the equivalent of Auschwitz." (emphasis added)
Moreover, the Islamic Republic is not Hitler's Germany, particularly regarding Jews. No matter how many anti-Zionist or even anti-Semitic quotes Gerecht, Goldberg, and others may marshal from Iranian politicians, inconvenient realities undermine the Islamic Republic/Third Reich analogy: Roughly 25,000-30,000 Jews continue living in Iran, with civil status equal to other Iranians and a constitutionally guaranteed parliamentary seat. It is illegal in the Islamic Republic for Muslims to consume alcohol --but Jews (and Christians) are permitted wine for religious ceremonies and personal consumption. Iranian politicians frequently question Israel's legitimacy and predict demographics will ultimately produce a "one-state" solution in Palestine. It's true that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made provocative statements questioning the Holocaust. But neither Ahmadinejad nor any other Iranian leader has threatened to destroy Israel by initiating military conflict.
Fixating on Ahmadinejad's rhetoric obscures the fact that normalized U.S.-Iranian relations would profoundly benefit Israel -- just as Henry Kissinger's engagement with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in the 1970s decisively changed regional dynamics to preclude any possibility of another generalized Arab-Israeli war. It is only in retrospect that Sadat -- an open admirer of Hitler who worked with Germany against Britain during World War II and not only made vicious anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic statements but launched a war that killed and injured thousands of Israelis -- is depicted as a "man of peace."
Goldberg ascribes Netanyahu's concern about the "existential threat" from Iran to the influence of Netanyahu's father -- a revisionist scholar who upended historiography of the Spanish Inquisition by focusing on its anti-Semitic roots. But Netanyahu père's worldview does not permit rational calculation of threat or diplomatic contributions to Israel's security. Ben Zion Netanyahu opposed Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin over peace with Egypt and, in an interview last year, said of Arabs that they are "an enemy by essence ... [T]he only thing that might move the Arabs from the rejectionist position is force."
This is a strategically obtuse outlook, the influence of which on the current Israeli government's decision-making can only be pernicious. But Goldberg's reporting on his conversations with Israeli generals, national-security policymakers, and politicians makes clear that, in fact, those at the top of Israel's political order understand Iran's nuclear program is not an "existential threat." His interlocutors recognize Iran is unlikely to invite its own destruction by attacking Israel directly. Rather, they say, a nuclear Iran "will progressively undermine [Israel's] ability to retain its most creative and productive citizens," according to Defense Minister Ehud Barak.
"The real threat to Zionism is the dilution of quality," Barak tells Goldberg. "Jews know that they can land on their feet in any corner of the world. The real test for us is to make Israel such an attractive place, such a cutting-edge place in human society, education, culture, science, quality of life, that even American Jewish young people want to come here ... Our young people can consciously decide to go other places [and] stay out of here by choice."
Ephraim Sneh, retired general and former deputy defense minister, also describes the non-existential nature of the Iranian "threat":
"[Israelis] are good citizens, and brave citizens, but the dynamics of life are such that if ... someone finishes a Ph.D. and they are offered a job in America, they might stay there ... The bottom line is that we would have an accelerated brain drain."
In other words, Israeli elites want the United States to attack Iran's nuclear program -- with the potentially negative repercussions that Goldberg acknowledges -- so that Israel will not experience "a dilution of quality" or "an accelerated brain drain." Sneh argues that "if Israel is no longer understood by its 6 million Jewish citizens, and by the roughly 7 million Jews who live outside of Israel, to be a ‘natural safe haven', then its raison d'être will have been subverted."
To be sure, the United States has an abiding commitment to Israel's security. But, just as surely, preventing "dilution of quality" or bolstering Israelis' perceptions regarding their country's raison d'être can never give an American president a just or strategically sound cause for initiating war. And make no mistake: Bombing Iran's nuclear facilities would mean war.
Netanyahu himself admits that the challenges posed by a nuclear Iran "are more subtle than a direct attack," noting that "you'd create a sea change in the balance of power in our area." This is another major point in the Israeli case for war that deserves unpacking -- and debunking. Goldberg points out that "Persian and Jewish civilizations have not forever been enemies." In fact, the Islamic Republic and Israel have not forever been enemies. During the Iran-Iraq war, Israel -- over Washington's objections -- sold weapons to Iran, and was involved in U.S. President Ronald Reagan's subsequent outreach to Tehran (which imploded in the Iran-Contra scandal).
However, Israeli-Iranian geopolitical dynamics changed with the Cold War's end, the Soviet Union's collapse, and the removal of Iraq's military as a factor in the regional balance of power through the first Gulf War. Since then, Israel has deemed Iran its principal rival for regional hegemony -- and the Islamic Republic views what it sees as Israel's hegemonic ambitions as threatening its vital interests.
Israeli elites want to preserve a regional balance of power strongly tilted in Israel's favor and what an Israeli general described to Goldberg as "freedom of action" --the freedom to use force unilaterally, anytime, for whatever purpose Israel wants. The problem with Iranian nuclear capability -- not just weapons, but capability -- is that it might begin constraining Israel's currently unconstrained "freedom of action." In May, retired Israeli military officers, diplomats, and intelligence officials conducted a war game that assumed Iran had acquired "nuclear weapons capability." Participants subsequently told Reuters that such capability does not pose an "existential threat" to Israel -- but "would blunt Israel's military autonomy."
One may appreciate Israel's desire to maximize its military autonomy. But, in an already conflicted region, Israel's assertion of military hegemony is itself a significant contributor to instability and the risk of conflict. Certainly, maximizing Israel's freedom of unilateral military initiative is not a valid rationale for the United States to start a war with Iran. Just imagine how Obama would explain such reasoning to the American people.
So, what should Obama do? Goldberg concludes with a story told by Israeli President Shimon Peres about Israel's founding prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. When Ben-Gurion met U.S. president-elect John F. Kennedy in late 1960, Kennedy asked what he could do for Israel. Ben-Gurion replied, "What you can do is be a great president of the United States."
Regarding Iran, what constitutes "greatness" for Obama? Clearly, Obama will not achieve greatness by acquiescing to another fraudulently advocated and strategically damaging war in the Middle East. He could, however, achieve greatness by doing with Iran what Richard Nixon did with Egypt and China -- realigning previously antagonistic relations with important countries in ways that continue serving the interests of America and its allies more than three decades later.
Related:
It's Time to Get Tough on Iran
Why it could be Tehran -- not Washington -- that provokes a war.
By Michael Eisenstadt and David Crist
Iran: The Point of No Return - The Atlantic
domingo, 15 de agosto de 2010
The Weak Case for War with Iran
BY FLYNT LEVERETT, HILLARY MANN LEVERETT
Foreign Policy, August 11, 2010
Jeffrey Goldberg's new article in the Atlantic is deeply reported -- and deeply wrong about the Middle East. But it's his misunderstanding of America that is most dangerous of all.
Amid widespread skepticism that sanctions will stop Tehran's nuclear development and grudging, belated recognition that the Green Movement will not deliver a more pliable Iranian government, a growing number of commentators are asking the question, "What does President Obama do next on Iran?"
For hawks, the answer is war. Last month, in The Weekly Standard, Reuel Marc Gerecht made the case for an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear targets. With the publication of Jeffrey Goldberg's "The Point of No Return" in the Atlantic, the campaign for war against Iran is now arguing that the United States should attack so Israel won't have to.
To be sure, Goldberg never explicitly writes that "the United States should bomb Iran." But he argues that, unless Israel is persuaded that Obama will order an attack, "there is a better than 50 percent chance that Israel will launch a strike by next July." And Goldberg's Israeli interlocutors readily acknowledge that the United States could mount a far more robust air campaign against Iranian nuclear targets than Israel could. A much more limited Israeli strike "may cause Iran to redouble its efforts-this time with a measure of international sympathy-to create a nuclear arsenal [and] cause chaos for America in the Middle East," he acknowledges. Goldberg believes the Obama administration understands that "perhaps the best way to obviate a military strike on Iran is to make the threat of a strike by the Americans seem real." But there is a clear implication that, if threat alone does not work, better for the United States to pull the trigger than Israel.
Goldberg's reporting on Israeli thinking about Iran -- reflecting interviews with "roughly 40 current and past Israeli decision makers" -- including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu -- is exemplary. Unlike Gerecht, Goldberg does not skirt the potentially negative consequences of war. But Goldberg's reporting also reveals that the case for attacking Iran -- especially for America to attack so Israel won't -- is even flimsier than the case Goldberg helped make for invading Iraq in 2002, in a New Yorker article alleging that "the relationship between Saddam's regime and Al Qaeda is far closer than previously thought."
Goldberg's case for war on Iran starts with the Holocaust -- and a view of the Islamic Republic as a latter-day Third Reich, under ideologically obsessed, anti-Semitic leadership to which "rational deterrence theory ... might not apply." Israelis across the political spectrum have bought the argument that Iran is an "existential threat," he writes. But, as Goldberg himself acknowledges, this is not true. He recounts his realization of the "contradiction" captured in a photograph of Israeli fighter planes flying over Auschwitz that he saw "in more than a dozen different offices" at Israel's defense ministry:
"If the Jewish physicists who created Israel's nuclear arsenal could somehow have ripped a hole in the space-time continuum and sent a squadron of fighters back to 1942, then the problem of Auschwitz would have been solved in 1942. In other words, the creation of a serious Jewish military capability-a nuclear bomb, say, or the Israeli air force-during World War II would have meant a quicker end to the Holocaust. It is fair to say, then, that the existence of the Israeli air force, and of Israel's nuclear arsenal, means axiomatically that the Iranian nuclear program is not the equivalent of Auschwitz." (emphasis added)
Moreover, the Islamic Republic is not Hitler's Germany, particularly regarding Jews. No matter how many anti-Zionist or even anti-Semitic quotes Gerecht, Goldberg, and others may marshal from Iranian politicians, inconvenient realities undermine the Islamic Republic/Third Reich analogy: Roughly 25,000-30,000 Jews continue living in Iran, with civil status equal to other Iranians and a constitutionally guaranteed parliamentary seat. It is illegal in the Islamic Republic for Muslims to consume alcohol --but Jews (and Christians) are permitted wine for religious ceremonies and personal consumption. Iranian politicians frequently question Israel's legitimacy and predict demographics will ultimately produce a "one-state" solution in Palestine. It's true that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made provocative statements questioning the Holocaust. But neither Ahmadinejad nor any other Iranian leader has threatened to destroy Israel by initiating military conflict.
Fixating on Ahmadinejad's rhetoric obscures the fact that normalized U.S.-Iranian relations would profoundly benefit Israel -- just as Henry Kissinger's engagement with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in the 1970s decisively changed regional dynamics to preclude any possibility of another generalized Arab-Israeli war. It is only in retrospect that Sadat -- an open admirer of Hitler who worked with Germany against Britain during World War II and not only made vicious anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic statements but launched a war that killed and injured thousands of Israelis -- is depicted as a "man of peace."
Goldberg ascribes Netanyahu's concern about the "existential threat" from Iran to the influence of Netanyahu's father -- a revisionist scholar who upended historiography of the Spanish Inquisition by focusing on its anti-Semitic roots. But Netanyahu père's worldview does not permit rational calculation of threat or diplomatic contributions to Israel's security. Ben Zion Netanyahu opposed Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin over peace with Egypt and, in an interview last year, said of Arabs that they are "an enemy by essence ... [T]he only thing that might move the Arabs from the rejectionist position is force."
This is a strategically obtuse outlook, the influence of which on the current Israeli government's decision-making can only be pernicious. But Goldberg's reporting on his conversations with Israeli generals, national-security policymakers, and politicians makes clear that, in fact, those at the top of Israel's political order understand Iran's nuclear program is not an "existential threat." His interlocutors recognize Iran is unlikely to invite its own destruction by attacking Israel directly. Rather, they say, a nuclear Iran "will progressively undermine [Israel's] ability to retain its most creative and productive citizens," according to Defense Minister Ehud Barak.
"The real threat to Zionism is the dilution of quality," Barak tells Goldberg. "Jews know that they can land on their feet in any corner of the world. The real test for us is to make Israel such an attractive place, such a cutting-edge place in human society, education, culture, science, quality of life, that even American Jewish young people want to come here ... Our young people can consciously decide to go other places [and] stay out of here by choice."
Ephraim Sneh, retired general and former deputy defense minister, also describes the non-existential nature of the Iranian "threat":
"[Israelis] are good citizens, and brave citizens, but the dynamics of life are such that if ... someone finishes a Ph.D. and they are offered a job in America, they might stay there ... The bottom line is that we would have an accelerated brain drain."
In other words, Israeli elites want the United States to attack Iran's nuclear program -- with the potentially negative repercussions that Goldberg acknowledges -- so that Israel will not experience "a dilution of quality" or "an accelerated brain drain." Sneh argues that "if Israel is no longer understood by its 6 million Jewish citizens, and by the roughly 7 million Jews who live outside of Israel, to be a ‘natural safe haven', then its raison d'être will have been subverted."
To be sure, the United States has an abiding commitment to Israel's security. But, just as surely, preventing "dilution of quality" or bolstering Israelis' perceptions regarding their country's raison d'être can never give an American president a just or strategically sound cause for initiating war. And make no mistake: Bombing Iran's nuclear facilities would mean war.
Netanyahu himself admits that the challenges posed by a nuclear Iran "are more subtle than a direct attack," noting that "you'd create a sea change in the balance of power in our area." This is another major point in the Israeli case for war that deserves unpacking -- and debunking. Goldberg points out that "Persian and Jewish civilizations have not forever been enemies." In fact, the Islamic Republic and Israel have not forever been enemies. During the Iran-Iraq war, Israel -- over Washington's objections -- sold weapons to Iran, and was involved in U.S. President Ronald Reagan's subsequent outreach to Tehran (which imploded in the Iran-Contra scandal).
However, Israeli-Iranian geopolitical dynamics changed with the Cold War's end, the Soviet Union's collapse, and the removal of Iraq's military as a factor in the regional balance of power through the first Gulf War. Since then, Israel has deemed Iran its principal rival for regional hegemony -- and the Islamic Republic views what it sees as Israel's hegemonic ambitions as threatening its vital interests.
Israeli elites want to preserve a regional balance of power strongly tilted in Israel's favor and what an Israeli general described to Goldberg as "freedom of action" --the freedom to use force unilaterally, anytime, for whatever purpose Israel wants. The problem with Iranian nuclear capability -- not just weapons, but capability -- is that it might begin constraining Israel's currently unconstrained "freedom of action." In May, retired Israeli military officers, diplomats, and intelligence officials conducted a war game that assumed Iran had acquired "nuclear weapons capability." Participants subsequently told Reuters that such capability does not pose an "existential threat" to Israel -- but "would blunt Israel's military autonomy."
One may appreciate Israel's desire to maximize its military autonomy. But, in an already conflicted region, Israel's assertion of military hegemony is itself a significant contributor to instability and the risk of conflict. Certainly, maximizing Israel's freedom of unilateral military initiative is not a valid rationale for the United States to start a war with Iran. Just imagine how Obama would explain such reasoning to the American people.
So, what should Obama do? Goldberg concludes with a story told by Israeli President Shimon Peres about Israel's founding prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. When Ben-Gurion met U.S. president-elect John F. Kennedy in late 1960, Kennedy asked what he could do for Israel. Ben-Gurion replied, "What you can do is be a great president of the United States."
Regarding Iran, what constitutes "greatness" for Obama? Clearly, Obama will not achieve greatness by acquiescing to another fraudulently advocated and strategically damaging war in the Middle East. He could, however, achieve greatness by doing with Iran what Richard Nixon did with Egypt and China -- realigning previously antagonistic relations with important countries in ways that continue serving the interests of America and its allies more than three decades later.
Related:
It's Time to Get Tough on Iran
Why it could be Tehran -- not Washington -- that provokes a war.
By Michael Eisenstadt and David Crist
terça-feira, 17 de agosto de 2010
Auto-censura: um retrato do pais a que chegamos...
Da coluna do jornalista gaúcho Diego Casagrande (17.08.2010):
ARTIGO:
QUEM PRECISA DE CENSURA?
por Glauco Fonseca
Dia desses, um jornalista catarinense dos bons e amigo melhor ainda me confidenciou, magoado, que estava sofrendo pressões do veículo no qual trabalha por conta de suas posições políticas. Contou-me que, durante muitos anos, exprimira suas convicções livremente, pois que eram muito semelhantes ao pensamento e a opção editorial dos mesmos veículos, dos mesmos patrões. No caminho da constatação de que as coisas mudaram ? e como -, um belo dia ele foi chamado a uma conversa com o editor-chefe, que, por sua vez, havia sido provocado pelo diretor comercial que, por coincidência, era filho do patriarca. Ele foi informado que o cliente privado XPTO estaria tirando a verba da publicação caso ele permanecesse com sua linha de posicionamento. Ao ouvir o relato, perguntei a mim mesmo quem precisa de uma censura governamental se já temos, entre nós, mecanismos horrorosos de opressão e intimidação, públicos e também privados, capazes de submeter inclusive aqueles que, outrora, foram formidáveis e providenciais líderes de opinião?
Até mesmo o atual governo se deu conta de que não precisa mais se preocupar com essas polêmicas trivialidades. Descobriu que é muito mais fácil ligar para a agência de propaganda, que liga para o dono do jornal, que chama o jornalista e apela para o seu bom senso. Fulano, estou com as mãos atadas e precisamos deste patrocínio...se tu continuares dando porrada, vamos perder esta receita e não poderemos mais arcar com teu polpudo salário....
Depois desta descoberta, tão vil ou ainda pior do que invasões truculentas e armadas às redações, acabou o estresse de ter de aprovar um projeto como o tal Controle Social da Mídia, proposto e retirado do programa de governo de Dilma no TSE. O repórter aquele está incomodando? Avisa o dono da TV que a concessão dele vai ser questionada, que o BNDES vai abrir uma linha exclusiva para redes que não a dele e manda tirar aquela mídia gigantesca do grupo. O repórter logo terá apenas duas opções: calar-se ou demitir-se.
O problema são os ciclos de persistência, cada vez mais frágeis e desprovidos de qualquer convicção que não se renda às eficazes baionetas econômicas. E o que eu chamo de ciclo de persistência de líderes de opinião de outrora, está com os dias contados. O empresário, dono do jornal ou da TV, mudou de opinião quanto ao capitalismo, à livre iniciativa e à soberania do mercado? Provavelmente não. Sua postura empresarial diante de uma perspectiva não só de sobrevivência, mas de crescimento, ao se aliar aos novos mandatários, esta sim, em vários casos, mudou muito. Afinal de contas, ele é um empresário e não um monge e pode, sim, fazer o que quiser com seu patrimônio. Ficará mal nesta história quem costumava trabalhar com o antigo chefe, aquele que sobreviveu e prosperou nos anos de direita e centro e que, agora, não tem como ser clicado na mesma foto com um chefe que também deseja sobreviver e prosperar em tempos de PT e sua nova ordem.
Eu disse ao meu amigo, com a sinceridade que ele sempre me mereceu, que ou ele mudava de lado ou de profissão. O Brasil não precisa mais de uma censura verde-oliva. O Brasil tem hoje uma censura capitalista, ainda mais implacável, pública e também privada, que, se por um lado não confisca computadores, assim o faz com vozes, textos, imagens.
A história da nova censura brasileira poderá ser bem pior do que a da Venezuela de Chávez e sua Globovisión.
ARTIGO:
QUEM PRECISA DE CENSURA?
por Glauco Fonseca
Dia desses, um jornalista catarinense dos bons e amigo melhor ainda me confidenciou, magoado, que estava sofrendo pressões do veículo no qual trabalha por conta de suas posições políticas. Contou-me que, durante muitos anos, exprimira suas convicções livremente, pois que eram muito semelhantes ao pensamento e a opção editorial dos mesmos veículos, dos mesmos patrões. No caminho da constatação de que as coisas mudaram ? e como -, um belo dia ele foi chamado a uma conversa com o editor-chefe, que, por sua vez, havia sido provocado pelo diretor comercial que, por coincidência, era filho do patriarca. Ele foi informado que o cliente privado XPTO estaria tirando a verba da publicação caso ele permanecesse com sua linha de posicionamento. Ao ouvir o relato, perguntei a mim mesmo quem precisa de uma censura governamental se já temos, entre nós, mecanismos horrorosos de opressão e intimidação, públicos e também privados, capazes de submeter inclusive aqueles que, outrora, foram formidáveis e providenciais líderes de opinião?
Até mesmo o atual governo se deu conta de que não precisa mais se preocupar com essas polêmicas trivialidades. Descobriu que é muito mais fácil ligar para a agência de propaganda, que liga para o dono do jornal, que chama o jornalista e apela para o seu bom senso. Fulano, estou com as mãos atadas e precisamos deste patrocínio...se tu continuares dando porrada, vamos perder esta receita e não poderemos mais arcar com teu polpudo salário....
Depois desta descoberta, tão vil ou ainda pior do que invasões truculentas e armadas às redações, acabou o estresse de ter de aprovar um projeto como o tal Controle Social da Mídia, proposto e retirado do programa de governo de Dilma no TSE. O repórter aquele está incomodando? Avisa o dono da TV que a concessão dele vai ser questionada, que o BNDES vai abrir uma linha exclusiva para redes que não a dele e manda tirar aquela mídia gigantesca do grupo. O repórter logo terá apenas duas opções: calar-se ou demitir-se.
O problema são os ciclos de persistência, cada vez mais frágeis e desprovidos de qualquer convicção que não se renda às eficazes baionetas econômicas. E o que eu chamo de ciclo de persistência de líderes de opinião de outrora, está com os dias contados. O empresário, dono do jornal ou da TV, mudou de opinião quanto ao capitalismo, à livre iniciativa e à soberania do mercado? Provavelmente não. Sua postura empresarial diante de uma perspectiva não só de sobrevivência, mas de crescimento, ao se aliar aos novos mandatários, esta sim, em vários casos, mudou muito. Afinal de contas, ele é um empresário e não um monge e pode, sim, fazer o que quiser com seu patrimônio. Ficará mal nesta história quem costumava trabalhar com o antigo chefe, aquele que sobreviveu e prosperou nos anos de direita e centro e que, agora, não tem como ser clicado na mesma foto com um chefe que também deseja sobreviver e prosperar em tempos de PT e sua nova ordem.
Eu disse ao meu amigo, com a sinceridade que ele sempre me mereceu, que ou ele mudava de lado ou de profissão. O Brasil não precisa mais de uma censura verde-oliva. O Brasil tem hoje uma censura capitalista, ainda mais implacável, pública e também privada, que, se por um lado não confisca computadores, assim o faz com vozes, textos, imagens.
A história da nova censura brasileira poderá ser bem pior do que a da Venezuela de Chávez e sua Globovisión.
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Livro Marxismo e Socialismo finalmente disponível - Paulo Roberto de Almeida
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