quinta-feira, 24 de março de 2022

Quel impact économique de la guerre en Ukraine ? Eric Chaney (Institut Montaigne)

 EUROPE / MONDE

Quel impact économique de la guerre en Ukraine ?

Trois questions à Eric Chaney

INTERVIEW - 18 MARS 2022

L’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, qui a débuté le 24 février dernier, donne lieu à un conflit militaire majeur. La condamnation des agissements de Vladimir Poutine par le monde occidental se traduit, entre autres, par la mise en place de sanctions économiques importantes contre le régime russe. S’il est encore trop tôt pour savoir la tournure que prendront ces événements dramatiques, les premières conséquences économiques de cette guerre se font d’ores et déjà sentir. Quelles sont-elles ? À quoi faut-il s’attendre pour les mois à venir pour les différents pays concernés, directement ou indirectement, par le conflit russo-ukrainien ? Eric Chaney, conseiller économique de l’Institut Montaigne, nous livre son analyse.

Retrouvez la timeline de l’Institut Montaigne dédiée à remonter le temps et saisir la chronologie du conflit.

Comment la guerre en Ukraine et les sanctions contre la Russie vont-elles affecter l’économie mondiale ?

L’économie mondiale fait face à un choc stagflationniste de grande ampleur, quoique moins violent qu’en 1973-1974.

Mais avant d’analyser le choc mondial, un mot de la Russie. En se mettant au ban des nations, la Russie est sur le point de détruire la partie moderne et ouverte à l’extérieur de sa propre économie. Exclue du système financier international et sujette à un embargo sélectif d’exportations de biens d’origine américaine ou européenne, qui va de la technologie aux pièces détachées des avions, elle entre dans une spirale à la fois dépressive et inflationniste, le rouble ayant perdu 32 % de sa valeur depuis le début de l’année et 72 % depuis l’annexion de la Crimée. Le régime bénéficie encore de la rente pétrolière et gazière par ses ventes à l’Europe, qui se poursuivent malgré les atrocités commises en Ukraine. Je signale à ce sujet l’appel à cesser de financer la guerre de Poutine, lancé par un groupe d’économistes dont je fais partie, en mettant en œuvre trois mesures, l’embargo sur le pétrole, une taxe sur les importations de gaz et des transferts fiscaux vers les bas revenus pour amortir le choc.

Dans le cas d’une occupation prolongée de l’Ukraine, l’économie russe se contracterait durablement. 

L’avenir n’est pas complètement bouché pour la Russie : si un accord satisfaisant intervenait rapidement, les sanctions touchant le cœur de l’économie russe pourraient être levées. Dans ce cas, le choc serait transitoire et l’économie se relèverait. Dans le cas d’une occupation prolongée de l’Ukraine, l’économie russe se contracterait durablement.

Sur la base des sanctions déjà actées, le FMI estime la baisse du PIB russe à 7 % en 2022. Ce chiffre paraît presque anodin au regard de la rigueur des sanctions, mais il reflète un acquis de croissance élevé au début de 2022. Mesurée entre la fin de 2021 et la fin 2022, et non pas en moyenne annuelle, la chute du PIB sous-jacente à l’estimation du FMI serait probablement bien plus prononcée. Mais là n’est pas le plus important. La stratégie Poutine entraîne la Russie vers une dépression durable, avec une baisse permanente d’activité de 15 % à 20 %, et une baisse du revenu réel de la population au moins aussi importante. La réorientation vers l’Asie du rêve poutinien est une illusion : coupée de l’Ouest, la Russie ne serait que vassale de la puissance chinoise.

Revenons à l’économie mondiale. Elle est confrontée à un choc d’offre multiple et de grande ampleur : l’offre d’énergie fossile, pétrole, gaz et charbon, l’offre de denrées alimentaires comme le blé, et d’intrants agricoles (potasse, engrais azotés) et industriels (nickel, titane), qui forment l’essentiel des exportations de la Russie, sont toutes fortement réduites, sans parler de celles de l’Ukraine. Il en résulte une augmentation des prix mondiaux pour tous ces intrants, comme on l’a vu de façon caricaturale pour le nickel.

Avant l’invasion de l’Ukraine, on parlait déjà d’un risque stagflationniste, en raison de la hausse des matières premières et des goulots d’étranglement dans les chaînes de productions mondiales. Mais la source même du risque était de nature temporaire, s’effaçant au fur et à mesure d’un retour à une certaine normale dans les chaînes de production. Tout a changé, car non seulement le choc est bien plus important, touche un plus large spectre de canaux mais surtout, il risque d’être durable.

La baisse de l’offre va mécaniquement réduire l’activité dans certaines branches déjà touchées par des pénuries ou des délais de livraison, l’automobile en particulier, mais aussi les composants électroniques. D’autre part, la montée de l’inflation va réduire le pouvoir d’achat des consommateurs. Cette cisaille géante va réduire l’activité, tout en accélérant l’inflation : c’est bien de stagflation dont il s’agit, avec à la clef pertes d’emploi et profits des entreprises réduits, donc moins d’investissement, et, enfin, envolée des déficits budgétaires.

Cette cisaille géante va réduire l’activité, tout en accélérant l’inflation : c’est bien de stagflation dont il s’agit.

Comme nous le remarquions pour la Russie, les conséquences du choc stagflationniste dépendent fortement de sa durée. Dans le cas économiquement bénin - sauf pour l’Ukraine dont les infrastructures font l’objet d’une destruction massive - d’un règlement rapide, le retour à la normale envisagé avant l’invasion serait seulement retardé. Les banques centrales auraient à gérer une montée plus forte de l’inflation, mais leur problématique serait la même : comment faire baisser l’inflation sans casser la reprise. Dans le cas d’un enlisement et d’une extension dans le temps des sanctions, l’économie mondiale aurait plus de mal à retrouver le chemin d’une croissance équilibrée, en raison d’ajustements coûteux et longs des appareils productifs.

Ce schéma vaut pour tous les pays, mais à des degrés différents. En Europe, par exemple, la France et le Royaume-Uni importent moins de ressources de Russie et y exportent moins de biens et services que l’Allemagne et l’Italie, qui seront donc plus durement touchées.

Le ministre des finances a parlé d’un choc d’une ampleur similaire à celle de 1973, êtes-vous d’accord ?

Le choc pétrolier de 1973-1974 était bien un choc d’offre négatif pour l’économie mondiale. En effet, le transfert de revenu des importateurs de pétrole vers l’Opep ne fut pas un jeu à somme nulle, du fait de la faible propension des nouveaux rois du pétrole à consommer leurs nouveaux et immenses revenus. Il était de nature stagflationniste et ce sont d’ailleurs ses conséquences, inflation endémique et faible croissance, qui ont forgé le terme barbare "stagflation", même si d’autres facteurs de ralentissement de la productivité étaient à l’œuvre avant le choc pétrolier. La comparaison du ministre peut donc se comprendre.

Je vois cependant trois différences importantes avec 1973-1974.

  1. L’ampleur initiale du choc que nous vivons est moindre. En 1973-1974, le prix du pétrole brut avait bondi de 370 %. En supposant que le prix du pétrole se stabilise autour de 110 $/bl (au 17 mars, le baril de Brent s’échangeait à 106 $), l’augmentation sur 2021 et 2022 serait de 180 %, un bond très sérieux, mais n’atteignant que 60 % de celui de 73-74. 
     
  2. Les économies développées sont beaucoup moins dépendantes du pétrole, et moins énergivores en général qu’elles ne l’étaient en 1973. Le cas de la France est particulièrement intéressant : en 2019, la consommation de pétrole par unité de PIB était 71 % plus basse qu’en 1973, ce qui vaut d’ailleurs pour l’ensemble des énergies fossiles. Toutes choses égales d’ailleurs, l’économie française est aujourd’hui 3,5 fois moins sensible aux variations du prix des énergies fossiles. Même si le prix de l’électricité a également beaucoup augmenté, ce qui n’avait pas été le cas à l’époque où les prix étaient administrés, l’ampleur du choc serait trois fois moindre qu’en en 1973-74, dans une estimation conservatrice.
     
  3. En 1973, l’économie mondiale était bien moins interdépendante qu’aujourd’hui. Si les chocs pétroliers des années 70 ont entraîné une sorte de mondialisation en ouvrant au commerce mondial de nouveaux marchés solvables (les pays de l’Opep), la Chine, l’URSS et l’Inde restaient en dehors. Le commerce mondial d’aujourd’hui est dominé par la Chine, aussi bien pour les exportations (12,2 % des exportations mondiales) que les importations (11,2 %). A supposer que la Chine soit moins touchée que les pays de l’Ocde, l’économie mondiale bénéficierait d’une sorte d’amortisseur qui n’existait pas en 1973.

Pour ces raisons, la comparaison avec 1973 a ses limites. En ce qui concerne l’économie française, l’Insee apporte une perspective équilibrée dans sa toute récente Note de Conjoncture. A ce propos, signalons le remarquable travail des experts de l’Insee, qui ont réussi à extraire un maximum d'informations d’enquêtes de conjoncture en cours de traitement pour éclairer les perspectives. Soulignant à juste titre les grandes incertitudes créées par la guerre, avant tout celle de la durée des sanctions, ils apportent néanmoins deux informations importantes.

Les chefs d’entreprise interrogés après le 25 février ont immédiatement révisé à la baisse leurs perspectives d’activité, très fortement dans le commerce de détail, et significativement dans l’industrie. Notons d’ailleurs que l’enquête méthodologiquement comparable de la Fed de New York avait déjà montré des réactions similaires. En revanche et à ce stade, les services et le bâtiment seraient bien moins touchés. La forte hausse des prix et son impact anticipé sur la consommation expliquent le pessimisme des commerçants tandis que du côté des industriels, c’est plus probablement le risque de pénurie d’intrants essentiels qui l’explique.

Partant du scénario de base de la Banque de France (3,4 % en 2022, 2,0 % en 2023), la croissance ralentirait à 2,4 % en 2022 et 1,5 % en 2023. 

Par ailleurs, l’Insee a procédé à une simulation de l’impact à court terme de la hausse déjà observée des prix de l’énergie à l’aide de modèles macro-économétriques (français et international pour tenir compte de l’impact sur la demande extérieure), sans hypothèse de réaction de politique économique. Le résultat : une réduction de 0,7 % du PIB français en 2022, en comparaison de ce qu’il aurait été sans le choc. Pour la zone euro, l’Ocdeannonce un impact deux fois plus important, à -1,4 %, la différence pouvant s’expliquer par des hypothèses plus contraignantes, mais aussi par le fait que la France est moins exposée que la moyenne de la zone euro.

Admettons que l’impact sur la France en 2022 soit de l’ordre de un point de PIB et, dans le cas d’une guerre prolongée, réduise encore la croissance d’un demi-point en 2023. Partant du scénario de base de la Banque de France (3,4 % en 2022, 2,0 % en 2023), la croissance ralentirait à 2,4 % en 2022 et 1,5 % en 2023. C’est évidemment un choc important, mais sans mesure commune avec les 6 points perdus en 1974-1975 à la suite du choc d’octobre 1973. De plus, le ralentissement de l’économie ne serait pas suffisant pour inverser la courbe du chômage, même si sa réduction serait bien moins rapide qu’on aurait pu l’espérer.

Que doit-on attendre des politiques économiques pour réduire le choc ?

Avant l’invasion de l’Ukraine, les choix de politique économique étaient bornés par des conditions du genre “en faire assez, mais pas trop”.

Pour les politiques budgétaires, il s’agissait de réduire les déficits publics creusés par la pandémie, mais ni trop fort ni trop vite, pour ne pas casser les reprises. La France s’était engagée sur ce chemin, mais avec sa prudence habituelle. Le “chèque inflation”, la décision de plafonner l’augmentation du prix du gaz et de l’électricité, une façon étrange de réagir à un choc d’offre (d’énergie) puisque cela revient à tout faire pour que la demande ne baisse pas, avaient déjà sérieusement entamé la trajectoire de réduction du déficit budgétaire. La décision de rabais de 15 centimes par litre de gazole ou d’essence pour quatre mois, critiquable pour les mêmes raisons que le plafond sur le gaz (mais qui a l’avantage d’être temporaire, alors qu’une baisse de taxe aurait été difficilement réversible) va encore grever le budget. La réduction du déficit budgétaire prévue par la loi de finances, de 8,4 % du PIB en 2021 à 4,8 % en 2022 sera donc significativement rabotée, un déficit de 6 à 7 % du PIB paraissant possible.

En réalité, c’est à un nouveau changement de paradigme que nous pourrions assister. Au “quoi qu’il en coûte” de la crise Covid, qui a permis de passer l’épreuve en minimisant les dommages économiques, dont certains auraient été difficilement réversibles sans cette politique, pourrait succéder un état d’esprit d’économie de guerre, justifiant une poursuite du “quoiqu’il en coûte”, mais pour des raisons différentes.

C’est à un nouveau changement de paradigme que nous pourrions assister.

L’irruption de la guerre et de ses horreurs à la frontière de l’Union européenne, la transformation d’un régime autoritaire exprimant son hostilité à l’Europe par des voies détournées, comme le soutien aux partis politiques europhobes, en régime dictatorial disposant du plus grand nombre d’ogives nucléaires de la planète et menaçant des pires représailles ceux qui s’aventureraient à lui tenir tête, change profondément la donne pour les politiques économiques. La décision de l’Allemagne de tripler (temporairement à ce stade) son budget militaire en est le signe le plus clair.

Pour les politiques budgétaires de la zone euro, cela signifiera très probablement un plus grand laxisme de la Commission européenne à propos des déficits budgétaires. L’impact du choc stagflationniste, l’augmentation des dépenses militaires, le coût de l’accueil des réfugiés, qu’il serait intelligent de considérer comme un investissement, l’accélération des investissements d’infrastructure énergétiques pour sortir de la dépendance russe, tous ces nouveaux éléments vont dans la même direction : augmenter les dépenses publiques. Il ne serait pas étonnant qu’après le plan Next Generation, financé en commun par une extension de la durée du budget de l’UE, un nouveau plan du même type voit le jour, dicté par l’économie de guerre.

Mais comment financer ces besoins budgétaires accrus ? Relever les impôts en plein choc stagflationniste serait contre-productif. Reste donc le recours à l’endettement. Or de nouvelles marges de manœuvre sont apparues grâce à la baisse des taux d’intérêt réels, elle-même causée par la montée des anticipations d’inflation. La Réserve fédérale américaine, qui vient de remonter son taux directeur de 0,25 point de pourcentage, n’a pas enrayé pour autant la baisse des taux d’intérêt réels à cinq ans, en chute de 0,5 point depuis début février, à -1,3 %, malgré les annonces de futures hausses de taux. Voilà ce que signifie le paradigme “économie de guerre”. Dans ce contexte, il y a fort à parier que la BCE se montrera encore plus prudente et il est possible qu’elle aille jusqu’à lancer un nouveau programme d’achat de dettes des États, si le choc s’étendait dans le temps. L’objectif d’inflation à 2 % serait alors sagement mis de côté pour des jours meilleurs.

 

 

Copyright : ALEXANDER UTKIN / AFP

Eu acuso a diplomacia brasileira - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Eu acuso a diplomacia brasileira


Paulo Roberto de Almeida


Fornecer armas à Ucrânia aumentaria o sofrimento do povo ucraniano?

Sanções econômicas não são eficazes e não poderiam ser feitas à margem de decisões do CSNU?

Essas são posições dignas da diplomacia brasileira?

Por acaso o Brasil pretende que o povo ucraniano se deixe massacrar passivamente?

Quer que o agressor fique impune, seria isso?

Pretendem continuar no reino da fantasia por quanto tempo mais?

Segundo o que transpareceu da chancelaria brasileira, sanções contra a Rússia “mundializam” o que seria um conflito “apenas europeu”.

Não gostaria de qualificar essa opinião como simplesmente equivocada. 

O diplomata que sugeriu tal linha de argumento ao chanceler deve sofrer de sérios distúrbios psíquicos (para usar uma figura só neutra).

Alguma outra explicação seria bem mais contundente (eu nunca escondo o que penso, apenas tento não agredir colegas sob intensa pressão daqueles generalecos amestrados do Planalto).

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 24/03/2022 (um mês da agressão criminosa do tirano russo contra o povo ucraniano, um mês de pusilanimidade diplomática brasileira)

Não esperem democracia na Rússia anytime soon - Hal Brands (Boston Globe)

 Quem espera queda do Putin e retorno da democracia na Rússia— já teve, alguma vez? — talvez tenha de esperar sentado, segundo Hal Brands. A coisa está mais para Teerã sobre o Volga, ou totalitarismo bizantino…

Boston Globe – 24.3.2022

What Happens in Russia If Putin Can’t Win in Ukraine?

It’s tempting to think the strongman could fall and democracy could revive, but a more likely scenario is “Tehran on the Volga.”

Hal Brands

 

The world has been transfixed by Ukraine’s fight for survival. As the war drags on, we’d better start considering what will become of Russia, as well.

President Vladimir Putin’s nation has now been subjected to an isolation more sudden and total than that experienced by any major power in recent history. What that leads to may not be pretty.

Since late February, Russia has been hit with punishing economic, trade and financial sanctions. It is careering toward a debt default, as a rapid technological decoupling is also underway. Foreign firms are fleeing the country, while Russian teams are excluded from international competitions in soccer and other sports. Even the International Cat Federation has barred Russian felines from its events.

Russia isn’t some tinpot tyranny like Cuba or North Korea; it is a major power whose population was, until recently, deeply connected to its larger global environment. Now, Russia is suffering a degree of international ostracism that typically happens only when a country is at war with the world.

What will this mean for Moscow if its conflict with Ukraine drags on for months or years to come? We can imagine a few scenarios, all of which would pose nasty challenges for Russia, and some of which could be quite concerning for America and its allies. 

The rosiest is a “Moscow Spring,” in which the costs of conflict lead to regime change and a rebirth of the democracy Russia experienced fleetingly in the 1990s. Russian elites push Putin aside and make peace with Ukraine. Having experienced the consequences of aggression and autocracy, the more urban, liberal swaths of Russian society demand a broader political opening and the country’s reintegration into the world. Just as isolation helped convince South Africa to ditch apartheid in the late 1980s, foreign opprobrium forces dramatic change in Moscow’s foreign and domestic policies.

The odds of this scenario materializing are slim. Two decades of Putinism have left Russia with a weak, fragmented opposition. The president has surely tried to coup-proof his regime by co-opting the security and intelligence services and pitting them against one another. And even if Russia did experience a revolution, look out: The history of the 1990s cautions us that instability and even chaos could follow.

A second, more plausible scenario is “Wounded Giant.” Here, Putin uses his control of the security services to hang onto power and repress whatever popular discontent isolation produces. He exploits the black-market opportunities that sanctions inevitably create to compensate loyal cronies.Russia becomes more dependent on China as it seeks economic and technological alternatives to the West.

What changes is not so much Russian policies but Russian power: The cost of slogging ahead is continued attrition of the economy, retarded technological modernization and a long-term weakening of Moscow’s military potential. This scenario isn’t great for the Western and Pacific democracies, but it isn’t terrible, either: Against a more sluggish, stagnating Russia, the U.S. could fare well enough in a protracted rivalry.

There is a third, darker scenario: “Tehran on the Volga.” Here, isolation and radicalization go hand in hand. Educated, upwardly mobile Russians leave the country, ridding the regime of its most outspoken liberal critics. Hard-liners embrace a “resistance economy” premised on self-sufficiency and avoiding the contaminating influence of the West. Aggressive internal purges, relentless propaganda and the fanning of militant nationalism produce a Russian variant of fascism. When Putin eventually falls, he is replaced by an equally repressive, ambitious and xenophobic leader.

Russia thus becomes a superpowered Iran with nuclear weapons — a country that is permanently estranged from the world and compensates for weakness with heightened belligerency. Far from retreating in its confrontation with the West, this Russia might dial up the intensity of that struggle — pursuing wide-ranging programs of sabotage in Europe or more aggressively training its cyberweapons on targets in the U.S. and other democratic countries.

The eventual reality could diverge from any of these scenarios, of course. But the exercise illustrates two important points.  

First, Washington needs to start thinking seriously about Russia’s long-term trajectory. In 1989, the administration of President George H.W. Bush quietly created a planning group to consider what might happen amid earthshaking changes in the Soviet Union. Regardless of what happens in this crisis, Russia is big and powerful enough that its trajectory will be vital to the overall health of the international order — which means that the U.S. needs to be ready for whatever direction the country takes.

Second, be careful what you wish for. The U.S. and its allies are rightly using devastating sanctions, along with tenacious Ukrainian resistance, to impose heavy costs on a Russian regime that has flagrantly violated the most basic norms of international behavior. Appeasement and military intervention are the only obvious, and abhorrent, alternatives to this policy. But we have only begun to consider what its long-term consequences might be.

Even in the best-case scenario, the U.S. would confront enormous challenges helping a liberalizing Russia emerge from authoritarian rule. More plausibly, Washington could face a recalcitrant, perhaps even a further radicalized, Russia instead. The war in Ukraine will eventually end, but America’s problems with Russia may only be getting started. (Bloomberg)

 

Um novo Tratado Geral da Infâmia? - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Um novo Tratado Geral da Infâmia?


Tempos mais do que sombrios para política externa e a diplomacia do que era, outrora, o Brasil: o subtítulo de meu primeiro livro do tenebroso ciclo bolsolavista na política externa, “Miséria da diplomacia” (2019), era “a destruição da inteligência no Itamaraty”. 

Acho que ele continua válido, a despeito da saída do ex-chanceler acidental. 

Pensei que eu havia terminado o ciclo com o quinto e mais recente livro: “Apogeu e demolição da política externa” (2021).

Aparentemente , a agressão criminosa da Rússia contra a Ucrânia e a postura pusilânime — estou usando um conceito neutro — do Brasil  no plano multilateral me obrigarão a retomar esse lamentável e indesejado ciclo de obras, que representam pequenos degraus da infâmia que constitui a atual política externa do bolsonarismo alucinante e alucinado.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 24/03/2022

quarta-feira, 23 de março de 2022

The Threat of Russian Cyberattacks Looms Large (A outra grande paranoia: a guerra cibernética) - Sue Halpern

A outra grande paranoia: a guerra cibernética. Acredito que tanto a Rússia quanto a China adorariam ganhar uma guerra cibernética contra os EUA. Só não o fazem porque, como nos tempos da MAD nuclear, a retaliação seria maciça e destrutiva.

So far, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has not involved the sort of devastating cyberattacks that many anticipated. But it’s not clear why, or whether that pattern will hold.
Illustration of Ukrainian flag made of code
Illustration by Nicholas Konrad / The  New  Yorker

Fifteen days into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Senator Angus King, of Maine, asked the director of the National Security Agency, General Paul Nakasone—who is also the commander of the United States Cyber Command—a question that was on the minds of many observers of the conflict: Why hadn’t the Russians launched a concerted cyberattack on the country? Russia, after all, is home to both sophisticated state-sanctioned hackers in its military and intelligence services and to cybercriminal gangs, loosely affiliated with the government, that have been active in Ukraine in the past. Just before Christmas of 2015, for instance, hackers believed to be Russian sabotaged parts of the power grid in western Ukraine, leaving people in the cold and the dark. Though the outage lasted only a few hours, the operating systems of the three regional power-distribution companies that had been affected remained compromised long after the lights were back on. Two years later, in June of 2017, attackers struck Ukraine again, shutting down government offices, banks, ports, and the postal service. The malware used in the attack, which the Ukrainian security service attributed to Russia, then spread from the computers of companies based in Ukraine to those of their affiliates around the world, causing damage reported to have cost ten billion dollars. Just last year, according to Microsoft’s 2021 Digital Defense Report, which tracks cyber threats against nation-states, Ukraine was second only to the U.S. in the number of cyberattacks it had experienced over the past year. Given this history, it stood to reason that future Russian incursions in Ukraine would likely involve cyber weapons. “Much can still occur,” Nakasone said. “We will be very, very vigilant to see what occurs there.” Still, the fact that devastating attacks haven’t occurred so far has raised doubts in some quarters about the viability and efficacy of using malicious software as a weapon of war.

There are many theories floating around as to why the Russians didn’t go all-out and take down Ukraine’s cellular networks, electric grid, municipal water supplies, and other crucial utilities, either in the run-up to war or in its first days. It may be that the Kremlin, high on its own propaganda, believed that the Russian army would conquer Ukraine in record time and install a puppet government that would need to have those services intact. When that didn’t happen and the Russians began bombing cities, it made cyber weapons that could turn off the lights, say, largely beside the point: a bomb dropped on a power plant is a definitive way to destroy it, with little chance that it will come back online. “If you’re already at a stage in a conflict where you’re willing to drop bombs, you’re going to drop bombs,” Jacquelyn Schneider, a fellow at the Hoover Institution who is a former Air Force intelligence analyst, told me. In other words, bombs are blunter, more peremptory instruments.

But it also may be that Russia never had the capabilities that its adversaries ascribed to it in the first place: unlike conventional weapons, which can be counted, cyber weapons are invisible until they are deployed, making it impossible for outsiders to assess the size and power of a nation’s cyber arsenal. Or it may be that the Russian generals prosecuting the war were skeptical of relying on weapons composed of zeros and ones. Or that the Russians tried to replicate their earlier attacks but that Ukraine’s digital defenses, which are much stronger now, successfully fended them off. Cyber weapons, which exploit software vulnerabilities, can take years to develop and may be held in reserve for months or years. If those vulnerabilities are patched in the meantime, the weapons become useless. After the 2017 cyberattack, Ukraine, with help from its allies, fortified its computer networks. It received ten million dollars from the U.S. State Department in 2018 to secure critical infrastructure, with an additional eight million dollars in 2020 and a pledge for thirty million more, as well as cyber assistance from the U.S. Army and from NATO. Days before the invasion, Ukraine also requested and received help from the European Union’s Cyber Rapid Response Team.

The private sector is also pitching in. Within hours of the invasion, Christopher Ahlberg, the C.E.O. of Recorded Future, a Somerville, Massachusetts-based cybersecurity company, sent out an e-mail with the subject line “We Stand With Ukraine,” promising Ukrainians his firm’s “full resources, capabilities, and intelligence to support them in their fight against Russia.” (When I spoke with Ahlberg a few days later, he told me that Recorded Future is “helping out with pertinent intelligence and providing its intelligence platform to a series of actors in and around the conflict,” adding that he could not be more specific because “there are many eyes on targets in and outside of Ukraine.”) Among other organizations that have stepped in is Bitdefender, a global cybersecurity company based in Romania, which has teamed up with the country’s National Cyber Security Directorate to provide support and intelligence to Ukraine. And Tom Burt, Microsoft’s vice-president in charge of customer security and trust, told me in an e-mail that his company’s Threat Intelligence Center has “developed and shared tools to help Ukraine be more resistant to the specific attacks we have observed,” and that this work was continuing “around the clock.”

Cyber weapons are stealthy, cheap to develop—especially compared with conventional weapons—and can be launched anonymously. This offers regimes that use them plausible deniability, and makes retaliation, at best, problematic. In some situations, that may make cyber “the perfect weapon,” as David Sanger of the Times has written, but right now the Russians appear to be spending a lot of time defending their own networks, which may be taking resources away from a cyber offensive. On February 24th, the day of the invasion, the hacker collective Anonymous declared that it “was officially in cyber war” against Russia, and has since claimed to have conducted surreptitious attacks on the Russian Ministry of Defense, its Federal Security Service, and Russian state television. Ukraine’s state-sanctioned volunteer “I.T. Army” has also been levelling countless distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS) against Russian businesses and government Web sites, overwhelming them with traffic in order to make them inaccessible. A weekly analysis of cyber activities from the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine issued on March 19th noted that Russian propaganda “had shifted the focus of its attention from attacks against Ukraine to attacks against Russian information infrastructure.”

But that same report made clear something that has largely been lost in the musings about Russia’s failure—so far—to use cyber weapons to crippling effect in the war: Ukraine has actually been under a constant barrage of cyberattacks that began before the invasion. Since February 15th, Ukraine has experienced more than three thousand DDoS attacks, including two hundred and seventy-five in a single day. Tom Burt told me that, as early as January, his team discovered wiper malware—malicious software that erases the targeted computer’s hard drive—on Ukrainian government networks, and shortly before the invasion they detected new wiper attacks against both the government and the private sector. He also said that “there have been dozens of espionage attacks on high-value targets.” Just last week, Ukraine’s Computer Emergency Response Team detected new malware, distributed through phishing campaigns, against state bodies, most likely from a hacking group with ties to Russian intelligence. Perhaps most crucial, on the morning of the invasion, hackers jammed the satellite signal that delivered broadband satellite Internet services to much of Ukraine and other parts of Europe and, through a malicious software update, disabled Internet modems used to communicate with the satellite, taking out ten thousand terminals around Europe. The service has not been fully restored. Viasat, the company whose satellite was targeted, provides Internet service to the Ukrainian army and a number of Western militaries. (The company said that the attack did not affect the U.S. military, which relies on Viasat for some of its battle-management systems.) The source of the attack is not yet known.

In retrospect, it seems possible that the attack on Viasat was actually Russia’s opening gambit—a cyberattack intended to compromise Ukraine’s command-and-control systems—but was only marginally successful. Then, while the world was waiting for Russia to turn off the lights in Ukraine, the Kremlin was, instead, engaging in more targeted and strategic attacks. Still, Russia might do something more comprehensive and destructive going forward. A cyber weapon can only be launched once; it is possible that the Kremlin is holding its most powerful malware in reserve. As Burt told me, although Russia’s cyber activity has not caused mass destruction, “it does not in any way reduce the risk that more aggressive and destructive attacks could be deployed in the future inside or outside Ukraine.”

There is also no guarantee that, just because they haven’t done so yet, the Russians won’t retaliate against the U.S. and its allies for supporting Ukraine. On March 17th, the F.B.I. and CISA, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, warned that they were “aware of possible threats to U.S. and international satellite communication (SATCOM) networks,” and they urged network providers and customers to harden their defenses. On Monday, President Biden reinforced this message. “I have previously warned about the potential that Russia could conduct malicious cyber activity against the U.S., including as a response to the unprecedented economic costs we’ve imposed on Russia alongside our allies and partners. It’s part of Russia’s playbook,” he said. “Today, my Administration is reiterating those warnings based on evolving intelligence that the Russian Government is exploring options for potential cyberattacks.” CISA has been exhorting American entities to put their “shields up” to deter attackers, and earlier this month Congress finally overcame private-sector resistance and approved legislation that requires critical infrastructure companies to report cyber intrusions within seventy-two hours of an attack and twenty-four hours after paying a ransom. The new requirements will give CISAa better understanding of how our adversaries are targeting entities such as pipelines, dams, and the electric grid, and allow the agency to warn other entities of ongoing threats.

It is too early to know, yet, the true role that cyber weapons are playing in this particular conflict—or will play in those to come. Indeed, the only thing we know for sure is that the Internet is its own battlefield, and we’re all on it.


The Great Economic Rivalry: China vs the U.S., ou A GRANDE PARANOIA AMERICANA - Graham Allison, Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The Great Economic Rivalry: China vs the U.S.

ou A GRANDE PARANOIA AMERICANA

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida; Graham Allison 



A inacreditável PARANOIA da academia americana

Depois de descrever toda a COMPLEMENTARIDADE ECONÔMICA entre os Estados Unidos e a China, com todos os vínculos econômicos de integração comercial, industrial e financeira, esse acadêmico, tido por brilhante intelectual, ainda classifica essa relação como sendo a de uma GRANDE RIVALIDADE ECONÔMICA, o que é propriamente alucinante.

Eles ainda se referem à GRANDE RIVALIDADE MILITAR – que eles mesmos incitam, propagam e desenvolvem – e à GRANDE RIVALIDADE TECNOLÓGICA, como se não pudesse existir competição e avanços, relativos e absolutos, em outros países, e que APENAS os EUA têm o direito de definir o que é COMPETIÇÃO e o que é RIVALIDADE. Eles pretendem medir o mundo de acordo com a sua régua, caolha, deformada, absolutamente unilateral. Que grande mal estão fazendo ao mundo!

Esses acadêmicos foram contaminados pelo vírus da paranoia aguda dos generais do Pentágono, que entre ele é endêmico, natural e esperado, mas que de vez em quando tem brotes epidêmicos, quando surge algum novo competidor estratégico, que nem poderia ser caracterizado como sendo um rival e muito menos um adversário tecnológico – digamos, um imitador por vezes ousado demais – ou militar, o que só revela a paranoia arrogante do grande império da atualidade.

Lamento pelo mundo, e pelos países pobres, que continuarão pobres por muito tempo mais, já que os impérios da atualidade continuarão a torrar o dinheiro dos seus contribuintes com brinquedinhos militares que JAMAIS serão usados.


Os relatórios citados estão aqui:


1) The Great Economic Rivalryhttps://www.belfercenter.org/publication/great-economic-rivalry-china-vs-us

2) The Great Military Rivalryhttps://www.belfercenter.org/publication/great-military-rivalry-china-vs-us 

3) The Great Tech Rivalryhttps://www.belfercenter.org/publication/great-tech-rivalry-china-vs-us

 

Lamento pelos contribuintes americanos, e lamento mais ainda pela sua academia...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida


========

The Great Economic Rivalry: China vs the U.S.

Graham Allison
Belfer Center of Harvard University
March 23, 2022

Who is the manufacturing workshop of the world? Who is the major trading partner of most nations, including the EU and Japan? Who is the exporter of the most essential links in the global supply chain? Who is the top foreign supplier of goods to the United States? According to the yardstick that both the CIA and IMF judge the best for comparing national economies, who has the largest economy in the world today?

If you hesitated before answering any of these questions, you will find the Harvard China Working Group’s new report, The Great Economic Rivalry, bracing. The report documents what has actually happened in the economic competition between China and the U.S. since 2000. Two decades ago, China was still classified as a “poor, developing country,” struggling to be admitted to the WTO. 460 million of its citizens lived below the abject poverty line of $2 a day; China’s GDP was less than one-tenth of what it is today. Back then, the answer to most of the questions in the first paragraph was: USA.

The big takeaway from this report mirrors the findings of the earlier reports in our “Great Rivalry” series: The Great Military Rivalry and the The Great Tech Rivalry. In one line: the days in which China could be thought of as a “near peer competitor” – as Washington keeps trying to call it – are over. China’s miracle economic growth over the past four decades at an average rate four times that of the U.S. has redefined the global economic order. Today and for the foreseeable future, China will be a full-spectrum peer competitor.

What about the future? Will China continue growing at twice or more the rate of the U.S. in the decade ahead? Given the storm clouds on the horizon, most of the current American press and commentariat answer “no”. But examining the bets made this past year by the CEOs of America’s most valuable corporation (Apple), largest asset manager (BlackRock), and most successful automaker (Tesla), the answer for each is clearly “yes”. The concluding section of our report summarizes the main factors cited by those who have reached opposing conclusions and invites the reader to make his or her own bet.

For disagreements and debate about the report, see the recent JFK Jr. Forum – “The Economic Olympics: Can China Win Gold?” – where I hosted Larry Summers, Keyu Jin, and Kelly Sims Gallagher. While Larry remains bearish on China’s prospects, Jin reminds us that “the Chinese government is one of the most adaptive governments in the world, with the ability to readjust its policies in ways that other governments don’t enjoy, including the U.S.”

If you have reactions, I’ll be interested to hear from you.

Graham Allison
Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Follow me on Twitter


Talibã revoga permissão para meninas irem à escola (Deutsche Welle)

EducaçãoAfeganistão

Talibã revoga permissão para meninas irem à escola

Deutsche Welle, 23/03/2022 

Volta às aulas para meninas e meninos estava prevista para esta quarta-feira, mas ordem do grupo que comanda o Afeganistão vetou a presença delas "até segunda ordem". Missão da ONU no país critica a medida.

O Talibã determinou nesta quarta-feira (23/03) às autoridades do Afeganistão que impeçam meninas de participarem de aulas em escolas do ensino fundamental e médio no país, segundo o Ministério da Educação afegão.

"Informamos a todas as escolas de ensino médio para meninas e às escolas com alunas acima do sexto ano que elas estão vetadas até segunda ordem", informou um comunicado do Ministério da Educação.

A pasta informou que as escolas para meninas seriam reabertas assim que um plano fosse elaborado de acordo com a "lei islâmica e a cultura afegã".

O anúncio veio um dia depois de o porta-voz do Ministério da Educação ter divulgado um vídeo parabenizando os alunos pela volta às aulas. A pasta havia anunciado que abriria as escolas para todos os alunos, inclusive para meninas, a partir desta quarta-feira.

Imagens de meios de comunicação afegãos mostraram garotas chorando e protestando contra a mudança repentina.

ONU e EUA criticam medida

"A ONU no Afeganistão deplora o anúncio feito hoje pelo Talibã de que eles estão prorrogando ainda mais sua proibição por tempo indeterminado de que estudantes femininas acima da sexta série sejam autorizadas a voltar às aulas", disse a Missão de Assistência das Nações Unidas no Afeganistão (Unama) em um comunicado.

Ian McCary, encarregado da embaixada dos Estados Unidos em Cabul, que está operando atualmente a partir de Doha, no Catar, escreveu no Twitter que estava "muito preocupado" com a ordem. "Todos os jovens afegãos merecem ser educados", disse.

O Talibã ainda não decidiu os próximos passos, disse Waheedullah Hashmi, um membro sênior do grupo fundamentalista. Segundo ele, matricular meninas no ensino médio poderia corroer o apoio ao governo do Talibã. "A liderança não decidiu quando ou como eles permitirão que as meninas retornem à escola", disse.

Hashimi afirmou que havia apoio para a educação das meninas nos centros urbanos, mas que grande parte do Afeganistão rural, especialmente nas regiões tribais de Pashtun, permanecia contra a ideia de educar as meninas.

Talibã cerceia os direitos das mulheres

Desde que assumiu o poder em agosto, após a retirada das tropas dos Estados Unidos e da Otan do Afeganistão, o Talibã impôs uma série de restrições às mulheres, incluindo a proibição de frequentarem escolas.

Em fevereiro, algumas universidades públicas foram reabertas e o Talibã disse que permitiria que as mulheres fossem às aulas, desde que as classes permanecessem segregadas e baseadas em princípios islâmicos. No entanto, houve relatos mistos sobre a medida, com mulheres sendo tanto permitidas como proibidas de frequentar as universidades.

O Talibã proibiu a educação para mulheres na última vez em que o grupo esteve no poder, de 1996 a 2001. A comunidade internacional tem repetidamente feito da educação de meninas e mulheres um ponto-chave de suas exigências, enquanto o Talibã busca o reconhecimento internacional de seu governo e mais ajuda estrangeira para o país.

bl/ek (AP, Reuters)

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