O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida
sábado, 12 de janeiro de 2019
O neomercantilismo EUA-China
Podem até dizer que é realismo, mas não é: é pura rendição à esquizofrenia trumpista.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Before we reach the March 1 deadline, expect Trump to declare a “triumph” in a great trade deal that will feature China’s purchase of more than a trillion dollars of additional US products.
US trade negotiators concluded a first round of negotiations in Beijing on Wednesday to attempt to hammer out a trade agreement that will prevent US tariffs increasing from 10 to 25% on $200 billion of Chinese imports. After spending 10 days in China just before Christmas listening to leaders from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s team, I registered my bet that Xi has decided to yield on enough of what Trump has been demanding for Trump to declare victory before the deadline.
More specifically: in addition to more purchases of US gas, oil, and agricultural products, expect the agreement to include targets for increases in American companies’ share of banking, insurance, and equity markets. Since American producers account for 6 percent of China’s current gas imports, 3 percent of its oil imports, and 14 percent of its agricultural imports, and Chinese companies control 98 percent of its banking market, 95 percent of the equity business, and 91 percent of insurance, all this should not be that hard. Phase two of the negotiations will then struggle with the more difficult issues of protection of intellectual property and industrial policy.
On the larger geopolitical chessboard, the tariff conflict is relatively small potatoes. The terms on which it is settled, or postponed, will not significantly affect the trajectory of the Thucydidean rivalry between a rising China and a ruling United States. Even if China were to concede on every item on the Trump team’s wish list, China’s economy will likely continue growing at more than twice the rate of the United States.
If you have reactions, I’ll be interested.
Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School