2061) Estado terminal das FFAA da Argentina

Defensa en crisis
Editorial La Nación
Viernes 9 de abril de 2010

El paso del tiempo y el escaso presupuesto tornan obsoletos los equipos y los armamentos de las Fuerzas Armadas

Cada año que transcurre agrava las consecuencias de la ya crónica desinversión que sufren nuestras Fuerzas Armadas, que, al verse privadas del presupuesto necesario, no sólo no pueden adquirir equipamiento nuevo, sino que tampoco pueden mantener ni reparar el existente, que de a poco se vuelve inoperable mientras el personal se ve rezagado en materia de capacitación.

La situación no es nueva. La Argentina invierte en defensa mucho menos que los países de la región y de la Unión Europea. Esto se verifica, como proporción del producto bruto interno (PBI), en gasto por kilómetro cuadrado de superficie o por habitante.

Al margen de esas cifras, el resultado es preocupante: las Fuerzas Armadas no están en condiciones de cumplir hoy con su misión principal.

El atraso en la inversión en esta área adquirió un tono marcado desde el primer gobierno de Carlos Menem, cuando se redujo el presupuesto para Defensa y se privatizaron varias de las plantas del complejo fabril de Fabricaciones Militares.

La desinversión ha continuado. El atraso es tal que para darle un corte y comenzar a revertirlo se requiere un cambio de política. En la Presidencia resultaría cómodo argumentar en voz baja que se han equivocado los gobiernos de la ex presidenta Michelle Bachelet en Chile y de los actuales presidentes Luiz Lula da Silva en Brasil, Nicolas Sarkozy Francia y José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero en España, por citar ejemplos muy diferentes entre sí, en dar a esta área un lugar preponderante y, de ese modo, ceder a perversas presiones antidemocráticas.

Al cabo de siete años de bonanza sin precedente en los dineros públicos argentinos -fruto de la economía internacional, no de la sabiduría de los gobernantes locales-, las Fuerzas Armadas afrontan hoy una situación muy difícil y compleja, que constituye ya una pesada hipoteca para el próximo gobierno, cualquiera sea su signo político. El equipamiento del Ejército tiene una edad promedio superior a los 30 años. De los aviones de combate de la Fuerza Aérea vuela menos del 15 por ciento y no tienen misiles ni munición.

La Armada no puede mantener en forma adecuada los buques de la familia Meko, cuyo sistema es el más moderno; su electrónica está fuera de época. Precisamente, el programa Meko fue un ejemplo: decidió incorporarlo en 1974 el presidente Perón, con aprobación del Congreso. El último barco entró en servicio cuando Néstor Kirchner ya era presidente de la República.

De un total de 60 barcos "sólo 16 están en condiciones de navegar", expresó el diputado radical Julio César Martínez, presidente de la Comisión de Defensa de la Cámara baja. En lo que hace a la Fuerza Aérea, solamente uno o dos Mirage estarían en condiciones de volar, y en la aviación naval sólo habría tres aviones Super Etendard operativos.

Este penoso panorama coincide con la actitud de los gobiernos de Néstor y Cristina Kirchner hacia el personal militar: han logrado desmotivarlo. Las autoridades de Defensa han alterado las exigencias de excelencia profesional para los ascensos, reemplazándolas por criterios políticos de facción.

A esa arbitrariedad se ha sumado el desorden. Las Fuerzas Armadas, con graves penurias presupuestarias y sin equipos, tienen hoy más oficiales superiores, generales, almirantes y brigadieres que en las últimas tres décadas. Ha crecido, asimismo, el personal y la burocracia del Ministerio.

La comparación con nuestros vecinos es elocuente. La Argentina destina el 5,38 por ciento de su presupuesto a Defensa, contra el 12,3 de Chile y el 7,3 de Uruguay. Un estudio de la consultora Nueva Mayoría indica que en 2008 los gastos argentinos en Defensa representaron el 0,87 por ciento del PBI, muy lejos de Ecuador (3,81), Chile (3,73), Colombia (3,34), Uruguay (1,77) y Brasil (1,70). Surinam, con el 0,95 por ciento, invirtió más en Defensa que nuestro país.

A esta altura del deterioro, resulta irrelevante perderse en anécdotas sobre el estado de equipos cuyo mantenimiento es muy oneroso y sus prestaciones inciertas. Incluso hay muchos equipos que sólo tienen una existencia virtual o contable, pues han sido canibalizados y sus repuestos no se fabrican en el mundo desde hace décadas.

Además de mantener lo que es indispensable mantener -porque es lo único que tenemos-, para lo cual el presupuesto no alcanza y tendría que ser incrementado, deberíamos estar analizando en qué va a gastar la Nación para construir su seguridad futura.

Falta una política de largo alcance que contemple el necesario reequipamiento y capacitación. Nuestras Fuerzas Armadas no pueden estar condenadas a la mera subsistencia, desguazando algunos componentes de su sistema de armas para permitir el precario funcionamiento de otros.

Es vergonzoso que algunos pilotos de la Fuerza Aérea se vean obligados a completar su cuota anual de horas de vuelo y de ciclos de despegues y aterrizajes a bordo, como ocurre, de avionetas Cessna.

En un país en el que aún hay niños que mueren de hambre no se trata, obviamente, de lanzarse a una carrera armamentista, sino de dotar a las fuerzas a las que la Constitución consagró a nuestra defensa de los medios necesarios para que estén en condiciones de cumplir ese mandato. Es responsabilidad del Gobierno y, en distinto grado, de la oposición.

No hay soluciones mágicas para la situación a la que se ha llegado, pero debería haber, al menos, decisión política para revertirla en el futuro inmediato.

2060) United Nations and G20 - A Stanley Foundation Memo

The United Nations and the G-20: Ensuring Complementary Efforts
Stanley Foundation, April 10, 2010
Policy Memo

In little more than a year, the G-20 has emerged as a vital summit-level forum for leaders to coordinate international economic policy. The global financial crisis drove home the need for consultations among a wider set of key economic players, more representative of 21st-century realities than the earlier G-8 club of predominately Western industrialized nations.

This development raises important questions about the future shape of the international system and multilateral cooperation. It is increasingly clear that diplomatic cooperation will be multi-multilateral—with an intricate web of different intergovernmental forums and mechanisms. If multilateral cooperation is to fulfill its purpose of solving problems and spreading peace and justice around the world, governments and their leaders must mobilize and harmonize the capabilities of the intergovernmental instruments at their disposal.

The Stanley Foundation's 41st United Nations Issues Conference convened some 35 governmental and nongovernmental officials near New York on March 26-28, 2010, to discuss effective collaboration between the United Nations and the G-20 heads of state summits and preparatory processes. Participants included UN officials, diplomats from a number of countries, and global governance specialists.

Highlights and key observations from the discussion are in this new Policy Memo.

About The Stanley Foundation
The Stanley Foundation seeks a secure peace with freedom and justice, built on world citizenship and effective global governance. It brings fresh voices, original ideas, and lasting solutions to debates on global and regional problems. The foundation is a nonpartisan, private operating foundation, located in Muscatine, Iowa, that focuses on peace and security issues and advocates principled multilateralism. The foundation frequently collaborates with other organizations. It does not make grants. Online at www.stanleyfoundation.org.

2059) Blogometria: apenas um exercicio quantitativo

Recebido de um contador manual, que fica escondido atrás deste blog, contando os incautos, curiosos e outros distraídos que por aqui passam. Não pago nada para ele, então ele me apresenta estas estatísticas brutas (stricto et lato sensi) e não posso reclamar de nada.

Diplomatizzando
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Mas, seu eu perguntar algo, ele me diz sempre as mesmas coisas. Os que mais acessam este blog é uma manada de candidatos desesperados querendo entrar para a carreira diplomática, sem saber o que os espera (tudo de bom, certamente).
Mas, ao lado dos temas habituais da carreira, também entra um ou dois posts sobre os conselheiros da Petrobras (regiamente remunerados, por certo, inclusive a ex-ministra e pré-candidata governista Dilma Rousseff, que provavelmente não largou o osso, na verdade um filé suculento) e o protecionismo argentino (que um raio caia na cabeça dos protecionistas de todos os países).

2058) Nuclear Weapons and National Security - Carnegie Endowment

Nuclear Weapons and National Security — A New Strategy
George Perkovich
Carnegie Endowment Q&A, April 07, 2010

The Obama administration released a new nuclear arms strategy on Tuesday. The Nuclear Posture Review narrows the use of nuclear weapons and says that the primary role of the U.S. nuclear posture is to deter an attack on the United States and prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

In a video Q&A, George Perkovich analyzes U.S. strategy, nuclear deterrence, and national security. Perkovich contends that the new policy reflects the reality we live in today and gives momentum to President Obama’s long-term goal of living in a world without nuclear weapons.

* What is the Nuclear Posture Review and how important is it?
* What are the key elements of the new report?
* How significantly did President Obama alter U.S. nuclear strategy?
* Does the new policy limit America’s nuclear deterrent?
* How does the NPR relate to Obama’s goal of moving toward a world without nuclear weapons?
* Why is the strategy controversial?
* Are disarmament advocates going to be disappointed by the NPR?
* How does the NPR set the stage for the new START agreement, Global Nuclear Security Summit, and Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference?
* Does the new strategy influence how the U.S. can contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions?

What is the Nuclear Posture Review and how important is it?

The Nuclear Posture Review is a document required by the U.S. Congress, where the Secretary of Defense sends to Congress the administration’s overall view of nuclear weapons—the role that nuclear weapons play in U.S. national security policy, what they want to communicate to allies that we try to reassure with these weapons, and how they communicate to potential adversaries of the United States what the deterrent strategy of the United States is.

From that document then come instructions which the military uses to actually design the targeting options for nuclear weapons and the planning of the U.S. nuclear force posture. The posture review also in a sense sets out the requirements for nuclear weapons, which then has implications in the budgets of the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and has implications for the size of the infrastructure necessary to produce and maintain U.S. nuclear weapons.

So it’s your kind of your basic operating system for nuclear weapons.

What are the key elements of the new report?

The new posture review departs from the one that the Bush administration did early in its term in several ways. One, the Obama one says that the primary objective or concern of U.S. nuclear posture is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists. This is interesting because past administrations have said these are very important things, but it’s not part of our nuclear policy and our nuclear posture.

The administration also says very clearly that the goal of the United States is ultimately to have a world without nuclear weapons and acknowledges we’re far from that possibility today, but that it is an objective and therefore that the United States will try to lead the world in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in everyone’s national security policy.

So, the United States would try to lead by example and, as much as possible, to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. security, but also to then encourage and put pressure on others to do the same.

So those are two kind of interesting changes in priority, in a sense, of this posture.

How significantly did President Obama alter U.S. nuclear strategy?

Actually, the Bush administration got an unfair criticism. People around the world didn’t like the administration for a lot of reasons, and they basically interpreted the Bush administration’s strategy as somehow increasing the reliance by the United States on nuclear weapons and lowering the threshold that would decide whether the United States would use nuclear weapons. Neither of those was true.

The Bush administration also sought to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and I would argue that the Obama posture review extends what was already a process begun by the Bush administration and it extends it in ways reflecting the realities of the world.

The United States has greater conventional, non-nuclear military capabilities. It’s fought a couple of wars since the last posture review in Iraq and Afghanistan. These are major wars, cost more than a trillion dollars, and it’s obvious to everyone that we would never use nuclear weapons in these situations. They’re irrelevant, basically, and we have lots of other needs that need to be concentrated upon and fulfilled.

And so, this posture review reflects what the military understands, which is that it’s almost impossible to imagine a circumstance—other than a nuclear attack by a major state against the United States—where the United States would threaten to use nuclear weapons and so we ought to have a policy that reflects that reality.

Does the new policy limit America’s nuclear deterrent?

If you ask, how would the United States interpret it if a competitor makes declarations about its nuclear posture. Let’s say Russia for example. If the Russians came out and said, “Americans trust us, we won’t use nuclear weapons against you.”

Do you think the U.S. government, Congress, and the military are just going to take that at face value and say well the Russians said they won’t use nuclear weapons against us therefore let’s forget about the thousands of nuclear weapons that they have. No. You want to look at what their capabilities are, you want to look at scenarios—you want to be real.

Similarly, what the United States actually says in terms of whether or not it’s beating its chest and saying to the world out there, don’t you dare doing anything to us or we will nuke you. That they would take that seriously and as gospel is strange credulity. But similarly if we said to our potential adversaries, don't worry we’re past nuclear weapons. We still have a couple thousand of them, but don’t worry we’re nice guys. They won’t believe that either.

What they are looking at is what capabilities you have, the scenarios they can imagine of conflict, and the basic reality that if the United States was threatened in a fundamental way, it’s existence was threatened, an extreme threat or one of its allies like Japan was threatened that way, the other guy knows that if we have nuclear weapons and that’s the only thing we can use to defeat the other guy, that’s what we’re going to do.

So it doesn't matter so much what we say about it, it’s that capability and that context that will determine whether a state is deterred or not.

How does the NPR relate to Obama’s goal of moving toward a world without nuclear weapons?

This posture review states in many places that the goal of the United States is to move toward a world without nuclear weapons. It’s not unilateral, the United States is not going to get rid of its nuclear weapons alone. And it states clearly that as long as others have weapons, the United States will have to retain them and we will have to retain them in a safe and reliable manner.

But it does commit to this goal. It says if others want to work with us, we’re prepared to go there. It very specifically, for example, invites Russia and China—the two main potential competitors of the United States in a nuclear sphere—to further strategic dialogue, to further develop common understanding, so we can avoid any offensive nuclear competition, but actually move to reduce the role of these weapons in each of our cases. And to make sure that we have stable relations so that we don’t get into a crisis that could lead to a nuclear war or the threat of a nuclear war.

So that’s very important in the posture, that invitation to Russia and China to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.

Why is the strategy controversial?

I don’t think this is going to be controversial. There may be people on the far right who don’t like it, but in many cases they don’t understand reality, whether it was under the Bush administration or any previous administration. If you don’t understand the reality that, since 1945, we haven’t used nuclear weapons, no one has used nuclear weapons in anger, that every president has understood that this is a taboo that they don’t want to cross and that we don't make nuclear threats idly. You have to understand that and many people don’t.

You also have to understand that U.S. military doesn’t want to use nuclear weapons, doesn't feel that it would need to use nuclear weapons, and that we have enough conventional military capabilities to deter any rational actor from threatening us. The statements in this posture review don't really change all of that. There is some reassurance to adversaries, but it’s not the United States unilaterally giving up military power.

On the left, it will be criticized because they will argue that the President doesn’t go far enough to say that the only purpose for nuclear weapons is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others.

So the posture review says, look we want to move to that point of saying the only way in which we would consider using nuclear weapons is to retaliate to a nuclear attack. But states may develop biological weapon capabilities in the future and so we may then face a massive threat that is non-nuclear and so we would reserve this option. And more importantly today, we have some allies that we care greatly about, including South Korea, who worry that they face an adversary, in this case North Korea, that could threaten them with massive artillery attacks because the distance between Seoul and North Korea is very slight.

And our ally South Korea might want us to still threaten North Korea with a nuclear response even though North Korea would be attacking South Korea conventionally. The U.S. military knows that we can defeat North Korea without nuclear weapons, but in order to reassure our ally South Korea we’re not saying quite that way. We’re leaving the options fuzzier because this is reassuring to our ally South Korea.

Are disarmament advocates going to be disappointed by the NPR?

Some of the disarmament advocates around the world might be disappointed because people wanted President Obama to have a posture and declare that the only purpose is deter the use of nuclear weapons by others.

It’s very important to realize that this is the best posture review that the president and his administration thought could get the 67 votes in the U.S. Senate needed to ratify the START treaty.

On the one hand, you could have a posture review which says lovely things opposed to nuclear weapons that the disarmament community would applaud, but would in turn reduce the chances you could actually get a real treaty to reduce nuclear weapons ratified in the Senate.

So the administration decided to have a posture review that is conceived in terms of what we need to do to get votes in the Senate to actually implement reductions that can lead toward the future that disarmament advocates might want, even if our language now may disappoint them.

How does the NPR set the stage for the new START agreement, Global Nuclear Security Summit, and Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference?

The NPR is very important—it’s a document that will guide U.S. policy for the next five years. The new START treaty which will be signed in Prague on April 8 and hopefully ratified this year was already informed by the Nuclear Posture Review.

When the nuclear posture review was being drafted, the negotiators of the START treaty and the Pentagon and the military got together and said, here’s the basic parameters of what we’re going to talk about in START, in the Nuclear Posture Review that you are doing do you have any problem with us reducing to these levels. And the answer was no, we can maintain deterrence, the security of the United States is ensured at the levels that we are talking about with START. So in a way the posture review came before the START treaty even though it’s being announced only two days before the signing of the treaty.

Politically what all this means is that the President’s agenda that he announced a year ago in Prague of reducing the role of nuclear weapons now has the posture review which does that, the START treaty coming several days later which demonstrates it, the nuclear security summit in Washington on April 12-13 with the heads of more than 40 countries showing a commitment to try to keep nuclear material from terrorists (that’s the focus of the nuclear security summit).

All of which is meant to give momentum and show the seriousness of the United States as the review conference happens in May in New York with all the states in the nonproliferation treaty. So the United States is trying to say look, let’s keep the bargain where all of the rest of the world agrees not to get nuclear weapons and to work with us to keep nuclear weapons from terrorists and other states, because we are keeping our side of the bargain. We are doing everything we can to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and reduce the number of nuclear weapons.

We’re demonstrating that in April, you respond in kind in May.

Does the new strategy influence how the U.S. can contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions?

The NPR is not directed against Iran in any way. If you ask the U.S. military, we don’t need nuclear weapons to fight or deter Iran from committing the kind of aggression that militaries prevent. And even if Iran had a handful of nuclear weapons, the United States for the next decade at least is going to have thousands of strategic nuclear weapons as well as hundreds of shorter range nuclear weapons.

There is no nuclear equation with Iran and the U.S. military knows that even if people in the public or Congress say we may need to nuke Iran. That is not the way the military thinks about it.

What the posture review can help do though is encourage other countries to work with us to isolate Iran diplomatically, politically, and economically. With an understanding the United States is trying to be progressive or constructive in the way the rest of the world thinks about nuclear weapons.

And therefore we strengthen our persuasiveness in getting the rest of the world to be constructive with us as we deal with the kind of threats that Iran poses.

2057) Nuclear Security - Stanley Foundation

Next Generation Nuclear Security
Stanley Foundation
Available on Monday, April 12

Watch the live Webcast

The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), of which the Stanley Foundation is a member, is offering a live Webcast of its event Next Generation Nuclear Security: Meeting the Global Challenge on Monday, April 12. The broadcast will begin at 8:45 a.m. (EST). Edited, archived video of the event will also be posted 24 hours after its conclusion.

Additionally, the FMWG has a number of valuable resources available in advance of the unprecedented, heads of state Nuclear Security Summit taking place in Washington, DC, on April 12-13.

• A C-SPAN broadcast of a pre-summit press briefing by four members of the FMWG.
• A congressional briefing by Kenneth Luongo, president of Partnership for Global Security, on funding the objective of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years.
• A congressional briefing by Matthew Bunn, associate professor at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, on securing nuclear stockpiles in four years.
• “Making the Nuclear Security Summit Matter: An Agenda for Action”—an article by Kenneth Luongo.
• The FMWG’s letter to Congress regarding adequate nuclear security funding in FY2011.
• A new FMWG column in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
• The FMWG’s three-part blog series on Nuclear Security Summit issues on the Partnership for a Secure America’s “Across the Aisle” blog.
• Radioactive Challenge, an original video report by the Stanley Foundation about the challenge of securing fissile materials worldwide.

More information is available at www.fmwg.org.

About The Stanley Foundation
The Stanley Foundation seeks a secure peace with freedom and justice, built on world citizenship and effective global governance. It brings fresh voices, original ideas, and lasting solutions to debates on global and regional problems. The foundation is a nonpartisan, private operating foundation, located in Muscatine, Iowa, that focuses on peace and security issues and advocates principled multilateralism. The foundation frequently collaborates with other organizations. It does not make grants. Online at www.stanleyfoundation.org.

2056) US Nuclear Strategy - Cato Institute

New Nuclear Strategy for U.S.
Cato Institute
April 9, 2010

In advance of the Global Summit on Nuclear Security next week, President Obama on Tuesday announced a slight shift in U.S. nuclear weapons policy that essentially split the difference between conservatives who favor an expanded role for nuclear weapons and liberals who anticipate their complete elimination. Cato scholar Christopher A. Preble says that overall the Nuclear Posture Review "signals more continuity than change," but warns, "Unfortunately, it fails to set the stage for dramatic and necessary changes to a bloated and outdated force structure because it reaffirms the U.S. commitment to other countries that imposes a huge burden on our military and on U.S. taxpayers."

In the December 2009 issue of Cato’s Nuclear Proliferation Update, Preble discussed the cost of our nuclear program, and how it is the least transparent feature of the nation’s massive budget:
In the most comprehensive study of nuclear weapons spending, [researchers] concluded that U.S. taxpayers spent at least $52.8 billion in fiscal year 2008—a reasonable floor based solely on information in the public domain. The actual top–line budget, which includes classified and intelligence-related activities, is surely higher—and likely much higher. …Nuclear weapons–related spending might be warranted if the money was likely to advance American security, and do so at a reasonable cost. Programmatic reforms, beginning with a full and public accounting of all spending, are essential to making this a reality.

Preble discussed the reduction of the nuclear arsenal in a recent Cato Daily Podcast.

2055) Nuclear Posture Review of the US - CSIS

The Nuclear Posture Review
Sharon Squassoni
Center For Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
April 8, 2010

Q1: Why a Nuclear Posture Review now?
A1: Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. presidents have been grappling with the implications of a drastically changed security environment. Congress mandated that the Defense Department complete a review of the roles and missions of nuclear forces, and the first one appeared in 1994 under the Clinton administration. The Bush administration's review was completed in 2001. This latest Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was mandated by Congress in 2008. It acknowledges that nuclear weapons play a narrower role in U.S. national security strategy than in the past and seeks to widen the role of conventional elements of deterrence. It concludes that thousands of nuclear weapons have little relevance in meeting the most pressing security challenges facing the United States today-nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

Q2: Is this review a radical departure from previous reviews?
A2: No. The review does not call for a no-first-use policy, nor for deep, quick reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, either unilaterally or in tandem with Russia. The strategic nuclear triad (warheads delivered by submarines, missiles, and bombers) is intact and will probably remain so for decades unless much deeper cuts are made. Allies will continue to rely on U.S. extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear "umbrella." The safety, security, and reliability of the existing arsenal will be maintained. Lastly, the review does not close off the possibility that U.S. nuclear weapons might be used to respond to nonnuclear attacks, although it limits those circumstances.
A few changes are significant, however. Among other things, the United States will not develop new warheads, and life-extension programs will not support new military missions or capabilities. Stockpile stewardship investments will allow major reductions in warheads held in reserve. The review explicitly strengthens assurances to nonnuclear weapon states that comply with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

Q3: What is the domestic and international impact of this NPR at this time?
A3: This review was necessary to determine force levels under the new START agreement, which will be signed on April 8 in Prague. It would be hard to convince the Senate to ratify that treaty without a clear framework for nuclear policy for the next decade. Likewise, this NPR will be crucial to administration efforts to get a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratified by the Senate at some point in the future. Stockpile stewardship measures will be critical to that debate. Internationally, this NPR will be closely scrutinized as an indication of U.S. commitment to its disarmament obligations under the NPT, as state parties meet in May in New York to review that treaty's implementation. Disarmament progress is considered crucial by many to gain support for stronger nonproliferation measures.

Sharon Squassoni is a senior fellow and director of the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.