sexta-feira, 17 de maio de 2013

Containeres: mais globalizadores do que o livre-comercio


Finance and economics

Free exchange

The humble hero

Containers have been more important for globalisation than freer trade

THE humble shipping container is a powerful antidote to economic pessimism and fears of slowing innovation. Although only a simple metal box, it has transformed global trade. In fact, new research suggests that the container has been more of a driver of globalisation than all trade agreements in the past 50 years taken together.
Containerisation is a testament to the power of process innovation. In the 1950s the world’s ports still did business much as they had for centuries. When ships moored, hordes of longshoremen unloaded “break bulk” cargo crammed into the hold. They then squeezed outbound cargo in as efficiently as possible in a game of maritime Tetris. The process was expensive and slow; most ships spent much more time tied up than plying the seas. And theft was rampant: a dock worker was said to earn “$20 a day and all the Scotch you could carry home.”
Containerisation changed everything. It was the brainchild of Malcom McLean, an American trucking magnate. He reckoned that big savings could be had by packing goods in uniform containers that could easily be moved between lorry and ship. When he tallied the costs from the inaugural journey of his first prototype container ship in 1956, he found that they came in at just $0.16 per tonne to load—compared with $5.83 per tonne for loose cargo on a standard ship. Containerisation quickly conquered the world: between 1966 and 1983 the share of countries with container ports rose from about 1% to nearly 90%, coinciding with a take-off in global trade (see chart).
The container’s transformative power seems obvious, but it is “impossible to quantify”, in the words of Marc Levinson, author of a history of “the box” (and a former journalist at The Economist). Indeed, containerisation could merely have been a response to tumbling tariffs. It coincided with radical reductions in global trade barriers, the result of European integration and the work of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
Yet a new paper aims to separate one effect from the other. Zouheir El-Sahli, of Lund University, and Daniel Bernhofen and Richard Kneller, of the University of Nottingham, looked at 157 countries from 1962 to 1990. They created a set of variables which “switch on” when a country or pair of trading partners starts using containers via ship or rail (landlocked economies, such as Austria, often joined the container age by moving containers via rail to ports in neighbouring countries, such as Hamburg in Germany). The researchers then estimated the effect of these variables on trade.
The results are striking. In a set of 22 industrialised countries containerisation explains a 320% rise in bilateral trade over the first five years after adoption and 790% over 20 years. By comparison, a bilateral free-trade agreement raises trade by 45% over 20 years and GATT membership adds 285%.
To tackle the sticky question of what is causing what, the authors check whether their variables can predict trade flows in years before container shipping is actually adopted. (If the fact that a country eventually adopts containers predicts growth in its trade in years before that adoption actually occurred, that would be evidence that the “container” jump in trade was actually down to some other pre-existing trend.) But they do not, the authors say, providing strong evidence that containerisation caused the estimated surge in trade.
What explains the outsize effect of containers? Reduced costs alone cannot. Though containers brought some early savings, shipping rates did not drop very much after their introduction. In a 2007 paper David Hummels, an economist at Purdue University, found that ocean-shipping charges varied little from 1952 to 1970—and then rose with the cost of oil.
Put them in a container
More important than costs are knock-on effects on efficiency. In 1965 dock labour could move only 1.7 tonnes per hour onto a cargo ship; five years later a container crew could load 30 tonnes per hour (see table). This allowed freight lines to use bigger ships and still slash the time spent in port. The journey time from door to door fell by half and became more consistent. The container also upended a rigid labour force. Falling labour demand reduced dockworkers’ bargaining power and cut the number of strikes. And because containers could be packed and sealed at the factory, losses to theft (and insurance rates) plummeted.
Over time all this reshaped global trade. Ports became bigger and their number smaller. More types of goods could be traded economically. Speed and reliability of shipping enabled just-in-time production, which in turn allowed firms to grow leaner and more responsive to markets as even distant suppliers could now provide wares quickly and on schedule. International supply chains also grew more intricate and inclusive. This helped accelerate industrialisation in emerging economies such as China, according to Richard Baldwin, an economist at the Graduate Institute of Geneva. Trade links enabled developing economies simply to join existing supply chains rather than build an entire industry from the ground up. But for those connections, the Chinese miracle might have been much less miraculous.
Not only has the container been more important than past trade negotiations—its lessons ought also to focus minds at future talks. When governments meet at the WTO’s December conference in Bali they should make a special effort in what is called “trade facilitation”—efforts to boost efficiency at customs through regulatory harmonisation and better infrastructure. By some estimates, a 50% improvement in these areas could mean benefits as big as the elimination of all remaining tariffs. This would not be a glamorous outcome, but the big ones seldom are.
Sources
"Estimating the Effects of the Container Revolution on World Trade", by Daniel Bernhofen, Zouheir El-Sahli and Richard Kneller, Lund University, Working Paper 2013:4, February 2013
"Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of Globalisation", by David Hummels, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(3): 131-154, 2007

Brasilia, Genebra, OMC, Brasil - Marcelo de Paiva Abreu


Genebra não é Brasília 
Marcelo de Paiva Abreu
Doutor em economia pela Universidade De Cambridge, é professor titular no departamento de economia da PUC-RIO
O Estado de S. Paulo, 16/05/2013

A vitória de Roberto Azevêdo na disputa pela posição de diretor-geral da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) provocou grande alívio em Brasília. Depois que a União Europeia decidiu votar em bloco na candidatura do rival mexicano, houve o temor de que o brasileiro fosse derrotado. Uma derrota para o México resultaria em grandes estragos na postulação brasileira pela liderança política na América Latina, baseada, embora com claros exageros, em manter posição menos alinhada em relação a Washington.
Com base nas simétricas reações mexicanas à derrota de Herminío Blanco, é possível imaginar a reação brasileira a uma eventual derrota de Azevêdo. O ex-presidente- do país Ernesto Zedillo, no Wall Street Journal, foi menos elegante do que sugeriria sua biografia e, confundindo pessoa com país, lamentou a escolha com o discutível argumento de que "o Brasil não foi o parceiro mais positivo da OMC". Já Jorge Castañeda foi inusitadamente comedido, limitando-se a sugerir que Azevêdo foi escolhido por ser da "confraria" de Genebra.
Não cabe dúvida de que a vitória decorreu do reconhecimento das virtudes do candidato, que teve envolvimento estreito em panels nos quais o Brasil contestou as políticas protecionistas de países desenvolvidos. As vitórias nos panels do açúcar e do algodão, contra a União Europeia e os EUA, respectivamente, foram marcos na consolidação do sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC. Depois disso, o embaixador viu-se obrigado a defender posições menos sólidas quanto ao protecionismo no Brasil e à inclusão de mecanismo de ajuste de tarifas para levar em conta flutuações cambiais.
A vitória brasileira foi a vitória do multilateralismo. Herminio Blanco foi o principal negociador do Nafta, marco da abertura mexicana baseia-se na celebração de acordos regionais, em contraste com negociações multilaterais. Assim, após o Nafta, o México celebrou muitos outros acordos de livre comércio. É estratégia cuja generalização tem limites, especialmente para países com comércio menos concentrado geograficamente.
Na contabilidade dos votos, a vitória de Azevêdo dependeu crucialmente dos votos africanos. O México teria vencido se tivesse repartido os votos dos africanos que votaram no Brasil. Não é só na América Latina que o México é visto, nas palavras de Castañeda, "com suspicácia"  por sua proximidade com os EUA. O apoio ao Brasil na África decorreu, também, da política de abertura de novas embaixadas e de uso menos intenso, pelos europeus, das tradicionais pressões sobre ex-colônias.
A derrota dos países desenvolvidos, que apoiaram a candidatura Blanco a despeito das "parcerias estratégicas" celebradas pela diplomacia brasi1eira, revela o aumento do peso das economias em desenvolvimento na economia mundial.. E também falta de compromisso dos desenvolvidos com o multilateralismo, quando ganham proeminência as futuras negociações entre União Europeia e EUA e a do Trans-Pacifíc Trade Agreement.
A combinação da assimetria do peso de diferentes países no comércio mundial com a regra de que a cada país corresponde um voto ge ra problemas de governança que têm levado muitos organismos multilaterais à paralisia. Evitar que isso ocorra na OMC é tarefa espinhosa que exigirá todos os talentos de. Azevêdo.
Ontem fui a uma agência dos Correios e retirei a encomenda de um DVD sobre a obra de Joseph Haydn. Paguei imposto equivalente a 72% do preço de face no Reino Unido. Ao pagar me veio à mente a declaração recente do ministro Fernando Pimentel, ao negar o protecionismo brasileiro: "Protecionismo é um conceito utilizado pelos países desenvolvidos quando querem entrar no mercado de outros países"". Vamos torcer para que Roberto Azevêdo se distancie das posições de Brasília.

O Brasil, o "Itamarichy" e a China - David Shambaugh


Brasil tem que "acordar" para desafio chinês, diz especialista
MARCELO NINIO DE PEQUIM
Folha de S.Paulo, 16/05/2013

Autor critica falta de estrutura para estudos sobre gigante da Ásia

Nas mais de 400 páginas do livro "China Goes Global" (a China se lança no mundo, em tradução livre), de David Shambaugh, um dos únicos pontos de exclamação é usado quando ele descreve o choque provocado pelo despreparo da diplomacia brasileira em lidar com a China.
"Quando visitei o Ministério das Relações Exteriores, em 2008, me foi dito que não havia sequer uma pessoa fluente em chinês ou um grupo de especialistas em China em todo o serviço diplomático!", espanta-se ele, um dos mais renomados especialistas em política externa chinesa.
O Itamaraty (que Shambaugh grafa como "Itamarichy") agora tenta recuperar o atraso, com um grupo de jovens diplomatas em Pequim exclusivamente dedicados a aprender o idioma chinês.
Shambaugh teve outra surpresa ao questionar os governos do Brasil e de outros países da América do Sul sobre qual era a estratégia em relação à China. A resposta geralmente foi um silêncio constrangedor, conta Shambaugh.
A falta de uma estrutura acadêmica de estudos sobre o maior parceiro comercial do Brasil também impressionou o autor. "É chocante, mas não há um programa de estudos chineses em todo o Brasil", escreveu.
O despreparo é explorado pelos chineses em sua expansão silenciosa no continente, afirma o autor. A maioria dos diplomatas chineses na região fala português ou espanhol com fluência.
E, apesar de negarem, têm uma estratégia definida, baseada na abertura de mercados e na obtenção de recursos naturais.
O desequilíbrio nas relações deveria ser motivo de preocupação, afirma Shambaugh. Segundo um estudo recente da Universidade Columbia (EUA), o Brasil exporta para a China 7,6% de produtos de alta tecnologia, enquanto importa 41,4% de itens desse tipo.
"Sim, o Brasil deveria ver a China com preocupação exatamente por isso.", disse ele à Folha, por e-mail.
Outros países da América Latina e da África já começam a ter dificuldades no comércio com a China devido a essa atitude, chamada de neo-colonialista, diz ele.
"Todos esses países precisam acordar para o tipo de desafio que a China impõe, ser mais duros e deixar a ingenuidade de lado", diz.

Diretor do Programa de Política da China da Universidade George Washington, Shambaugh falará hoje no Instituto Fernando Henrique, em São Paulo.
China é uma potência parcial, diz especialista
folha.com/no1279328

A frase da semana: o socialismo e o papel higienico - eu mesmo, with a little help from a 4 years old boy

Minha frase da semana, que acabo de inventar:

O socialismo acaba quando não tem mais papel higiênico.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, com ajuda de Pedro Paulo, quando tinha 4 anos...

Livro: Matthias Herdegen: Principles of International Economic Law (OUP, 2013)


Um livro indispensável, para oa estudiosos das relações econômicas internacionais.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


Principles of International Economic Law

Herdegen, Matthias

Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2013. 

Principles of International Economic Law gives a comprehensive overview of the central topics in international economic law, with an emphasis on the interplay between the different economic and political interests on both the international and domestic levels. The book sets the classic topics of international economic law, WTO law, investment protection, commercial law, and monetary law in context with human rights, environmental protection, good governance, and the needs of developing countries. It thus provides a concise picture of the current architecture of international economic law. Topics covered range from codes of conduct for multinational enterprises, to the human rights implications of the exploitation of natural resources. The book demonstrates the economic foundations and economic implications of legal frameworks. It puts into profile the often complex relationship between, on the one hand, international standards on liberalization and economic rationality and, on the other, state sovereignty and national preferences.It describes the new forms of economic cooperation which have developed in recent decades, such as the growing number of transnational companies in the private sector, and forms of cooperation between states such as the G8 or G20. Providing a perfect introductory text to the field of international economic law, the book thoroughly analyses legal developments within their wider political, economic, or social context.


Table of Contents
 PART I. CONTENTS, HISTORY, AND STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
I. The Law of International Economic Relations: Contents and Structure 3
1. Understanding and Contents of International Economic Law 3
2. The Interaction .between International and Domestic Law 5
3. The Interaction of Different National Laws 7
4. Main Areas of International Economic Law 7
5. The Relationship between International Economic Law and
Economic Rationality 11
 II. Past and Present of the International Economic Order 13
1. The Historical Foundations of International Economic Law 13
2. The Concerns of Developing Countries and the Call for a 'New
Economic Order' 16
3. The System of the World Trade Organization 18
4. The Regional Integration of Markets 19
5. Globalization of Economic Relations: Chances,. Risks, and
Asymmetries " 19
 III. The Actors of International Economic Law 25
1. Subjects of International Law vs Actors in International
Economic Relations 25
2. States x 26
3. State Enterprises 26
4. International Organizations 28
5. Non-institutionalized Forums of Cooperation in Economic
Relations 33
6. International Inter-Agency Cooperation 35
7. Non-governmental Organizations 37
8. Private Corporations and Codes of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations 38
 IV. The Legal Sources of International Economic Law 42
1. International Law as an Order of Transboundary Economic Relations 42
2. The Law of the European Union 46
3. International Agreements on Private Economic Transactions 47
4. 'Transnational Law' and 'lex mercatorid 48
 PART II. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AS
AN ORDER OF RULES AND PRINCIPLES
V. Basic Principles of the International Economic Order 53
1. States' Autonomy in Economic Choices 53
2. Trade Liberalization: Reduction of Tariffs and Elimination
of Non-Tariff Barriers 54
3. Fair Treatment of Foreign Investors 54
4. Non-discrimination 55
5. Favourable Conditions for Developing Countries 57
6. Sustainable Development 62
7. Respect for Human Rights 63
 VI. Sovereignty and International Economic Relations 65
1. A Modern Concept of Sovereignty: Response to Globalization
and Deference to Democratic Choices 65
2. The Principle of Non-intervention 68
3. State Immunity 69
4. The Treatment of Foreign Persons 72
5. Diplomatic Protection 74
6. National Economic Law and its Extraterritorial Application 77
7. Criteria for Exercising Jurisdiction: Legitimating Links 86
8. The Extraterritorial Application of National Law 88
 VII. Human Rights and International Economic Relations 101
1. The Exploitation of Natural Resources 102
2. Treaties on Economic Cooperation and Economic Integration 107
3. The Impact and Liability of Transnational Corporations (TNC) 108
 VIII. Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development 118
1. Transboundary Impacts and Transboundary Harm 119
2. Sustainable Development , 121
3. The Precautionary Principle 122
4. Treaties on Pollution Control and on the Liability for
Environmental Contaminations 124
5. Treaties on the Protection of the Atmosphere and for
Climate Protection 126
 6. Treaties on Biodiversity, Access to Genetic Resources, and Biosafety 129
7. The Law of Biotechnology 136
 IX. Good Governance—The Internal Structure of States and Global
Economic Integration 139
1. Standards of Good Governance 140
2. Global Economic Integration: The Relevance of the
Constitutional and Economic Order 144
 X. Dispute Settlement 147
1. Mechanisms of International Dispute Settlement 147
2. International Commercial Arbitration 151
3. Jurisdiction of National Courts 156
4. Obtaining Evidence Abroad ' - —-• 164
5. Service of Process, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments '• 166
 PART III. WORLD TRADE LAW AND
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
XI. History and Development of World Trade Law 171
1. Development up to the Uruguay Round 171
2. The Uruguay Round 173
3. Post-Uruguay Perspectives and Challenges for the WTO System 175
 XII. The World Trade Organization 178
1. The WTO as Institutional Platform for Trade Relations 178
2. Members 178
3. Organs of the WTO 180
 XIII. The Multilateral and the Plurilateral Agreements on Trade 184
1. Multilateral and Plurilateral Trade Agreements:
Concentric Circles 184
2. The GATT 1994 and Related Trade Agreements 185
 XIV. The GATT 188
1. Objectives and< Basic Principles 188
2. Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 189
3. National Treatment 195
4. General Exceptions (Article XX of the GATT) and Security
Exceptions (Article XXI of the GATT) 203
5. Safeguard Measures (Article XIX of the GATT) 212
6. Waivers 213
7. Burden of Proof 213
 XV. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 215
XVI. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 223
XVII. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 225
1. Scope and Relevance 225
2. Telecommunication Services 228
3. WTO Law and Financial Services 230
 XVIII. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) ~  232
1. General Aspects 232
2. Patent Rights ' 233
3. The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Broader
International Context 241
 XIX. Subsidies and Anti-dumping Measures 245
1. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) 245
2. The Agreement on Agriculture 252
3. Dumping and Anti-Dumping Measures 254
 XX. Dispute Settlement in the WTO 256.
XXI. WTO Law in Broader Perspective: The Interplay with
Other Regimes of International Law 264
XXII. WTO Law in Domestic Law 269
XXIII. The Regional Integration of Markets ' 274
1. Forms of Regional Market Integration (Free Trade Areas,
Customs Unions, and Economic Communities) 274
2. The Free Movement of Goods and Services in the European
Union 277
3. EFTA and the European Economic Area 281
4. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 284
5. Regional Integration in South America 286
6. Regional Integration in Central America and the Caribbean 290
7. Regional Integration in Asia and the Pacific 291
8. Regional Integration in Africa 292
9. Bilateral Trade Agreements of die European Union and
of the United States 293
 PART IV. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW
XXIV. International Sales and Contract Law 299
1. Introduction 299
2. The Rome Convention, the Rome I Regulation, and
the Common European Law on Sales 302
3. UN Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG) 304
4. Electronic Commerce 316
 XXV. Letters of Credit 318
1. Documentary Credit 318
2. Standby Letters of Credit 321
 XXVI. International Building and Construction Contracts 323
1. FIDIC Manuals - 323
2. Long-term Contracts (BOT,  BOO, BOOT, BLOT, BOTT) 324
 XXVII. International Company, Competition, and Tax Law 326
1. Relevance 326
2. The Proper Law of a Corporation 326
3. Recognition of Foreign Corporations and Deference to
'Home' Regulation 328
4. EU Company Law: the Societas Europaea 330
 5. Corporate Governance 332
XXVIII. International Accounting Standards 334
XXDC International Competition Law % 336
 1. National and International Rules against Anti-Competitive
Behaviour 336
2. The Application of Competition Law and Extraterritorial Effects 338
3. Bilateral Cooperation 340
4. Convergences and Divergences between EU Competition
Law and US Antitrust Law , 342
XXX. International Tax Law 346
PARTV. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
XXXI. Foreign Investment in Practice 353
1.  Economic and Political Relevance 353
2. Direct and Indirect Investment 354
3. Investors 355
4. The Control of Foreign Investment 357
 XXXII. Customary International Law 359
1. Customary Standards and Foreign Investment 359
2. Expropriation and Compensation 360
3. The Extraterritorial Effects of Expropriations 368
 XXXIII. Concessions and Investment: Agreements between States
and Foreign Companies 375
1. Stabilization and Internationalization 375
2. Concessions 378
 XXXIV. Treaties on Investment Protection 380
1. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements on the Protection
of Investments 380
2. Personal Scope of Protection 384
3. Protected 'Investments' 388
4. Modern Standards of Investment Protection 391
5. Dispute Setde'ment 411
 XXXV. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes 416
XXXVI. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 420
XXXVII. The Interplay of Investment Protection and Other Areas
of International Law 422
 PART VI. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE
XXXVIII. International Monetary Law and International Economic
Relations 427
1. The Impact of Monetary Relations on International
Trade and Business 427
2. The Bretton Woods System and the Development
of Currency Exchange Arrangements 428
3. Currency Exchange Regimes 430
4. Monetary Unions 431
5. 'Eurodollars' and other Eurocurrencies 435
 XXXK. The International Monetary Fund: Objectives, Organization,
and Functions 437
1. Objectives 437
2. Membership 438
 3. Organization 439
4. Financing of the IMF 439
5. IMF Members' General Obligations and the Surveillance
of Exchange Rate Policies: Stability and Fair Competitive
Conditions 440
6. Convertibility of Currencies and Restriction of Exchange
Controls 444
7. Exchange Control Regulations and their Extraterritorial
Effect 446
8. Special Drawing Rights 449
9. Use of the Fund's Financial Resources_for Members in
Economic Difficulties 450
XL. The World Bank and Other International Financial
Institutions 455
 1. The World Bank Group 455
2. Regional Development Banks 460
3. The Bank for International Settlements 461
XLI. Debt Crises and State Insolvency 463
 1. The International Management of Debt Crises 463
2. For Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The 'Paris Club'
and the'London Club' 465
3. State Insolvency and International Law 465
 XLII. International Regulation of the Banking Sector 477
1. The Need for Enhanced Cooperation of Supervisory
Authorities and for Harmonized Standards 477
2. Supervisory Authorities and Macro-Prudential Oversight
of the Financial System 478
3. Global Regulatory Standards for Adequate Bank Capital
and Risk Management: the Basel Accords 480
Index 483














quinta-feira, 16 de maio de 2013

A frase do ano: "A classe media e' fascista..." - Adivinhe quem?

Ai, minha Nossa Senhora da Classe Média, o que fazer agora, que estamos todos condenados ao fogo do inferno?
Quem poderá nos salvar?
Jesus Cristo é a salvação?
Difícil, depois destas frases memoráveis:


A classe média é o atraso de vida.
A classe média é estupidez. 
É o que tem de reacionário, conservador, ignorante, petulante, arrogante, terrorista. 
A classe média é uma abominação política, porque ela é fascista, uma abominação ética, porque ela é violenta, e ela é uma abominação cognitiva, porque ela é ignorante.

Dixit, Marilena Chaui, aparentemente professora da USP, talvez aposentada, mas ativa...
(Eu ví o vídeo dessa fala, no lançamento de um livro mentiroso sobre outro mentiroso, e posso garantir: a classe média que estava lá, aplaudiu e se achou enquadrado nos casos previstos pela professora que não é da classe média.

O jornalista Augusto Nunes convida seus leitores a escolherem entre pelo menos três opções: 
1) Marilena saiu da classe média porque ficou pobre; 
2) Marilena caiu fora da classe média porque virou bilionária; 
3) Marilena continua na classe média e resolveu confessar que se odeia. 
Uma quarta sugere que Marilena endoidou faz tempo.

Dixit...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Escravidao moderna?: como requisitar e enviar ao exterior dois regimentos de especialistas?

Perguntar não ofende: 

Que tipo de Estado, que tipo de governo, que país é este, capaz de chegar para um outro e dizer?

-- Ei! Por acaso você não quer receber seis mil médicos, prontos para o consumo, muito baratinhos? Pode pegar e usar, quando quiser, e fazer o que quiser, enfiar onde quiser, e pagar o que quiser, desde que seja para mim...

Pois é, é com países assim que os companheiros gostam de se relacionar: chamemo-los de escravagistas contemporâneos...

E ainda tem gente que acha isso normal, e diz: 
-- Tudo bem, eles estão mesmo à disposição, depois a gente devolve...
Pois é, eu pensava que pessoas normais não fariam esse tipo de coisa...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Postagem em destaque

Livro Marxismo e Socialismo finalmente disponível - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Meu mais recente livro – que não tem nada a ver com o governo atual ou com sua diplomacia esquizofrênica, já vou logo avisando – ficou final...