O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks

sábado, 23 de abril de 2022

Eleições francesas: Le Monde promete resultados e análises quase imediatamente: https://www.lemonde.fr/resultats-elections/

 Eis o link para os resultados do 2do turno das eleições presidenciais na França, neste domingo 24 de abril,  a partir de 20hs francesas, quatro horas antes no Brasil: https://www.lemonde.fr/resultats-elections/

Les résultats du second tour de l’élection présidentielle

Les premières estimations des résultats du second tour de l’élection présidentielle seront disponibles ici dès 20 heures.

En attendant, suivez la journée électorale en direct avec la rédaction du Monde.

Les résultats du premier tour de l’élection présidentielle

CANDIDAT
SCORE
Emmanuel MACRON
Qualifié
La République en marche
27,85 %
9 783 058
Marine LE PEN
Qualifiée
Rassemblement national
23,15 %
8 133 828
Jean-Luc MÉLENCHON
La France insoumise
21,95 %
7 712 520
Éric ZEMMOUR
Reconquête
7,07 %
2 485 226
Valérie PÉCRESSE
Les Républicains
4,78 %
1 679 001
Yannick JADOT
Europe-Ecologie-Les Verts
4,63 %
1 627 853
Jean LASSALLE
Résistons !
3,13 %
1 101 387
Fabien ROUSSEL
Parti communiste français
2,28 %
802 422
Nicolas DUPONT-AIGNAN
Debout la France
2,06 %
725 176
Anne HIDALGO
Parti socialiste
1,75 %
616 478
Philippe POUTOU
Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste
0,77 %
268 904
Nathalie ARTHAUD
Lutte ouvrière
0,56 %
197 094

Eleições francesas, 2do turno das presidenciais: Editorial do Le Figaro

L’éditorial du Figaro, par Vincent Trémolet de Villers

Étrange veillée d’armes. La politique, ces derniers jours, malgré le débat, malgré les meetings, semblait comme assourdie. Le grand rendez-vous démocratique qu’est l’élection présidentielle relégué au rang des préoccupations secondaires. Pourtant, la guerre est en Europe, l’économie mondiale retient son souffle, la menace islamiste couve toujours et l’instabilité générale devrait être accentuée par la possibilité d’une alternance politique périlleuse. Certes, les appels résonnent contre «la menace Le Pen», mais ils tiennent plus du rituel que de l’expression d’une angoisse profonde. Comme si les Français, peuple politique, avaient compris dès le soir du premier tour que la reconduction du chef de l’État avait la force de l’évidence.

Les quinze jours qui s’achèvent, d’enquêtes d’opinion en confrontations télévisuelles, ont confirmé cette impression première. Il faut dire que la candidate du Rassemblement national a montré dans sa stratégie (à gauche toute) l’étroitesse de sa vision…

(...)

Novo livro na praça: Venezuela e o Chavismo em perspectiva: análises e depoimentos; organizadores Paulo Velasco e Pedro Rafael Azevedo; prefácio Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Leio, com grata satisfação, nota no Instagram de Pedro Rafael Pérez Rojas Mariano de Azevedo, um dos organizadores, junto com o professor Paulo Afonso Velasco Júnior, deste livro: Venezuela e o Chavismo em perspectiva: análises e depoimentos (Appris, 2022).


Hoje é o Dia Internacional do Livro e fico muito (muito mesmo!) feliz em anunciar que um projeto de anos está pronto, publicado e impresso: o livro sobre política venezuelana! 

Um livro escrito sob muitas mãos e com diversas visões… mas que seria impossivel acontecer sem a parceria do meu orientador da faculdade de Relações Internacionais @paulo.velasco.jr, a quem agradeço imensamente pela confiança! Agradeço também ao embaixador @pralmeida por fazer o prefácio e aos amigos @jffa18@tanialopezlizca@mariaoropeza94 ...

De fato, colaborei, mas pouco, apenas fazendo o prefácio, que reproduzo abaixo e convido todos a lerem este livro, ainda atual, pois o chavismo continua aparentemente firme, embora não inabalável, na Venezuela, e foi o fenômeno político mais importante na América Latina, no século XXI (pelo menos até aqui): 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida: “Venezuela: apogeu e tragédia da aventura chavista”, Prefácio ao livro de Paulo Afonso Velasco Júnior e Pedro Rafael Pérez Rojas Mariano de Azevedo (orgs.), Venezuela e o Chavismo em perspectiva: análises e depoimentos (Curitiba: Appris, 2022).

Venezuela: apogeu e tragédia da aventura chavista

  

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Venezuela e o Chavismo em perspectiva: análises e depoimentos

Paulo Afonso Velasco Júnior e Pedro Rafael Pérez Rojas Mariano de Azevedo (orgs.) 

 

Com as conhecidas exceções dos sistemas judaico e islâmico, o calendário mais aceito no mundo – inclusive por uma velhíssima civilização, como a da China – é o cristão, que divide o tempo histórico entre uma época anterior ao nascimento de Cristo (AC) e a que se lhe segue imediatamente (DC). Aceitando-se que os dados de respeitáveis órgãos do sistema multilateral (FMI e Cepal) sejam fiáveis, a Venezuela – que era, até os anos 1980, um dos países mais ricos da região – tornou-se agora, depois até do Haiti, o país mais pobre da América Latina. Pode-se, a partir daí, estabelecer um novo calendário para a história do país: como o cristão, ele também pode ser dividido em um AC e um DC, apenas que se trata de um Antes e Depois de Chávez. De fato, como confirmado pelo título deste livro, a Venezuela e o chavismo são praticamente indissociáveis nas primeiras duas décadas do século XXI.

O contraste entre uma e outra situação é realmente notável, extraordinário mesmo, levando-se em conta que essa inacreditável derrocada, da maior renda per capita para uma situação próxima da miséria absoluta, não resultou de nenhuma guerra, nenhuma catástrofe natural, nenhuma invasão estrangeira ou maldição divina; ela foi, em tudo e por tudo, integralmente fabricada pelos próprios dirigentes nacionais, numa acumulação de erros econômicos e de conflitos políticos e sociais criados inteiramente pela desastrosa gestão chavista do país, desde 1999 e continuada após a sua morte, em 2013, por seus sucessores designados. Trata-se, possivelmente, de um caso único na história econômica mundial, uma vez que todos os demais casos de declínio econômico ou político costumam ser processos mais longos de perda de dinamismo de sua base produtiva ou o efeito de regimes políticos especialmente incompetentes, mas cuja ação se prolonga num tempo mais largo. No caso da Venezuela, processou-se uma deterioração da situação econômica e uma degradação de suas instituições políticas em um tempo incrivelmente curto: o principal responsável foi Chávez.

O que simboliza, mais que quaisquer outros aspectos, a derrocada do país mais rico da América Latina é o exílio forçado, por razões políticas ou mais simplesmente econômicas, de quase 1/5 da população do país, com a primeira leva coincidindo com a implantação de um regime autoritário e a segunda como consequência do desastre econômico criado pelo projeto eminentemente chavista de “socialismo do século XXI”. Em parte, essa derrocada pode ser atribuída à influência dos dirigentes castristas sobre Hugo Chávez e associados; mas isso é incrível, uma vez que a ilha caribenha já tinha acumulado ampla experiência própria sobre os desastres do socialismo de tipo soviético, e poderia ter “instruído” melhor seus aliados no país que já foi o mais importante produtor de petróleo na região. Não o fizeram porque eles mesmos estavam extenuados com seu regime inoperante, e precisavam extrair da Venezuela o máximo de recursos financeiros e energéticos; não há dados fiáveis sobre essa extração.

Houve um tempo, na primeira década do século, em que Chávez foi, ao lado de Lula, o mais importante líder político da região, com a diferença de que este soube operar uma economia de mercado visando políticas sociais de caráter redistributivo, sem alterar os mecanismos essenciais do sistema capitalista. Chávez, como Lênin e os cubanos, tentou “domar” o mercado, usando métodos rústicos de estatização. Combinado ao maná do petróleo – cujo barril chegou a 140 dólares naquela época –, sua economia esquizofrênica só produziu uma queda fenomenal da oferta interna e uma corrupção raras vezes vista num continente habituado a conviver com estamentos políticos do tipo predatório. A produção de petróleo reduziu-se cinco vezes desde o início do chavismo: a recuperação do setor vai demandar um enorme aporte de investimentos e de know-how estrangeiro, algo que não está perto de ocorrer em vista da persistência de uma direção gangsterista no comando do Estado. A inflação “bolivariana” já ultrapassou os exemplos mais dramáticos da história monetária mundial, traduzida em diversas “moedas” até se chegar à atual dolarização informal. 

O livro aborda essas diversas facetas do drama chavista na Venezuela, por autores que, inclusive por experiência própria, conhecem a fundo como foi sendo construído o maior desastre humanitário vivido no continente, só comparado, talvez, à emigração síria, mas esta provocada por dez anos de guerra civil e intervenção estrangeira. Chávez, os castristas e seus seguidores construíram uma derrocada única na história da região, uma tragédia ainda hoje sustentada pelas forças de esquerda em países vizinhos: estas parecem não perceber que Chávez é o mais próximo que se conheceu de um êmulo de Mussolini na região. A verdade, porém, é que a história não se repete e, no caso do chavismo, sequer como farsa. Trata-se de uma “aventura” a ser detidamente estudada: este livro é um excelente começo para a tarefa.

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor

Brasília, dezembro de 2021

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4029: 30 novembro 2021, 2 p.



Le Pen Closer Than Ever to the French Presidency (and to Putin) - Roger Cohen (NYT)

Nunca a extrema direita chegou tão perto do poder. A extrema-esquerda também.


Le Pen Closer Than Ever to the French Presidency (and to Putin)

As elections approach Sunday, the far-right candidate is linked to the Russian president by a web of financial ties and a history of support that has hardly dimmed despite the war in Ukraine.

By Roger Cohen

The New York Times, April 22, 2022



Marine Le Pen, left, the challenger for France’s presidency, and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia at the Kremlin in March 2017. She has supported his annexation of Crimea.Credit...

Pool photo by Mikhail Klimentyev

 


PARIS — When Europe’s far-right leaders gathered in Madrid in January, they had no problem finding unity on the issues they hold dear, whether cracking down on immigrants or upholding “European Christian ideals.” But as Russian troops massed on the Ukrainian border, they were divided on one issue: the threat posed by President Vladimir V. Putin.

Marine Le Pen, the extreme-right challenger for the French presidency, objected to a paragraph in the final statement calling for European solidarity to confront “Russian military actions on the eastern border of Europe.” Even in a gathering of illiberal nationalists, she was an outlier in her fealty to Mr. Putin.

Now, on her campaign website, the leaders’ statement appears with that paragraph cut in an unacknowledged change to the text. This little subterfuge is consistent with an embrace of Mr. Putin so complete that even his ravaging of Ukraine has hardly diminished it.

Over the past decade, Ms. Le Pen’s party, the National Rally, formerly the National Front, has borrowed millions from a Russian bank, and Ms. Le Pen has supported Mr. Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as his incendiary meddling that year in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, where just this week Russia redoubled its offensive.

Her support for Mr. Putin is one thing in a time of peace and another in a time of war. Russia, a nuclear power, has invaded a European state, and Ms. Le Pen is closer than ever to her cherished goal of becoming president of France, having narrowed the gap with President Emmanuel Macron before the decisive round of the election on Sunday.

With polls showing Ms. Le Pen gaining about 44.5 percent of the vote to Mr. Macron’s 55.5 percent, she is within range of the shocks that produced Brexit and Donald J. Trump’s victory in 2016. As in Britain and the United States, alienation and economic hardship have fed a French readiness to gamble on nationalist dreams.

If Ms. Le Pen wins, which is not likely but possible, her victory will almost certainly fracture the allied unity engineered by President Biden in an attempt to defeat Mr. Putin. It would hand Mr. Putin by far his most important ally in Europe, one he could leverage in his aims to divide Europe from the United States and fracture Europe’s decades-old project of unity.

France, a core member of the European Union and NATO, is suddenly the possible soft underbelly of the West.

Julien Nocetti, a Russia expert at the French Institute of International Relations, said there was “a complete ideological alignment between Putin and Le Pen” — one that would be deeply worrying to France’s American and European allies.

The Ukraine war has caused Ms. Le Pen to pivot a little by saying Mr. Putin crossed “a red line” with the invasion, but she still says her foreign-policy priority is a rapprochement with Russia once the fighting stops.

Since Ms. Le Pen, 53, took over the leadership of her party in 2011, she has only deepened its Putin predilection, making four trips to Moscow and one to Crimea. She would support sanctions against Russia, she says, but not cutting off imports of Russian oil and gas, which she has equated with economic death for France.

“We have to think of our people,” she said in a recent TV interview, a position consistent with the strong focus on pocketbook issues that has propelled her campaign. The majority of French people are more focused on getting to the end of the month than getting Russia out of Ukraine.

Certainly, Ms. Le Pen vaunted her connection with Mr. Putin until he went to war on Feb. 24. She included a photo of herself shaking hands with him in her election brochure as evidence of her “international stature.” This handout disappeared abruptly from view after the Russian invasion.

The photo was taken at the Kremlin on March 24, 2017. That was less than five weeks before the first round of the last presidential election, in which Mr. Macron defeated Ms. Le Pen by 66.1 percent to 33.9 percent. The National Rally leader said then that she would immediately review lifting “unjust” sanctions against Russia if elected.

As for Mr. Putin, he said with a knowing smirk that Russia did “not want to influence events in any way.”

Jean-Maurice Ripert, the French ambassador in Moscow from 2013 to 2017, said in an interview that a fellow European ambassador, a close friend, had asked the Russian leader after the French election why he had backed Ms. Le Pen.

“Because I had been told she was going to win,” Mr. Putin said.

Certainly that is what he wanted. Ms. Le Pen, committed to “equidistance” between great powers and hostile to “America’s protectorate on European soil,” sees in Mr. Putin the defender of the nation-state, family and Christianity against border-eroding multilateralism and irreligious cultural decay.

“It’s all about sovereignty,” said Marlène Laruelle, the French director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian studies at George Washington University. “The sovereign state against international organizations; the sovereign traditional family against L.G.B.T.Q. rights.”

Then there is the money. Unable to get a loan from French banks, Ms. Le Pen and several of her top aides scrambled for cash in Russia, accepting a 9.4 million euro loan, then $12.2 million, at a 6 percent interest rate, from the First Czech-Russian Bank in September 2014. It was supposed to be repaid by 2019.

Wallerand de Saint-Just, who was long the National Rally’s treasurer before leaving the position last year, negotiated the deal in Moscow. In a written answer to a question as to why French banks had refused any loan to the National Rally, he said “My experience with the six big French banking groups is that they obey orders from the political executive.”

But given the lack of transparency and accountability in Russia’s financial sector — and Mr. Putin’s sway over it in his pay-to-play system — the sum has long raised hard questions of just how beholden Ms. Le Pen actually is to the Russian president, and whether some of her outspoken backing for him has been a consequence.

I asked Ms. Le Pen this month at a news conference whether the outstanding loan did not create at least the impression of dependence on Russia, a liability for any future president?

“Absolutely not,” she said. “I am totally independent of any link to any power.”

In her current campaign, again unable to get a loan from a French bank, Ms. Le Pen turned to Hungary, where Viktor Orban, the anti-immigrant Hungarian prime minister, has been in power for 12 years. A Hungarian bank has now lent the National Rally another $11.4 million, so if she were to win she would be indebted to both Mr. Putin and Mr. Orban.

Already her backing of Mr. Putin has been borderline fawning. Ms. Le Pen visited Moscow and Crimea in June 2013; Moscow in April 2014; and Moscow again in May 2015. She was received by the president of the Duma, the lower chamber of Russia’s Parliament, during the first of these visits, and sprinkled her Russian sojourns with pro-Putin remarks.

In 2013, she blamed the European Union for a new “Cold War on Russia.” In 2015, also while in Moscow, she criticized France’s pro-American stance and suggested this would change “in 2017 with Marine Le Pen as president.” In 2021, she recommended Russia’s uncertain Sputnik vaccine for the coronavirus, saying “our anti-Russian ideology should not ruin our capacity to vaccinate our fellow citizens.”

The 2014 visit came at a particularly delicate moment, given the Crimea annexation. It was one of several demonstrations of support for Mr. Putin from prominent members of Ms. Le Pen’s party who visited Crimea that year, and the Donbas, the Ukrainian region where clashes kindled by Moscow had begun.

Among them was Aymeric Chauprade, her former top diplomatic adviser, who went to Crimea to observe the dubious March 2014 referendum that massively backed the Russian annexation. A United Nations General Assembly resolution declared the vote invalid.

“It was the West that began changing European borders with Kosovo’s independence in 2008,” Mr. Chauprade, who has since left the National Rally, said in an interview. “There was an openness to accepting invitations from Russia, a good atmosphere.”

Russian troops guarded a Ukrainian marine base in Crimea as Mr. Putin moved to annex the peninsula in March 2014. Le Pen has visited Moscow and Crimea and made remarks that were supportive of Russia. 

Mediapart, a French investigative news website, was the first to expose the Russian loan to the National Rally in September 2014. In an earlier interview with Mediapart, Mr. Chauprade said visits to the Donbas that year and in 2015 by Jean-Luc Schaffhauser, a former National Rally member of the European Parliament, had been a “quid pro quo” for the loan.


“Going to the Donbas amounted to strong support for Russia,” he said.

Mr. Schaffhauser did not respond to a request for comment.

I asked Mr. Chauprade whether the loan was indeed a “quid pro quo.” He said that while there was an “inclination to help,” there was “no conditionality.”

The Russian loan, whatever the strings, has had a convoluted history.

Shortly after the First Czech-Russian bank collapsed in 2016, the National Rally loan was acquired by Aviazapchast, a private Russian company that in Soviet times was part of the aviation ministry, supporting Soviet aircraft operating abroad.

On its website, Aviazapchast describes its main activities as “supply of aviation technical equipment and civil and dual-use material as well as repair of aircraft.”

Its general director is listed as Dzheruk V. Ivanovic, who served in the Russian armed forces from 1983 to 1996. A former deputy general director, Yevgeny N. Barmyantsev, worked as a Soviet spy in the United States, before he was expelled in 1983.

New York Times account at the time said he was “caught in the act of retrieving what he thought were stolen American military secrets from the base of a tree in rural Maryland.”

Odd company, on the face of it, for a French presidential candidate’s party to keep.

Mr. Saint-Just, in his written answer, said that Aviazapchast’s “holding of the loan has been entirely approved by the court of appeal in Moscow.”

“This is a very obvious and clear case of dependence on Russia,” Mr. Nocetti, the Russia expert, said. “The company holding the loan has an organic link with the Russian government through its military origins.”

Mr. Macron, in an electoral debate on Wednesday with Ms. Le Pen, said, “When you speak to Russia, you speak to your banker.” She insisted that she was “a totally free woman.”

Ms. Le Pen, in answer to my question, said she was ready for any French or American bank to take over the loan. “We continue to reimburse the loan. That is the only obligation of my movement,” she said.

It is possible that the exercise of power, if she is elected, would attenuate Ms. Le Pen’s long-held pro-Putin, anti-NATO positions, especially if Mr. Putin prosecutes the war in Ukraine with relentless brutality.

Last week, however, she said that she would withdraw France from the integrated military command of NATO, a technical step with powerful symbolism at a moment when NATO’s original mission to defend a free Europe against Moscow has been revived.

America’s alliance with France, one of its oldest, has been put to many tests over the centuries. But all the evidence suggests that a France governed by Ms. Le Pen would pose enormous problems for President Biden just when he needs his nuclear-armed ally most.

One core issue is how free Ms. Le Pen would really be when it comes to Russia. “If Ms. Le Pen is still reimbursing, she is not free, she’s dependent,” said Sylvie Bermann, who succeeded Mr. Ripert as French ambassador to Russia in 2017.

Mr. Saint-Just, the former National Rally treasurer, had another explanation of Ms. Le Pen’s Russia policy. “She believes in balance and equidistance. She has always had in her head a phrase of General de Gaulle: ‘In foreign affairs, France has no friends, only interests.’ 


Adèle Cordonnier contributed reporting.

 

What to Know About France’s Presidential Election 

Heading to a runoff. In the first round of the election, French citizens voted to advance President Emmanuel Macron and the far-right leader Marine Le Pen to the second round on April 24. This runoff, which polls predict could be close, will hinge to a large extent on perceptions of the economy. Here’s a look at the race:

The incumbent. Mr. Macron, an inveterate political gambler, who in 2017 became the nation’s youngest elected leader, announced his re-election bid just a day before the deadline, against the background of the war in Ukraine. After a lackluster campaign, Mr. Macron is trying to tap into the country’s large pool of voters worried about the environment with ambitious promises.

The far-right veteran. Ms. Le Pen, a nationalist with an anti-immigrant agenda, is making her third attempt to become president of France and is facing Mr. Macron for a second time after losing to him in the 2017 runoff. Though she has sought to sanitize her image, her proposal to ban Muslim women from wearing head scarves is controversial.


What comes next? At 8 p.m. in France on April 24, the French news media will work with pollsters to publish projected results based on preliminary vote counts, though projections might not become clear until later if the race is close. Read more about the runoff here.


Eleições na França: debate após os resultados oficiais

 No canal You Tube do MyNews, sendo que os resultados definitivos deverão confirmar a vitória de Macron. Esta não é a grande novidade e sim a progressão da nova esquerda e da extrema-direita.


sexta-feira, 22 de abril de 2022

Como andamos para trás! - Embaixador Sergio Abreu e Lima Florêncio

 Como andamos para trás!

Embaixador Sergio Abreu e Lima Florêncio
Autor do livro Diplomacia, Revolução e Afetos: de Vila Isabel a Teerã (Curitiba: Appris, 2022)
Brasília, 20/04/2022
Em 1976, diante de provas irrefutáveis da prática de tortura pela ditadura militar, o Almirante Júlio Bierrenbach, meu tio em segundo grau, Ministro do Superior Tribunal Militar - STM, afirmava. " Não podemos admitir que o homem, depois de preso, tenha sua integridade fisica atingida por indivíduos covardes, na maioria das vezes, de pior caráter que o encarcerado."
Em 2022, vem a público mais de 10 mil horas de gravação de sessões do STM. Foram examinados na época casos de tortura que provocaram a indignação de Ministros como Julio Bierrenbach e Rodrigo Otavio.
Diante de tão vergonhosas evidências, o atual Presidente do STM, Luis Carlos Gomes Matos, declara. " Simplesmente ignoramos uma notícia tendenciosa daquela, que nós sabemos o motivo, né?"
Logo em seguida, o Vice-Presidente da República , com ar de deboche, acrescenta. " Vai tirar do túmulo?"
O Vice e o Presidente da República, repetidas vezes, afirmam sua admiração pelo oficial Brilhante Ustra, um dos maiores torturadores no regime militar.
Ao comparar as declarações dos Ministros do STM em 1976, com a reação do atual Presidente do STM e com o deboche seguido de riso do Vice- Presidente, em 2022, a conclusão é inescapável. Como andamos para trás!
Triste Brasil.


OMC afetada pela guerra de agressão russa contra a Ucrânia - Jamil Chade

 ✺ THE WAR IN UKRAINE CONTAMINATES THE WORK AT THE WTO

By Jamil Chade
Geneva, april 22/04/2022

The war in Ukraine continues to disrupt the work of an already deadlocked World Trade Organisation (WTO). Across different committees, negotiations, and working groups, the mutual accusations between Kiev and Moscow are overshadowing all other issues.

A case in point was the March 24–25 meeting of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). In the end, members did manage to raise 48 specific trade concerns on topics including restrictions and approval procedures for imports of animal and plant products, pesticide policies, and maximum residue levels. However, the meeting offered an opportunity for Ukraine to underline the impact of Russia’s invasion on its economy.

Ukraine warned that its participation on the Committee had been jeopardized by the Russian military invasion. “Military aggression of one member towards another WTO member puts the multilateral trading system and the institution in an unprecedented situation, one that does not allow us to conduct business as usual,” Ukraine’s delegate said. According to the country’s own estimates, as of last week, direct economic losses caused by Russia’s military aggression had already reached $565 billion.

Ukraine thanked those governments that have adopted strong economic sanctions and trade measures against Russia, and pressed for the “comprehensive support of all WTO members to end the Russian aggression against Ukraine with all available WTO tools.” Countries such as Japan, Canada, Norway, Australia, the United States, Korea, the United Kingdom and New Zealand took the floor to condemn the Russian invasion, reaffirming their commitment to ensure the Russian government pays a severe economic and diplomatic price for their aggression against Ukraine.

Russia responded that the WTO is a rule-based trade organization and should remain as such. The Russian delegation denounced what it considers a politicization of the WTO which leads to the fragmentation of the multilateral trading system. The Russian representative stressed that members should refrain from discussing political issues at the WTO.

On March 30, the conflict dominated the agenda again during the meetings of the Committee on Market Access. The war was not on the initial agenda, but Ukraine used a procedural clause to bring the issue to the fore. The delegation shared, “as a matter of urgency and for the sake of transparency,” a notification (https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.wto.org%2Fdol2fe%2FPages%2FSS%2Fdirectdoc.aspx%3Ffilename%3Dq%3A%2FG%2FMAQRN%2FUKR5A2.pdf%26Open%3DTrue&data=04%7C01%7C%7Ca39dba2c33f945817a1908da12fbc4ff%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C637843169833522997%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=CNlPtAr41osFB7AEspsgVrWq8n3tDk6CZQFImoUdccg%3D&reserved=0&mc_cid=fb3e64f45b&mc_eid=UNIQID)  dated March 25, which indicates that “due to Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Government of Ukraine was forced to introduce export restriction measures on certain products in order to ensure national food
security.”

The restrictions apply to multiple food products, including: Live bovine animals, meat of bovine animals, frozen meat and edible meat by-products, poultry and eggs, wheat, corn, rye, oats, buckwheat, millet, sugar, salt and sunflower oil.
“OUR FARMERS ARE RISKING THEIR LIVES AS THEY HAVE ALREADY STARTED THE SOWING SEASON IN SOME REGIONS OF UKRAINE.”
The Ukrainian delegate said that active military actions have already halted trade and destroyed many sown areas and farms, adding that “even under these circumstances, our farmers are risking their lives as they have already started the sowing season in some regions of Ukraine.”

The Russian delegate claimed that consideration of global or regional security matters and UN Charter compliance does not fall under the mandate of the Committee on Market Access, and asked the chair to moderate the discussion accordingly. Delegates should be reminded that they are violating rules that they have themselves developed and adopted, Russia insisted, “Otherwise, we’re running the risk [of becoming] a medieval bazaar rather than a WTO committee meeting. I urge delegates to exercise self-restraint.”

Predictably, however, the meeting quickly became another platform for countries to reiterate their condemnation of the Russian invasion, and to point out the pertinence of the issue. The United Kingdom was first to take the floor, sharing its own notification on the decision to implement an additional 35% tariff for a number of goods originating in Russia and Belarus. The UK said it will continue to work with its allies and partners across the multilateral system to condemn Russia’s appalling actions and to isolate it on the international stage.

This discussion is absolutely relevant to the committee, the EU delegation said: “We could try and ignore the international context in which our meeting is taking place, but that would not [negate] the important impact the war has had on market access related issues, which have been felt all over the world”.

The United States also spoke of unity and reiterated its commitment to ensure the Russian government will pay a severe economic and diplomatic price for their actions, which, it noted, are incompatible with the rules-based system.

Russia responded by claiming that unilateral measures are the reason for a drastic increase in the cost of freight and insurance for Russian products, including agricultural ones. “Additional costs […] are passed on to consumers, resulting in growing global food prices,” the Russian delegate said. Moreover, disrupted plans of international commodity traders and international banks have resulted in reduced shipments of agricultural products to the global market.

The Russians also pointed to a number of measures which it saw as inconsistent with WTO provisions: implementation of import tariffs above MFN rates; import bans on Russian oil and refined oil products, as well as natural gas and coal; restrictions on exports to Russia of various goods, including oil refining equipment and technologies, foodstuff, and other goods; impeding Russian financial institutions, transportation companies and export support agencies; banning Russia’s use of EU seaports; and the freezing of a substantial part of the country’s currency reserves. For Moscow, “this is a robbery, if we call a spade a spade.”

The discussions on COVID-19 vaccines have not been spared. In the first half of March, during a meeting of the TRIPS Council, Ukraine simply asked members to refrain from engaging with the Russian delegation, claiming that “the Russian Federation has clearly abandoned the basic principles and values that the GATT and the WTO have promoted for almost 80 years since the end of World War II.”

-JC
READ OUR PREVIOUS BRIEFINGS (https://us19.campaign-archive.com/home/?u=b3372615f7a316d6426d48fc4&id=8a3adfe528&mc_cid=fb3e64f45b&mc_eid=UNIQID)

French Elections: Is Marine Le Pen a Fascist? - Robert Zaretsky (Foreign Policy)

  Uma análise do campo da direita na França, persistente e cada vez mais radical.

Analysis

Is Marine Le Pen a Fascist?

The French presidential contender’s reliance on referenda suggests she is more of a Bonapartist.

By Robert Zaretsky, a professor of history at the University of Houston’s Honors College and the author of Victories Never Last: Reading and Caregiving in a Time of Plague

 

Foreign PolicyApril 21, 2022 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/21/france-election-le-pen-ideology/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Editors%20Picks%20OC&utm_term=41624&tpcc=Editors%20Picks%20OC


Ever since its publication in 1954, historian René Remond’s classic work Les Droites en France has framed and, at times, enflamed how French historians discuss the political right. A growing number of scholars have, of late, insisted that Remond’s analysis is obsolete, superseded by events over the past few decades. Yet, the event that now rivets our attention—the faceoff between candidate Marine Le Pen, a figure often described in France as a “facho,” or fascist, and French President Emmanuel Macron in the second round of France’s presidential election on Sunday—suggests that Remond is more relevant than ever.
With the French Revolution, not only was the political left born but so too was the right. Although historians tend to focus on the former —1789 was, after all, all about liberty, equality, and fraternity—Remond turned to the latter. The funny thing about the right, he observed, was there was not one but three rights—triplets that, to varying degrees, resented the event that had heaved them into the world.
The first to appear was the Legitimist, fanatical about reversing the revolution and restoring the Bourbons. Then came the Orléanist, dedicated to the parliamentary legacy of the revolution but determined to keep out the people. The oddest offspring, however, was the romantic Bonapartists, dedicated to a ruler who, by channeling the will of the people, guaranteed their equality, glorified their fraternity, and garroted their liberty.
In 1851, the first (and last president) of the Second Republic, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, used two tricks from the repertoire of his uncle, Napoléon Bonaparte. First, he overthrew the republic by a coup; second, he offered a plebiscite—a vote by French citizens—to legitimize the coup. Just as the elder Napoleon employed a plebiscite to ratify his self-promotion from first consul to emperor, the younger Napoleon harnessed it to transform himself from former president to future emperor. What had been, under the Roman Republic, a device of democracy had become, under the Bonapartes, an accomplice of autocracy.
In this campaign, Le Pen has emphasized the issue of pouvoir d’achat (“purchasing power”) over her more traditional focus on immigration. Although some of Le Pen’s aides worried that this move would repel her base, it has proven to be a canny move. With the war in Ukraine stoking inflationary pressures in France, Le Pen appears to some voters as not just prescient but also presidential. Last week, a Le Figaro poll revealed that a clear majority of French—54 percent—believe that she, not Macron, is more sympathetic to their lot and more capable to help them make ends meet.
But a different kind of pouvoir has always been Le Pen’s real focus. This became clear at a tense press conference last week. Sitting behind a wall of microphones, she declared that France faced an “unprecedented democratic crisis” and that referendums were its cure. After becoming president, Le Pen vowed that she would “organize a referendum on the essential questions of the control of immigration, the protection of the French identity, and the primacy of national rights.” In the referendum, the French would vote up or down on “la priorité nationale”: a proposal blocking noncitizens living in France from seeking employment, housing, health care, and social benefits. A yes from the people would make “national priority” the law of the land.

Because Le Pen also wants to ditch the principle of jus soli, which confers citizenship of those born on French soil, the number of noncitizens would increase dramatically. Moreover, as most constitutional scholars insist, such a law would violate the principle of equality embedded in every constitution France has enacted, stretching from the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” to the constitution of the Fifth Republic. Passage of this law, declared constitutional expert Dominique Rousseau, would “be like a coup d’état.”
During her initial campaign, Le Pen had sought, with some success, to soften her abrasive and aloof image by distancing herself from her father’s persona. Yet the press conference revealed that she had no more changed than her party did when its name changed from the National Front—bequeathed to her by her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen—to the gentler Rassemblement National, or National Rally.
Little distinguishes Marine’s notion of “national priority” from “national preference,” the term employed by her father during his time as leader of the National Front. Similarly, the daughter’s use of phrases like “unprecedented democratic crisis” is bland shorthand for her father’s earlier and earthier claims that France’s political class, though mouthing republican and democratic pieties, was nothing more than “a cosmopolitan, totalitarian, and corrupt oligarchy.”
Since the elite firmly controls the levers of institutional power, the solution both Le Pens have offered is a referendum. In the 2002 presidential election, when he stunned the world by reaching the second round, Jean-Marie attacked what he called “creeping totalitarianism under the mask of democracy.” Hence, he called for the “establishment of a national and popular republic based on the use of referendums.” This would return to the people, Jean-Marie declared, the voice they had lost.
Jean-Marie’s appeal fell on deaf ears: He was trounced by Jacques Chirac, who won more than 80 percent of the vote in the second round. But Marine believes the promise of a plebiscitary democracy is a winning proposition. Along with a referendum on national priority, she would encourage further referenda on what she calls citizen initiatives. They could, she has said, address “every subject,” including the death penalty and abortion, and require just 500,000 signatures to be launched. (Such referendums are possible even now, but crucially, they require 4 million, not 500,000, signatures to reach critical institutional mass.)
Marine Le Pen has marinated too long in her father’s ideological stew to forget the referendum as an essential ingredient. But does its presence in the Le Pen stew make it taste more like Bonapartism than fascism? In the final edition of Remond’s book, published in 1982, the historian argued this was the case. He noted that the National Rally party, like its earlier iterations, from the Boulangist movement in the 1880s to the Poujadist movement of the 1950s, issued not from the left—which is the case of fascism—but from the right; that it sought to conserve, not destroy, traditional social structures; and that it aspired to authoritarian, not totalitarian control. In effect, whereas fascism denies the legitimacy and legacy of the Enlightenment and French Revolution, Bonapartism accepts aspects of both.
Moreover, Bonapartism, unlike totalitarianism, bases itself on plebiscitary principle. Both Napoléons turned to the people, not their representatives, to legitimize their coups against the republics they once led. While Le Pen is not planning an actual coup, her promise to hold a referendum nevertheless smacks of the Bonapartist tradition. One hitch: There is no legal means for Le Pen to either enact or act upon such a referendum. Although two articles allow for changes in the constitution through referendums, they are very clear on the whys and whens. In the case of Article 89, the constitution can be revised only after the most rigorous process. If each of the two legislative chambers—the National Assembly and the Senate—pass the proposed change, they must then meet in a joint session, where the bill requires a three-fifths majority to pass. Only then can voters decide its fate in the form of a referendum.
Not surprisingly, only once has a constitutional change—shortening the presidential term of office from seven to five years in 2000—managed to jump through all of these hoops. No less important, Le Pen knows that even if there was a majority in the National Assembly to support her proposal, the Senate, which is not facing elections, would prevent it from going any further.
This leaves Article 11, which allows the president to submit a referendum on the “organization of the public authorities” or with “economic or social policy … [or] public services.” According to legal experts, the constitutional change Le Pen seeks does not qualify under any of these rubrics. In 1962, this did not stop then-French President Charles de Gaulle, who famously used this article to change the constitution to allow the direct election of the president by popular suffrage. De Gaulle’s gamble paid off: More than 60 percent of voters marked “oui” on their ballots and, quite suddenly, the already awesome powers of the presidency were dramatically reinforced.
Inevitably, Le Pen made this Gaullist connection not only during her press conference but also at the end of last night’s debate against Macron, when she trumpeted her plan to hatch “une renaissance démocratique.” To hasten this rebirth, Le Pen again promised to enable citizens to launch referenda. More important, she cited de Gaulle when she pledged to offer a referendum on adding “national priority” to the constitution. “Let me be clear: I will use Article 11, as did General de Gaulle in 1962.”
Perhaps if she had made this claim earlier in the debate, Macron would have replied that de Gaulle’s use of the referendum was, at the time, widely seen as an extra-constitutional act. It sparked a political firestorm, enraging not just the left and center but also former Gaullists like the Senate’s then-leader, Gaston Monnerville.
He might have added two other crucial elements to this story. First, the 1962 referendum spurred the Constitutional Council to make clear that Article 11 cannot be used to do the very thing Le Pen seeks to do—namely, alter the fundamental text of the constitution. Second, in 1969, de Gaulle again used the referendum, this time to reform the Senate. Unlike the earlier referendum, this one fell flat, and almost immediately, de Gaulle announced he would resign from office.
This decision reflected, at least for de Gaulle, the plebiscitary nature of referendums. He understood it was a vote less against the proposed law than against his own person. Yet when Le Pen was asked if she would step down should her referendum fail, she replied she would not. It would mean, she explained, a political, not personal, failure. Whether this, too, is Bonapartist is an open question. What does seem clear, though, is that whether it is Bonapartist or fascist, a Le Pen government will seek to radically change France not for the better but for the worse.

Robert Zaretsky is a professor of history at the University of Houston’s Honors College and the author of Victories Never Last: Reading and Caregiving in a Time of Plague.

 

quinta-feira, 21 de abril de 2022

Bolsonaro avalia tirar Carlos França do comando do Itamaraty - Robson Bonin (Veja-Radar)

Minha opinião: eu acho que seria muito ruim para a imagem internacional do Brasil, mas muito bom para a carreira do Carlos França, para que não termine como o ex-chanceler acidental...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Bolsonaro avalia tirar Carlos França do comando do Itamaraty
Presidente têm conversado com especialistas da área internacional do governo para encontrar um novo ministro das Relações Exteriores
Por Robson Bonin
Veja (Radar), 21 abr 2022

Descontente com as posições do Itamaraty em discussões internacionais — inclusive em temas recentes no Conselho de Segurança da ONU –, o presidente Jair Bolsonaro começou a ouvir figuras importantes do governo para encontrar um nome que substitua o chanceler Carlos Alberto França no comando do Itamaraty.
A situação do chanceler se deteriorou no Planalto nos últimos meses e piorou bastante nas últimas semanas, quando o Brasil não seguiu países árabes — além de Estados Unidos, Rússia, China, França e Reino Unido — numa discussão no Conselho de Segurança da ONU que condenava ações terroristas no Oriente Médio. Bolsonaro, ao ser cobrado sobre a posição da diplomacia brasileira, sequer havia sido informado pelo chanceler do assunto.
Diante da crise provocada pela falta de apoio do Brasil a países árabes, Bolsonaro enviou o almirante Flávio Rocha, secretário Especial de Assuntos Estratégicos, aos Emirados Árabes para desfazer o mal estar criado pela posição brasileira. A troca de comando na diplomacia brasileira é questão de tempo.