quinta-feira, 9 de fevereiro de 2012

Malvinas-Falklands: tangos e tragédias, um debate inconcluso...

Tangos e tragédias
Primeiro,  a opinião de um jurista britânico (suspeito, por certo), mas deve-se considerar os argumentos em seus próprios méritos, não quem os expede:


Both sides advance claims to sovereignty based on various historic acts which may or may not amount to annexation, cession or conquest.  
But in a way more importantly, the current problem is this.  
The islands have been colonised by British people since the nineteenth century, and the current inhabitants  (about 3,000 in number) are bitterly opposed to any kind of deal with Argentina, the more so since Argentina's unsuccessful attempt in 1982 to resolve the matter by military means.  
Various compromises have been canvassed, but at present the inhabitants are unwilling to accept any kind of cession or lease to Argentina.  (Cf. Gibraltar.)  
Quite apart from any international law issues about self-determination in this context, the brutal fact is that it would, in the immediate future anyway, be politically impossible for the current British government to cut any deal which the inhabitants do not consent to.


Agora, uma reação sobre o assunto: 
Nos acordos da Convenção de Nutka na década de 1790, a Espanha acordou com a Inglaterra a proibição de qualquer nova ocupação em ilhas do Atlântico Sul. Claramente expresso no Artigo VI da convenção.
A Argentina ocupou as ilhas Malvinas em 1820, estavam desertas desde a evacuação espanhola de 1811.
A Inglaterra reconheceu a independência da Argentina em 14 de dezembro 1824.
Somente em 1833 uma frota inglesa expulsou o capitão Don Pinedo do ARA Sarandi das ilhas, que não viam uma embarcação inglesa desde 1774.
Sem dúvida um ato imperialista contra uma nação independente. Da mesma forma que uma pequena frota da Inglaterra tentou ocupar a Ilha da Trindade em 1895, mas a diplomacia brasileira com a ajuda de Portugal conseguiu reverter a ocupação. Por sorte uma tentativa frustrada, senão teríamos duas questões semelhantes no Atlântico Sul.
Excluída a questão dos anseios dos habitantes locais, sem dúvida fortalecidos pelos pesados subsídios ingleses (assim como a França faz na Guiana), os Argentinos tem plena razão em seus reclames, em minha singela opinião.
Lara Wasser


E uma outra reação:  
Ai que consiste o problema. Essa é a história que a Argentina repassa, mas não condiz com o que houve.
Que se saiba, o primeiro assentamento nas ilhas foi de Franceses. Não há habitantes originais, como afirmam os Argentinos. Estes relatos confirmam a presença francesa na regiao: http://www.amazon.com/history-Malouine-Falkland-Bouganville-settlement/dp/1170997562/ref=sr_1_26?ie=UTF8&qid=1328902630&sr=8-26 . Os ingleses chegaram, a meiados do séc XVIII e tomaram posse de determinada região (diz-se ainda haver ruinas), conviveram com os franceses. Com a saida dos franceses, foi que os bravos espanhois tomaram a parte deixada pelos franceses e ficaram na ilha até o começo do século XIX. De novo, como venho dizendo hé diversos emails: nao há tal coisa como 'nativos das ilhas'. São uma mistura de tudo o que passou por ali, desde espanhois, ingleses, franceses, holandeses... Essa historia é mais parte da mentira, distorção histórica que os argentinos tentam criar (ainda não vi uma fundamentação documental do que dizem, enquanto o outro lado sim que possui).
Até onde me conste (em uns livros que li ha tempos atras, com referencias a documentos, na Inglaterra), o primeiro assentamento ingles na ilha se deu na segunda metade do século XVIII, nao apenas em 1833 como afirmam os argentinos.  Com o início das batalhas de independência nos EUA, a Inglaterra precisou de todo o apoio militar para reforçar a sua presença nas colonias do norte. Assim sendo, a marinha inglesa se retirou das ilhas (que jamais foram habitadas !!!! isso é uma mentira da parte da Argentina), não sem antes deixar uma placa (legalmente aceita, de acordo com as convenções da época) reclamando a propriedade da região. Bem, a Argentina invadiu a ilha, nao reconheceu a autoridade estrangeira e fincou presença. Quando acabou a guerra das colonias americanas, a marinha inglesa voltou e recuperou a sua presença.
Por que não vale o acordo que a Inglaterra assinou com a Espanha? Simples: porque da data de assinatura eles (ingleses) JA estavam presentes na ilha, e o texto afirma: novas ocupações. Isso nao aconteceu (talvez no Caribe). Enfim... Trata-se de uma pseudo historia por parte dos argentinos. Eles contam a 2a metade e ocultam a 1a. Obvio. Nao os interessa.
Há um tempo atras recebi este material sobre o assunto. Bem ilustrado e com referencias ao que é citado. Recomendo:


P.S. Recomendo observar o texto, as citações, cruzar dedos, procurar as referencias que ele faz antes de criticar a origem simplesmente pelo nome do site, chamando-o de parcial (o que de fato é, mas o que eles fazem com reforço intelectual de pesquisa)



Timeline deixando bem clara a presenca de Franceses (tal qual no livro que indiquei anteriormente) e de alguns outros paises. Mostra a presença dos espanhois (que ocuparam a colonia francesa) e a tal da Convenção Nootka (que segundo me dizem é bem confuso e abre espaço a interpretações ). Enfim, a confusao esta toda ai. E os 200 anos antes que os argentinos teimam em ignorar:


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LEO TELES

Por uma vez concordo com os companheiros: Nao foi privatizacao, foi concessao...

Por isso, como realmente não foi privatização, mas uma mera concessão, os aeroportos brasileiros vão continuar uma M.... completa.
Podem completar os quatro pontinhos que faltam...


Eu viajo muito, todos sabem: conheço dezenas de aeroportos no mundo inteiro, até no interior da China, no deserto da Mongólia.
Pois bem: em poucos lugares tenho encontrado aeroportos tão primitivos, tão desconfortáveis, tão vagabundos quanto os brasileiros. E estou falando de Galeão, Guarulhos, Brasília, Congonhas, todos uma M.... completa, com perdão das senhoras e crianças aqui presentes...


Pois é, como os companheiros são contra as privatizações, essas M....s de aeroportos vão continuar uma M.... completa, e piorar, claro, pois a M.... vai custar mais caro, podem apostar...
O que é que vocês queriam: eles não privatizaram, isso não.
Entregaram, com o nosso dinheiro (pois o dinheiro do BNDES é nosso, não é?), a fundos de pensão estatais, e a uma empresa de aeroportos da África do Sul, como o Brasil um membro proeminente do grupo Brics, e um exemplo de desenvolvimento econômico, social, tecnológico, enfim, dos irmãos africanos, tudo a ver com a nossa herança histórica, etc...


Por uma vez que queria concordar com o jornalista abaixo, mas não vou poder.
Vou concordar com os companheiros: não foi privatização, foi mera concessão.
Pior, foi uma estatização.
Preparem-se para a M.... em regime de concessão.
E agradeçam aos companheiros, pois vocês não vão estar pagando para capitalistas perversos.
Não, imaginem: vão estar pagando para os companheiros dos sindicatos mafiosos dos fundos de pensão.
Que alívio...
M.... nacional, mais cheirosa...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


'Privatização? o que é isso? não, foi concessão', diz o abc do PT

Blog do Augusto Nunes, 9/02/2012

Desde 1997, quando o presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso decidiu reduzir o peso e aumentar a eficácia do mamute estatal, o PT fez o que pôde para transformar a privatização no oitavo pecado capital.
Sempre de olho na próxima eleição e de costas para as próximas gerações, a seita chefiada por Lula passou 15 anos enxergando mais uma perfídia infiltrada na “herança maldita” no que foi um notável avanço civilizatório. Graças ao governo FHC, o Brasil ficou menos primitivo.A privatização dos três principais aeroportos informa que os pastores do atraso enfim capitularam, constatei nesta quarta-feira no comentário de 1 minuto para o site de VEJA.
A teimosia insensata da companheirada custou muitos bilhões de reais, desperdiçados pelo governo em remendos, puxadinhos e outros monumentos ao improviso erguidos para distrair a atenção de eleitores tapeados por promessas que seguem acampadas nos palanques.
Os defensores do Estado obeso também consumiram o estoque de paciência de multidões de passageiros flagelados por congestionamentos nos saguões, nas salas de embarque, nas imediações das esteiras de bagagens, nas filas de táxi. O tempo que se perdeu é irrecuperável.
Mas antes tarde do que nunca. “O ‘reposicionamento dos petistas em relação aos aeroportos nos livrou, para todo o sempre, do estelionato eleitoral em torno das privatizações”, registrou o senador Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, do PSDB paulista.
Ainda não, avisa a discurseira de oficiais do PT decididos a provar que, embora os aeroportos tenham sido privatizados, não houve privatização nenhuma. “Querem confundir uma coisa com outra”, ensina o inevitável José Dirceu. “O que houve foi uma concessão”.
O guerrilheiro de festim vive criticando o governo paulista por ter entregue à iniciativa privada, em regime de concessão, a administração das rodovias estaduais. “Os tucanos privatizaram o patrimônio rodoviário”, berra desde o século passado.
É o que acaba de fazer o governo federal com a fatia mais valiosa do patrimônio aeroportuário, mas para isso existe a novilíngua companheira. “Privatização”, no dicionário do PT, virou “concessão”.
O rebanho vai balir como ordenam os guias. Tomara que o eleitorado não seja tão paspalho, ou que já não sejam tantos os brasileiros idiotizados com direito a voto.

Ministros renunciam... Epa!!!!

Já no Brasil....


Ministros renunciam na Índia após serem flagrados vendo pornografia

Três ministros assistiram ao que seria um filme pornográfico no celular durante sessão legislativa

quarta-feira, 8 de fevereiro de 2012

India-Brazil: same fight, same goals in Defence policy?

Significativo...



06/02/2012 India, Brazil discuss defence cooperation - PTI
Text of report by Indian news agency PTI
New Delhi, 6 February: India and Brazil on Monday [6 February] held discussions to enhance their bilateral cooperation in areas of defence and regional security.
"Defence Minister A K Antony held talks with his Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim and had candid discussions on bilateral defence cooperation and regional security issues," the Ministry said in a release.
Amorim is on a five-day visit to India which started on February 4. After taking over as Defence Minister in his country recently, this is Amorim's first foreign visit.
The visiting Minister emphasised that due to the high importance accorded to New Delhi by his country, he chose to visit India first, officials said.
In the 40-minute meeting between the two Ministers, senior Brazilian officials along with its Air Force chief and Indian officials also took part.
The Brazilian Defence Minister will visit HAL in Bangalore on Tuesday. India has bought six Embraer aircraft from Brazil to develop its indigenous Airborne Early Warning and Control System aircraft.
Top Ministers and bureaucrats also use the Brazilian-origin Embraer aircraft for visits within the country and the neighbouring nations.
Source: PTI news agency, New Delhi, in English 1521gmt 06 Feb 12


A geopolitica confusa de Mister Brzezinski: poderes declinantes nao sabem o que fazer...

Mister Brzezinski parece saber o que fazer, mas não sabe bem com quais aliados pode contar...
O problema é que essas digressões semi-acadêmicas nunca funcionam na prática...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 



06/02/2012 Italian aide argues case for expanding Atlantic community southward
Text of report by Italian privately-owned centrist newspaper La Stampa website, on 6 February
[Commentary by Italian Foreign Under Secretary Marta Dassu: "It Is Crucial To Expand the West"]
Dear Editor,
Is the West fated to inevitably decline? Writing in yesterday's edition of La Stampa, Zbigniew Brzezinski chipped into this now time-honoured debate - aggravated by the financial crisis - by responding in the negative. But he added that there are two conditions which must be fulfilled if we are to prevent that decline. The first is domestic and it entails the United States rediscovering the reasons for its "primacy" (innovation, education, and a dynamic society); while the second belongs to the field of "strategic visions" - and the vision offered by the former national security adviser is both simple and direct: If it is to avoid losing its relevancy and its influence in the Asian century, the West needs to expand. But to expand in which direction? In book recently published in Washington, Brzezinski argues that one might envision the "broader"  West, a couple of decades from now, as comprising a head that is still American (on condition, of course, that the United States also does its homework) and a heart that is European (on condition that the EU becomes a genuine political Union), with arms and legs stretching out towards Russia (on condition that it opts for full democracy), towards Turkey (on condition that it becomes more European than neo-Ottoman), and towards old and new Asian allies bent on balancing China's weight. Is that a strategic vision, or is it a mere theory that will never be implemented in practice?
The truth of the matter is that, at a time when the financial crisis is sorely testing liberal democracies and the combination between capitalism and authoritarianism is starting to be seen as an alternative model, it is crucial that we rethink the West's borders. In Brzezinski's opinion, it is obvious that the United States' comparative strength be rebuilt first and foremost from the inside, just as the comparative strength of the Europeans demands a solider Union. But it is clear also that the old transatlantic relationship is no longer sufficient in the face of a shift in economic, demographic, and financial power towards new countries. From his standpoint, expanding the West towards the Eurasian continent is the strategic priority.
Brzezinski's mental map is still "horizontal": It goes from west to east, and along with the impact of China's rise, it continues to reflect the last century's unresolved problems: Integrating Russia into the Western community is one of hopes that has remained at least partially unfulfilled since 1991. Russia's veto on the resolution faulting Syria in the United Nations confirms the gap that still exists - and with bitter consequences, in this case for the people of Syria who have been exposed to brutal repression for months.
Yet there is also a "vertical" map worth exploring and it involves the possibility of bringing into the fold the Atlantic's southern shores, where potentially strong economic powers such as Brazil are theoretically equipped with Western democratic "software" in the form of the historical and cultural roots that shape their identity. In other words, the broader West could have an important leg stretching not only further east but also further south, and the strategic vision could comprise a 21st century "panatlantic" community capable of benefiting from tangible resources (the additional thrust of an emerging area) and of using its common cultural roots to good effect. Keeping the Atlantic alive is even more important a precondition for the Europeans than it is for the United States if they wish to continue carrying weight in the Pacific century. That is one of several reasons why proposals regarding the establishment of something akin to a transatlantic free-trade area should be assessed not only in economic terms (i.e. in terms of their cost and benefit in different areas of the economy) but also in terms of their strategic importance.
Having said that, the vision which Brzezinski prescribes for the United States quite rightly views the Far East as a region where, with or without the global economy, traditional geopolitics continues to matter. The economic interdependence between Washington and Beijing or the importance of commercial ties between China and Germany have not done away with the 20th century fault lines, with dynamics based on deterrence and military balances. In light of this, the "balancing act" which Brzezinski recommends that the United States perform in Asia is still necessary, and indeed the US defence review is moving in that direction. But that is another reason why the Europeans should adopt an increasing share of the responsibility on their borders, in North Africa and in the Balkans. Thus if the West is to continue to wield influence at the global level, it must not simply expand, it must also specialize.
Of course, none of this is going to work unless the first condition that Brzezinski sets the United States - a condition, incidentally , which applies to Western democracies in general, i.e. that they impart a fresh boost both to themselves and to their economies - withstands the test of concrete implementation.
As Niall Ferguson argues in Aspenia, one of the causes behind the West's relative decline is its tendency to shy away from using its winning weapons - competition, scientific research, the work ethic - and even to start questioning its own political systems. The revolution of "growing" expectations that guaranteed the Western model's success over the past two decades, has turned into its opposite, and the economic, political, and social repercussions of that transformation have yet to be gauged.
Source: La Stampa website, Turin, in Italian 6 Feb 12 p 33

Companion to Marxist Economy: uma digressao sobre o nada...


Alguém ainda acredita que a "economia política" marxista sirva para outra coisa senão filosofia política?
Quantos departamentos sérios de economia usam, de fato, QUALQUER categoria econômica marxista -- mais valia, lei tendencia da baixa da taxa de lucro, pauperizacao, MDM, etc -- para qualquer outra coisa senão digressões inúteis no campo da economia?
NUNCA vi qualquer economista digno desse nome usar o ferramental marxista, a não ser para fazer política...
Isso não funciona em NENHUM departamento de economia.
Melhor ver com os Fefelechs da vida...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 




The Elgar Companion To Marxist Economics

Edited by Ben Fine, Professor of Economics and Alfredo Saad-Filho, Professor of Political Economy, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK with Marco Boffo, PhD candidate, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK

January 2012 432 pp Hardback 978 1 84844 537 6

Hardback $225.00 on-line price $202.50

Description
This Companion takes stock of the trajectory, achievements, shortcomings and prospects of Marxist political economy. It reflects the contributors’ shared commitment to bringing the methods, theories and concepts of Marx himself to bear across a wide range of topics and perspectives, and it provides a testimony to the continuing purpose and vitality of Marxist political economy.
Contents
Contributors include: G. Albo, R. Albritton, D. Ankarloo, S.J. Ashman, A.J. Ayers, R. Balakrishnan, J. Banaji, S. Bisnath, M. Boffo, T.J. Byres, A. Campbell, P. Cerni, P. Chattopadhyay, S. Clarke, A. Colás, G.C. Comninel, M. Di Meglio, P.L. dos Santos, G. Duménil, B. Fine, J. Ghosh, G. Hoe-Gimm, H. Goodacre, B. Gruffydd-Jones, B. Harriss-White, K. Hart, M. Itoh, H. Jeon, B. Jessop, D. Johnston, R. Kiely, S. Knafo, D. Laibman, D. Lévy, D. Lo, T. Marois, P. Masina, S.D. Mavroudeas, D. Milonakis, S. Mohun, S. Newman, P. Patnaik, U. Patnaik, L. Pradella, H. Radice, A. Saad-Filho, S. Savran, G. Slater, T. Smith, E. Swyngedouw, B. Tinel, A. Toscano, J. Weeks, E. Wood, A. Zack-Williams, P. Zarembka, Y. Zhang
This Companion takes stock of the trajectory, achievements, shortcomings and prospects of Marxist political economy. It reflects the contributors’ shared commitment to bringing the methods, theories and concepts of Marx himself to bear across a wide range of topics and perspectives, and it provides a testimony to the continuing purpose and vitality of Marxist political economy.

As a whole, this volume analyzes Marxist political economy in three areas: the critique of mainstream economics in all of its versions; the critical presence of Marxist political economy within, and its influence upon, each of the social science disciplines; and, cutting across these, the analysis of specific topics that straddle disciplinary boundaries. Some of the contributions offer an exposition of basic concepts, accessible to the general reader, laying out Marx’s own contribution, its significance, and subsequent positions and debates with and within Marxist political economy. The authors offer assessments of historical developments to and within capitalism, and of its current character and prospects. Other chapters adopt a mirror-image approach of pinpointing the conditions of contemporary capitalism as a way of interrogating the continuing salience of Marxist analysis.

This volume will inform and inspire a new generation of students and scholars to become familiar with Marxist political economy from an enlightened and unprejudiced position, and to use their knowledge as both a resource and gateway to future study.
Contents:

Introduction
Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad-Filho

1. Accumulation of Capital
Paul Zarembka

2. The Agrarian Question and the Peasantry
Terence J. Byres

3. Analytical Marxism
Marco Boffo

4. Anthropology
Keith Hart

5. Capital
Jayati Ghosh

6. Capitalism
Ellen Wood

7. Centrally Planned Economy
Dic Lo and Yu Zhang

8. Class and Class Struggle
Utsa Patnaik

9. Classical Political Economy
Hugh Goodacre

10. Combined and Uneven Development
Samantha J. Ashman

11. Commodification and Commodity Fetishism
Robert Albritton

12. Competition
Paresh Chattopadhyay

13. Consumerism
Paula Cerni

14. Contemporary Capitalism
Greg Albo

15. Crisis Theory
Simon Clarke

16. Dependency Theory
John Weeks

17. Ecology and the Environment
Barbara Harriss-White

18. Economic Reproduction and the Circuits of Capital
Ben Fine

19. Exploitation and Surplus Value
Ben Fine

20. Feminist Economics
Radhika Balakrishnan and Savitri Bisnath

21. Feudalism
George C. Comninel

22. Finance, Finance Capital, and Financialisation
Thomas Marois

23. Friedrich Engels
Paresh Chattopadhyay

24. Geography
Erik Swyngedouw

25. Global Commodity Chains and Global Value Chains
Susan Newman

26. Globalisation and Imperialism
Ray Kiely

27. International Political Economy
Alejandro Colás

28. Karl Marx
Lucia Pradella

29. Knowledge Economy
Heesang Jeon

30. Labour, Labour Power, and the Division of Labour
Bruno Tinel

31. Labour Theory of Value
Ben Fine

32. Market Socialism
Makoto Itoh

33. Marx and Underdevelopment
Mauro di Meglio and Pietro Masina

34. Marxism and History
George C. Comninel

35. Method of Political Economy
Branwen Gruffydd-Jones

36. Mode of Production
Jairus Banaji

37. Money
Paulo L. dos Santos

38. Neoliberalism
Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy

39. Neoclassical Economics
Dimitris Milonakis

40. Neo-Ricardianism
Sungur Savran

41. New Technology and the 'New Economy’
Tony Smith

42. Political Science
Alison J. Ayers

43. Population and Migration
Deborah Johnston

44. Productive and Unproductive Labour
Simon Mohun

45. Race
Alfred Zack-Williams

46. Radical Political Economy in the United States
Al Campbell

47. The Rate of Profit
Simon Mohun

48. The Regulation Approach
Stavros D. Mavroudeas

49. Rent and Landed Property
Erik Swyngedouw

50. The Social Structures of Accumulation Approach
Stavros D. Mavroudeas

51. Socialism, Communism and Revolution
Al Campbell

52. Sociology
Alberto Toscano

53. The State
Bob Jessop

54. 'Transformation Problem’
Alfredo Saad-Filho

55. The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism
David Laibman

56. Transnational Corporations
Hugo Radice

57. Unemployment
Gary Slater

58. Value Form Approach
Samuel Knafo

59. Vladimir I Lenin
Prabhat Patnaik

60. The Welfare State
Daniel Ankarloo

61. World Economy
Gong Hoe-Gimm

References

Index

Michael Mussa: um analista critico dos sistemas financeiros (RIP)

Eu li muitos trabalhos de Michael Mussa, tanto quando estava em Washington, quanto depois, pela internet.
Superb, como diriam os connoisseurs...
Meus sentimentos pela perda...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 



Michael Mussa (1944–2012): Challenging Conventional Wisdom
by Flemming Larsen | January 30th, 2012 | 11:01 am 

I had the privilege to work with Mike for close to nine exciting and fulfilling years.
Mike made the Research Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) relevant and respected, both inside and outside the Fund. Above all, he gave meaning to the Economic Counselor role by fulfilling his duties with incisive analyses and policy advice.
From the very start, he challenged conventional IMF wisdom.
He effectively used wit to underscore his points. When some Executive Directors criticized Mike for advocating policy activism and fine tuning, he explained how he would use the gas pedal in his old Buick to regulate its speed.
He was particularly critical of IMF surveillance of exchange rates, which was “as firm as an overripe avocado.” His seminars on financial markets for the Executive Board were some of his finest moments.
He distrusted financial markets. Whenever a new financial crisis erupted, he would proclaim “happy days are here again.” His judgment that “banks are dangerous” was proven right again and again.
On a personal note, I still remember the observation of our youngest son, then in junior high, who attended one of our press conferences on the World Economic Outlook: In listening to Mike he discovered that economics could be funny.
Mike liked to celebrate birthdays and special accomplishments, and his senior staff frequently enjoyed his generosity when he hosted a dinner party in his Watergate apartment. He would always prepare the dinner himself, and treat his guests to a remarkable selection of fine wines from his private cellar. On one occasion, after learning that my wife Birte was born in 1945, he served a 1945 Cheval Blanc.
Because Mike really did take his role as Counselor seriously, relations with management were not always easy. His views were not always convenient, but the Executive Board learned to appreciate Mike.
The author is former deputy director of the Research Department at the International Monetary Fund.
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Michael Mussa (1944–2012): Integrity, Courage, and a Gift for Friendship
by Morris Goldstein | January 27th, 2012 

I have been a close friend of Michael Mussa for over twenty years. When Mike joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as Economic Counselor and Director of Research in 1991, I was his deputy. When I left the Fund in 1994, he and I stayed in frequent contact, including socially. And when Mike left the Fund in 2001, I helped persuade him to join me as Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, where he worked for the last ten years of his career. During the past two decades, I spent more time working with and just hanging out with Mike than probably anybody else.
Mike was a “character” in the best sense of the word. To me, four things stood out. First, there was the soaring intellect. Mike used that horsepower to very good effect to analyze key issues in economics—be they theory or policy. Mike was clearly one of most talented international economists of his generation. No matter what your political persuasion or intellectual orientation, you could not be involved seriously in international economics over the past forty years without being aware of, and learning something from, what Mike wrote and said. Whether it was what determined the fundamental behavior of exchange rates and the balance of payments, or the properties of different currency regimes, or evaluating the performance of the Federal Reserve, or projecting what the recovery from the global economic and financial crisis of 2007–09 would look like, or what an emerging economy in crisis needed to do to exit from the crisis, nobody was better at cutting to the core of the problem and at dispensing sensible advice. As Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, put it in a recent tribute: “… he will be remembered for his contribution to economics as a rigorous discipline and to policymaking as an exercise in applying rigorous thought to the problems of the day.” I do not mean to suggest, of course, that Mike’s insights were restricted to economics. As many of you will know, Mike also had a commanding knowledge of history, politics, and mathematics—to say nothing of his true passion, namely, wine.
A second hallmark of Mike’s character was his integrity and courage. In short, Mike simply would not allow himself to be intimidated by anyone. He would say what he thought—whether the counterparty was a first-year graduate student, a Nobel laureate, the IMF Executive Board, the Peterson staff at Friday lunch meetings, more than one hundred of the world’s most senior economic officials attending the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole annual symposium, or the President of the United States. Mike was fond of quoting Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan that everyone was entitled to their own opinion—but not to their own facts. When Mike thought that the truth was being assailed by nonsense, he would invariably stand up and set the record straight. This characteristic did not endear Mike to everyone, but over time he developed a reputation for being a straight shooter that only increased the demand for his services. Mike was a good businessman and he made a good business of “telling like it is” to economic policymakers all over the world.
Defining characteristic number three was Mike’s terrific sense of humor—something he employed not only to entertain his friends but also to help communicate his economic policy messages. By now, you have probably seen some of Mike’s more famous quips in the obituaries that appeared in the Wall Street Journal, in the New York Times, and in the Washington Post. Just to convey the flavor, I mention here a few of my personal favorites. On watching teams of officials preparing to intervene in a crisis: “Some of them seem more excited than a personal injury lawyer at a six-car crackup.” On the “catch and release” policy of fishing guides: “This has nothing to do with conservation: The guides simply realize that if there are no fish, there is no demand for fishing guides.” On standing up for yourself: “If you don’t want to be known as a doormat, don’t let people walk all over you.” On policymaking in the nation’s capital: “In Washington DC, truth is just another special interest—and not a particularly well-financed one.” On the charge during Congressional testimony that he was a hired gun: “At least I hit what I aim at.” And on the relationship between regulators and the banks they regulate: “The time has long since passed for public officials and central bankers to stop kissing and start kicking the posteriors of bankers whose self-interest diverges substantially from the public interest.” Some of my fondest memories of Mike are of the two of us sitting in my office or his telling stories, jokes, and gossip until—on our best days —we were laughing so hard that tears were streaming down both our faces. When I retired from the Fund after 25 years of service, I offered the view that nobody was more fun to work with than Mike; ten years of working together at Peterson only reinforced that view.
Last but not least, I want to pay testimony to Mike’s kindness and loyalty. Once you were a good friend of Mike’s, he was there to support you whenever you needed it—whether that meant writing letters of recommendation, arguing on your behalf to whomever, offering you suggestions for making your latest paper much better, trying to cheer you up on the phone, or holding a dinner party to help you celebrate one of your personal milestones. When my wife died suddenly and unexpectedly five and a half years ago after 36 years of marriage, Mike was there for me—everything from letting colleagues know about funeral arrangements, to driving out to my house frequently to see how I was doing. When his long-time administrative officer at the Fund had a serious operation after she and he had left the Fund, Mike kept on the case until he was sure she was out of danger. I know that Mike has likewise helped his brother, Roger, through some of his most difficult challenges. There are more than a few international economists who are where they are today professionally in part because of Mike’s mentorship and support. I would estimate that more than 90 percent of the great dinner parties that Mike had at his Watergate apartment—serving the best wines in the world—were not for government bigwigs, but rather for Mike’s friends.
With Michael Mussa’s passing, the world has indeed lost one of its finest international economists. Yet what seems even more painful today is that some of us have lost a truly wonderful friend.
This is a revised version of the eulogy for Michael Mussa delivered by the author on January. 25, 2012, in Los Angeles.

Dos Piratas do Caribe aos Piratas da Somalia: custos

Outros piratas, em outras paragens, alguns até em terra firme, também provocam um prejuízo dos diabos.
Só consultando os jornais, eu posso falar de vários navios piratas navegando em terra firme...



Higher speeds, hired guns drive Somali piracy cost
By Peter Apps, Political Risk Correspondent

(Reuters) - Somali piracy in the Indian Ocean costs the global economy some $7 billion a year, a study said on Wednesday, with ships forced to travel faster over longer routes and increasingly hire armed security guards.
"The question for the shipping industry is how long this is sustainable," said Anna Bowden, program manager for the research by the U.S.-based One Earth Future foundation.
For the last five years, a few hundred pirates sailing from a handful of towns in the Somali enclave of Puntland have pushed ever deeper into the Indian Ocean despite the dozens of international warships trying to stop them.
The study showed world governments spending at least $1.3 billion trying to control the problem, a figure dwarfed by shipping industry costs estimated at up to $5.5 billion.
The biggest single item was the $2.7 billion it costs for lone container ships to hurry through at much higher, and much less economic, speeds. Non-container ships with less flexibility to increase speed were adopting other costly strategies.
Shippers also spent more than $1 billion on private security guards, often armed, a figure that was rising sharply, the study showed. Half of all ships were carrying guards by the end of last year, against an average of 25 percent for the whole year.
That means the private security companies, many based in Britain or elsewhere in northern Europe, that combat the pirates were earning much more than the pirates themselves.
COMPLACENCY SETTING IN?
The report estimated the total paid in ransoms at $160 million although the average ransom for a ship paid in 2011 rose from $4 million to $5 million.
Whilst slightly fewer ships were taken in 2011, the amount of time vessels and crews were held hostage kept increasing, as did the level of violence used in attacks and against hostages.
Nonetheless,, protective measures have proved relatively effective, the study said. So far, pirates have never seized a ship travelling faster than 18 knots. Armed private security guards also had a 100 percent success rate in protecting ships.
Shippers have added barb wire and an array of other measures to vessels, including "citadels" - armored safe rooms in which crews can shelter from attack until naval help arrives.
That has helped bring down insurance premiums, although shippers are still paying some $635 million in extra premiums.
Re-routing ships to hug the Indian coast to avoid the mostly unpatrolled Indian Ocean cost $486-680 million. Crews demanded some $195 million in higher wages to transit the region.
"A major risk for 2012 is that complacency sets in if we think piracy is now under control," said Jens Vestergaard Madsen, a senior researcher on the project. "Pirates were less successful in 2011, but the piracy problem is still not resolved. Ninety nine percent of these costs are spent mitigating the problem, not resolving it."
In its first attempt to put a price tag on Somali piracy a year ago, the foundation estimated an annual global cost of $7-12 billion.
This year's estimate was at the lower end of that range partly because of a better dataset and partly because some numbers used earlier, such as estimates from insurance firms of ransom costs, appeared unrealistically high, the authors said.
The full report can be found at oceansbeyondpiracy.org/

Malucos tambem existem por aqui: no TCU frances, por exemplo...

O Tribunal de Contas francês precisa se decidir: ou é contra a austeridade, ou é a favor dos déficits.
Condenar a austeridade e pedir redução de déficit, ao mesmo tempo, é completamente contraditório.
Deviam pedir um exame psiquiátrico nesses controleurs de comptes...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida



France Info, le 08 février 2012 à 18h50
Le catalogue à la Prévert de la Cour des comptes
L'événement du jour c'est bien sûr la publication du rapport annuel de la Cour des comptes
La Cour épingle cette année les autoroutes ferroviaires qui n'ont pas fait leurs preuves, le manque  de rigueur budgétaire à la Banque de France et la mauvaise gestion des stocks d'or, la fraude à la taxe carbone qui a couté plus d'un milliard et demi d'euros au budget de l'Etat, les insuffisances dans la construction de logements sociaux, les errements des communes balnéaires de la région Languedoc Roussillon, le manque de réformes à la rédaction de France Télévisions, et l'échec annoncé d'un parc touristique en Alsace. Il y en a pour tous les goûts dans ce rapport qui tient en deux volumes.
Reste une critique sur le fond de la politique budgétaire française : la Cour estime que la succession de plans d'austérité nuit à la croissance tout en saluant les efforts faits pour réduire le déficit.

The Idiot's Guide for Brazilian Hegemony in South America

Only idiots, and naifs, exhibit pretentions, or aspire, to something called Brazilian leadership -- sometimes confounded with hegemony -- in South America. Sensible diplomats, and insensible neighbors, do not want to hear anything about it.
Only academics, and the anti-imperialistic militants talk about this kind of soft power. Idiots alike?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

EL ASCENSO DE BRASIL INQUIETA A SURAMÉRICA
Foreign Policy en Español, 07 de febrero de 2012
¿Los deseos hegemónicos brasileños romperán la armonía con sus vecinos latinoamericanos? He aquí el ligero cambio de rumbo de la diplomacia de Dilma Rousseff y las reacciones que ha suscitado en el continente.
AFP/Getty Images 
Todo sigue igual pero algo ha cambiado en Brasilia. La llegada al poder de Dilma Rousseff ha significado un ligero viraje en las relaciones con los vecinos suramericanos, que ven con recelo las aspiraciones hegemónicas de Brasil y echan de menos los agrados y el trato personal que partía de su antecesor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
En su primer año en el poder, Rousseff ha seguido las grandes líneas de la diplomacia de Lula, su padrino político, basadas en la búsqueda de una mayor cooperación en el eje sur-sur con fuerte acento suramericano, pero ha imprimido su estilo propio, más pragmático y más reservado, que ha disgustado a algunos socios. Poco amiga de los discursos, de la parafernalia de las visitas oficiales y de los abrazos con los colegas latinoamericanos, Rousseff disminuyó la agenda de viajes al exterior, que con Lula adquirió un ritmo frenético y llevó al carismático líder sindical a pasar en el extranjero casi un año entero de los ocho que duró su mandato. Rousseff se ausentó del último Foro de Davos y de la Cumbre Iberoamericana del pasado noviembre, lo que se recibió como un agravio en Paraguay, país anfitrión de la cita.
La Presidenta brasileña también ha acabado con los encuentros trimestrales que mantenía su antecesor con Hugo Chávez y ha visitado Venezuela tan solo una vez, coincidiendo con la cumbre fundacional de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (Celac), proyecto impulsado por Caracas, al que se ha sumado Brasil sin reparos, pero también sin alharacas. En un mensaje enviado al Congreso el pasado enero, Rousseff dijo que la creación de la Celac “reafirma el deseo [de los países de América Latina] de actuar juntos sin tutela externa, con base en una agenda trazada por la propia región”.
No obstante, es notorio que el pragmatismo y la racionalidad han sucedido al trato amistoso y personal que cultivaba Lula con el eje bolivariano, en el que Bolivia y Ecuador no han encontrado hueco en la agenda de Rousseff. Estos países han perdido también un canal directo de comunicación con el palacio de Planalto como era Marco Aurelio García, asesor de la presidencia brasileña que bajo Lula asumía en la práctica las funciones de ministro de Exteriores con los vecinos latinoamericanos y ahora encuentra cerrada la puerta del despacho de Rousseff, que ha decidido a acabar con la bicefalia de la diplomacia y ha desdibujado la figura de Marco Aurelio.
El Gobierno brasileño también ha tenido ya sus primeros roces con Argentina por disputas comerciales y ha anunciado que va a renegociar con México el acuerdo del sector del automóvil firmado en 2002. Todos son indicios de que Brasilia ha acabado con la generosidad y el paternalismo que mostró Lula hacia sus vecinos y ahora, aunque continúe abogando por la integración, parece que va a hacer hincapié en posicionar a Brasil en un lugar predominante, acorde con el tamaño de su economía y con sus aspiraciones de convertirse en un actor geopolítico. En ese sentido, se espera que el Gobierno brasileño retome este año la política de rearme y modernización de las Fuerzas Armadas, suspendida en 2011 por las necesidades de la crisis, con la que pretende destacarse como la potencia militar de la región.
Continúan intactas las aspiraciones de que se incluya al país en la lista de miembros del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU y Rousseff, al igual que su predecesor, no pierde la oportunidad de expresar esta demanda a todo mandatario que visita Brasilia. En esta línea se podrían inscribir los nuevos esfuerzos de acercamiento a China y Estados Unidos, dos de las dos potencias más reticentes a las reformas en la ONU que son, a su vez, los mayores socios comerciales de Brasil, lo que ha llevado a Rousseff a conjugar los esfuerzos para mejorar las relaciones diplomáticas y económicas con ambos países.
El acercamiento a Pekín es palpable y se siente en el creciente peso de la corriente comercial y de las inversiones chinas en Brasil, cuestiones que fueron el tema central de la visita de Rousseff al Imperio del Centro el pasado abril. Las exportaciones brasileñas a China se han cuadruplicado desde 2007 y el gigante asiático se ha convertido de largo en el mayor cliente de Brasil y en uno de los principales inversores en el país, sobre todo en el sector del suministro de materias primas.
      
La posición oficial es que se acabaron los guiños a países que no respeten los derechos humanos, pero la defensa de los valores democráticos ha sido mucho más tibia en la reciente visita de Rousseff a Cuba
      
Las relaciones entre Brasilia y Washington no pasaron su mejor momento en el tiempo que convivieron Lula y Obama. Para dar una señal clara sobre su intención de cambio, Rousseff nombró ministro de Exteriores a Antonio Patriota, que fue embajador en EE UU durante dos años, y ya ha dado los primeros pasos para volver a aproximarse a este aliado tradicional. El presidente estadounidense esperó la salida de Lula del Planalto para realizar su primer viaje oficial Brasil y Rousseff se dispone a devolverle la visita el próximo abril. De forma paralela surgen señales de mejoría de las relaciones, como el reciente anuncio de la flexibilización en la concesión de visados de turismo a los brasileños o el fin de las barreras a la importación de etanol a EE UU, dos antiguas reivindicaciones de Brasilia. Del otro lado, Rousseff hizo un guiño a Washington al distanciarse de Irán, en un giro diplomático de 360 grados con respecto a la política de Lula, que abrazó a Ahmadineyad y le echó un capote en plena crisis diplomática con los países occidentales por su controvertido programa nuclear. La posición oficial de la cancillería brasileña es que con Rousseff se acabaron los guiños a países que no respeten los derechos humanos, pero la defensa de los valores democráticos ha sido mucho más tibia en la reciente visita de Rousseff a Cuba, donde la mandataria brasileña rechazó entrevistarse con la disidencia para centrarse en cuestiones comerciales, otro síntoma de que el sentido práctico va a guiar las relaciones de Brasil con América Latina.
El tono comercial guía exclusivamente el trato de Brasilia con la Unión Europea y se han enfriado rápidamente las relaciones amistosas que Lula mantenía con Nicolas Sarkozy, por el enfado de París en los atrasos de Brasil en concluir una licitación para la compra de aviones de combate en la que Francia era favorita.
Este año será decisivo para la nueva diplomacia de Brasil, ya que el país va a ser anfitrión de la cumbre de la ONU sobre desarrollo sostenible Río+20, que va a reunir a un centenar de jefes de Estado y de Gobierno en Río de Janeiro el próximo junio. En esa cita cabe esperar que Rousseff presente a un Brasil en posición de liderazgo en el campo ambiental y con serias aspiraciones de afianzarse como uno de los principales actores internacionales, con derecho a un pedazo de poder en el seno de la ONU por su posición de líder suramericano y pujante economía emergente. Queda la duda de si los deseos hegemónicos de Brasil van a contribuir a resquebrajar la armonía con sus vecinos latinoamericanos en cuya construcción se había empeñado Lula.
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