The Economist, 28 Feb/3 Mar, 2015
The downgrading of Petrobras’s credit rating to junk status by Moody’s sent shivers through Brazilian markets. The state-controlled oil company is mired in a corruption scandal involving politicians from Brazil’s ruling Workers’ Party, preventing Petrobras from undertaking a proper financial audit.
LEADERS
Brazil - In a quagmire
Latin America’s erstwhile star is in its worst mess since the early 1990s
CAMPAIGNING for a second term as Brazil’s president in an election last October, Dilma Rousseff painted a rosy picture of the world’s seventh-biggest economy. Full employment, rising wages and social benefits were threatened only by the nefarious neoliberal plans of her opponents, she claimed. Just two months into her new term, Brazilians are realising that they were sold a false prospectus.
Brazil’s economy is in a mess, with far bigger problems than the government will admit or investors seem to register. The torpid stagnation into which it fell in 2013 is becoming a full-blown—and probably prolonged—recession, as high inflation squeezes wages and consumers’ debt payments rise (see page 71). Investment, already down by 8% from a year ago, could fall much further. A vast corruption scandal at Petrobras, the state-controlled oil giant, has ensnared several of the country’s biggest construction firms and paralysed capital spending in swathes of the economy, at least until the prosecutors and auditors have done their work. The real has fallen by 30% against the dollar since May 2013: a necessary shift, but one that adds to the burden of the $40 billion in foreign debt owed by Brazilian companies that falls due this year.
Escaping this quagmire would be hard even with strong political leadership. Ms Rousseff, however, is weak. She won the election by the narrowest of margins. Already, her political base is crumbling. According to Datafolha, a pollster, her approval rating fell from 42% in December to 23% this month. She has been hurt both by the deteriorating economy and by the Petrobras scandal, which involves allegations of kickbacks of at least $1 billion, funnelled to politicians in her Workers’ Party (PT) and its coalition partners. For much of the relevant period Ms Rousseff chaired Petrobras’s board. If Brazil is to salvage some benefits from her second term, then she needs to take the country in an entirely new direction.
Levy to the rescue?
Brazil’s problems are largely self-inflicted. In her first term Ms Rousseff espoused a tropical state-capitalism that involved fiscal laxity, opaque public accounts, competitiveness-sapping industrial policy (see Schumpeter) and presidential meddling in monetary policy. Last year her re-election campaign saw a doubling of the fiscal deficit, to 6.75% of GDP.
To her credit, Ms Rousseff has at least recognised that Brazil needs more business-friendly policies if it is to retain its investment-grade credit rating and return to growth. This realisation is personified by her new finance minister, Joaquim Levy, a Chicago-trained economist and banker and one of the country’s rare economic liberals (see article). However, Brazil’s past failure to deal promptly with macroeconomic distortions has left Mr Levy to grapple with a recessionary trap.
To stabilise gross public debt, he has promised a whopping fiscal squeeze of almost two percentage points of GDP this year. Part of this is coming from the removal of an electricity subsidy and the reimposition of fuel duty. Both measures have helped to push inflation to 7.4%. He also plans to curb subsidised lending by public banks to favoured sectors and firms.
Ideally, Brazil would offset this fiscal squeeze with looser monetary policy. But because of the country’s hyperinflationary past, as well as more recent mistakes—the Central Bank bent to the president’s will, ignored its inflation target and foolishly slashed its benchmark rate in 2011-12—the room for manoeuvre today is limited. With inflation still above its target, the Central Bank cannot cut its benchmark rate from today’s level of 12.25% without risking further loss of credibility and sapping investor confidence. A fiscal squeeze and high interest rates spell pain for Brazilian firms and households and a slower return to growth. What makes this adjustment perilous is the political fragility of Ms Rousseff herself. On paper she won a comfortable, though reduced, legislative majority in the October election. Yet the PT is already grumbling about Mr Levy’s fiscal policies—partly because the campaign did not lay the ground for them. Ms Rousseff suffered a crushing defeat on February 1st in an election for the politically powerful post of head of the lower house of Congress. Eduardo Cunha, who vanquished the PT’s man, will pursue his own agenda, not hers. Not for the first time, Brazil may be in for a period of semi-parliamentary government.
The country thus faces its biggest test since the early 1990s. The risks are clear. Recession and falling tax revenue may undermine Mr Levy’s adjustment. Any backsliding may in turn prompt a run on the real and a downgrade in Brazil’s credit rating, raising the cost of financing for government and companies alike. Were Brazil to see a repeat of the mass demonstrations of 2013 against corruption and poor public services, Ms Rousseff might be doomed.
From weakness, opportunity
Yet the president’s weakness is also an opportunity—and for Mr Levy in particular. He is now indispensable. He should build bridges to Mr Cunha, while making it clear that if Congress tries to extract a budgetary price for its support, that will lead to cuts elsewhere. The recovery of fiscal responsibility must be lasting for business confidence and investment to return. But the sooner the fiscal adjustment sticks, the sooner the Central Bank can start cutting interest rates.
More is needed for Brazil to return to rapid and sustained growth. It may be too much to expect Ms Rousseff to overhaul the archaic labour laws that have helped to throttle productivity, but she should at least try to simplify taxes and cut mindless red tape. There are tentative signs that the government will scale back industrial policy and encourage more international trade in what remains an over-protected economy.
Brazil is not the only member of the BRICS quintet of large emerging economies to be in trouble. Russia’s economy, in particular, has been battered by war, sanctions and dependence on oil. For all its problems, Brazil is not in as big a mess as Russia. It has a large and diversified private sector and robust democratic institutions. But its woes go deeper than many realise. The time to put them right is now.
Brazil’s liberals - Niche no longer
Thatcherism is winning adherents
AMONG the buskers on Avenida Paulista, São Paulo’s main thoroughfare, one act stood out on a recent Friday afternoon. A live rock band played spiffy renditions of “Blue Suede Shoes” and other 1950s classics; between numbers, six panellists sang the praises of competition and fielded questions from 100-odd onlookers about such issues as transport prices. The event was organised by the Free Brazil Movement (MBL), a group founded last year to promote free-market answers to the country’s problems. The al fresco concert-cum-colloquium was a riposte to demonstrators who took to the streets a half-dozen times in January to demand free bus transport. A better idea would be to open bus services to competition among private firms, which would improve quality and lower costs, the MBL-ers claimed.
Although Brazil thinks of itself as a “tropical Sweden”, advocates of freer markets and a less intrusive state are making headway. Of the 50 organisations that belong to the Liberty Network, an umbrella group, all but a handful were founded in the past three years. A “liberty forum” in April is expected to draw some 5,000 South American freedom-lovers to Porto Alegre, a southern city. This year’s theme, inspired by the Charlie Hebdo murders, is freedom of expression.
Soon such folk will have a new political party to represent them. Called simply Novo (“new”), the party stands unabashedly for free markets, a minimal state, low taxes and individual liberties. This would extend Brazil’s narrow political spectrum. The Workers’ Party of the president, Dilma Rousseff, is decidedly left-wing. The main opposition party, the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB), is friendlier to markets but, as its name suggests, it is by no means Thatcherite.
Novo sounds like it will be. Its president, a banker called João Amoêdo, calls for privatisation of state-controlled enterprises such as Petrobras, an oil giant in the midst of a corruption scandal. The fledgling party has submitted the 492,000 notarised signatures needed to register with the electoral authority. Mr Amoêdo hopes for approval in March; it plans to field candidates in next year’s local elections. A new liberal force could provide fresh answers to the country’s increasingly difficult economic plight (see article).
Novo’s brassy brand of liberalism is still a minority taste. Many Brazilians associate the liberal reforms enacted when the PSDB was in power in the 1990s with the short-term pain they caused rather than the long-term stability they secured. At the University of São Paulo, the loftiest of Brazil’s ivory towers, microeconomics courses dwell on market imperfections while neglecting government failures, laments Fabio Barbieri, who teaches the subject.
The social-science section of Livraria Cultura, a famous bookshop on Avenida Paulista, displays freshly printed copies of Karl Marx’s “Capital” but carries nothing by John Stuart Mill, his great liberal contemporary. After the military coup of 1964 “we were all deformed by revolutionary Marxism”, says Eduardo Giannetti, a liberal economist (his 29-year-old son was among the Paulista panellists). For decades a cartelised capitalism, protected by the state, kept products shoddy and prices high, which did not help the private sector win friends.
But opinion may be shifting. Brazilians have long been open-minded about gay rights and immigration (but not legalisation of drugs). A poll by Datafolha, a research firm, published in September found that 30% are sceptical about state intervention and tax-and-spend policies, up from 26% a year earlier. In October’s presidential election Ms Rousseff defeated her challenger, the pro-business candidate of the PSDB, only narrowly. These are hopeful signs for liberals. But it will be some time before “let’s introduce competition into public transport” drums up the same enthusiasm as “free tickets”.
BUSINESS
Schumpeter - Brazil’s business Belindia
Why the country produces fewer world-class companies than it should
BRAZILIANS make up almost 3% of the planet’s population and produce about 3% of its output. Yet of the firms in Fortune magazine’s 2014 “Global 500” ranking of the biggest companies by revenue only seven, or 1.4%, were from Brazil, down from eight in 2013. And on Forbes’s list of the 2,000 most highly valued firms worldwide just 25, or 1.3%, were Brazilian. The country’s biggest corporate “star”, Petrobras, is mired in scandals, its debt downgraded to junk status. In 1974 Edmar Bacha, an economist, described its economy as “Belindia”, a Belgium-sized island of prosperity in a sea of India-like poverty. Since then Brazil has done far better than India in alleviating poverty, but in business terms it still has a Belindia problem: a handful of world-class enterprises in a sea of poorly run ones.
Brazilian businesses face a litany of obstacles: bureaucracy, complex tax rules, shoddy infrastructure and a shortage of skilled workers—to say nothing of a stagnant economy (see article). But a big reason for Brazilian firms’ underperformance is less well rehearsed: poor management. Since 2004 John van Reenen of the London School of Economics and his colleagues have surveyed 11,300 midsized firms in 34 countries, grading them on a five-point scale based on how well they monitor their operations, set targets and reward performance. Brazilian firms’ average score, at 2.7, is similar to that of China’s and a bit above that of India’s. But Brazil ranks below Chile (2.8) and Mexico (2.9); America leads the pack with 3.3. The best Brazilian firms score as well as the best American ones, but its long tail of badly run ones is fatter.
Part of the explanation is that medium and large firms tend to be better-organised than small ones, and not only because well-run ones are likelier to grow. Brazil offers incentives aplenty to stay bitty, such as preferential tax treatment for firms with a turnover of no more than 3.6m reais ($1.3m). As they expand, many firms split rather than face increased scrutiny from the taxman. According to the World Bank, a midsized Brazilian firm spends 2,600 hours filing taxes each year. In Mexico, it is 330 hours.
Ownership patterns play a part too. Many Brazilian concerns are controlled by an individual shareholder, or one or two families. Two-thirds of those with sales of more than $1 billion a year are family-owned, notes Heinz-Peter Elstrodt of McKinsey, a consulting firm. That is less than in Mexico (96%) or South Korea (84%) but more than in America or Europe. Mr Van Reenen’s research shows that where family owners plump for outside chief executives, their firms do no worse than similarly sized ones with more diverse shareholders. But all too often they pick kin over professional managers—and performance suffers. This is particularly true in “low-trust” societies like Brazil, where bosses hire relatives instead of better-qualified strangers to avoid being robbed or sued for falling foul of overly worker-friendly labour laws.
Decades of economic turmoil—which ended when hyperinflation was vanquished in 1994—meant that companies were managed from crisis to crisis. This forced Brazilian firms to be nimble. But it also encouraged short-termism, which management consultants and academics finger as Brazilian managers’ number-one sin. Faced with a record drought in 2014, and a subsequent spike in energy prices in a hydropower-dependent country, Usiminas, a steelmaker, stopped smelting and started selling power it had bought on cheap long-term contracts. Energy sales made up most of its operating profits that year. Such short-term stunts are hardly the path to long-term greatness.
Worse, crisis management all too often consists of going cap in hand to the government. Brazilian bosses continue to waste hours in meetings with politicians that could be better spent improving their businesses. In January 2014, as vehicle sales flagged, the automotive industry’s reflex reaction was to descend on the capital, Brasília, and demand an extension of its costly tax breaks. Thanks to lifelines cast by the state, feeble firms stay afloat rather than sink and make room for more agile competitors. Shielded from competition by tariffs, subsidies and local-content rules, they have little reason to innovate. A locally invented gizmo which lets cars run on both petrol and biodiesel is nifty. But, asks Marcos Lisboa of Insper, a business school, does that really justify six decades of public support for the motor industry?
The dead hand of government
Indeed, a glance at the “Belgian” end of Brazil’s corporate landscape suggests that successful firms cluster in sectors the state has not tried desperately to help, such as retail or finance. Bradesco, a big lender, is internationally praised as a pioneer of automated banking. Each month Arezzo creates 1,000 new models of women’s shoes, and picks 170-odd to sell in its shops.
Brazil’s other world-beaters are in industries like agriculture and aerospace, which are free to compete at home and abroad, and in which the government sticks to its proper role. In 1990 farms were allowed to consolidate and to buy foreign machines, pesticides and fertiliser. Efforts by Brazil’s trade negotiators opened up export markets. JBS, a meat giant, can slaughter 100,000 head of cattle a day, selling more beef than any rival worldwide. Thanks in part to Embrapa, the national agriculture-research agency, Brazilian farms have been raising productivity by about 4% a year for two decades. Similarly, a supply of skilled engineers and know-how from the government’s Technological Institute of Aeronautics has helped turn Embraer, privatised in 1994, into one of the world’s most successful aircraft-makers.
The success of businesses such as these offers a lesson for the state. The best way to make Brazil’s underperforming firms more competitive would be to make them compete more. Coddling by the state can be more a curse than a blessing. Ronald Reagan’s dictum that the nine most terrifying words in the English language are, “I’m from the government and I’m here to help,” translates well into Flemish, Hindi and Brazilian Portuguese.
FINANCE AND ECONOMICS
Brazil’s coming recession - The crash of a titan
Brazil’s fiscal and monetary levers are jammed. As a result, it risks getting stuck in an economic rut
IT IS easy for a visitor to Rio to feel that nothing is amiss in Brazil. The middle classes certainly know how to live: with Copacabana and Ipanema just minutes from the main business districts a game of volleyball or a surf starts the day. Hedge-fund offices look out over botanical gardens and up to verdant mountains. But stray from comfortable districts and the sheen fades quickly. Favelas plagued by poverty and violence cling to the foothills. So it is with Brazil’s economy: the harder you stare, the worse it looks.
Brazil has seen sharp ups and downs in the past 25 years. In the early 1990s inflation rose above 2,000%; it was only banished when a new currency was introduced in 1994. By the turn of the century Brazil’s deficits had mired it in debt, forcing an IMF rescue in 2002. But then the woes vanished. Brazil became a titan of growth, expanding at 4% a year between 2002 and 2008 as exports of iron, oil and sugar boomed and domestic consumption gave an additional kick. Now Brazil is back in trouble. Growth has averaged just 1.3% over the past four years. A poll of 100 economists conducted by the Central Bank of Brazil suggests a 0.5% contraction this year followed by 1.5% growth in 2016.
Economic indicators
Both elements of that prediction—the mild downturn and the quick rebound—look optimistic. The prospects for private consumption, which accounted for around 50% of GDP growth over the past ten years, are rotten. With inflation above 7%, shoppers’ purchasing power is being eroded. Hefty price rises will continue. Brazil is facing an acute water shortage; since three-quarters of its electricity comes from hydroelectric dams, this is sapping it of energy. To avoid blackouts the government plans to deter use by raising prices: rates will increase by up to 30% this year. With the real losing 10% of its value against the dollar in the past month alone, rising import prices will bring more inflation.
There is little hope of disposable income keeping pace. One reason is that Brazilian workers’ productivity does not justify further rises. In the past ten years wages in the private sector have grown faster than GDP; cosseted public-sector workers have done even better (see chart 1). Since Brazil’s minimum wage is indexed to GDP and inflation, a recession will freeze real pay for the millions who earn it.
Austerity will bite, too, as Brazil’s new finance minister, Joaquim Levy, tries to balance the books. Higher taxes on fuel are being phased in, a blow for a car-loving country. If Mr Levy reforms the generous state pension, the incomes of older Brazilians will stall.
Debt payments add to the woes. Total credit to the private sector has jumped from 25% of GDP to 55% in the past ten years. With total household debt at around 46% of disposable income, Brazilian households are much less indebted than those in Italy or Japan. Yet the price of this borrowing is sky-high. Four-fifths of it is punishingly costly consumer credit (the average rate on new lending is 27%, according to the Central Bank). Once hefty principal payments are added in, debt service takes up 21% of disposable income. With the economy slowing and the Central Bank reluctant to cut interest rates because of high inflation, consumers will feel the pinch, says Arthur Carvalho of Morgan Stanley. On February 25th a survey put consumer confidence at a ten-year low.
There are few compensating sources of demand. Investment, which rose in eight of the ten years to 2013, often substantially, will sink in 2015. Petrobras, the partially state-owned oil giant that is Brazil’s largest investor, is mired in a corruption scandal that has paralysed spending: the affair may cost up to 1% of GDP in forgone investment. On February 24th Moody’s, a credit-rating agency, cut its debt to junk status; if Petrobras fails to publish audited results soon it may be unable to borrow at all.
Exporting is no answer, despite the falling real. Five countries—China, America, Argentina, the Netherlands and Germany—buy 45% of Brazil’s exports. Ten years ago these economies’ average GDP growth, weighted by their heft in Brazilian trade, was 12%; this year 5% would be good.
Yet the biggest worry is not that Brazil has a bad year, but that its broken policy levers mean that it gets stuck in a rut. Brazil spent 311.4 billion reais (6% of GDP) on interest payments in 2014, a 25% increase on 2013. This means that even if Mr Levy’s fiscal drive works—he is aiming for a primary surplus of 1.2% of GDP—Brazil will be nowhere near the black. The state’s outgoings have proved hard to control, with benefits payments rising despite falling unemployment. In a recession it will be harder still.
Brazil’s parlous finances leave no room for debt-financed stimulus. At 66% of GDP its gross public debt is the highest of the BRIC countries. Its bonds yield 13%—more than Russia’s. Rates could rise further. Fitch, a credit-rating agency, puts Brazil one notch above junk, but it has more debt, bigger deficits and higher interest rates than most countries in that category. If growth evaporates, a downgrade would be a certainty, raising debt costs even more.
Such predicaments are not uncommon, but Brazil’s monetary problems are. The governor of the Central Bank, Alexandre Tombini, must choose between two nasty paths. The first is a hard-money approach: keeping interest rates high despite the weak economy. This would prop up the real and boost the bank’s inflation-bashing credentials. But it is not just households that are hurt by high rates; firms are, too. In aggregate the big Brazilian firms Fitch rates have had negative cashflow since 2010. They have plugged the gap by running down savings and issuing debt. Borrowing is up by 23% in five years. With the risk of default rising, a fifth of these firms face a downgrade, in many cases imminent.
In reality, a tough monetary stance would have to be softened by an extension of Brazil’s lavish financial subsidies. State-owned banks like BNDES, a development bank, and Caixa Econômica Federal, a retail one, made 35% of loans in 2009. Today their share is 55%. Since many Brazilian firms cannot pay private market rates (the average rate for new corporate loans is 16%) BNDES lends at a concessionary rate, currently 5.5%. That makes banking in Brazil a fiscal operation, says Mansueto Almeida, an expert on the public finances. The funding comes from the state, which borrows at a much higher rate than firms pay. The difference, a loss, is borne by taxpayers.
The alternative path for Mr Tombini to go down is to cut rates despite rising inflation—a daring move given Brazil’s history. The cause of price increases, after all, is not an overheating economy, but the real’s fall, rising taxes and the drought. The textbook response would be to “see through”—ie, ignore—this inflation.
But soft money would hurt, too. It would cause the real to fall further, and thus accelerate increases in the prices of imported goods. Foreign debts, which Brazilian firms and local governments have accumulated due to the lower interest rates on offer, would become harder to bear. Data collected by the Bank for International Settlements show dollar debts rising from $100 billion to $250 billion over the past five years. But the burden in local-currency terms has jumped much more, from around 210 billion reais to 655 billion reais (see chart 2). The state lends a hand here too, with the central bank offering swap contracts to insure firms against a falling real. The scheme cost the bank 38 billion reais in the second half of last year alone.
Faced with these poisonous options, a middle path is most likely. Interest rates will be too high for households and firms, so subsidised funding will grow. But they will be too low to protect the real, so swap costs will rise, too. Both subsidies put extra pressure on the government’s finances. By mixing monetary and fiscal policy in this way, Brazil is slowly rendering both ineffective. In an economy heading for recession, that is not a good place to be.
A ideia do interesse nacional: onde estamos?
por Paulo Roberto de Almeida
The Idea of National Interest
é o título de um livro que o historiador americano Charles Beard
publicou em 1934, em plena crise econômica dos Estados Unidos e no
início do New Deal, programa de recuperação impulsionado pelo
presidente Roosevelt. O livro, porém, não é conjuntural; ele não trata
exclusivamente da realidade imediata do país, e sim faz uma reflexão
histórica de longo prazo sobre a construção do projeto nacional pela
vertente das relações exteriores. O subtítulo do livro é An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy,
e o primeiro capítulo trata dos “pivôs da diplomacia”, analisando, nos
demais capítulos, a expansão territorial da nação, o seu crescimento
econômico e comercial, ademais do impacto externo dos assuntos internos;
o apêndice traz um balanço dos interesses americanos no exterior
(capitais e investimentos diretos), embora a edição que consultei,
publicada em 1966 por seu filho e por um assistente de pesquisa,
procedeu a alguns cortes nas estatísticas da edição original e fez
atualizações sobre os dados que Beard havia consolidado até o final dos
anos 1920.
Beard foi o único acadêmico americano a
ter exercido a presidência de duas associações profissionais diferentes:
a American Historical Association e a American Political Science
Association. Ele abre o seu livro citando um discurso do Secretário de
Estado Charles Hughes, que trabalhou sob os presidentes Harding e
Coolidge na primeira metade dos anos 1920, e que se pronunciou sobre o
interesse nacional na política externa nestes termos: “As políticas
externas não são elaboradas sobre a base de abstrações. Elas são o
resultado de concepções práticas do interesse nacional que emergem a
partir de alguns requerimentos imediatos ou de fundamentos essenciais,
em perspectiva histórica. Quando mantidas por bastante tempo, essas
concepções expressam as esperanças e os temores, os objetivos de
segurança e de engrandecimento, que se tornaram dominantes na
consciência nacional, transcendendo, assim, divisões partidárias e
fazendo com que se atenuem as oposições que poderiam advir de certos
grupos” (discurso na Filadélfia, em 30/11/1923). Beard analisa então
todas as facetas do interesse nacional americano em sua expressão
diplomática e nas relações com o ambiente doméstico, sobretudo em sua
dimensão econômica.
É bem possível que seus argumentos, e o
seu próprio livro, tenham inspirado o célebre cientista político
germano-americano Hans Morgenthau – autor do clássico Politics Among Nations, publicado em 1948, o mesmo ano da morte de Charles Beard – a elaborar um outro livro, chamado justamente In Defense of the National Interest (1951), seguido, no ano seguinte, de um artigo sobre o mesmo tema: “What Is the National Interest of the United States?” (The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
vol. 282, julho de 1952, p. 1-7). Morgenthau também serviu como
consultor do Departamento de Estado no começo da Guerra Fria, quando um
diplomata, também célebre, George Kennan, dirigia ali a divisão de
planejamento político, o Policy Planning Staff, que trabalhou
no Plano Marshall e na formulação das principais medidas da então
nascente doutrina da contenção. O próprio Kennan, aliás, não cessava de
alertar seus chefes quanto às fragilidades que poderiam emergir do ponto
de vista do interesse nacional americano a partir da erosão da posição
competitiva dos Estados Unidos no mundo e do aprofundamento dos déficits
no balanço de pagamentos; ele expressou suas preocupações, entre outros
escritos, no livro Realities of American Foreign Policy, publicado em 1954.
O livro de Morgenthau sobre o interesse
nacional americano foi republicado em 1982, e talvez tenha animado o já
então famoso jornalista Irving Kristol a dar início, em 1985, à revista The National Interest,
apoiada nos mesmos princípios da escola realista, que está identificada
com a expressão política, econômica e militar do poder americano em
escala global, mas cujos fundamentos devem sempre ser construídos
internamente. Pode ser também que a mesma revista e sua ideia central
tenham inspirado o embaixador Rubens Barbosa a lançar, em 2008, a
revista Interesse Nacional,
fundada em concepções similares sobre as bases internas da expressão
internacional do Brasil. Qual seria, então, o interesse nacional
brasileiro, e que tipo de políticas e orientações econômicas melhor
serviriam à sua defesa e consolidação? Difícil dizer, já que existem
concepções muito diversas do que seja o interesse nacional, como já
dizia o próprio Beard em 1934.
O editor da revista brasileira se encarrega, aliás, de expressar tal dificuldade em nota de apresentação:
“Sendo necessariamente genérica, a noção de interesse nacional não tem
uma definição precisa. De um lado, porque, sobre o que seja concreta e
especificamente o interesse nacional, haverá sempre visões não
coincidentes, apoiadas em valores e/ou interesses diferentes. De outro,
porque a definição do interesse nacional requer um juízo informado, mas
sempre político e não estritamente técnico, sobre riscos e oportunidades
que se apresentam à realização dos valores e interesses de um país em
cenários estratégicos de longo prazo. E estes serão, sempre, objeto de
incerteza e controvérsia”. Mas o editorial acrescenta logo em seguida:
“O interesse nacional é, pois, uma construção política”, o que pode ser
uma constatação óbvia, mas que não nos ajuda muito na busca por uma
definição mais precisa sobre qual seria o interesse nacional brasileiro.
Conceda-se, pois, que diferentes grupos
políticos, e diferentes agregações de poder, representados pelas forças
políticas temporariamente predominantes no sistema de governança,
manifestem concepções diversas do chamado interesse nacional, e que eles
defendam, portanto, suas orientações particulares, ou setoriais, com
base numa legitimidade supostamente construída nas urnas, a cada
escrutínio eleitoral. Esta é uma suposição arriscada, e provavelmente
falsa, pois os eleitores não possuem, geralmente, no momento do voto, um
grau suficiente de informação sobre os programas, ou sobre as
consequências de determinadas políticas do ponto de vista de seus
interesses imediatos e os de mais longo prazo, e menos ainda do ponto de
vista dos interesses da nação.
Na impossibilidade de se chegar a uma
definição consensual de quais seriam as expressões efetivas do interesse
nacional, talvez seja o caso de investigar numa outra direção, ou seja,
identificar aquelas políticas e orientações que se opõem, ou que podem
contrariar, o interesse nacional. Nesse caso, é melhor trabalhar com
exemplos concretos do que com definições abstratas, como afirmava em
1923 o secretário de Estado Charles Hughes, em pronunciamento recuperado
pelo historiador Charles Beard uma década depois. E quais seriam, no
nosso caso, os exemplos contrários ao interesse nacional que podem ser
identificados numa perspectiva mais imediata ou de mais longo prazo, que
podem ser prejudiciais ao nosso desenvolvimento e ao “engrandecimento”
do país? Mas mesmo para identificar essas ações contrárias, seja no
plano interno, seja no âmbito internacional, é preciso ter balizas
mínimas sobre o que o país pretende ser como nação e como sociedade. É
preciso saber o que se quer, para rejeitar o que não serve a tal fim.
O editorial da revista Interesse Nacional
nos fornece, mais uma vez, alguns dos parâmetros que podem ser
aplicados ao caso: “A democracia e a inserção internacional são parte do
interesse nacional brasileiro, aquela como valor, esta como objetivo.
Se a democracia é um valor que queremos preservar, e se a inserção
internacional é hoje, mais do que nunca, uma condição do
desenvolvimento, resta perguntar como se inserir no mundo para
fortalecer a democracia e promover o desenvolvimento” (nota editorial de
Interesse Nacional, loc. cit.). A pergunta traz, portanto, um começo de resposta.
Se concordarmos com essa “plataforma”,
democracia e inserção internacional passam a ser as palavras chave do
interesse nacional brasileiro. Então, qualquer ação nacional que vise a
diminuir as bases da democracia representativa, que constitui a forma
atual da governança política no Brasil, seria contrária e prejudicial ao
interesse nacional brasileiro; como, por exemplo, um famoso decreto
“bolivariano” que pretende instituir a intermediação de “conselhos
populares” na definição e aprovação de políticas públicas, quando
sabemos que eles constituem uma emanação de tipo bolchevique – e por
isso mesmo foram chamados de “sovietes” – do partido gramsciano que tem a
clara intenção de se eternizar no poder. No plano externo, o apoio
acintoso a regimes pouco democráticos, ou ditatoriais de fato (e de
direito), diminui a credibilidade de nossa política externa, ao nos
identificar com sistemas políticos já devidamente denunciados em
protocolos instituindo “cláusulas democráticas” a que aderimos
voluntariamente, e por força de nossa adesão (inclusive constitucional)
aos valores da democracia.
Da mesma forma, qualquer política ou
medida que obstaculize a integração da economia nacional aos circuitos
internacionais da interdependência econômica pode ser considerada como
contrária ao interesse nacional, na medida em que diminui nossa
capacidade de absorção de know-how e de tecnologias de ponta
que são essenciais ao processo de desenvolvimento do país. O
protecionismo comercial não é apenas estúpido no plano estritamente
econômico; ele é também profundamente reacionário, no sentido marxista
da expressão, já que pretende “fazer rodar para trás a roda da
História”, como dito no Manifesto de 1848. Com efeito, ele
representaria uma volta a um regime de autarquia econômica que estava na
base da economia hitlerista – bastante admirada por militares
brasileiros, naquela época e depois – e seria uma espécie de “stalinismo
para os ricos”, um projeto de “capitalismo num só país” que talvez
ainda encante alguns arautos da burguesia industrial tupiniquim e seus
representantes acadêmicos.
Mais ainda, e com especial impacto na
imagem e na confiabilidade do país no plano internacional, ao aderir a
essas medidas de duvidosa eficácia competitiva – ao contrário, elas
diminuem nossa capacidade de competir internacionalmente – o país não
apenas deixa de cumprir obrigações contraídas ao abrigo do sistema
multilateral de comércio, como também se mostra conivente com sócios do
mesmo esquema regional de integração, o Mercosul, que reincidem nas
mesmas transgressões, e aqui não só contra os próprios interesses
comerciais do Brasil e contra regras do bloco comercial, mas igualmente
contrárias às normas do Gatt, de seus protocolos setoriais e de acordos
emanados da Rodada Uruguai de negociações comerciais. É, sob todos os
aspectos, uma péssima demonstração de inadimplência no tocante ao
respeito a princípios do direito internacional e, mais uma vez, de ação
contrária ao interesse nacional.
Democracia e inserção internacional vêm
sendo, assim, afastados de nosso horizonte de realizações históricas, em
nome de uma concepção de política interna e de política externa que
rompem com consensos nacionais laboriosamente mantidos ao longo de um
itinerário diplomático de quase dois séculos de existência efetiva.
Esses desvios de conduta – que representam, na verdade, concepções que
não transcendem, ao contrário, alimentam as “divisões partidárias”, como
a elas se referia o secretário de Estado Charles Hughes – se revelam
não apenas em relação à substância mesma das políticas seguidas, mas
igualmente no tocante ao próprio instrumento diplomático, ou seja, a
ferramenta da política externa, que é o seu serviço exterior.
Charles Beard, no capítulo de seu livro
dedicado à “interpretation, advancement, and enforcement of national
interest”, dizia que “By far the most important means used to advance
and enforce national interest is the ‘system’, or institution, of
diplomacy” (p. 341). Ele se referia, exatamente, à administração e ao
funcionamento das atividades diplomáticas, bem como à “multitude of
services performed by diplomatic agents in behalf of the citizens” (p.
347), ou seja, a cobertura que um país é capaz de dar aos seus cidadãos e
às empresas nacionais presentes nos mais diversos cantos do mundo.
Nesse particular, a ferramenta da política externa brasileira tem
custado muito pouco à nação durante a maior parte de sua história: menos
de 1% do orçamento da União (que parece ter passado a menos de 0,5%
atualmente). Ver essa dotação ainda mais diminuída, em detrimento da boa
qualidade, do funcionamento e, sobretudo, da respeitabilidade desse
instrumento, é a pior forma de promover o dito interesse nacional.
Os bolcheviques costumavam repetir, em
seus tempos de hegemonia absoluta, e para justificar os incontáveis
crimes cometidos contra os direitos humanos, a conhecida frase que
pretende que “não se faz omelete sem quebrar os ovos”, querendo
significar que sacrifícios são necessários para obter resultados em
algum objetivo qualquer. Pode ser que seja verdade, mas no caso que nos é
próximo, nem ovos, nem omelete parecem ter resultado dos sacrifícios
impostos ao instrumento diplomático nacional. Não se pode, com efeito,
fazer diplomacia, sem um mínimo de gastos com representação: o interesse
nacional, nesse caso, vem sendo atingido em sua dignidade pelos
seguidos exemplos de inadimplência no cumprimento de suas obrigações, da
mesma forma como, no passado, se decretava “moratórias soberanas” sobre
os compromissos financeiros externos. A insolvência pode até ter
deixado de ser financeira, mas ela passou a ser de ordem moral.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida é diplomata e professor do Centro Universitário de Brasília – Uniceub (@pauloalmeida53).

