Parece que as elites dos Estados falidos não têm nada a ver com o fato de seus países serem um fracasso completo. O que quer que o Ocidente faça, ele sempre é culpado de alguma coisa.
Se o Ocidente deixasse os Estados falidos à sua mercê, eles se converteriam rapidamente em centros de corrupção, de tráfico de drogas e de todos os tipos de criminalidade transnacional, de piratas, fontes de miséria e desespero para suas próprias populações. Então a "opinião pública" internacional -- isto é ocidental, exclusivamente -- pressiona seus governos para intervir e colocar ordem na casa. Raramente dá certo, pois construir Estados, reconstruir sociedades é uma tarefa hercúlea, que nunca pode ser feita a partir de fora, mas dependeria do engajamento de suas próprias elites. Se estas são incompetentes ou incapazes, nada de bom pode resultar dessa intervenção.
SPIEGEL: Mr. Rashid, in 2014 the West will withdraw from Afghanistan. To what extent have they failed?
Rashid: In my view, the Western model of influencing the
development of third world countries is doomed to failure. The West does
not understand how to deal with states that no longer have any
authority and are threatened by dissolution. Their efforts failed in
Iraq as well as Afghanistan. They are simply not capable of promoting
the indigenous economy. Neither USAID nor Germany's international
technical cooperation agency, the GIZ, are able to get a grip on it.
They provide temporary assistance, no more than that. Many billions of
dollars flooded into Afghanistan, but without any significant effect.
SPIEGEL: There is rarely a lack of monetary aid in such
countries. So why does the Western model fail in building up a country
such as Afghanistan?
Rashid: It would be better if the private sector would participate to a larger extent. Dysfunctional states like
Afghanistan
need business people who are deeply rooted in their country and invest
in it. They can add stability. But all development programs of the
United States and the European countries unfortunately exclude the
private sector, which could make investments based on profitability.
SPIEGEL: Presumably it would also be quite difficult to persuade companies to invest in countries like Afghanistan or Somalia.
Rashid: Yes, I am aware of the challenges. But I am confident
that there are hedge funds, banks or investment companies that could
allocate five percent of their portfolios for risky investments. In any
event, for countries like Afghanistan the formation of an
entrepreneurial class is of vital importance.
SPIEGEL: The United States is trying to establish a more peaceful
environment prior to the withdrawal of their troops and to initiate
talks with the Taliban -- also with limited success.
Rashid: Evidently, the US also isn't capable of mediation. This
lesson can be drawn from the failure of the talks with the Taliban in
Qatar. Here too it would be better to involve the private sector, such
as with respectable organizations that are preferably trusted by both
sides. States should limit themselves to facilitating mediation. For
example, the International Red Cross has the best contact to the
Taliban. The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan has for the past fifteen
years managed three hundred schools in an area of Afghanistan that is
under Taliban control. The Swedes have to deal with the Taliban on an
almost daily basis so the schools can be kept open for boys and girls.
This remarkable local initiative could be transformed into a nationwide
initiative for dialogue and mediation.
SPIEGEL: What you are proposing is a paradigm shift.
Rashid: Exactly, the West would be well advised to change its
approach towards failing states. At present, no major power can find the
correct ways and means --and the numbers of failing states are
increasing, almost as if there were a race going on. This year we
watched the
collapse of Mali,
a consequence of the Libyan civil war. The south of Libya and Mali, and
Niger too, are well on the way to becoming a no-man's land. After 9/11,
George W. Bush and Tony Blair made the promise that they would not
tolerate failed states because they could become a haven for terrorists.
And today? The number increases. Last year it was Yemen, this year it
is the southern Sahara.
SPIEGEL: What do you suggest? A military intervention surely can no longer be an alternative.
Rashid: It would have been better if the United Nations had sent a
team to Mali right away to mediate between the government and the
rebels. But where is the political initiative? The Americans make their
usual recommendations. They want to train the army for the fight with
the rebels. US special forces are already in Mali.
SPIEGEL: The promise that Bush and Blair made can hardly be kept
after the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the near future, the
United States can probably not be persuaded to launch military
interventions.
Rashid: The United States only knows one form of intervention and
that is the military one. Everything depends on drawn weapons. We
should, however, develop a wider scope of action. And we should learn to
be patient.
SPIEGEL: But did you not welcome the military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001?
Rashid: At that time, I assumed that the Afghans were incapable
of dealing with the Taliban. They were exhausted from the civil war,
they had suffered defeats, they were economically destitute, the unrest
in the country was enormous. They had a famine. India, Pakistan and Iran
waged a proxy war in Afghanistan. Al-Qaida supported the Taliban
financially, which provided a basis for them. There was no alternative
to America's military intervention. Therefore I welcomed it, yes.
SPIEGEL: You have always complained that the United States
neglected Afghanistan because of the war in Iraq. What should have been
the second step after the occupation?
Rashid: Very simple, economic development. The civil war was over
and the Taliban was no longer there. Troops were necessary to guarantee
security. To that end, back then the United States stationed 20,000
soldiers in Afghanistan, but that was not enough. And so they left the
security to the Afghan warlords. The CIA consulted with them and by
doing so destroyed the morale of the Afghans. They hated the warlords.
SPIEGEL: But quite a few billion dollars also went into building up the country. What happened with that money?
Rashid: In 2001 USAID, the American governmental organization for
international development that was founded during the Cold War, invited
me and several others to give them suggestions on how development
should be carried out after 9/11. We told them that in the next 10 years
the United States should make $5 billion available for Afghanistan
every year -- enough to revitalize the economy, invest in infrastructure
and rebuild education and health. A third-world country like
Afghanistan could not possibly absorb more than these five billion. Five
billion was peanuts back then. Much money came in but it went to the
wrong things, such as making payoffs to the warlords. There was
insufficient investment in infrastructure until much later, and the same
went for building a self-sustaining economy and agriculture. We
suggested major investments in agriculture, as Afghanistan happens to be
a land of farmers. Until 2010 nothing was allocated. Richard Holbrooke,
whom Obama appointed special envoy of the region, was the first who saw
the necessity of investing in agriculture.
SPIEGEL: Obama changed quite a few things in his Afghanistan
policy. He increased the number of troops and at the same time set the
US withdrawal date to 2014. That was America's next mistake.
Rashid: That was the biggest mistake Obama could have made. Now
the United States has to ensure that Afghanistan does not immediately
collapse after being left to itself in 2014.
SPIEGEL: In your lifetime, you have witnessed the interventions of two super powers. What did the Soviet Union leave behind?
Rashid: The Soviets held to the tradition of colonialism. They
raped the country and killed many people. But they also built dams,
electrical power plants, streets, and technical schools. They were
communists and had the same vision for Afghanistan that Stalin and Lenin
had for the Soviet Union: Progress is communism plus electrification.
And today? Today Kabul gets its electrical power from Uzbekistan, Herat
from Iran and Jalalabad from Pakistan.
SPIEGEL: And what is the West's legacy in Afghanistan?
Rashid: America does not hold to the colonial tradition. America
came, liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban and al-Qaida, came to an
arrangement with Hamid Karzai, wanted to organize elections as soon as
possible and then withdraw. The Bush administration had an obsession
with democracy building. They thought that once there is a democracy,
everything else will fall into place. If today you speak to the
architects of the 2001 Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, they will tell
you that instead of being fixated on elections, we should have built a
state with an army and a police force first.
SPIEGEL: Even after the withdrawal, some US troops will remain in Afghanistan. How many should stay?
Rashid: The Americans estimate that 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers
will fight terrorists from their various bases. That makes me think of
Iraq, where the US also wanted to station 20,000 soldiers. The Iraqis
encouraged them to leave.
SPIEGEL: Do you think that something similar will happen in Afghanistan?
Rashid: If Afghan soldiers continue to kill American soldiers as
is happening these days, it can hardly be assumed that they will stay in
Afghanistan in the long term. And what role are they to play? There
will not be enough soldiers to ensure the security of the country. But
will the US still be permitted to kill terrorists in Afghanistan and
Pakistan with un-manned drones? That could worsen the situation in the
neighboring states and they could view Afghanistan as a threat.
SPIEGEL: After 2014, will the Taliban again play a role in
Afghanistan, whether the West likes it or not? Is Mullah Omar still the
same stone-age Islamist he was 11 years ago?
Rashid: I believe that the Taliban are just as worn out from war
as all of the other parties are. Perhaps they realize that they cannot
win another civil war, particularly since Iran and India are boosting
and protecting their own allies against the Taliban. Therefore, the
Taliban cannot defeat the North. Should they aim to conquer the whole
country, the world would turn its back on Afghanistan, including the
United Nations. Then there would be no more money for Afghanistan, and
that also goes for the $4 billion the West promised in Tokyo for the
economic build-up. The Taliban would be well advised to come to an
agreement with the government in Kabul, because they have the access to
the money from the West.
SPIEGEL: But then the Taliban of today would no longer be the Taliban of yesterday.
Rashid: I think they are ready to compromise.
SPIEGEL: You have known Hamid Karzai for decades. What do you think of him today?
Rashid: He is a survivalist. But he has also deepened the ethnic
divide in the country. He has neither fought against corruption nor
against crime. He has not reformed the justice system. He has
personalized his leadership, and in that respect he is similar to his
father. During his father's lifetime there was the king, and he
negotiated matters with the tribal leaders. Fifty years ago this form of
rule was pretty normal, but today that is no longer the case.
SPIEGEL: In 2014 the new president of Afghanistan will be elected. Karzai cannot run again after two terms. Who will be his successor?
Rashid: Someone from his cabinet, someone whom he trusts. In any
event it will be a Pashtun. If, however, the fighting in the country
still continues in 2014, matters will be difficult. In 2008, Karzai
rigged the election in part because a large number of Pashtuns in areas
with a lot of fighting going on could not cast their vote. If that
dilemma is repeated in 2014, a candidate from the North could win the
majority. But Afghanistan is not yet ready for a president who is not a
Pashtun. For that reason too, an armed truce in 2014 is important.
SPIEGEL: The emerging world powers India and China border on
Afghanistan and Pakistan. What are the opportunities this neighborhood
offers to the smaller countries?
Rashid: The neighbors have for many decades been accustomed to
exerting control in Afghanistan. But Pakistan, with its fundamentalism,
with its multitude of terrorist groups, with its declining economy can
hardly be curtailed. The key for any change to this permanent and
ever-increasing calamity is the relationship to India. India will not
trust Pakistan as long as its secret service and army allow tens of
thousands of militants to fight in Kashmir, and as long as it has to
anticipate another assassination plot like that in Mumbai in 2008.
SPIEGEL: The next intervention will likely not be military, but
economic, and one initiated by China and India. Why not to the advantage
of Pakistan?
Rashid: Our elites are spoiled by permanent foreign aid and
therefore find it difficult to change course. Pakistan needs someone who
stands up and says: Fundamentalism is bad, capitalism is good. This
region harbors enormous potential. Pakistan could become the hub for the
energy that is transported from Central Asia to South Asia. That could
change the whole region. Or, India could invest in Pakistan, build
factories and pipelines. Pakistan could provide engineers, drivers,
workers, and forge alliances with the neighboring states. Twice the
world powers have intervened and Pakistan has tried to play games with
them. The third intervention will be economic, and we should
participate.
SPIEGEL: Mr. Rashid, thank you for this conversation.