Economia fiscal, uma piada de gosto duvidoso
Editorial econômico, O Estado de S.Paulo, 30/12/2012
As contas públicas consolidadas apresentaram, em novembro, o pior resultado desde que Banco Central (BC) iniciou a série histórica, em 2001. Motivo: o excesso de gastos do governo central - ou seja, do Tesouro - em relação às receitas. As contas estão sob ameaça, sem direito a "gargalhada" - como sugeriu a presidente Dilma Rousseff aos que ouvirem falar em apagão elétrico. O chavão de que o governo faz economia, apesar de déficits primário e nominal expressivos, torna-se piada de mau gosto.
Entre outubro e novembro, em números redondos, as receitas da União caíram R$ 8 bilhões, enquanto as transferências a Estados e municípios aumentaram R$ 6 bilhões e o déficit da Previdência Social foi R$ 2,5 bilhões maior. O resultado primário do governo central (que não inclui juros) foi negativo em R$ 4,3 bilhões. Comparando janeiro a novembro, de 2011 e de 2012, houve superávit primário com declínio de 34%: de R$ 91,5 bilhões para R$ 60,4 bilhões.
À piora das contas federais, muito além do que se esperava, soma-se o déficit primário recorde de R$ 5,5 bilhões, no mês passado, nas contas do governo central, de Estados, municípios, estatais e do Banco Central.
Em 12 meses, até novembro, o superávit primário consolidado foi de apenas 1,93% do PIB, ante 2,26% do PIB, em outubro. O governo terá de recorrer a malabarismo - o abatimento de despesas do Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC) dos gastos públicos - para não expor a gravidade da situação fiscal. A meta de superávit primário, de 3,1% do PIB, em 2012, ou R$ 139,8 bilhões, mostrou o grau de irrealismo das previsões das autoridades, feitas há um ano.
Os déficits nominais do setor público, de R$ 21,8 bilhões, em novembro, e de R$ 112,1 bilhões, em 11 meses, também foram os piores resultados da série histórica para os períodos mencionados.
As contas fiscais de novembro mostram que a política de incentivos fiscais adotada para combater a desaceleração econômica, em especial, a redução do IPI e a desoneração da folha de pagamentos, provocou uma piora da situação fiscal. Em dezembro, deverá haver melhora, graças ao aumento da arrecadação, inclusive da Previdência Social, mas não a ponto de reabilitar as metas.
Na busca de preservar a confiança dos agentes econômicos, o chefe do Departamento Econômico do BC, Tulio Maciel, mostrou que a dívida líquida atingiu o menor patamar da série (35% do PIB), em novembro, e que a previsão de gastos com juros é de 4,8% do PIB, ante 5,7% em 2011.
terça-feira, 1 de janeiro de 2013
A "nova classe media" e a economia do calote - Estadao
UM CALOTE DE R$ 44 BILHÕES
O Estado de S.Paulo, 30 de dezembro de 2012
Depois da farra do crédito fácil, que alavancou o crescimento do País até 2010, nova classe média dá calote recorde e a economia brasileira patina. Impacto chegou a diferentes setores da economia
A técnica em enfermagem Wedna Bispo, 31 anos, ganha R$ 1,2 mil por mês e até outro dia devia quase R$ 34 mil na praça. Não consegue lembrar tudo que comprou, mas estava pendurada na loja de material de construção, em dois cartões de crédito, no banco e na faculdade. Estica prazo daqui, renegocia dali, agora só falta discutir R$ 2,6 mil com o curso de enfermagem. "Minhas dívidas viraram uma bola de neve. Se você não controla, só se lasca." Wedna admite ter se perdido nas compras, mas hoje percebe que o descontrole não foi só dela: num dos cartões de crédito, a administradora lhe deu limite para gastar R$ 1,2 mil por mês - exatamente o valor de seu salário.
Wedna é uma típica brasileira da nova classe média enrolada na armadilha do crédito fácil. Como ela, milhões de pessoas atraídas pela oferta de crédito abundante nos bancos se atiraram às compras em 2009, 2010 e no início de 2011. Este ano, a conta chegou. Para muitos, foi como acordar de um surto coletivo de embriaguez: as doses de crédito a mais desaguaram num calote total de R$ 44,2 bilhões em bancos, financeiras e no cartão de crédito. Para comparar, em 2010, a inadimplência total era de R$ 23,7 bilhões, quase a metade de hoje. As contas foram feitas pela economista Marianne Hanson, da Confederação Nacional do Comércio (CNC).
O reflexo do aumento da inadimplência e do maior comprometimento da renda das famílias com dívidas foi além do balanço dos bancos e respingou em setores da economia real. Depois do avanço de 7,5% do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) em 2010, o País patinou e cresceu 2,7% em 2011 e deve avançar apenas 1% este ano. Para os especialistas, o impacto pode persistir até 2014.
A ressaca só não é maior porque muitos inadimplentes renegociaram dívidas para limpar o nome. Foram pelo menos 15 milhões de pessoas apenas nos mutirões organizados - em escala recorde - por duas empresas de serviços financeiros, a Serasa Experian e a Boa Vista Serviços. "Tivemos uma bolha de crédito para o consumo. E a bolha sempre estoura com a inadimplência", diz José Roberto Mendonça de Barros, sócio da MB Associados.
Segundo várias avaliações, a maior parte dos inadimplentes são famílias emergentes que melhoraram de vida nos últimos anos e migraram da base para o miolo da pirâmide social. Parte dessa massa de 40 milhões de pessoas está tateando o mercado de crédito e acabou se perdendo no uso do cheque especial, do cartão de crédito e do financiamento sem entrada com parcelas a serem pagas em cinco anos ou mais.
O Instituto GEOC, que reúne 17 empresas de cobrança de dívidas, captou uma mudança significativa no perfil dos inadimplentes. Cinco anos atrás, o principal motivo para deixar de pagar a prestação era a perda do emprego. "Hoje o consumidor está empregado e o motivo é que tomou mais crédito do que podia", diz Jair Lantaller, presidente do instituto. Estudo do Ibope e da Serasa Experian, encomendado pelo GEOC, mostra que 87% dos inadimplentes e 69% de quem está com os pagamentos em dia chegam ao fim do mês sem dinheiro. "O brasileiro está cada vez mais endividado", confirma Lantaller.
Exageros. Passada a euforia, apareceram os exageros do festival de empréstimos. Não foram só os consumidores que erraram nas contas. Os bancos estavam entusiasmados com a nova classe média e emprestaram sem muito critério. O governo, empolgado com o aumento da renda da população, colocou os bancos federais para inundar a praça com crédito e alavancar a economia.
O gerente de uma grande concessionária Volkswagen de São Paulo conta que há cerca de dois anos, na disputa pela classe C, os bancos pagavam comissões às concessionárias e aos vendedores de 5% a 10% do valor financiado - prática depois proibida pelo Banco Central. "O crédito era automático. Se o nome não estava sujo, era aprovado", diz o gerente. "Na época, por exemplo, tinha muito camelô comprando carro bom e, como não tinha comprovação de renda, o banco pedia só o extrato bancário."
Um dos sinais mais marcantes dessa fase de exageros só apareceu mais tarde, na forma de um indicador que o mercado não costumava prestar atenção: de repente, os bancos descobriram que muitos dos que compraram carros em parcelas a perder de vista não pagaram sequer a primeira prestação. No Banco Votorantim, um dos líderes no financiamento de veículos, de 4% a 5% dos clientes deram calote já na primeira parcela entre 2010 e 2011. É o dobro dos 2% que o mercado costuma aceitar como índice máximo desse tipo de inadimplência.
Para piorar, o sistema de checagem dos clientes era limitado. Os bancos não tinham acesso aos dados sobre o comprometimento total da renda do comprador. Até abril deste ano, o Sistema de Informações de Créditos (SCR), do BC, só informava dívidas individualizadas acima de R$ 5 mil. Mesmo que o tomador tivesse vários contratos abaixo desse valor, não era identificado pelo sistema. Assim, a loja vendia um carro sem saber que a renda do cliente já estava comprometida em outras compras.
Hoje, dentro do governo, já há quem reconheça - com a condição de permanecer no anonimato - que houve exageros nas concessões de empréstimos em 2010. "Os bancos emprestavam sem entrada e por prazo superior à vida útil do bem. Se não tivéssemos atuado, o ajuste seria traumático", afirma uma fonte do BC, lembrando que a autoridade monetária tomou uma série de medidas no fim daquele ano para frear o crédito.
Os bancos são pragmáticos e encaram a inadimplência por outro ângulo: é o preço pago para transformar em clientes 36,2 milhões de pessoas que abriram conta em banco entre 2002 e 2011. "Os bancos não erraram, foi o preço que tivemos de pagar pela bancarização", diz um alto executivo de uma das maiores instituições financeiras do País. "Fomos compelidos pelas circunstâncias a essa velocidade."
Política de consumo. O estímulo à popularização do crédito e o incentivo às compras foram produtos de uma política de crescimento baseada no consumo. Começou com o governo Lula, na crise de 2008, e foi reforçada com as reduções temporárias de impostos para a compra de carros, eletrodomésticos e material de construção. O governo mandou seus bancos de varejo, o Banco do Brasil e a Caixa Econômica Federal, abrirem os cofres para financiar o consumo. Em abril de 2009, o então presidente do BB, Antonio Francisco de Lima Neto, foi demitido porque demorou a cumprir a ordem do ex-presidente Lula.
No esforço de guerra para ampliar o crédito, o BB comprou quase metade do Banco Votorantim, da família Ermírio de Moraes. A Caixa comprou o Panamericano, mas essa estratégia deu errado porque o banco, que na época pertencia ao apresentador Silvio Santos, estava quebrado. Com a movimentação das instituições estatais, a banca privada sentiu-se pressionada a segui-las para não perder mercado.
Além da pressão de Brasília, as instituições privadas sofreram outro tipo de influência para turbinar a oferta de crédito. Na visão dos investidores, havia uma demanda por crédito reprimida no País e os bancos que se lançassem agressivamente na conquista desses consumidores ganhariam mais mercado. Foi com a promessa de abocanhar parte desse crescimento que o Santander levantou mais de R$ 14 bilhões com a abertura de seu capital no Brasil, em 2009. A operação foi, na época, a maior do tipo já realizada no País.
O caso do banco Votorantim foi exemplar. Na visão do mercado, o banco pisou forte demais no acelerador depois que o BB tornou-se sócio e passou a usá-lo como linha auxiliar na política oficial de estímulo ao consumo. Experiente no ramo de carros usados, o Votorantim passou a atuar também com veículos novos, segmento no qual a competição é maior. Como resultado, sua fatia no financiamento total de veículos saltou de 12% para 21% entre 2008 e 2011.
A onda de calotes, que envolveu todo o sistema financeiro, pegou forte no Votorantim. De janeiro a setembro, a instituição registrou prejuízo de R$ 1,6 bilhão ante lucro de R$ 455 milhões no mesmo período de 2011. Desde o fim do ano passado, o banco passa por um processo de reestruturação. "Os impactos ainda são relevantes, mas os números estão melhorando e o pior ficou para trás", diz o presidente do Votorantim, João Teixeira, que assumiu o cargo em setembro de 2011 para colocar a casa em ordem.
Para analistas, a ressaca da onda de calotes deve se estender até meados do ano que vem, em algumas instituições até 2014. "Em 2012, os bancos foram mais criteriosos e a turma ruim (de maus pagadores) está indo embora", diz Décio Carbonari, presidente da Associação Nacional das Empresas Financeiras das Montadoras (Anef). "A água limpa que está entrando no lamaçal é pouca, por isso a inadimplência vai demorar a cair", afirma Luiz Rabi, assessor da Serasa Experian. /MÁRCIA DE CHIARA, CLEIDE SILVA, RAQUEL LANDIM, MELINA COSTA E DAVID FRIEDLANDER
O Estado de S.Paulo, 30 de dezembro de 2012
Depois da farra do crédito fácil, que alavancou o crescimento do País até 2010, nova classe média dá calote recorde e a economia brasileira patina. Impacto chegou a diferentes setores da economia
A técnica em enfermagem Wedna Bispo, 31 anos, ganha R$ 1,2 mil por mês e até outro dia devia quase R$ 34 mil na praça. Não consegue lembrar tudo que comprou, mas estava pendurada na loja de material de construção, em dois cartões de crédito, no banco e na faculdade. Estica prazo daqui, renegocia dali, agora só falta discutir R$ 2,6 mil com o curso de enfermagem. "Minhas dívidas viraram uma bola de neve. Se você não controla, só se lasca." Wedna admite ter se perdido nas compras, mas hoje percebe que o descontrole não foi só dela: num dos cartões de crédito, a administradora lhe deu limite para gastar R$ 1,2 mil por mês - exatamente o valor de seu salário.
Wedna é uma típica brasileira da nova classe média enrolada na armadilha do crédito fácil. Como ela, milhões de pessoas atraídas pela oferta de crédito abundante nos bancos se atiraram às compras em 2009, 2010 e no início de 2011. Este ano, a conta chegou. Para muitos, foi como acordar de um surto coletivo de embriaguez: as doses de crédito a mais desaguaram num calote total de R$ 44,2 bilhões em bancos, financeiras e no cartão de crédito. Para comparar, em 2010, a inadimplência total era de R$ 23,7 bilhões, quase a metade de hoje. As contas foram feitas pela economista Marianne Hanson, da Confederação Nacional do Comércio (CNC).
O reflexo do aumento da inadimplência e do maior comprometimento da renda das famílias com dívidas foi além do balanço dos bancos e respingou em setores da economia real. Depois do avanço de 7,5% do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) em 2010, o País patinou e cresceu 2,7% em 2011 e deve avançar apenas 1% este ano. Para os especialistas, o impacto pode persistir até 2014.
A ressaca só não é maior porque muitos inadimplentes renegociaram dívidas para limpar o nome. Foram pelo menos 15 milhões de pessoas apenas nos mutirões organizados - em escala recorde - por duas empresas de serviços financeiros, a Serasa Experian e a Boa Vista Serviços. "Tivemos uma bolha de crédito para o consumo. E a bolha sempre estoura com a inadimplência", diz José Roberto Mendonça de Barros, sócio da MB Associados.
Segundo várias avaliações, a maior parte dos inadimplentes são famílias emergentes que melhoraram de vida nos últimos anos e migraram da base para o miolo da pirâmide social. Parte dessa massa de 40 milhões de pessoas está tateando o mercado de crédito e acabou se perdendo no uso do cheque especial, do cartão de crédito e do financiamento sem entrada com parcelas a serem pagas em cinco anos ou mais.
O Instituto GEOC, que reúne 17 empresas de cobrança de dívidas, captou uma mudança significativa no perfil dos inadimplentes. Cinco anos atrás, o principal motivo para deixar de pagar a prestação era a perda do emprego. "Hoje o consumidor está empregado e o motivo é que tomou mais crédito do que podia", diz Jair Lantaller, presidente do instituto. Estudo do Ibope e da Serasa Experian, encomendado pelo GEOC, mostra que 87% dos inadimplentes e 69% de quem está com os pagamentos em dia chegam ao fim do mês sem dinheiro. "O brasileiro está cada vez mais endividado", confirma Lantaller.
Exageros. Passada a euforia, apareceram os exageros do festival de empréstimos. Não foram só os consumidores que erraram nas contas. Os bancos estavam entusiasmados com a nova classe média e emprestaram sem muito critério. O governo, empolgado com o aumento da renda da população, colocou os bancos federais para inundar a praça com crédito e alavancar a economia.
O gerente de uma grande concessionária Volkswagen de São Paulo conta que há cerca de dois anos, na disputa pela classe C, os bancos pagavam comissões às concessionárias e aos vendedores de 5% a 10% do valor financiado - prática depois proibida pelo Banco Central. "O crédito era automático. Se o nome não estava sujo, era aprovado", diz o gerente. "Na época, por exemplo, tinha muito camelô comprando carro bom e, como não tinha comprovação de renda, o banco pedia só o extrato bancário."
Um dos sinais mais marcantes dessa fase de exageros só apareceu mais tarde, na forma de um indicador que o mercado não costumava prestar atenção: de repente, os bancos descobriram que muitos dos que compraram carros em parcelas a perder de vista não pagaram sequer a primeira prestação. No Banco Votorantim, um dos líderes no financiamento de veículos, de 4% a 5% dos clientes deram calote já na primeira parcela entre 2010 e 2011. É o dobro dos 2% que o mercado costuma aceitar como índice máximo desse tipo de inadimplência.
Para piorar, o sistema de checagem dos clientes era limitado. Os bancos não tinham acesso aos dados sobre o comprometimento total da renda do comprador. Até abril deste ano, o Sistema de Informações de Créditos (SCR), do BC, só informava dívidas individualizadas acima de R$ 5 mil. Mesmo que o tomador tivesse vários contratos abaixo desse valor, não era identificado pelo sistema. Assim, a loja vendia um carro sem saber que a renda do cliente já estava comprometida em outras compras.
Hoje, dentro do governo, já há quem reconheça - com a condição de permanecer no anonimato - que houve exageros nas concessões de empréstimos em 2010. "Os bancos emprestavam sem entrada e por prazo superior à vida útil do bem. Se não tivéssemos atuado, o ajuste seria traumático", afirma uma fonte do BC, lembrando que a autoridade monetária tomou uma série de medidas no fim daquele ano para frear o crédito.
Os bancos são pragmáticos e encaram a inadimplência por outro ângulo: é o preço pago para transformar em clientes 36,2 milhões de pessoas que abriram conta em banco entre 2002 e 2011. "Os bancos não erraram, foi o preço que tivemos de pagar pela bancarização", diz um alto executivo de uma das maiores instituições financeiras do País. "Fomos compelidos pelas circunstâncias a essa velocidade."
Política de consumo. O estímulo à popularização do crédito e o incentivo às compras foram produtos de uma política de crescimento baseada no consumo. Começou com o governo Lula, na crise de 2008, e foi reforçada com as reduções temporárias de impostos para a compra de carros, eletrodomésticos e material de construção. O governo mandou seus bancos de varejo, o Banco do Brasil e a Caixa Econômica Federal, abrirem os cofres para financiar o consumo. Em abril de 2009, o então presidente do BB, Antonio Francisco de Lima Neto, foi demitido porque demorou a cumprir a ordem do ex-presidente Lula.
No esforço de guerra para ampliar o crédito, o BB comprou quase metade do Banco Votorantim, da família Ermírio de Moraes. A Caixa comprou o Panamericano, mas essa estratégia deu errado porque o banco, que na época pertencia ao apresentador Silvio Santos, estava quebrado. Com a movimentação das instituições estatais, a banca privada sentiu-se pressionada a segui-las para não perder mercado.
Além da pressão de Brasília, as instituições privadas sofreram outro tipo de influência para turbinar a oferta de crédito. Na visão dos investidores, havia uma demanda por crédito reprimida no País e os bancos que se lançassem agressivamente na conquista desses consumidores ganhariam mais mercado. Foi com a promessa de abocanhar parte desse crescimento que o Santander levantou mais de R$ 14 bilhões com a abertura de seu capital no Brasil, em 2009. A operação foi, na época, a maior do tipo já realizada no País.
O caso do banco Votorantim foi exemplar. Na visão do mercado, o banco pisou forte demais no acelerador depois que o BB tornou-se sócio e passou a usá-lo como linha auxiliar na política oficial de estímulo ao consumo. Experiente no ramo de carros usados, o Votorantim passou a atuar também com veículos novos, segmento no qual a competição é maior. Como resultado, sua fatia no financiamento total de veículos saltou de 12% para 21% entre 2008 e 2011.
A onda de calotes, que envolveu todo o sistema financeiro, pegou forte no Votorantim. De janeiro a setembro, a instituição registrou prejuízo de R$ 1,6 bilhão ante lucro de R$ 455 milhões no mesmo período de 2011. Desde o fim do ano passado, o banco passa por um processo de reestruturação. "Os impactos ainda são relevantes, mas os números estão melhorando e o pior ficou para trás", diz o presidente do Votorantim, João Teixeira, que assumiu o cargo em setembro de 2011 para colocar a casa em ordem.
Para analistas, a ressaca da onda de calotes deve se estender até meados do ano que vem, em algumas instituições até 2014. "Em 2012, os bancos foram mais criteriosos e a turma ruim (de maus pagadores) está indo embora", diz Décio Carbonari, presidente da Associação Nacional das Empresas Financeiras das Montadoras (Anef). "A água limpa que está entrando no lamaçal é pouca, por isso a inadimplência vai demorar a cair", afirma Luiz Rabi, assessor da Serasa Experian. /MÁRCIA DE CHIARA, CLEIDE SILVA, RAQUEL LANDIM, MELINA COSTA E DAVID FRIEDLANDER
A decada dos companheiros, perdida para Brasil - Marco Antonio Villa
Instituicoes em frangalhos, ausencia de reformas estruturais, corrupcao nova e velha crescendo, companheiros da nomenklatura engordando contas e perfis... Este e' o Brasil da ultima decada...
A década perdida
MARCO ANTONIO VILLA
O Estado de S.Paulo, 31/12/2012
A eleição de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva em 2002 foi recebida como um conto de fadas. O País estaria pagando uma dívida social. E o recebedor era um operário.
Operário que tinha somente uma década de trabalho fabril, pois aos 28 anos de idade deu adeus, para sempre, à fábrica. Virou um burocrata sindical. Mesmo assim, de 1972 a 2002 - entre a entrada na diretoria do Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de São Bernardo do Campo e a eleição presidencial -, portanto, durante 30 anos, usou e abusou do figurino do operário, trabalhador, sofrido. E pior, encontrou respaldo e legitimação por parte da intelectualidade tupiniquim, sempre com um sentimento de culpa não resolvido.
A posse - parte dos gastos paga pelo esquema do pré-mensalão, de acordo com depoimento de Marcos Valério ao Ministério Público - foi uma consagração. Logo a fantasia cedeu lugar à realidade. A mediocridade da gestão era visível. Como a proposta de governo - chamar de projeto seria um exagero - era inexequível, resolveram manter a economia no mesmo rumo, o que foi reforçado no momento da alta internacional no preço das commodities.
Quando veio a crise internacional, no final de 2008, sem capacidade gerencial e criatividade econômica, abriram o baú da História, procurando encontrar soluções do século 20 para questões do século 21. O velho Estado reapareceu e distribuiu prebendas aos seus favoritos, a sempre voraz burguesia de rapina, tão brasileira como a jabuticaba. Evidentemente que só poderia dar errado. Errado se pensarmos no futuro do País. Quando se esgotou o ciclo de crescimento mundial - como em tantas outras vezes nos últimos três séculos -, o governo ficou, como está até hoje, buscando desesperadamente algum caminho. Sem perder de vista, claro, a eleição de 2014, pois tudo gira em torno da permanência no poder por mais um longo tempo, como profetizou recentemente o sentenciado José Dirceu.
Os bancos e as empresas estatais foram usados como instrumentos de política partidária, em correias de transmissão, para o que chamou o ministro Celso de Mello, do Supremo Tribunal Federal, de "projeto criminoso de poder", quando do julgamento do mensalão. Os cargos de direção foram loteados entre as diferentes tendências do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) e o restante foi entregue à saciedade dos partidos da base aliada no Congresso Nacional. O PT transformou o patrimônio nacional, construído durante décadas, em moeda para obter recursos partidários e pessoais, como ficou demonstrado em vários escândalos durante a década.
O PT era considerado uma novidade na política brasileira. A "novidade" deu vida nova às oligarquias. É muito difícil encontrar nos últimos 50 anos um período tão longo de poder em que os velhos oligarcas tiveram tanto poder como agora. Usaram e abusaram dos recursos públicos e transformaram seus Estados em domínios familiares perpétuos. Esse congelamento da política é o maior obstáculo ao crescimento econômico e ao enfrentamento dos problemas sociais tão conhecidos de todos.
Não será tarefa fácil retirar o PT do poder. Foi criado um sólido bloco de sustentação que - enquanto a economia permitir - satisfaz o topo e a base da pirâmide. Na base, com os programas assistenciais que petrificam a miséria, mas garantem apoio político e algum tipo de satisfação econômica aos que vivem na pobreza absoluta. No topo, atendendo ao grande capital com uma política de cofres abertos, em que tudo pode, basta ser amigo do rei - a rainha é secundária.
A incapacidade da oposição de cumprir o seu papel facilitou em muito o domínio petista. Deu até um grau de eficiência política que o PT nunca teve. E o ano de 2005 foi o ponto de inflexão, quando a oposição, em meio ao escândalo do mensalão, e com a popularidade de Lula atingindo seu nível mais baixo, se omitiu, temendo perturbar a "paz social". Seu principal líder, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, disse que Lula já estava derrotado e bastaria levá-lo nas cordas até o ano seguinte para vencê-lo facilmente nas urnas. Como de hábito, a análise estava absolutamente equivocada. E a tragédia que vivemos é, em grande parte, devida a esse grave erro de 2005. Mas, apesar da oposição digna de uma ópera-bufa, os eleitores nunca deram ao PT, nas eleições presidenciais, uma vitória no primeiro turno.
O PT não esconde o que deseja. Sua direção partidária já ordenou aos milicianos que devem concentrar os seus ataques na imprensa e no Poder Judiciário. São os únicos obstáculos que ainda encontram pelo caminho. E até com ameaças diretas, como a feita na mensagem natalina - natalina, leitores! - de Gilberto Carvalho - ex-seminarista, registre-se - de que "o bicho vai pegar". A tarefa para 2013 é impor na agenda política o controle social da mídia e do Judiciário. Sabem que não será tarefa fácil, porém a simples ameaça pode-se transformar em instrumento de coação. O PT tem ódio das liberdades democráticas. Sabe que elas são o único obstáculo para o seu "projeto histórico". E eles não vão perdoar jamais que a direção petista de 2002 esteja hoje condenada à cadeia.
A década petista terminou. E nada melhor para ilustrar o fracasso do que o crescimento do produto interno bruto (PIB) de 1%. Foi uma década perdida. Não para os petistas e seus acólitos, claro. Estes enriqueceram, buscaram algum refinamento material e até ficaram "chiques", como a Rosemary Nóvoa de Noronha, sua melhor tradução. Mas o Brasil perdeu.
Poderíamos ter avançado melhorando a gestão pública e enfrentado com eficiência os nossos velhos problemas sociais, aqueles que os marqueteiros exploram a cada dois anos nos períodos eleitorais. Quase nada foi feito - basta citar a tragédia do saneamento básico ou os milhões de analfabetos.
Mas se estagnamos, outros países avançaram. E o Brasil continua a ser, como dizia Monteiro Lobato, "essa coisa inerme e enorme".
MARCO ANTONIO VILLA É HISTORIADOR E PROFESSOR DA UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SÃO CARLOS (UFCAR)
A década perdida
MARCO ANTONIO VILLA
O Estado de S.Paulo, 31/12/2012
A eleição de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva em 2002 foi recebida como um conto de fadas. O País estaria pagando uma dívida social. E o recebedor era um operário.
Operário que tinha somente uma década de trabalho fabril, pois aos 28 anos de idade deu adeus, para sempre, à fábrica. Virou um burocrata sindical. Mesmo assim, de 1972 a 2002 - entre a entrada na diretoria do Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de São Bernardo do Campo e a eleição presidencial -, portanto, durante 30 anos, usou e abusou do figurino do operário, trabalhador, sofrido. E pior, encontrou respaldo e legitimação por parte da intelectualidade tupiniquim, sempre com um sentimento de culpa não resolvido.
A posse - parte dos gastos paga pelo esquema do pré-mensalão, de acordo com depoimento de Marcos Valério ao Ministério Público - foi uma consagração. Logo a fantasia cedeu lugar à realidade. A mediocridade da gestão era visível. Como a proposta de governo - chamar de projeto seria um exagero - era inexequível, resolveram manter a economia no mesmo rumo, o que foi reforçado no momento da alta internacional no preço das commodities.
Quando veio a crise internacional, no final de 2008, sem capacidade gerencial e criatividade econômica, abriram o baú da História, procurando encontrar soluções do século 20 para questões do século 21. O velho Estado reapareceu e distribuiu prebendas aos seus favoritos, a sempre voraz burguesia de rapina, tão brasileira como a jabuticaba. Evidentemente que só poderia dar errado. Errado se pensarmos no futuro do País. Quando se esgotou o ciclo de crescimento mundial - como em tantas outras vezes nos últimos três séculos -, o governo ficou, como está até hoje, buscando desesperadamente algum caminho. Sem perder de vista, claro, a eleição de 2014, pois tudo gira em torno da permanência no poder por mais um longo tempo, como profetizou recentemente o sentenciado José Dirceu.
Os bancos e as empresas estatais foram usados como instrumentos de política partidária, em correias de transmissão, para o que chamou o ministro Celso de Mello, do Supremo Tribunal Federal, de "projeto criminoso de poder", quando do julgamento do mensalão. Os cargos de direção foram loteados entre as diferentes tendências do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) e o restante foi entregue à saciedade dos partidos da base aliada no Congresso Nacional. O PT transformou o patrimônio nacional, construído durante décadas, em moeda para obter recursos partidários e pessoais, como ficou demonstrado em vários escândalos durante a década.
O PT era considerado uma novidade na política brasileira. A "novidade" deu vida nova às oligarquias. É muito difícil encontrar nos últimos 50 anos um período tão longo de poder em que os velhos oligarcas tiveram tanto poder como agora. Usaram e abusaram dos recursos públicos e transformaram seus Estados em domínios familiares perpétuos. Esse congelamento da política é o maior obstáculo ao crescimento econômico e ao enfrentamento dos problemas sociais tão conhecidos de todos.
Não será tarefa fácil retirar o PT do poder. Foi criado um sólido bloco de sustentação que - enquanto a economia permitir - satisfaz o topo e a base da pirâmide. Na base, com os programas assistenciais que petrificam a miséria, mas garantem apoio político e algum tipo de satisfação econômica aos que vivem na pobreza absoluta. No topo, atendendo ao grande capital com uma política de cofres abertos, em que tudo pode, basta ser amigo do rei - a rainha é secundária.
A incapacidade da oposição de cumprir o seu papel facilitou em muito o domínio petista. Deu até um grau de eficiência política que o PT nunca teve. E o ano de 2005 foi o ponto de inflexão, quando a oposição, em meio ao escândalo do mensalão, e com a popularidade de Lula atingindo seu nível mais baixo, se omitiu, temendo perturbar a "paz social". Seu principal líder, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, disse que Lula já estava derrotado e bastaria levá-lo nas cordas até o ano seguinte para vencê-lo facilmente nas urnas. Como de hábito, a análise estava absolutamente equivocada. E a tragédia que vivemos é, em grande parte, devida a esse grave erro de 2005. Mas, apesar da oposição digna de uma ópera-bufa, os eleitores nunca deram ao PT, nas eleições presidenciais, uma vitória no primeiro turno.
O PT não esconde o que deseja. Sua direção partidária já ordenou aos milicianos que devem concentrar os seus ataques na imprensa e no Poder Judiciário. São os únicos obstáculos que ainda encontram pelo caminho. E até com ameaças diretas, como a feita na mensagem natalina - natalina, leitores! - de Gilberto Carvalho - ex-seminarista, registre-se - de que "o bicho vai pegar". A tarefa para 2013 é impor na agenda política o controle social da mídia e do Judiciário. Sabem que não será tarefa fácil, porém a simples ameaça pode-se transformar em instrumento de coação. O PT tem ódio das liberdades democráticas. Sabe que elas são o único obstáculo para o seu "projeto histórico". E eles não vão perdoar jamais que a direção petista de 2002 esteja hoje condenada à cadeia.
A década petista terminou. E nada melhor para ilustrar o fracasso do que o crescimento do produto interno bruto (PIB) de 1%. Foi uma década perdida. Não para os petistas e seus acólitos, claro. Estes enriqueceram, buscaram algum refinamento material e até ficaram "chiques", como a Rosemary Nóvoa de Noronha, sua melhor tradução. Mas o Brasil perdeu.
Poderíamos ter avançado melhorando a gestão pública e enfrentado com eficiência os nossos velhos problemas sociais, aqueles que os marqueteiros exploram a cada dois anos nos períodos eleitorais. Quase nada foi feito - basta citar a tragédia do saneamento básico ou os milhões de analfabetos.
Mas se estagnamos, outros países avançaram. E o Brasil continua a ser, como dizia Monteiro Lobato, "essa coisa inerme e enorme".
MARCO ANTONIO VILLA É HISTORIADOR E PROFESSOR DA UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SÃO CARLOS (UFCAR)
Bolivia: coca si; cocaina no! - Vai dar certo? (NYTimes)
Coca Licensing Is a Weapon in Bolivia’s Drug War
Meridith Kohut for The New York Times
Augustine Calicho, 45, separating the seeds from dried coca leaves in Villa Tunari in the Chapare region of Bolivia. More Photos »
By WILLIAM NEUMAN
The New York Times, December 26, 2012
TODOS SANTOS, Bolivia — There is nothing clandestine about Julián
Rojas’s coca plot, which is tucked deep within acres of banana groves.
It has been mapped with satellite imagery, cataloged in a government
database, cross-referenced with his personal information and checked and
rechecked by the local coca growers’ union. The same goes for the plots
worked by Mr. Rojas’s neighbors and thousands of other farmers in this
torrid region east of the Andes who are licensed by the Bolivian
government to grow coca, the plant used to make cocaine.
Multimedia
Meridith Kohut for The New York Times
Meri Pintas, 30, center, harvesting coca leaves with
her children in the Yungas region of Bolivia. Thousands of legal coca
patches are intended to produce coca leaf for traditional uses.
More Photos »
Meridith Kohut for The New York Times
A counternarcotics agent explained the eradication
process to coca growers whose patch was two rows over the legal limit.
More Photos »
President Evo Morales, who first came to prominence as a leader of coca
growers, kicked out the Drug Enforcement Administration in 2009. That
ouster, together with events like the arrest last year of the former
head of the Bolivian anti-narcotics police on trafficking charges, led
Washington to conclude that Bolivia was not meeting its global
obligations to fight narcotics.
But despite the rift with the United States, Bolivia, the world’s
third-largest cocaine producer, has advanced its own unorthodox approach
toward controlling the growing of coca, which veers markedly from the
wider war on drugs and includes high-tech monitoring of thousands of
legal coca patches intended to produce coca leaf for traditional uses.
To the surprise of many, this experiment has now led to a significant
drop in coca plantings in Mr. Morales’s Bolivia, an accomplishment that
has largely occurred without the murders and other violence that have
become the bloody byproduct of American-led measures to control
trafficking in Colombia, Mexico and other parts of the region.
Yet there are also worrisome signs that such gains are being undercut as
traffickers use more efficient methods to produce cocaine and
outmaneuver Bolivian law enforcement to keep drugs flowing out of the
country.
In one key sign of progress in Bolivia’s approach toward coca, the total
acres planted with coca dropped 12 to 13 percent last year, according
to separate reports by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy.
At the same time, the Bolivian government stepped up efforts to rip out
unauthorized coca plantings and reported an increase in seizures of
cocaine and cocaine base.
“It’s fascinating to look at a country that kicked out the United States
ambassador and the D.E.A., and the expectation on the part of the
United States is that drug war efforts would fall apart,” said Kathryn
Ledebur, director of the Andean Information Network, a Bolivian research group. Instead, she said, Bolivia’s approach is “showing results.”
Still, there is skepticism. “Our perspective is they’ve made real
advances, and they’re a long way from where we’d like to see them,” said
Larry Memmott, chargé d’affaires of the American Embassy in La Paz. “In
terms of law enforcement, a lot remains to be done.”
Although Bolivia outlaws cocaine, it permits the growing of coca for
traditional uses. Bolivians chew coca leaf as a mild stimulant and use
it as a medicine, as a tea and, particularly among the majority
indigenous population, in religious rituals.
On a recent afternoon, Mr. Rojas placed a few dried leaves into his
mouth and watched the sun set over his coca field, slightly less than
two-fifths of an acre, the maximum allowed per farmer here in this
region, known as the Chapare.
“This is a way to keep it under control,” he said, spitting a stream of
green juice. “Everyone should have the same amount.”
Mr. Rojas is a face of a changing region. He makes far more money
growing bananas for export on about 74 acres than he does growing coca.
But he has no intention of giving up his tiny coca plot. “What happens
if a disease attacks the bananas?” he asked. “Then we still have the
coca to save us.”
The Bolivian government has persuaded growers that by limiting the
amount of plantings, coca prices will remain high. And it has largely
focused eradication efforts, of the kind that once spurred strong
popular resistance, outside the areas controlled by growers’ unions,
like in national parks.
The registration of thousands of Chapare growers, completed this year,
is part of an enforcement system that relies on growers to police one
another. If registered growers are found to have plantings above the
maximum allowed, soldiers are called in to remove the excess. If growers
violate the limit a second time, their entire crop is cut down and they
lose the right to grow coca.
Growers’ unions can also be punished if there are multiple violations among their members.
“We have to be constantly vigilant,” said Nelson Sejas, a Chapare grower
who was part of a team that checked coca plots to make sure they did
not exceed the limit.
But there is still plenty of cheating. Officials say they are going over
the registry of about 43,000 Chapare growers to find those who may have
multiple plots or who may violate other rules.
“The results speak for themselves,” said Carlos Romero, the minister of
government. “We have demonstrated that you can objectively do
eradication work without violating human rights, without polemicizing
the topic and with clear results.”
He said that the government was on pace to eradicate more acres of coca
this year than it did last year, without the violence of years past. A
government report said 60 people were killed and more than 700 were
wounded in the Chapare from 1998 to 2002 in violence related to
eradication.
But even as Bolivia shows progress, grave concerns remain.
The White House drug office estimated that despite the decrease in total
coca acreage last year, the amount of cocaine that could potentially be
produced from the coca grown in Bolivia jumped by more than a quarter.
That is because a large amount of recent plantings began to mature and
reach higher yields; new plantings with higher yields replaced older,
less productive fields; and traffickers switched to more efficient
processing methods.
Yet the glaring paradox of Bolivia’s monitoring program is that vast
amounts of the legally grown coca ultimately wind up in the hands of
drug traffickers and are converted into cocaine and other drugs. Most of
those drugs go to Brazil, considered the world’s second-largest cocaine
market. Virtually no Bolivian cocaine ends up in the United States.
César Guedes, the representative in Bolivia of the United Nations drugs
office, said that roughly half of the country’s coca acreage produces
coca that goes to the drug trade. By some estimates, more than 90
percent of the coca in Chapare, one of two main producing regions, goes
to drugs.
Two Chapare farmers explained that they generally sell one 50-pound bag
of coca leaf from each harvest to the government-regulated market. The
rest, often 200 pounds or more, is sold to buyers who work with
traffickers and pay a premium over the government-authorized price. One
of the growers said he recently delivered coca leaf directly to a lab
where it would be turned into drugs.
The central question is how much coca is needed to supply traditional
needs. Current government policy permits about 50,000 acres of legal
coca plantings, although the actual area in cultivation is much higher.
The United Nations estimated there were 67,000 acres of coca last year.
Whatever the exact figure, most analysts agree that far more is produced
than is needed to supply the traditional market.
The European Union financed a study several years ago to estimate how
much coca was needed for traditional uses, but the Bolivian government
has refused to release it, saying that more research is needed.
The push to reduce coca acreage comes as the Morales government is
lobbying other countries to amend a United Nations convention on
narcotics to recognize the legality of traditional uses of coca leaf in
Bolivia. A decision is expected in January.
On a recent morning just after dawn, a squad of uniformed soldiers used
machetes to cut down a plot of coca plants near the town of Ivirgarzama.
They had come to chop down an old coca patch that had passed its prime
and measure a replacement plot planted by the farmer. The soldiers
determined that the new plot was slightly over the limit and removed
about two rows of plants before going on their way.
“Before, there was more tension, more conflict, more people injured,”
Lt. Col. Willy Pozo said. “This is no longer a war.”
A version of this article appeared in print on December 27, 2012, on page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Coca Licensing Is a Weapon in Bolivia Drug War.
Estados falidos: o Ocidente e' sempre o culpado...
Parece que as elites dos Estados falidos não têm nada a ver com o fato de seus países serem um fracasso completo. O que quer que o Ocidente faça, ele sempre é culpado de alguma coisa.
Se o Ocidente deixasse os Estados falidos à sua mercê, eles se converteriam rapidamente em centros de corrupção, de tráfico de drogas e de todos os tipos de criminalidade transnacional, de piratas, fontes de miséria e desespero para suas próprias populações. Então a "opinião pública" internacional -- isto é ocidental, exclusivamente -- pressiona seus governos para intervir e colocar ordem na casa. Raramente dá certo, pois construir Estados, reconstruir sociedades é uma tarefa hercúlea, que nunca pode ser feita a partir de fora, mas dependeria do engajamento de suas próprias elites. Se estas são incompetentes ou incapazes, nada de bom pode resultar dessa intervenção.
Por que culpar o Ocidente, então?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Se o Ocidente deixasse os Estados falidos à sua mercê, eles se converteriam rapidamente em centros de corrupção, de tráfico de drogas e de todos os tipos de criminalidade transnacional, de piratas, fontes de miséria e desespero para suas próprias populações. Então a "opinião pública" internacional -- isto é ocidental, exclusivamente -- pressiona seus governos para intervir e colocar ordem na casa. Raramente dá certo, pois construir Estados, reconstruir sociedades é uma tarefa hercúlea, que nunca pode ser feita a partir de fora, mas dependeria do engajamento de suas próprias elites. Se estas são incompetentes ou incapazes, nada de bom pode resultar dessa intervenção.
Por que culpar o Ocidente, então?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Interview with Ahmed Rashid The West Should 'Change Its Approach to Failing States'
Der Spiegel, 31/12/2012
REUTERS
SPIEGEL: Mr. Rashid, in 2014 the West will withdraw from Afghanistan. To what extent have they failed?
Rashid: In my view, the Western model of influencing the
development of third world countries is doomed to failure. The West does
not understand how to deal with states that no longer have any
authority and are threatened by dissolution. Their efforts failed in
Iraq as well as Afghanistan. They are simply not capable of promoting
the indigenous economy. Neither USAID nor Germany's international
technical cooperation agency, the GIZ, are able to get a grip on it.
They provide temporary assistance, no more than that. Many billions of
dollars flooded into Afghanistan, but without any significant effect.
SPIEGEL: There is rarely a lack of monetary aid in such
countries. So why does the Western model fail in building up a country
such as Afghanistan?
Rashid: It would be better if the private sector would participate to a larger extent. Dysfunctional states like Afghanistan need business people who are deeply rooted in their country and invest in it. They can add stability. But all development programs of the United States and the European countries unfortunately exclude the private sector, which could make investments based on profitability.
SPIEGEL: Presumably it would also be quite difficult to persuade companies to invest in countries like Afghanistan or Somalia.
Rashid: Yes, I am aware of the challenges. But I am confident that there are hedge funds, banks or investment companies that could allocate five percent of their portfolios for risky investments. In any event, for countries like Afghanistan the formation of an entrepreneurial class is of vital importance.
SPIEGEL: The United States is trying to establish a more peaceful environment prior to the withdrawal of their troops and to initiate talks with the Taliban -- also with limited success.
Rashid: Evidently, the US also isn't capable of mediation. This lesson can be drawn from the failure of the talks with the Taliban in Qatar. Here too it would be better to involve the private sector, such as with respectable organizations that are preferably trusted by both sides. States should limit themselves to facilitating mediation. For example, the International Red Cross has the best contact to the Taliban. The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan has for the past fifteen years managed three hundred schools in an area of Afghanistan that is under Taliban control. The Swedes have to deal with the Taliban on an almost daily basis so the schools can be kept open for boys and girls. This remarkable local initiative could be transformed into a nationwide initiative for dialogue and mediation.
SPIEGEL: What you are proposing is a paradigm shift.
Rashid: Exactly, the West would be well advised to change its approach towards failing states. At present, no major power can find the correct ways and means --and the numbers of failing states are increasing, almost as if there were a race going on. This year we watched the collapse of Mali, a consequence of the Libyan civil war. The south of Libya and Mali, and Niger too, are well on the way to becoming a no-man's land. After 9/11, George W. Bush and Tony Blair made the promise that they would not tolerate failed states because they could become a haven for terrorists. And today? The number increases. Last year it was Yemen, this year it is the southern Sahara.
SPIEGEL: What do you suggest? A military intervention surely can no longer be an alternative.
Rashid: It would have been better if the United Nations had sent a team to Mali right away to mediate between the government and the rebels. But where is the political initiative? The Americans make their usual recommendations. They want to train the army for the fight with the rebels. US special forces are already in Mali.
SPIEGEL: The promise that Bush and Blair made can hardly be kept after the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the near future, the United States can probably not be persuaded to launch military interventions.
Rashid: The United States only knows one form of intervention and that is the military one. Everything depends on drawn weapons. We should, however, develop a wider scope of action. And we should learn to be patient.
SPIEGEL: But did you not welcome the military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001?
Rashid: At that time, I assumed that the Afghans were incapable of dealing with the Taliban. They were exhausted from the civil war, they had suffered defeats, they were economically destitute, the unrest in the country was enormous. They had a famine. India, Pakistan and Iran waged a proxy war in Afghanistan. Al-Qaida supported the Taliban financially, which provided a basis for them. There was no alternative to America's military intervention. Therefore I welcomed it, yes.
SPIEGEL: You have always complained that the United States neglected Afghanistan because of the war in Iraq. What should have been the second step after the occupation?
Rashid: Very simple, economic development. The civil war was over and the Taliban was no longer there. Troops were necessary to guarantee security. To that end, back then the United States stationed 20,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, but that was not enough. And so they left the security to the Afghan warlords. The CIA consulted with them and by doing so destroyed the morale of the Afghans. They hated the warlords.
SPIEGEL: But quite a few billion dollars also went into building up the country. What happened with that money?
Rashid: In 2001 USAID, the American governmental organization for international development that was founded during the Cold War, invited me and several others to give them suggestions on how development should be carried out after 9/11. We told them that in the next 10 years the United States should make $5 billion available for Afghanistan every year -- enough to revitalize the economy, invest in infrastructure and rebuild education and health. A third-world country like Afghanistan could not possibly absorb more than these five billion. Five billion was peanuts back then. Much money came in but it went to the wrong things, such as making payoffs to the warlords. There was insufficient investment in infrastructure until much later, and the same went for building a self-sustaining economy and agriculture. We suggested major investments in agriculture, as Afghanistan happens to be a land of farmers. Until 2010 nothing was allocated. Richard Holbrooke, whom Obama appointed special envoy of the region, was the first who saw the necessity of investing in agriculture.
SPIEGEL: Obama changed quite a few things in his Afghanistan policy. He increased the number of troops and at the same time set the US withdrawal date to 2014. That was America's next mistake.
Rashid: That was the biggest mistake Obama could have made. Now the United States has to ensure that Afghanistan does not immediately collapse after being left to itself in 2014.
SPIEGEL: In your lifetime, you have witnessed the interventions of two super powers. What did the Soviet Union leave behind?
Rashid: The Soviets held to the tradition of colonialism. They raped the country and killed many people. But they also built dams, electrical power plants, streets, and technical schools. They were communists and had the same vision for Afghanistan that Stalin and Lenin had for the Soviet Union: Progress is communism plus electrification. And today? Today Kabul gets its electrical power from Uzbekistan, Herat from Iran and Jalalabad from Pakistan.
SPIEGEL: And what is the West's legacy in Afghanistan?
Rashid: America does not hold to the colonial tradition. America came, liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban and al-Qaida, came to an arrangement with Hamid Karzai, wanted to organize elections as soon as possible and then withdraw. The Bush administration had an obsession with democracy building. They thought that once there is a democracy, everything else will fall into place. If today you speak to the architects of the 2001 Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, they will tell you that instead of being fixated on elections, we should have built a state with an army and a police force first.
SPIEGEL: Even after the withdrawal, some US troops will remain in Afghanistan. How many should stay?
Rashid: The Americans estimate that 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers will fight terrorists from their various bases. That makes me think of Iraq, where the US also wanted to station 20,000 soldiers. The Iraqis encouraged them to leave.
SPIEGEL: Do you think that something similar will happen in Afghanistan?
Rashid: If Afghan soldiers continue to kill American soldiers as is happening these days, it can hardly be assumed that they will stay in Afghanistan in the long term. And what role are they to play? There will not be enough soldiers to ensure the security of the country. But will the US still be permitted to kill terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan with un-manned drones? That could worsen the situation in the neighboring states and they could view Afghanistan as a threat.
SPIEGEL: After 2014, will the Taliban again play a role in Afghanistan, whether the West likes it or not? Is Mullah Omar still the same stone-age Islamist he was 11 years ago?
Rashid: I believe that the Taliban are just as worn out from war as all of the other parties are. Perhaps they realize that they cannot win another civil war, particularly since Iran and India are boosting and protecting their own allies against the Taliban. Therefore, the Taliban cannot defeat the North. Should they aim to conquer the whole country, the world would turn its back on Afghanistan, including the United Nations. Then there would be no more money for Afghanistan, and that also goes for the $4 billion the West promised in Tokyo for the economic build-up. The Taliban would be well advised to come to an agreement with the government in Kabul, because they have the access to the money from the West.
SPIEGEL: But then the Taliban of today would no longer be the Taliban of yesterday.
Rashid: I think they are ready to compromise.
SPIEGEL: You have known Hamid Karzai for decades. What do you think of him today?
Rashid: He is a survivalist. But he has also deepened the ethnic divide in the country. He has neither fought against corruption nor against crime. He has not reformed the justice system. He has personalized his leadership, and in that respect he is similar to his father. During his father's lifetime there was the king, and he negotiated matters with the tribal leaders. Fifty years ago this form of rule was pretty normal, but today that is no longer the case.
SPIEGEL: In 2014 the new president of Afghanistan will be elected. Karzai cannot run again after two terms. Who will be his successor?
Rashid: Someone from his cabinet, someone whom he trusts. In any event it will be a Pashtun. If, however, the fighting in the country still continues in 2014, matters will be difficult. In 2008, Karzai rigged the election in part because a large number of Pashtuns in areas with a lot of fighting going on could not cast their vote. If that dilemma is repeated in 2014, a candidate from the North could win the majority. But Afghanistan is not yet ready for a president who is not a Pashtun. For that reason too, an armed truce in 2014 is important.
SPIEGEL: The emerging world powers India and China border on Afghanistan and Pakistan. What are the opportunities this neighborhood offers to the smaller countries?
Rashid: The neighbors have for many decades been accustomed to exerting control in Afghanistan. But Pakistan, with its fundamentalism, with its multitude of terrorist groups, with its declining economy can hardly be curtailed. The key for any change to this permanent and ever-increasing calamity is the relationship to India. India will not trust Pakistan as long as its secret service and army allow tens of thousands of militants to fight in Kashmir, and as long as it has to anticipate another assassination plot like that in Mumbai in 2008.
SPIEGEL: The next intervention will likely not be military, but
economic, and one initiated by China and India. Why not to the advantage
of Pakistan?
Rashid: Our elites are spoiled by permanent foreign aid and
therefore find it difficult to change course. Pakistan needs someone who
stands up and says: Fundamentalism is bad, capitalism is good. This
region harbors enormous potential. Pakistan could become the hub for the
energy that is transported from Central Asia to South Asia. That could
change the whole region. Or, India could invest in Pakistan, build
factories and pipelines. Pakistan could provide engineers, drivers,
workers, and forge alliances with the neighboring states. Twice the
world powers have intervened and Pakistan has tried to play games with
them. The third intervention will be economic, and we should
participate.
SPIEGEL: Mr. Rashid, thank you for this conversation.
Interview by Gerhard Spörl
ANZEIGE
Rashid: It would be better if the private sector would participate to a larger extent. Dysfunctional states like Afghanistan need business people who are deeply rooted in their country and invest in it. They can add stability. But all development programs of the United States and the European countries unfortunately exclude the private sector, which could make investments based on profitability.
SPIEGEL: Presumably it would also be quite difficult to persuade companies to invest in countries like Afghanistan or Somalia.
Rashid: Yes, I am aware of the challenges. But I am confident that there are hedge funds, banks or investment companies that could allocate five percent of their portfolios for risky investments. In any event, for countries like Afghanistan the formation of an entrepreneurial class is of vital importance.
SPIEGEL: The United States is trying to establish a more peaceful environment prior to the withdrawal of their troops and to initiate talks with the Taliban -- also with limited success.
Rashid: Evidently, the US also isn't capable of mediation. This lesson can be drawn from the failure of the talks with the Taliban in Qatar. Here too it would be better to involve the private sector, such as with respectable organizations that are preferably trusted by both sides. States should limit themselves to facilitating mediation. For example, the International Red Cross has the best contact to the Taliban. The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan has for the past fifteen years managed three hundred schools in an area of Afghanistan that is under Taliban control. The Swedes have to deal with the Taliban on an almost daily basis so the schools can be kept open for boys and girls. This remarkable local initiative could be transformed into a nationwide initiative for dialogue and mediation.
SPIEGEL: What you are proposing is a paradigm shift.
Rashid: Exactly, the West would be well advised to change its approach towards failing states. At present, no major power can find the correct ways and means --and the numbers of failing states are increasing, almost as if there were a race going on. This year we watched the collapse of Mali, a consequence of the Libyan civil war. The south of Libya and Mali, and Niger too, are well on the way to becoming a no-man's land. After 9/11, George W. Bush and Tony Blair made the promise that they would not tolerate failed states because they could become a haven for terrorists. And today? The number increases. Last year it was Yemen, this year it is the southern Sahara.
SPIEGEL: What do you suggest? A military intervention surely can no longer be an alternative.
Rashid: It would have been better if the United Nations had sent a team to Mali right away to mediate between the government and the rebels. But where is the political initiative? The Americans make their usual recommendations. They want to train the army for the fight with the rebels. US special forces are already in Mali.
SPIEGEL: The promise that Bush and Blair made can hardly be kept after the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the near future, the United States can probably not be persuaded to launch military interventions.
Rashid: The United States only knows one form of intervention and that is the military one. Everything depends on drawn weapons. We should, however, develop a wider scope of action. And we should learn to be patient.
SPIEGEL: But did you not welcome the military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001?
Rashid: At that time, I assumed that the Afghans were incapable of dealing with the Taliban. They were exhausted from the civil war, they had suffered defeats, they were economically destitute, the unrest in the country was enormous. They had a famine. India, Pakistan and Iran waged a proxy war in Afghanistan. Al-Qaida supported the Taliban financially, which provided a basis for them. There was no alternative to America's military intervention. Therefore I welcomed it, yes.
SPIEGEL: You have always complained that the United States neglected Afghanistan because of the war in Iraq. What should have been the second step after the occupation?
Rashid: Very simple, economic development. The civil war was over and the Taliban was no longer there. Troops were necessary to guarantee security. To that end, back then the United States stationed 20,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, but that was not enough. And so they left the security to the Afghan warlords. The CIA consulted with them and by doing so destroyed the morale of the Afghans. They hated the warlords.
SPIEGEL: But quite a few billion dollars also went into building up the country. What happened with that money?
Rashid: In 2001 USAID, the American governmental organization for international development that was founded during the Cold War, invited me and several others to give them suggestions on how development should be carried out after 9/11. We told them that in the next 10 years the United States should make $5 billion available for Afghanistan every year -- enough to revitalize the economy, invest in infrastructure and rebuild education and health. A third-world country like Afghanistan could not possibly absorb more than these five billion. Five billion was peanuts back then. Much money came in but it went to the wrong things, such as making payoffs to the warlords. There was insufficient investment in infrastructure until much later, and the same went for building a self-sustaining economy and agriculture. We suggested major investments in agriculture, as Afghanistan happens to be a land of farmers. Until 2010 nothing was allocated. Richard Holbrooke, whom Obama appointed special envoy of the region, was the first who saw the necessity of investing in agriculture.
SPIEGEL: Obama changed quite a few things in his Afghanistan policy. He increased the number of troops and at the same time set the US withdrawal date to 2014. That was America's next mistake.
Rashid: That was the biggest mistake Obama could have made. Now the United States has to ensure that Afghanistan does not immediately collapse after being left to itself in 2014.
SPIEGEL: In your lifetime, you have witnessed the interventions of two super powers. What did the Soviet Union leave behind?
Rashid: The Soviets held to the tradition of colonialism. They raped the country and killed many people. But they also built dams, electrical power plants, streets, and technical schools. They were communists and had the same vision for Afghanistan that Stalin and Lenin had for the Soviet Union: Progress is communism plus electrification. And today? Today Kabul gets its electrical power from Uzbekistan, Herat from Iran and Jalalabad from Pakistan.
SPIEGEL: And what is the West's legacy in Afghanistan?
Rashid: America does not hold to the colonial tradition. America came, liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban and al-Qaida, came to an arrangement with Hamid Karzai, wanted to organize elections as soon as possible and then withdraw. The Bush administration had an obsession with democracy building. They thought that once there is a democracy, everything else will fall into place. If today you speak to the architects of the 2001 Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, they will tell you that instead of being fixated on elections, we should have built a state with an army and a police force first.
SPIEGEL: Even after the withdrawal, some US troops will remain in Afghanistan. How many should stay?
Rashid: The Americans estimate that 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers will fight terrorists from their various bases. That makes me think of Iraq, where the US also wanted to station 20,000 soldiers. The Iraqis encouraged them to leave.
SPIEGEL: Do you think that something similar will happen in Afghanistan?
Rashid: If Afghan soldiers continue to kill American soldiers as is happening these days, it can hardly be assumed that they will stay in Afghanistan in the long term. And what role are they to play? There will not be enough soldiers to ensure the security of the country. But will the US still be permitted to kill terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan with un-manned drones? That could worsen the situation in the neighboring states and they could view Afghanistan as a threat.
SPIEGEL: After 2014, will the Taliban again play a role in Afghanistan, whether the West likes it or not? Is Mullah Omar still the same stone-age Islamist he was 11 years ago?
Rashid: I believe that the Taliban are just as worn out from war as all of the other parties are. Perhaps they realize that they cannot win another civil war, particularly since Iran and India are boosting and protecting their own allies against the Taliban. Therefore, the Taliban cannot defeat the North. Should they aim to conquer the whole country, the world would turn its back on Afghanistan, including the United Nations. Then there would be no more money for Afghanistan, and that also goes for the $4 billion the West promised in Tokyo for the economic build-up. The Taliban would be well advised to come to an agreement with the government in Kabul, because they have the access to the money from the West.
SPIEGEL: But then the Taliban of today would no longer be the Taliban of yesterday.
Rashid: I think they are ready to compromise.
SPIEGEL: You have known Hamid Karzai for decades. What do you think of him today?
Rashid: He is a survivalist. But he has also deepened the ethnic divide in the country. He has neither fought against corruption nor against crime. He has not reformed the justice system. He has personalized his leadership, and in that respect he is similar to his father. During his father's lifetime there was the king, and he negotiated matters with the tribal leaders. Fifty years ago this form of rule was pretty normal, but today that is no longer the case.
SPIEGEL: In 2014 the new president of Afghanistan will be elected. Karzai cannot run again after two terms. Who will be his successor?
Rashid: Someone from his cabinet, someone whom he trusts. In any event it will be a Pashtun. If, however, the fighting in the country still continues in 2014, matters will be difficult. In 2008, Karzai rigged the election in part because a large number of Pashtuns in areas with a lot of fighting going on could not cast their vote. If that dilemma is repeated in 2014, a candidate from the North could win the majority. But Afghanistan is not yet ready for a president who is not a Pashtun. For that reason too, an armed truce in 2014 is important.
SPIEGEL: The emerging world powers India and China border on Afghanistan and Pakistan. What are the opportunities this neighborhood offers to the smaller countries?
Rashid: The neighbors have for many decades been accustomed to exerting control in Afghanistan. But Pakistan, with its fundamentalism, with its multitude of terrorist groups, with its declining economy can hardly be curtailed. The key for any change to this permanent and ever-increasing calamity is the relationship to India. India will not trust Pakistan as long as its secret service and army allow tens of thousands of militants to fight in Kashmir, and as long as it has to anticipate another assassination plot like that in Mumbai in 2008.
SPIEGEL: Mr. Rashid, thank you for this conversation.
China: os companheiros progressistas contra a midia conservadora...
Um exemplo do que os companheiros chamam de "controle social da mídia":
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
By
THE NEW YORK TIMES,
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Visa Issue in China Forces Out Times Reporter
By
THE NEW YORK TIMES,
December 31, 2012
BEIJING — A correspondent for The New York Times was forced to leave mainland China on Monday after the authorities declined to issue him a visa for 2013 by year’s end.
Chris Buckley, a 45-year-old Australian who has worked as a
correspondent in China since 2000, rejoined The Times in September after
working for Reuters. The Times applied for Mr. Buckley to be accredited
to replace a correspondent who was reassigned, but the authorities did
not act before Dec. 31, despite numerous requests. That forced Mr.
Buckley, his partner and their daughter to fly to Hong Kong on Monday.
Normally, requests to transfer visas are processed in a matter of weeks or a couple of months.
The Times is also waiting for its new Beijing bureau chief, Philip P.
Pan, to be accredited. Mr. Pan applied in March, but his visa has not
been processed.
The visa troubles come amid government pressure on the foreign news
media over investigations into the finances of senior Chinese leaders, a
delicate subject. Corruption is widely reported in China, but top
leaders are considered off limits.
On the day that The Times published a long investigation
into the riches of the family of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, both its
English-language Web site and its new Chinese-language site were blocked
within China, and they remain so.
In June, the authorities blocked the English-language site of Bloomberg News after it published a detailed investigation
into the family riches of China’s new top leader, Xi Jinping. Chinese
financial institutions say they have been instructed by officials not to
buy Bloomberg’s computer terminals, a lucrative source of income for
the company.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to comment on Mr. Buckley’s
forced departure. Ministry officials have not said if they are linking
Mr. Buckley’s visa renewal or Mr. Pan’s press accreditation to the
newspaper’s coverage of China. In a statement, The Times urged the
authorities to process Mr. Buckley’s visa as quickly as possible so that
he and his family could return to Beijing.
“I hope the Chinese authorities will issue him a new visa as soon as
possible and allow Chris and his family to return to Beijing,” Jill
Abramson, the executive editor of The Times, said in the statement. “I
also hope that Phil Pan, whose application for journalist credentials
has been pending for months, will also be issued a visa to serve as our
bureau chief in Beijing.”
The Times has six other accredited correspondents in China, and their
visas were renewed for 2013 in a timely manner. David Barboza, the
Shanghai bureau chief, who wrote the articles about Mr. Wen’s family,
was among those whose visas were renewed.
Diagnostico europeu sobre a Europa e o mundo - ECFR
European Council on Foreign Relations
TEN TRENDS FOR 2013
Dear friends of ECFR,
Happy New Year! 2012 saw continuing crisis in the eurozone, growing Euroscepticism and populism in some corners of Europe, faltering transitions in Egypt and elsewhere, more violence in Syria, a new leadership in China, and both Putin II and Obama II. So what will 2013 hold? Gazing into our crystal ball, we came up with the following ideas (although it's fair to say that we were divided on many of them). Whatever happens, we wish you a good 2013!
1. The single market unravels.
As ECFR’s recent paper - “Why the euro crisis threatens the EU’s single market” - shows, however the EU and eurozone deal with the crisis this main achievement of European integration will be damaged. A full eurozone break up would shatter the single market (and Schengen) while a great leap towards integration would see shrinkage as others (like the UK) withdraw. But even “muddling through” will diminish its depth. In the past months banks in the eurozone have withdrawn from cross-border business. Because of the spreads, even poorly-managed German companies are paying significantly less interest than well-managed Spanish companies. All of these developments create new barriers and will lead to a renewed focus on domestic markets. For Europe, this means less competition, less growth, and higher prices for consumers. Our forthcoming paper on Europe’s “New Political Geography” (based upon ECFR’s 2012 series of 14 National Papers) shows how many EU member states are deeply concerned that differentiated integration is forcing them to the periphery of the European project.
2. “Small” states lead the EU’s foreign policy.
While the biggest countries of the eurozone are focused on the crisis and the UK is increasingly disengaged from Europe, new coalitions of willing members have been leading on the EU’s foreign policy. ECFR’s “Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012” showed that Poland and Sweden were the ones taking the initiative and leading Europe on the world stage. This year’s Scorecard, due to be published later this month, shows that Sweden is taking the initiative roughly as much as traditional large powers like France and the UK, with the Netherlands and Finland also demonstrating that in EU foreign policy size isn’t the only thing that matters.
3. The end of technocracy.
After a year where technocrats took over the countries of the periphery and other leaders, electoral politics will return to European integration. In Italy the vote could turn into a referendum on Monti’s reforms, with or without the current prime minister’s participation, with substantial implications for the rest of Europe. And the German elections could also see a new government elected that has less constraints on what it is able to do – although the danger is that Europe will be largely absent from the campaign.
4. The British debate over Europe becomes less toxic.
Although the UK Independence Party will continue to make gains and force many Conservative MPs towards more Eurosceptic positions, 2013 will see a growing realisation that the UK is sleepwalking towards a disastrous EU exit. Business leaders will lead the backlash, followed by politicians – including many Conservatives who decide that Euroscepticism divides their own party, helps UKIP, and distracts from their own challenges with economic dysfunction and a fractious coalition. The arguments over Scottish EU membership also serve to highlight the tangible benefits of membership (see Peter Kellner’s ECFR paper on how the result of a British referendum on the EU may turn on how many judge the EU in pragmatic rather than ideological terms).
5. Syria as the playground for proxy conflicts.
The ongoing civil war in Syria is the epicentre of a wider regional battle, complicating hopes of resolution and bringing in the threat of wider destabilisation. It is sharpening sectarian tensions, reinvigorating dormant Sunni jihadi forces, pushing Iran and its allies on the defensive, and providing new room for Kurdish ambitions. The febrile atmosphere in Kurdistan is opening cracks between Ankara and its de facto allies Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and reverberations are spreading into northern Iraq.
6. Political versus religious Islam.
With a backlash against political Islam evident in Egypt and Tunisia, it’s apparent that the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists are finding it hard to deal with voters’ everyday practical problems and aspirations. Islamist parties have been forced to develop a more mature political style and formulate policies on socio-economic challenges to retain the support of essentially traditional and pragmatic voters. However this is creating a gap between political Islamists and their religious such as the Salafists who are seeking to take advantage of greater religiosity in civil society. This tension will become a defining issue for countries such as Egypt and Tunisia as they continue their political transitions.
7. Putin’s increasingly ungovernable Russia.
A sick and politically enfeebled Putin is no longer able to play different power clans off against each other, making the country increasingly ungovernable while the petro-economy slows down. This may prompt a return to defensive/aggressive posturing to its south and west (it will keep quiet over China), for instance through greater involvement in the Former Soviet Union (meddling in Ukraine and Georgia), and diplomatic muscle flexing in Syria and with the US and NATO over missile defence and the Magnitski list. However, underlying this is the realisation that Russia desperately needs the West and can’t afford to push too hard in difficult times.
8. Security in the Maghreb becomes a real issue.
While UN and African peacekeepers struggle with the crisis in Mali, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) will attempt to extend its ambitions to terrorist attacks in Europe, prompting an increase in French military strikes against AQIM.
9. China 3.0 meets Chinese leadership 1.5.
Chinese intellectuals and thinkers, think their country needs to enter a new era. After Mao’s political revolution (‘China 1.0’) and Deng Xiaoping’s economic revolution (‘China 2.0’), they are expecting a ‘China 3.0’. Now that China is becoming more affluent, how does China deal with growing inequalities, rebalance its economy and increase its exposure to the global economy? How does the Communist Party retain stability, with increasing friction within Chinese society and half a billion ‘netizens’ active on the web? But the 18th Party congress has anointed leaders who have more in common with the past than the future. As the political system becomes more rigid, and its foreign policy more aggressive, there is a growing tension between China’s strong society and its weak political system.
And finally, the big question in European foreign policy is…
10. Will post-American Europe fail to grow up or discover strategy?
For European foreign policy the elections didn’t really matter, and now President Obama is proving it by showing that a “pivot” to Asia is a fundamental “shift” away from the North Atlantic. As the 2013 Scorecard suggests, Europe continues to find ways to fail to come to terms with foreign policy… but if Europe’s leaders finally look up from the euro crisis, notice how much the continent has lost power, prestige and influence, and accept the need to formulate a European Global Strategy it could all be so different (perhaps in 2014).
And a word about how well we did with our predictions last year:
1. A “European Clash of Civilisations” – True (and predictable) enough, in as much as the EU has been torn (between core and periphery, eurozone and non-eurozone, “virtuous” North and “profligate” South) for much of 2013. The picture is of course far more complicated, as our National Paper series shows, but we called this one right.
2. Germany discovers that it’s a European country – There are signs that the debate in Europe is now shifting, with questions of political integration now being discussed (not quite extending to eurobonds). Maybe we had better judge this one after the 2013 German elections are out of the way…
3. A British Europe without Britain – British Eurosceptics have certainly had a good year (although next year may not be so promising), and there are definite signs that aspects of the EU (for instance a greater role for national governments, liberal reforms for the periphery, loss of central institutional power) are becoming more “British.”
4. China is forced into a financial G3 to safeguard the value of its reserves – this has not held up quite so well, although as we noted, the power shift to the East needs to take into account China’s economic interdependence with the West and its need to rebalance its economy.
5. The Russian Scramble for Europe (and banks) – So far this has not happened, although the situation in Cyprus, where Russia has played an important role in helping the country deal with the financial crisis, shows that Russian investment is something that the EU should not ignore.
6. The remilitarisation of Europe – Although the crisis and international impotence over Syria has crowded out real discussion of European strategy, there is a feeling in some corners of ECFR that 2013 could be the real year where an EU-wide sharing of security concerns and capacity could be on the cards…
7. China discovers competitive politics while reinforcing authoritarianism – The Bo Xilai affair and the autumn leadership “selection” showed that authoritarianism was reinforced without much in the way of competitive politics – although (as discussed in ECFR’s “China 3.0”) there is a vibrant internal Chinese debate over other mechanisms for political representation and competition.
8. The Domesticated Brotherhood – As noted in this year’s set of “Ten Trends”, political Islam has found its first steps in government to be difficult ones, leading to something of a recent anti-Islamist backlash. This has led to a tension between political Islam and religious Islam that we think could be a big story in 2013.
9. A perfect Iranian storm – At the time of writing this has not happened, although Iran and its nuclear programme remains a toxic issue in the Middle East and beyond.
10. The Youthquake doesn’t happen – Despite the Occupy Movement, the Pirate Party and so much else, we were right: organised older folk and the impotence of treating Facebook “likes” as a real proxy for voting and participation means the “Youthquake” is yet to happen.
ECFR's London office:
35 Old Queen Street
London, Greater London SW1H 9JA
United Kingdom
Find us: ecfr.eu
TEN TRENDS FOR 2013
Dear friends of ECFR,
Happy New Year! 2012 saw continuing crisis in the eurozone, growing Euroscepticism and populism in some corners of Europe, faltering transitions in Egypt and elsewhere, more violence in Syria, a new leadership in China, and both Putin II and Obama II. So what will 2013 hold? Gazing into our crystal ball, we came up with the following ideas (although it's fair to say that we were divided on many of them). Whatever happens, we wish you a good 2013!
1. The single market unravels.
As ECFR’s recent paper - “Why the euro crisis threatens the EU’s single market” - shows, however the EU and eurozone deal with the crisis this main achievement of European integration will be damaged. A full eurozone break up would shatter the single market (and Schengen) while a great leap towards integration would see shrinkage as others (like the UK) withdraw. But even “muddling through” will diminish its depth. In the past months banks in the eurozone have withdrawn from cross-border business. Because of the spreads, even poorly-managed German companies are paying significantly less interest than well-managed Spanish companies. All of these developments create new barriers and will lead to a renewed focus on domestic markets. For Europe, this means less competition, less growth, and higher prices for consumers. Our forthcoming paper on Europe’s “New Political Geography” (based upon ECFR’s 2012 series of 14 National Papers) shows how many EU member states are deeply concerned that differentiated integration is forcing them to the periphery of the European project.
2. “Small” states lead the EU’s foreign policy.
While the biggest countries of the eurozone are focused on the crisis and the UK is increasingly disengaged from Europe, new coalitions of willing members have been leading on the EU’s foreign policy. ECFR’s “Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012” showed that Poland and Sweden were the ones taking the initiative and leading Europe on the world stage. This year’s Scorecard, due to be published later this month, shows that Sweden is taking the initiative roughly as much as traditional large powers like France and the UK, with the Netherlands and Finland also demonstrating that in EU foreign policy size isn’t the only thing that matters.
3. The end of technocracy.
After a year where technocrats took over the countries of the periphery and other leaders, electoral politics will return to European integration. In Italy the vote could turn into a referendum on Monti’s reforms, with or without the current prime minister’s participation, with substantial implications for the rest of Europe. And the German elections could also see a new government elected that has less constraints on what it is able to do – although the danger is that Europe will be largely absent from the campaign.
4. The British debate over Europe becomes less toxic.
Although the UK Independence Party will continue to make gains and force many Conservative MPs towards more Eurosceptic positions, 2013 will see a growing realisation that the UK is sleepwalking towards a disastrous EU exit. Business leaders will lead the backlash, followed by politicians – including many Conservatives who decide that Euroscepticism divides their own party, helps UKIP, and distracts from their own challenges with economic dysfunction and a fractious coalition. The arguments over Scottish EU membership also serve to highlight the tangible benefits of membership (see Peter Kellner’s ECFR paper on how the result of a British referendum on the EU may turn on how many judge the EU in pragmatic rather than ideological terms).
5. Syria as the playground for proxy conflicts.
The ongoing civil war in Syria is the epicentre of a wider regional battle, complicating hopes of resolution and bringing in the threat of wider destabilisation. It is sharpening sectarian tensions, reinvigorating dormant Sunni jihadi forces, pushing Iran and its allies on the defensive, and providing new room for Kurdish ambitions. The febrile atmosphere in Kurdistan is opening cracks between Ankara and its de facto allies Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and reverberations are spreading into northern Iraq.
6. Political versus religious Islam.
With a backlash against political Islam evident in Egypt and Tunisia, it’s apparent that the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists are finding it hard to deal with voters’ everyday practical problems and aspirations. Islamist parties have been forced to develop a more mature political style and formulate policies on socio-economic challenges to retain the support of essentially traditional and pragmatic voters. However this is creating a gap between political Islamists and their religious such as the Salafists who are seeking to take advantage of greater religiosity in civil society. This tension will become a defining issue for countries such as Egypt and Tunisia as they continue their political transitions.
7. Putin’s increasingly ungovernable Russia.
A sick and politically enfeebled Putin is no longer able to play different power clans off against each other, making the country increasingly ungovernable while the petro-economy slows down. This may prompt a return to defensive/aggressive posturing to its south and west (it will keep quiet over China), for instance through greater involvement in the Former Soviet Union (meddling in Ukraine and Georgia), and diplomatic muscle flexing in Syria and with the US and NATO over missile defence and the Magnitski list. However, underlying this is the realisation that Russia desperately needs the West and can’t afford to push too hard in difficult times.
8. Security in the Maghreb becomes a real issue.
While UN and African peacekeepers struggle with the crisis in Mali, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) will attempt to extend its ambitions to terrorist attacks in Europe, prompting an increase in French military strikes against AQIM.
9. China 3.0 meets Chinese leadership 1.5.
Chinese intellectuals and thinkers, think their country needs to enter a new era. After Mao’s political revolution (‘China 1.0’) and Deng Xiaoping’s economic revolution (‘China 2.0’), they are expecting a ‘China 3.0’. Now that China is becoming more affluent, how does China deal with growing inequalities, rebalance its economy and increase its exposure to the global economy? How does the Communist Party retain stability, with increasing friction within Chinese society and half a billion ‘netizens’ active on the web? But the 18th Party congress has anointed leaders who have more in common with the past than the future. As the political system becomes more rigid, and its foreign policy more aggressive, there is a growing tension between China’s strong society and its weak political system.
And finally, the big question in European foreign policy is…
10. Will post-American Europe fail to grow up or discover strategy?
For European foreign policy the elections didn’t really matter, and now President Obama is proving it by showing that a “pivot” to Asia is a fundamental “shift” away from the North Atlantic. As the 2013 Scorecard suggests, Europe continues to find ways to fail to come to terms with foreign policy… but if Europe’s leaders finally look up from the euro crisis, notice how much the continent has lost power, prestige and influence, and accept the need to formulate a European Global Strategy it could all be so different (perhaps in 2014).
And a word about how well we did with our predictions last year:
1. A “European Clash of Civilisations” – True (and predictable) enough, in as much as the EU has been torn (between core and periphery, eurozone and non-eurozone, “virtuous” North and “profligate” South) for much of 2013. The picture is of course far more complicated, as our National Paper series shows, but we called this one right.
2. Germany discovers that it’s a European country – There are signs that the debate in Europe is now shifting, with questions of political integration now being discussed (not quite extending to eurobonds). Maybe we had better judge this one after the 2013 German elections are out of the way…
3. A British Europe without Britain – British Eurosceptics have certainly had a good year (although next year may not be so promising), and there are definite signs that aspects of the EU (for instance a greater role for national governments, liberal reforms for the periphery, loss of central institutional power) are becoming more “British.”
4. China is forced into a financial G3 to safeguard the value of its reserves – this has not held up quite so well, although as we noted, the power shift to the East needs to take into account China’s economic interdependence with the West and its need to rebalance its economy.
5. The Russian Scramble for Europe (and banks) – So far this has not happened, although the situation in Cyprus, where Russia has played an important role in helping the country deal with the financial crisis, shows that Russian investment is something that the EU should not ignore.
6. The remilitarisation of Europe – Although the crisis and international impotence over Syria has crowded out real discussion of European strategy, there is a feeling in some corners of ECFR that 2013 could be the real year where an EU-wide sharing of security concerns and capacity could be on the cards…
7. China discovers competitive politics while reinforcing authoritarianism – The Bo Xilai affair and the autumn leadership “selection” showed that authoritarianism was reinforced without much in the way of competitive politics – although (as discussed in ECFR’s “China 3.0”) there is a vibrant internal Chinese debate over other mechanisms for political representation and competition.
8. The Domesticated Brotherhood – As noted in this year’s set of “Ten Trends”, political Islam has found its first steps in government to be difficult ones, leading to something of a recent anti-Islamist backlash. This has led to a tension between political Islam and religious Islam that we think could be a big story in 2013.
9. A perfect Iranian storm – At the time of writing this has not happened, although Iran and its nuclear programme remains a toxic issue in the Middle East and beyond.
10. The Youthquake doesn’t happen – Despite the Occupy Movement, the Pirate Party and so much else, we were right: organised older folk and the impotence of treating Facebook “likes” as a real proxy for voting and participation means the “Youthquake” is yet to happen.
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