O Stalin Sem Gulag e seu laranja panamenho: cobertura para lavagem de dinheiro do narcotrafico?

Esse tipo de investimento, descrito na matéria do Jornal Nacional transcrita na postagem do jornalista, costuma ser usado por criminosos, para lavar dinheiro. Seja que o dinheiro é oriundo do narcotráfico -- o que é bem provável -- seja que ele venha de algum capitalista brasileiro que não quer revelar sua fortuna, em qualquer hipótese a atividade e o próprio funcionamento do hotel parecem fazer parte de um empreendimento criminoso.
Acho que combina com o chefe da quadrilha, o Stalin Sem Gulag -- e agora talvez sem emprego no hotel-lavanderia -- já que ele sempre foi chegado a essas montagens misteriosas, que costumam ter as quatro patas afundadas no pântano da ilegalidade, quando não da criminalidade.
Aprendeu com os cubanos, certamente, que devem ter dado um curso completo daquilo que os americanos da NSA e da CIA chamam de deception.
Não que seja uma decepção para nós que conhecemos a história do Stalin mineiro: ele vem se revelando uma decepção como quadrilheiro que era; agora é só um bandido preso, sem emprego aparente...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

“Jornal Nacional” revela que “dono” do hotel em que Dirceu quer trabalhar é um panamenho pobre… É espantoso!

Reinaldo Azevedo, 3/12/2013

Reportagem do Jornal Nacional que acaba de ir ao ar, de autoria de Vladimir Netto, indica que há algo de profundamente errado com o tal hotel St. Peter, que resolveu “empregar” José Dirceu, com salário de R$ 20 mil. A dona da empresa seria uma “empresa” do Panamá chamada “Truston International Inc.”. Seu presidente é José Eugenio Silva Ritter, um panamenho pobre, que não tem um gato para puxar pelo rabo. Ele admite ser sócio de centenas de empresas porque é funcionário de uma empresa chamada “Morgan y Morgan”. Leiam o que vai Portal G1. Volto mais tarde.
*
O Jornal Nacional localizou em uma área pobre do Panamá o homem que seria o presidente da empresa que administra o hotel Saint Peter, em Brasília, onde o ex-ministro José Dirceu, condenado no julgamento do mensalão, pretende trabalhar.

Dirceu está preso na Penitenciária da Papuda, onde cumpre pena em regime semiaberto, que permite a ele trabalhar durante o dia e voltar à noite para a prisão, para dormir. Ele recebeu uma oferta de trabalho do Saint Peter, hotel no centro de Brasília, que fica em um prédio de 15 andares e 424 apartamentos. O Saint Peter pretende pagar ao ex-ministro R$ 20 mil por mês para que ele exerça o cargo de gerente administrativo.

O homem que preside a empresa administradora do hotel mora numa área pobre da Cidade do Panamá, capital do Panamá, país da América Central, e trabalha como auxiliar de escritório numa empresa de advocacia. Um dos sócios do hotel, Paulo Masci de Abreu, é irmão de José Masci de Abreu, presidente do PTN (Partido Trabalhista Nacional), que em 2010 apoiou a eleição da presidente Dilma Rousseff. Mas ele é sócio minoritário. Tem uma cota, no valor de R$ 1, como mostra o contrato social da empresa.

Todas as outras cotas, que somam R$ 499.999,00, pertencem a uma empresa estrangeira, a Truston International Inc, com sede na Cidade do Panamá. A Truston está inscrita no registro público do Panamá e tem como presidente um cidadão panamenho, José Eugenio Silva Ritter. O nome dele, abreviado, aparece , junto a outros dois nomes: Marta de Saavedra, tesoureira, e Dianeth Ospino, secretária. José Eugênio Silva Ritter também aparece ligado a mais de mil empresas em um site criado por um ativista anticorrupção. O procurador da Truston no Brasil, como mostra o contrato do hotel Saint Peter, é Raul de Abreu, filho de Paulo Masci de Abreu.

Por telefone, Paulo de Abreu e o advogado de Raul de Abreu disseram que José Eugenio Silva Ritter é um empresário estrangeiro apresentado por meio de um advogado. Também afirmaram que a empresa presta contas a José Eugenio regularmente. O repórter Vladimir Netto, da TV Globo, travou o seguinte diálogo por telefone com Paulo de Abreu:

- Vladimir Netto: Quem é o seu sócio majoritário?
- Paulo de Abreu: É a Truston. É uma empresa que investe em hotéis.
- Vladimir Netto: Quem é o dono da Ttruston?
- Paulo de Abreu: Ah, tem vários acionistas, né? Precisa ver, até porque as ações, como são vendidas constantemente, né?
- Vladimir Netto: Quem é José Eugenio Silva Ritter?
- Paulo de Abreu: É o presidente.
- Advogado: É o presidente da empresa.
- Vladimir Netto: mas vocês o conhecem?
- Paulo de Abreu: Uma vez nós já tivemos… em reunião.
- Vladimir Netto: Ele veio ao Brasil, dr. Paulo?
- Paulo de Abreu: não, eu estive lá em Miami.
- Vladimir Netto: Isso foi quando? Foi quando os senhores resolveram fazer uma sociedade pra administrar o Saint Peter?
- Paulo de Abreu: É, quando formalizamos a parceria. De lá pra cá, a gente manda as informações pra lá e ele se dá por satisfeito, enfim, ou pergunta alguma coisa, mas houve essa reunião em miami quando da formalização do entendimento.

O Jornal Nacional foi ao Panamá para tentar entrevistar o presidente da empresa que administra o hotel Saint Peter. Jose Eugenio Silva Ritter mora em uma rua em um bairro pobre na periferia da cidade do panamá. Quando o repórter chegou, ele estava lavando o carro na porta de casa. Ritter disse que trabalha num escritório de advocacia, o Morgan y Morgan, há mais de 30 anos. E reconheceu que aparece mesmo como sócio de muitas empresas mundo afora. “Trabalho na Morgan y Morgan e eles se dedicam a isso”, afirmou.

Ele disse que não lembra da Truston International Inc, que administra o hotel Saint Peter, empresa da qual ele é o presidente. “Eu sequer sei se é o nome de uma sociedade de várias pessoas. Você, por favor, vá lá na Morgan y Morgan, lá com um advogado e tudo, aí eu posso te dar a informação que você precisa. Se me autorizam, se posso falar, te dar as respostas, porque pode botar em perigo meu emprego”, afirmou.

No órgão que regulamenta e fiscaliza o mercado de capitais dos Estados Unidos consta que José Eugenio Silva Ritter é auxiliar de escritório do Morgan y Morgan. A Morgan y Morgan fica em um prédio no centro financeiro da Cidade do Panamá. É uma firma que ajuda na fundação e administração de empresas internacionais com sede no Panamá. A legislação do país permite que ações de companhias sejam transferidas de um empresário para outro sem que seja necessário informar as autoridades. Isso faz com que seja muito difícil saber quem é o verdadeiro dono de empresas como a Truston International Inc, proprietária do hotel Saint Peter.

“Esses países percebem como uma estratégia econômica de trazer recursos para aquele país, justamente flexibilizar as regras sobre tributação, sobre identificação. Então, esses países acabam diminuindo essas exigências de identificação de documentação pra atrair capitais, pra atrair ativos pra fomentar a propria riqueza do país”, afirmou Pierpaolo Bottini, professor de direito penal da Universidade de São Paulo (USP).

O Jornal Nacional procurou Morgan y Morgan para perguntar sobre a propriedade da administradora do hotel Saint Peter, mas ninguém quis atender. A advogada de Paulo Masci de Abreu, Rosane Ribeiro, revelou que a sócia majoritária da Truston International é a nora dele, a empresária lara Severino Vargas. E que a nora vendeu a Paulo de Abreu o controle acionário do hotel Saint Peter. A advogada lembrou também que o cliente é dono de 60% do prédio onde funciona o hotel Saint Peter. Os outros 40%, segundo a advogada, pertencem ao empresário Paulo Naya.

Israel: armas nucleares e balança geopolitica no Oriente Medio - Max Fisher (WP world blog)

WorldViews

Why is the U.S. okay with Israel having nuclear weapons but not Iran?
BY MAX FISHER
The Washington Post blog World View, December 2, 2013, at 9:30 am

Israel's Dimona nuclear power plant, in the Negev desert, started the country's nuclear program when it was built in the 1950s with French help.

Iranian officials sometimes respond to accusations that Tehran is seeking a nuclear weapons capability by replying that, not only do they not want a bomb, they'd actually like to see a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East. Yes, this is surely in part a deflection, meant to shift attention away from concerns about Iran's nuclear activities by not-so-subtly nodding to the one country in the region that does have nuclear weapons: Israel.

But could Iran have a point? Is there something hypocritical about the world tolerating Israel's nuclear arsenal, which the country does not officially acknowledge but has been publicly known for decades, and yet punishing Iran with severe economic sanctions just for its suspected steps toward a weapons program? Even Saudi Arabia, which sees Iran as its implacable enemy and made its accommodations with Israel long ago, often joins Tehran's calls for a "nuclear-free region." And anyone not closely versed in Middle East issues might naturally wonder why the United States would accept Israeli warheads but not an Iranian program.

"This issue comes up in every lecture I give," Joe Cirincione, president of the nuclear nonproliferation-focused Ploughshares Fund, told me. The suspicions that Israel gets special treatment because it's Israel, and that Western countries are unfairly hard on Israel's neighbors, tend to inform how many in the Middle East see the ongoing nuclear disputes. "It is impossible to give a nuclear policy talk in the Middle East without having the questions focus almost entirely on Israel," Cirincione said.

Of course, many Westerners would likely argue that Israel's weapons are morally and historically defensible in a way that an Iranian program would not be, both because of Israel's roots in the Holocaust and because it fought a series of defensive wars against its neighbors. "Israel has never given any reason to doubt its solely defensive nature," said Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, summarizing the American position. "Israel has never brandished its capabilities to exert regional influence, cow its adversaries or threaten its neighbors."

There's truth to both of these perspectives. But the story of the Israeli nuclear program, and how the United States came to accept it, is more complicated and surprising than you might think.

The single greatest factor explaining how Israel got the world to accept its nuclear program may be timing. The first nuclear weapon was detonated in 1945, by the United States. In 1970, most of the world agreed to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which forbids any new countries from developing nuclear weapons. In that 25-year window, every major world power developed a nuclear weapon: the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France and China. They were joined by exactly one other country: Israel.

The Israeli nuclear program was driven in many ways by the obsessive fear that gripped the nation's founding prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, in which the new country fought off Egyptian and Jordanian armies, Ben-Gurion concluded that Israel could survive only if it had a massive military deterrent -- nuclear weapons.

"What Einstein, Oppenheimer and Teller, the three of them are Jews, made for the United States could also be done by scientists in Israel for their own people," Ben-Gurion wrote in 1956. Avner Cohen, the preeminent historian of Israel's nuclear program, has written that Ben-Gurion "believed Israel needed nuclear weapons as insurance if it could no longer compete with the Arabs in an arms race, and as a weapon of last resort in case of an extreme military emergency. Nuclear weapons might also persuade the Arabs to accept Israel's existence, leading to peace in the region."

But Israel of the 1950s was a poor country. And it was not, as it is today, a close political and military ally of the United States. Israel had to find a way to keep up with the much wealthier and more advanced world powers dominating the nuclear race. How it went about doing this goes a long way to explaining both why the United States initially opposed Israel's nuclear program and how the world came around to accepting Israeli warheads.

So the Israelis turned to France, which was much further along on its own nuclear program, and in 1957 secretly agreed to help install a plutonium-based facility in the small Israeli city of Dimona. Why France did this is not settled history. French foreign policy at the time was assiduously independent from, and standoffish toward, the United States and United Kingdom; perhaps this was one of France's many steps meant to reclaim great power status. A year earlier, Israel had assisted France and the United Kingdom in launching a disastrous invasion of Egypt that became known as the "Suez Crisis"; French leaders may have felt that they owed Israel. Whatever France's reason, both countries kept it a secret from the United States.

When U.S. intelligence did finally discover Israel's nuclear facility, in 1960, Israeli leaders insisted that it was for peaceful purposes and that they were not interested in acquiring a nuclear weapon. Quite simply, they were lying, and for years resisted and stalled U.S.-backed nuclear inspectors sent to the facility. (This may help shed some light on why the United States and Israel are both so skeptical of Iran's own reactor, potentially capable of yielding plutonium, under construction at Arak.) The work continued at Dimona.

Gradually, as the United States came to understand the scope of the program, the administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy and even the relatively Israel-friendly Johnson all pushed ever harder to halt Israel's nuclear development. Their response to an Israeli bomb was "no."

"The U.S. tried to stop Israel from getting nuclear weapons and to stop France from giving Israel the technology and material it needed to make them," Cirincione said. "We failed."

The turning point for both Israel and the United States may have been the 1967 war. The second large-scale Arab-Israeli war lasted only six days, but that was enough to convince Israeli leaders that, though they had won, they could lose next time. Two crucial things happened in the next five years. First, in 1968, Israel secretly developed a nuclear weapon. Second, and perhaps more important, was a White House meeting in September 1969 between President Nixon and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. What happened during that meeting is secret. But the Nixon's administration's meticulous records show that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said to Nixon, in a later conversation about the Meir meeting, "during your private discussions with Golda Meir you emphasized that our primary concern was that Israel make no visible introduction of nuclear weapons or undertake a nuclear test program."

That meeting between Nixon and Meir set what has been Israel's unofficial policy ever since: one in which the country does nothing to publicly acknowledge or demonstrate its nuclear weapons program, and in exchange the United States would accept it. The Nixon administration had concluded that, while it didn't like the Israeli weapons program, it also wasn't prepared to stop it. The Cold War had polarized the Middle East, a region where Soviet influence was growing and where Israel -- along with Iran -- were scarce American allies. If they had already resigned themselves to living with a nuclear weapon, Kissinger concluded, they might as well make it on their terms.

"Essentially the bargain has been that Israel keeps its nuclear deterrent deep in the basement and Washington keeps its critique locked in the closet," Satloff explained.

If the 1967 war had sparked Israel's rush to a warhead and led the United States to tacitly accept the program, then the 1973 Arab-Israeli war made that arrangement more or less permanent. Egypt and Syria launched a joint surprise attack on Yom Kippur and made rapid gains -- so rapid that Israeli leaders feared that the entire country would be overrun. They ordered the military to prepare several nuclear warheads for launch -- exactly the sort of drastic, final measure then Ben-Gurion had envisioned 20 years earlier. (Update: This incident is disputed. See note at bottom.) But the Israeli forces held, assisted by an emergency U.S. resupply that Nixon ordered, and eventually won the war.

The desperation of the 1973 war may have ensured that, once Nixon left office, his deal with the Israelis would hold. And it has. But the world has changed in the past 40 years. Israel's conventional military forces are now far more powerful than all of its neighbors' militaries combined. Anyway, those neighbors have made peace with Israel save Syria, which has held out mostly for political reasons. From Israel's view, there is only one potentially existential military threat left: the Iranian nuclear program. But that program has not produced a warhead and, with Tehran now seeking to reach an agreement on the program, it may never.

Some scholars are beginning to ask whether the old deal is outdated, if Israel should consider announcing its nuclear weapons arsenal publicly. Cohen, the historian who studies the Israel program, argues that the policy of secrecy "undermines genuine Israeli interests, including the need to gain recognition and legitimacy and to be counted among the responsible states in this strategic field."

The dilemma for Israel is that, should Iran ever develop a nuclear warhead, Israel will surely feel less unsafe if it has its own nuclear deterrent. But, ironically, Israel's nuclear arsenal may itself be one of the factors driving Iran's program in the first place.

"History tells us that Israel's position as the sole nuclear-armed state in the region is an anomaly -- regions either have several nuclear states or none," said Cirincione, of the nonproliferation Ploughshares Fund. "At some point, for its own security, Israel will have to take the bombs out of the basement and put them on the negotiating table."

Some scholars suggest that world powers, including the United States, may have quietly tolerated Egyptian and Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles as counterbalances to Israel's own weapons of mass destruction; a concession just large enough to prevent them from seeking nuclear weapons of their own.

Ultimately, while every president from Nixon to Obama has accepted Israel's nuclear weapons, at some point the United States would surely prefer to see a Middle East that's entirely free of weapons of mass destruction.

"We are not okay with Israel having nuclear weapons, but U.S. policymakers recognize that there is not much we can do about it in the short-term," Cirincione said. "But these are general back-burner efforts. All recognize that Israel will only give up its nuclear weapons in the context of a regional peace settlement where all states recognized the rights of other states to exist and agree on territorial boundaries. This would mean a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian issues."

In other words, the Middle East would have to cease being the Middle East. Maybe that will happen, but not anytime soon.

Update: The much-discussed 1973 incident, in which Israel allegedly readied its nuclear weapons in case the country was overrun by the invading Arab armies, may have never actually happened. Avner Cohen, the ultimate authority on the subject, wrote as much in an October post for Arms Control Wonk. "The nuclear lore about 1973 has turned into an urban legend: nobody knows how exactly it originated and who the real sources were, but it is commonly believed as true or near-true," he wrote, calling the event "mythology."

What actually happened, according to Cohen, is that Defense Minister Moshe Dayan proposed in the middle of the war that Israel prepare to detonate a nuclear warhead over the desert as a "test" and show of force. But his proposal, Cohen says, was rejected immediately. Thanks to freelance journalist and former colleague Armin Rosen for flagging this. Read more in this recent paper on Israel's 1973 "nuclear alert," co-authored by Cohen along with Elbridge Colby, William McCants, Bradley Morris and William Rosenau.

Pausa para... humor economico (ou contos de fadas antecipando o Natal, para o ministro da deseconomia...)

O Ministro Mantega deve estar pedindo um PIBão, na sua meia de Natal, e espera que o Papai Noel, ou alguma fada distraída, lhe traga pelo menos um PIB de 2,5% de crescimento anual, de agora até o final do ano.
Não é uma gracinha?
Um grandalhão desses, um bobalhão econômico, melhor dito, acreditando em Papai Noel e contos de fadas.
Fica, em todo caso, registrado, nossa página de humor econômico da semana.
Nunca antes neste país se torceu tanto para uma inversão para cima do tal crescimento gradual, outra piada deste jornal mantido, financiado, escrito e a serviço do chefe da quadrilha, sim, ele mesmo, o Stalin Sem Gulag que curta sua "saison en enfer" da Papuda. O que é que vocês querem? O Stalin de verdade, o homem do Gulag, também enfrentou algum tempo de cadeia (por assaltar bancos) antes de ascender na escala do crime...
O nosso Stalin Sem Gulag fez mais do que assaltar bancos: expropriou contabilmente vários bancos, um procedimento mais limpo, mais seguro e muito mais eficaz. Bem, de vez em quando algo dá errado. Nem tudo é perfeito neste país.
De perfeito mesmo, só as projeções do pândego ministro Mantega.
Ele ficou contente com a revisão do IBGE, que corrigiu o fabuloso crescimento de 2012 de 0,9 para 1%, ou seja, um recuo de 0,5% no crescimento real per capita. Cada brasileiro ficou mais pobre em meio por cento, na média, com exceção dos amigos do rei, ou seja, os corruptos de sempre; estes continuam enriquecendo, a taxas que nem te conto...
Bem, chega de piada da semana, vamos ao que interessa...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Apesar da queda, Mantega ainda acredita em PIB a 2,5% este ano

Correio do Brasil, 3/12/2013
Por Redação - de Brasília e Rio de Janeiro

A economia brasileira está em trajetória de expansão gradual, que deve se manter nos próximos trimestres, avaliou o ministro da Fazenda, Guido Mantega, reconhecendo ainda que o desempenho da economia está abaixo do desejado.

– A recuperação talvez não seja na velocidade que gostaríamos – afirmou o ministro a jornalistas, acrescentando, no entanto, que ainda é possível que a economia avance 2,5% neste ano.

O Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) do país encolheu 0,5% no terceiro trimestre deste ano ante o segundo, primeiro resultado negativo e o pior em mais de quatro anos, afetado pela retração dos investimentos. Entre abril e junho passados, a atividade havia crescido 1,8%.

Sobre a dinâmica da expansão do PIB, o ministro avaliou que os investimentos estão acelerando e deverão registrar alta entre 6% e 7% neste ano em relação a 2012, apesar de terem encolhido 2,2% no trimestre passado sobre os três meses anteriores.

– O crescimento é gradual porque no mundo todo está sendo assim, e esse crescimento se dá principalmente em investimentos, bens de capital – disse Mantega a jornalistas, acrescentando que, por outro lado, vai demorar “mais alguns anos” para que a Formação Bruta de Capital Fixo – uma medida de investimento – corresponda a 24% do PIB.

O programa de concessões que está em curso, nos setores de infraestrutura e logística, vai ajudar a “elevar o crescimento potencial do país, de 4%”, afirmou ele. Mantega reconheceu que as sucessivas elevações na Selic tiveram impacto no crescimento da atividade neste ano. Em abril passado, o Banco Central iniciou um ciclo de aperto monetário que já levou a taxa básica de juros de 7,25% para o atual patamar de 10%, a fim de combater a inflação por meio do encarecimento do crédito e, consequentemente, do consumo.

O ministro afirmou que o consumo das famílias está sendo prejudicado pela falta de crédito, mas considera que com a queda da inadimplência e com o menor comprometimento da renda dos brasileiros, o consumo avançará. Mantega disse ainda que o crescimento baixo atrapalha o resultado fiscal, mas repetiu que o governo central – governo federal, BC e Previdência vão cumprir sua meta de superávit primário de R$ 73 bilhões neste ano.

Ele também citou o atual momento da economia mundial, que vem mostrando recuperação e será seguida pelo Brasil.

PIB fraco

A queda na base sequencial veio depois de uma expansão revisada de 1,8% do PIB no segundo trimestre ante o primeiro. Pesquisa da agência inglesa de notícias Reuters indicava que a economia brasileira teria contração de 0,2% nos três meses até setembro sobre o segundo trimestre e avançaria 2,5% na comparação anual, segundo a mediana das projeções e sem considerar a nova metodologia do IBGE para o PIB.

– Em linhas gerais, a despeito das mudanças metodológicas, temos a confirmação de PIB fraco. Olhando pela ótica da demanda, vemos claramente que está ficando mais evidente a questão da diferença entre oferta e demanda – afirmou o economista sênior do Espírito Santo Investment Bank, Flávio Serrano.

Para ele, o quarto trimestre começou fraco e o PIB deve encerrar este ano com expansão de 2,2% a 2,3%, pior do que sua previsão anterior de 2,5%. Segundo o IBGE, a Formação Bruta de Capital Fixo, uma medida de investimento, recuou 2,2% no terceiro trimestre sobre o período imediatamente anterior, no pior desempenho desde o primeiro trimestre de 2012 (-2,7%) e na primeira queda em um ano.

O governo da presidente Dilma Rousseff assumiu o discurso de que os investimentos serão o principal motor da economia brasileira, tendo como pano de fundo as concessões de infraestrutura e logística já feitas e programadas para o próximo ano.

– Vale destacar que uma das coisas que mais caiu foram os gastos de capital, que é o grande desafio do governo… O desafio é ver os investimentos se recuperarem mais e melhorar a situação das importações – afirmou o economista-chefe da Gradual Investimentos, André Perfeito, acrescentando que revisará as estimativas de crescimento do PIB em 2014 para entre 2,4% e 2,5%, ante 2,7%.

No trimestre passado, ainda segundo o IBGE, o setor de Agropecuária também encolheu, com retração de 3,5 por cento sobre abril a junho, enquanto os setores Industrial e de Serviços ficaram praticamente estáveis, com variação positiva de 0,1 por cento, após terem avançado 2,2 e 0,8 por cento, respectivamente, no segundo trimestre sobre o primeiro.

Já o consumo das famílias e do governo, no terceiro trimestre, tiveram expansão de 1 e de 1,2 por cento, respectivamente, sobre o segundo.

Revisão do IBGE

O IBGE também revisou os resultados do PIB de períodos anteriores por causa da nova metodologia. Pelos novos números apresentados, a economia cresceu 1% em 2012, ligeiramente acima do 0,9% divulgado inicialmente.

Os resultados trimestrais anteriores também mudaram. Além de ter revisado o PIB do segundo trimestre de alta de 1,5% para de 1,8% sobre janeiro a março, o IBGE informou agora que a economia no primeiro trimestre deste ano ficou estagnada, pior que o avanço de 0,6% divulgado inicialmente.

O IBGE passou a incorporar no cálculo do PIB sua nova pesquisa mensal de serviços, que começou a ser divulgada este ano e que, por enquanto, mede apenas a receita do setor. Grande parte dos especialistas ainda não tinha conseguido adequar suas projeções com os novos parâmetros.

OMC: conferencia de Bali e facilitacao do comercio - Jeronim Capaldo (Tufts University)

Global Development And Environment Institute at Tufts University

The Uncertain Gains from Trade Facilitation Jeronim Capaldo GDAE Policy Brief 13-02 December 2, 2013 Download the Policy Brief    On December 3, trade ministers from members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) will begin three days of meetings in Bali, Indonesia. Trade Facilitation, estimated to add $1 trillion to global income, features prominently in the negotiation agenda. However, official estimates depend on too many unjustifiable assumptions. Inaccuracy accumulates in several stages of the estimation process: in estimating the gains from trade facilitation for a sample of countries, in scaling up the gains to the global level and in estimating employment gains. This brief describes the estimation procedure and shows that the resulting figures are too uncertain to underpin any policy decisions. Read more in The Uncertain Gains from Trade Facilitation

Educacao em estagnacao, Brasil recua (alguma surpresa?); Enquanto isso, em Xangai...

Nenhuma: com a educação companheira, o Brasil só poderia recuar, absoluta e relativamente.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Avaliação

Avanço do Brasil na educação perde fôlego, revela o Pisa

Especialistas divergem sobre razões da melhoria passada, mas concordam sobre o futuro: para acelerar, é preciso promover mudanças profundas. Confira ranking completo da mais importante avaliação do ensino mundial

Jadyr Pavão Júnior

Alunos do Centro de Ensino Médio Elefante Branco se preparam para um simulado às vésperas do Enem 2013 (Wilson Dias/Agência Brasil)

Avaliar para mudar
O Pisa (Programme for International Student Assessment) é uma avaliação realizada a cada três anos pela OCDE, Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico. Participam estudantes com 15 anos de idade. A avaliação pretende aferir o quanto os alunos aprenderam em sala de aula, mas também se conseguem aplicar conhecimentos na solução de problemas reais. Outro objetivo da avaliação é fornecer subsídio para políticas de educação. Em 2012, 501.000 jovens de 65 países ou regiões econômicas delimitadas (caso de Xangai) aplicaram a prova. No Brasil, foram 19.877 estudantes, divididos em 837 escolas.

O ensino nas escolas públicas brasileiras é, em geral, muito ruim. Ponto. Resta saber se ele está melhorando. O relatório do Pisa, mais importante avaliação da educação internacional, publicado nesta terça-feira mostra que a formação oferecida nas escolas (públicas e privadas) do país vem avançando desde 2000, quando a primeira edição do levantamento foi lançada. Contudo, o movimento ascendente vem perdendo força muito antes de colocar o Brasil ao lado dos melhores ou até mesmo dos medianos. Isso faz com que especialistas sentenciem: para avançar mais, o país terá que promover reformas profundas. "Não cresceremos mais sem isso", diz Priscila Cruz, diretora-executiva do Todos pela Educação, ONG que atua ao mesmo tempo vigiando e propondo políticas públicas.

Comparadas as notas das avaliações de 2009 e 2012, o Brasil — 58º do novo ranking — caiu em leitura (412 pontos para 410), marcou passo em ciências (405) e registrou melhora em matemática (386 para 391). Praticamente estagnado na faixa dos 400 pontos, o país permanece distante dos líderes do levantamento — a província chinesa de Xangai, por exemplo, com média geral de 588 pontos — e se mantém na vizinhança de nações como Albânia, Tunísia. A pontuação não é decorativa. Continue a ler a reportagem

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Shanghai students top of the class ... and the world

By Zhao We

Shanghai Daily,  December 4, 2013, Wednesday |  PRINT EDITION

Shanghai again ranked first for mathematics, science and reading in a three-yearly report on global education as students in Asia continued to outshine their Western counterparts.

They also spent more time doing homework than their peers in the 65 countries and regions which took part in the tests for the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Its PISA report (Program for International Student Assessment) is the single largest study of global schooling.

It is highly influential, with participating countries and regions representing more than 80 percent of the global economy and often adapting policy in response to the findings.

The first PISA survey was carried out in 2000, and Shanghai joined in 2009, coming first in the three categories.

Around 6,400 students from 155 schools in Shanghai took part in the latest assessment in April last year. Globally, about half a million 15-year-olds took part.

The tests are based on a 1,000-point scale.

In mathematics, average scores ranged from 368 in Peru to 613 in Shanghai. The US average was 481, below the global average of 494. Singapore and Hong Kong took second and third with scores of 573 and 561.

In science, average scores ranged from 373 in Peru to 580 in Shanghai. The US scored 497. The global average was 501.

In reading, average scores ranged from 384 in Peru to 570 in Shanghai. The US scored 498, just above the global 496.

“The results are very inspiring. While it is good to see our students have performed so well, it is worth thinking if we really need so many students to be so good at mathematics,” said Zhang Minxuan, leader of the Shanghai PISA program and president of Shanghai Normal University.

Shanghai students reported an average of 13.8 hours every week doing school assignments, the highest and almost three times the average 4.9 hours.

Zhang said an analysis showed the optimal time for students to do homework is 11 hours per week including weekends. “We found that students who spent more than 11 hours on homework didn’t make significant progress, which deprived their time of discovering other talents.”

The mathematics test was divided into several parts to examine students’ skills to solve real-world questions using a knowledge of geometry, algebra, calculation and statistics. Shanghai students performed well in translating a real-world problem into a mathematics problem but were poorer at explaining the results.

Zhang attributed Shanghai’s students’ good performance in mathematics to more chances to learn the subject, personal ability and family background.

Boys and girls have a similar performance in mathematics but girls were more modest in assessing their ability.

“We should encourage girl students to think they can do math as good as boys and help them build confidence,” Zhang said.

In reading and science, the score gap between boys and girls in Shanghai has narrowed compared to 2009, Zhang said.

He said the results showed that Shanghai’s education was well-balanced as the gap between low proficiency and high proficiency was smaller than the average level.

Zhang said the PISA results had given thoughtful hints on how to provide a balanced education for students.

Schools are advised to give fewer after-school assignments and reduce homework so that students can have more time for individual development. For teachers, they should think about how to help students use mathematics skills to solve real problems instead of learning how to solve a math problem only. It is also suggested that parents not overburden their children with after-school tutoring.

Corrupcao avanca; Brasil recua (e poderia ser diferente?)

Com os companheiros no poder, todos os indicadores de comparações internacionais pioraram para o Brasil: corrupção, competitividade, comércio, democracia, direitos humanos, agilidade mental, etc...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Corrupção: Brasil cai três posições em ranking internacional
O Globo, 2/12/2013

País, que em 2012 ocupava a 69ª posição na tabela da ONG Transparência Internacional, que inclui 177 países, agora está em 72º lugar
O Brasil caiu três posições no ranking dos países considerados mais limpos ou livres da corrupção. A tabela será divulgada nesta terça-feira pela ONG Transparência Internacional, com sede em Berlim, Alemanha. O país, que em 2012 ocupava a 69ª posição na tabela que inclui 177 países, agora está em 72º lugar — bem atrás de vizinhos como Uruguai, na 19ª posição, ou o Chile, na 22ª.
O ranking é feito pela ONG por meio de pesquisas com entidades da sociedade civil, agências de risco, empresários e investidores. Pergunta-se qual a percepção que se tem sobre a transparência do poder público. Depois, a tabela é elaborada através de uma pontuação que vai de 100 (menos corrupto) a zero (mais corrupto).
O Brasil obteve 42 pontos, o mesmo que Bósnia-Hezergóvina, São Tomé e Príncipe, Sérvia e África do Sul, países que, no ranking, ficam atrás de outros como Botsuana (30ª posição), Costa Rica (49ª), Ruanda (49ª) ou Turquia (53ª).
— O país não está nem no topo e nem no fim da tabela, está lá pelo meio, mas mesmo assim tirou menos de 50, ou seja, foi reprovado — diz Alejandro Salas, diretor de Américas da Transparência Internacional, para quem o Brasil não está fazendo o seu dever de casa para combater o problema da corrupção.
Além do mais, segundo ele, “a corrupção não condiz com a importância econômica que o país tem, e nem com suas intenções de ser uma liderança mundial”.
Em ano de Copa do Mundo e eleições, Salas acredita que o problema da corrupção será amplamente debatido em 2014 no Brasil. E acha que o país avança, porém, se retrai em muitos aspectos.
— Certamente, fatores como o julgamento do mensalão diminuíram a percepção da corrupção em 2013. Mas o que ocorreu não foi suficiente em meio a outros escândalos graves que o Brasil enfrenta, como a máfia dos fiscais ou os escândalos dos trens em São Paulo. Ou seja, o país está estagnado neste quesito — comenta o analista.
Há surpresas na lista, como uma recuperação da transparência, em relação a 2012, da Grécia, atualmente em 80º lugar e uma queda da Espanha, para o 40º lugar. Segundo Salas, os dois países, apesar de enfrentarem uma crise econômica profunda, estão adotando diferentes estratégias para sanear as contas e combater a corrupção.
A estabilidade das democracias também parecem influenciar o ranking. Países que enfrentam conflitos, como a Síria, o Afeganistão ou a Somália estão no fim da tabela, em 168º e 175º (os dois últimos empatados). Ditaduras como a Coreia do Norte também, em 175º lugar. Países onde há “governos centrais fortes, que controlam várias instituições, como a Venezuela (160ª posição), também apresentam queda vertiginosa”, afirma Salas.
— Mais um motivo para o Brasil, uma democracia cada vez mais instituída e pulsante, melhorar sua posição — recomenda o analista.

Os países menos corruptos:

1º lugar: Dinamarca e Nova Zelândia

3º lugar: Finlândia e Suécia

5 º lugar: Noruega e Cingapura

Os países mais corruptos:

172º lugar: Líbia

173 º lugar: Sudão do Sul

174 º lugar: Sudão

175 º lugar: Afeganistão, Coréia do Norte e Somália

Os países latinos:

19º lugar: Uruguai

22º lugar: Chile

49º lugar: Costa Rica

63º lugar: Cuba

72º lugar: Brasil

83º lugar: Peru

94º lugar: Colômbia

102º lugar: Equador

106º lugar: Argentina, Bolívia e México

150º lugar: Paraguai

160º lugar: Venezuela

163º lugar: Haiti

O yuan (China) supera o euro como moeda de comercio internacional

E, por acaso, a Alemanha é o único país da zona do euro a ter saldos positivos no comércio  bilateral com a China.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

El yuan pasa al euro como segunda moneda del comercio mundial

El Pais Economia, 3/12/2013

El yuan se ha convertido en la segunda moneda más usada en el comercio mundial por delante del euro, según los datos actualizados hasta el pasado mes de octubre por la organización de servicios a las transacciones financeras SWIFT. El adelanto ha tenido lugar gracias a lanueva política del Gobierno de Pekín, que ha tomado medidas para potenciar la internacionalización de su divisa.
En concreto, el uso de la moneda china alcanzó en octubre una cuota de mercado del 8,66%, muy por encima del 1,89% registrado en enero de 2012, frente al del 6,64% del euro, que ha visto como su uso ha caído desde enero del año pasado, cuando representaba el 7,87% del total.
Los cinco países con mayor uso del yuan durante el pasado mes de octubre fueron China, Hong Kong, Singapur, Alemania y Australia, precisó la organización.
"El yuan es claramente una monedatop en los intercambios financieros globales y aún más en Asia", destacó Franck de Praetere, responsable de pagos y mercados comerciales para Asia Pecífico de SWIFT. No obstante, el uso del yuan aún está lejos de amenazar el dominio del dólar, cuya cuota de mercado se situó en octubre en el 81,08%, según los datos aportados por SWIFT.
Por otro lado, en cuanto al volumen de pagos en yuanes, la moneda china se mantuvo estable en octubre en decimosegunda posición con una ligera caída de la actividad al 0,84% del total, frente al 0,86% de de septiembre.
Sin embargo, durante el mismo periodo los pagos en yuanes aumentaron su valor un 1,5%, mientras que el crecimiento para el conjunto de monedas fue del 4,6%.

A arte da biografia, num pais livre (EUA) e num secreta e abertamente reprimido, o Brasil, claro...

Tudo isso a propósito de uma biografia de um dos maiores ícones da cuktura americana: Norman Rockwell. Creio que não vou encontrar essa biografopia na proxima vez que visitar o seu museu, em Stockbridge...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Rockwell Biography Angers His Family

By JULIE BOSMAN

The New York Times: December 2, 2013

The family of Norman Rockwell is waging a fierce campaign against a new biography of him, bristling at the book’s suggestions that Rockwell, artist of small-town Americana, could have been secretly gay or harbored pedophilic impulses.

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Associated Press

Norman Rockwell in his studio in 1969

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Deborah Solomon, author of “American Mirror.”

“American Mirror,” by Deborah Solomon, a 493-page account of the life and work of Rockwell, an illustrator for The Saturday Evening Post for nearly 50 years, was published last month by Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

In the book, Ms. Solomon raises the question of whether Rockwell was gay, writing that he “demonstrated an intense need for emotional and physical closeness with men,” and that his marriages may have been a strategy for “controlling his homoerotic desires.” She described a camping trip in Quebec that Rockwell took with his male assistant, during which the men swam and played cards together late into the night, and Rockwell noted in his diaries that his assistant looked “most fetching in his long flannels.” There is nothing, Ms. Solomon cautioned in the book, “to suggest that he had sex with men.”

Later in the book, Ms. Solomon writes that “we are made to wonder whether Rockwell’s complicated interest in the depiction of preadolescent boys was shadowed by pedophilic impulses.” She again added a disclaimer: “There is no evidence that he acted on his impulses or behaved in a way that was inappropriate for its time.”

But the mere insinuations have infuriated members of the Rockwell family intent on protecting his legacy. Two family members, who spoke in an interview on Monday, said that they regarded Ms. Solomon’s book as “shocking.”

“The bottom line is that’s it’s astonishing,” said Abigail Rockwell, a granddaughter of the painter, who said he was heterosexual and “not remotely a repressed man.”

“She layers the whole biography with these innuendos,” Ms. Rockwell added. “These things she’s writing about Norman Rockwell are simply not true.”

Thomas Rockwell, the second of Rockwell’s three sons, said the family fully cooperated with the biography. “We were perfectly open” with Ms. Solomon, he said, “because we liked her.”

The family plans to release a statement on Tuesday saying that Ms. Solomon’s purpose in writing the book was “publicity and financial gain and self-aggrandizement.”

The Rockwell family’s statements have drawn a sudden spotlight to portions of the book that, until now, had not been the center of discussions of the book in the press.

Reviewing the book in The New York Times, John Wilmerding made brief mention of the question of whether Rockwell was a “repressed homosexual,” but spent most of the review discussing Ms. Solomon’s broader account of his life and artistic accomplishments. The book, he wrote, “takes shape through compact vignettes of people and events, appropriate to Rockwell’s self-contained aphoristic depictions and often silhouetted figure groupings.”

Ms. Solomon, when told of the Rockwell family’s statements, said that the discussion of Rockwell’s sexuality was “a tiny part” of the book.

“The discussion is really about his work,” she said. “I feel like this is really the first book that convincingly makes the case for Rockwell’s artistic importance, and I would hope to keep the discussion on that subject.”

Asked whether she believes Rockwell was gay, she said, “I’m a biographer, I am not a psychiatrist. I would never presume to say that someone is gay. But I do feel entitled as an art critic and an art historian to analyze works of art. And I do think a case can be made that some of Rockwell’s paintings display homoerotic tendencies. He specialized in affectionate portrayals of the male figure and lamented many times that he could never paint a sexy woman. And nowhere in the book do I say that he is gay.”

Ms. Solomon said that she had not heard directly from any members of the family about the book.

Farrar, Straus and Giroux, which published the book on Nov. 5, said in a statement, “We have complete confidence in Deborah Solomon as a biographer and art historian and in the importance of her new book on Norman Rockwell, which argues strongly and in fresh ways for his achievements as an American master.”

Jeff Seroy, a spokesman for Farrar, Straus, said that 15,942 copies are in print. More than 2,600 copies have been sold in hardcover and almost 500 copies in e-book format.

On Wednesday, an auction of three of Rockwell’s most popular paintings will take place at Sotheby’s, works that could bring more than $30 million.

Asked why the family members waited weeks after publication to raise objections to the book, Ms. Rockwell said that they have debated whether to speak out but were spurred forward when the book received positive media attention, and Ms. Solomon began to be treated as “a Norman Rockwell authority.” Ms. Solomon, the author of biographies of Jackson Pollock and Joseph Cornell, is also a frequent contributor to The Times and a former columnist for The New York Times Magazine.

“We’ve asked ourselves over and over again, should we come forward or let this thing die?” Ms. Rockwell said. “People are now starting to refer to Pop,” she added, using her grandfather’s nickname, “as a closeted homosexual. This is dangerously becoming fact.”

Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement - George Friedman (Stratfor)

Geopolitical Weekly

Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement

By George Friedman

Stratfor, Tuesday, November 26, 2013

A deal between Iran and the P-5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) was reached Saturday night. The Iranians agreed to certain limitations on their nuclear program while the P-5+1 agreed to remove certain economic sanctions. The next negotiation, scheduled for six months from now depending on both sides' adherence to the current agreement, will seek a more permanent resolution. The key players in this were the United States and Iran. The mere fact that the U.S. secretary of state would meet openly with the Iranian foreign minister would have been difficult to imagine a few months ago, and unthinkable at the beginning of the Islamic republic. 

The U.S. goal is to eliminate Iran's nuclear weapons before they are built, without the United States having to take military action to eliminate them. While it is commonly assumed that the United States could eliminate the Iranian nuclear program at will with airstrikes, as with most military actions, doing so would be more difficult and riskier than it might appear at first glance. The United States in effect has now traded a risky and unpredictable air campaign for some controls over the Iranian nuclear program. 

The Iranians' primary goal is regime preservation. While Tehran managed the Green Revolution in 2009 because the protesters lacked broad public support, Western sanctions have dramatically increased the economic pressure on Iran and have affected a wide swath of the Iranian public. It isn't clear that public unhappiness has reached a breaking point, but were the public to be facing years of economic dysfunction, the future would be unpredictable. The election of President Hassan Rouhani to replace Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after the latter's two terms was a sign of unhappiness. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei clearly noted this, displaying a willingness to trade a nuclear program that had not yet produced a weapon for the elimination of some sanctions. 

The logic here suggests a process leading to the elimination of all sanctions in exchange for the supervision of Iran's nuclear activities to prevent it from developing a weapon. Unless this is an Iranian trick to somehow buy time to complete a weapon and test it, I would think that the deal could be done in six months. An Iranian ploy to create cover for building a weapon would also demand a reliable missile and a launch pad invisible to surveillance satellites and the CIA, National Security Agency, Mossad, MI6 and other intelligence agencies. The Iranians would likely fail at this, triggering airstrikes however risky they might be and putting Iran back where it started economically. While this is a possibility, the scenario is not likely when analyzed closely.

While the unfolding deal involves the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany, two countries intensely oppose it: Israel and Saudi Arabia. Though not powers on the order of the P-5+1, they are still significant. There is a bit of irony in Israel and Saudi Arabia being allied on this issue, but only on the surface. Both have been intense enemies of Iran, and close allies of the United States; each sees this act as a betrayal of its relationship with Washington.

The View from Saudi Arabia

In a way, this marks a deeper shift in relations with Saudi Arabia than with Israel. Saudi Arabia has been under British and later American protection since its creation after World War I. Under the leadership of the Sauds, it became a critical player in the global system for a single reason: It was a massive producer of oil. It was also the protector of Mecca and Medina, two Muslim holy cities, giving the Saudis an added influence in the Islamic world on top of their extraordinary wealth. 

It was in British and American interests to protect Saudi Arabia from its enemies, most of which were part of the Muslim world. The United States protected the Saudis from radical Arab socialists who threatened to overthrow the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. It later protected Saudi Arabia from Saddam Hussein after he invaded Kuwait. But it also protected Saudi Arabia from Iran.

Absent the United States in the Persian Gulf, Iran would have been the most powerful regional military power. In addition, the Saudis have a substantial Shiite minority concentrated in the country's oil-rich east. The Iranians, also Shia, had a potential affinity with them, and thereby the power to cause unrest in Saudi Arabia. 

Until this agreement with Iran, the United States had an unhedged commitment to protect Saudi Arabia from the Iranians. Given the recent deal, and potential follow-on deals, this commitment becomes increasingly hedged. The problem from the Saudi point of view is that while there was a wide ideological gulf between the United States and Iran, there was little in the way of substantial issues separating Washington from Tehran. The United States did not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranians didn't want the United States hindering Iran's economic development. The fact was that getting a nuclear weapon was not a fundamental Iranian interest, and crippling Iran's economy was not a fundamental interest to the United States absent an Iranian nuclear program.

If the United States and Iran can agree on this quid pro quo, the basic issues are settled. And there is something drawing them together. The Iranians want investment in their oil sector and other parts of their economy. American oil companies would love to invest in Iran, as would other U.S. businesses. As the core issue separating the two countries dissolves, and economic relations open up -- a step that almost by definition will form part of a final agreement -- mutual interests will appear.

There are other significant political issues that can't be publicly addressed. The United States wants Iran to temper its support for Hezbollah's militancy, and guarantee it will not support terrorism. The Iranians want guarantees that Iraq will not develop an anti-Iranian government, and that the United States will work to prevent this. (Iran's memories of its war with Iraq run deep.) The Iranians will also want American guarantees that Washington will not support anti-Iranian forces based in Iraq. 

From the Saudi point of view, Iranian demands regarding Iraq will be of greatest concern. Agreements or not, it does not want a pro-Iranian Shiite state on its northern border. Riyadh has been funding Sunni fighters throughout the region against Shiite fighters in a proxy war with Iran. Any agreement by the Americans to respect Iranian interests in Iraq would represent a threat to Saudi Arabia.

The View from Israel

From the Israeli point of view, there are two threats from Iran. One is the nuclear program. The other is Iranian support not only for Hezbollah but also for Hamas and other groups in the region. Iran is far from Israel and poses no conventional military threat. The Israelis would be delighted if Iran gave up its nuclear program in some verifiable way, simply because they themselves have no reliable means to destroy that program militarily. What the Israelis don't want to see is the United States and Iran making deals on their side issues, especially the political ones that really matter to Israel.

The Israelis have more room to maneuver than the Saudis do. Israel can live with a pro-Iranian Iraq. The Saudis can't; from their point of view, it is only a matter of time before Iranian power starts to encroach on their sphere of influence. The Saudis can't live with an Iranian-supported Hezbollah. The Israelis can and have, but don't want to; the issue is less fundamental to the Israelis than Iraq is to the Saudis.

But in the end, this is not the problem that the Saudis and Israelis have. Their problem is that both depend on the United States for their national security. Neither country can permanently exist in a region filled with dangers without the United States as a guarantor. Israel needs access to American military equipment that it can't build itself, like fighter aircraft. Saudi Arabia needs to have American troops available as the ultimate guarantor of their security, as they were in 1990. Israel and Saudi Arabia have been the two countries with the greatest influence in Washington. As this agreement shows, that is no longer the case. Both together weren't strong enough to block this agreement. What frightens them the most about this agreement is that fact. If the foundation of their national security is the American commitment to them, then the inability to influence Washington is a threat to their national security.

There are no other guarantors available. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went to Moscow, clearly trying to get the Russians to block the agreement. He failed. But even if he had succeeded, he would have alienated the United States, and would have gotten instead a patron incapable of supplying the type of equipment Israel might need when Israel might need it. The fact is that neither the Saudis nor the Israelis have a potential patron other than the United States.

U.S. Regional Policy

The United States is not abandoning either Israel or Saudi Arabia. A regional policy based solely on the Iranians would be irrational. What the United States wants to do is retain its relationship with Israel and Saudi Arabia, but on modified terms. The modification is that U.S. support will come in the context of a balance of power, particularly between Iran and Saudi Arabia. While the United States is prepared to support the Saudis in that context, it will not simply support them absolutely. The Saudis and Israelis will have to live with things that they have not had to live with before -- namely, an American concern for a reasonably strong and stable Iran regardless of its ideology.

The American strategy is built on experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has learned that it has interests in the region, but that the direct use of American force cannot achieve those goals, partly because imposing solutions takes more force than the United States has and partly because the more force it uses, the more resistance it generates. Therefore, the United States needs a means of minimizing its interests, and pursuing those it has without direct force.

With its interests being limited, the United States' strategy is a balance of power. The most natural balance of power is Sunni versus Shia, the Arabs against the Iranians. The goal is not war, but sufficient force on each side to paralyze the other. In that sense, a stable Iran and a more self-reliant Saudi Arabia are needed. Saudi Arabia is not abandoned, but nor is it the sole interest of the United States.

In the same sense, the United States is committed to the survival of Israel. If Iranian nuclear weapons are prevented, the United States has fulfilled that commitment, since there are no current threats that could conceivably threaten Israeli survival. Israel's other interests, such as building settlements in the West Bank, do not require American support. If the United States determines that they do not serve American interests (for example, because they radicalize the region and threaten the survival of Jordan), then the United States will force Israel to abandon the settlements by threatening to change its relationship with Israel. If the settlements do not threaten American interests, then they are Israel's problem.

Israel has outgrown its dependence on the United States. It is not clear that Israel is comfortable with its own maturation, but the United States has entered a new period where what America wants is a mature Israel that can pursue its interests without recourse to the United States. And if Israel finds it cannot have what it wants without American support, Israel may not get that support, unless Israel's survival is at stake. 

In the same sense, the perpetual Saudi inability to create an armed force capable of effectively defending itself has led the United States to send troops on occasion -- and contractors always -- to deal with the problem. Under the new strategy, the expectation is that Saudi soldiers will fight Saudi Arabia's wars -- with American assistance as needed, but not as an alternative force. 

With this opening to Iran, the United States will no longer be bound by its Israeli and Saudi relationships. They will not be abandoned, but the United States has broader interests than those relationships, and at the same time few interests that rise to the level of prompting it to directly involve U.S. troops. The Saudis will have to exert themselves to balance the Iranians, and Israel will have to wend its way in a world where it has no strategic threats, but only strategic problems, like everyone else has. It is not a world in which Israeli or Saudi rigidity can sustain itself.

Read more: Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement | Stratfor 

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Programa nuclear iraniano: desafios difíceis à frente - David Albright (ISIS Reports)

ISIS Reports

The Rocky Path to a Long-Term Settlement with Iran

by David Albright

The Washington Post, November 25, 2013

David Albright is president of the Institute for Science and International Security.

In the short run, the deal agreed to by Western powers and Iran over the weekend accomplishes a great deal. In the long run, however, many key issues still must be settled.

Iran has pledged, for six months, to halt advances in major parts of its gas centrifuge program, to stop essential construction of the Arak plutonium-producing reactor and to eliminate its most dangerous stock of low-enriched uranium — that near 20 percent — through dilution or conversion into oxide form. Iran promised not to install or stockpile centrifuges during that period and has said it will not enrich in any of its already installed advanced centrifuges, which can enrich three to five times faster than its first-generation (IR-1) centrifuges. It has agreed not to build any more centrifuge plants. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have greater access to Iran’s nuclear sites and information; overall transparency stands to increase significantly. All these conditions mean that, in the short term, Iran’s nuclear program will pose fewer risks.

Under these conditions, Iran’s nuclear “breakout” time would lengthen for the first time since its capability began approaching dangerous levels in the past year. If Iran used all of its installed centrifuges, the time it would need to produce a weapon would expand to at least 1.9 to 2.2 months, up from at least 1 month to 1.6 months. With IAEA monitors checking at Natanz and Fordow every day, this increase would allow the United States and its allies time to respond before Iran produces enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb.

Iran will also be delayed in reaching the point where it has sufficient centrifuges and enriched uranium to produce, undetected, enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb. The Institute for Science and International Security estimated in July that, absent a deal, Iran could achieve this critical capability in mid-2014. The interim deal will delay Iran from achieving this destabilizing threshold, even if the deal’s constraints end after six months.

The interim plan aims to resolve two key issues before a comprehensive deal can be finalized. U.S. officials have said that all IAEA concerns about Iran’s past, and possibly ongoing, work on nuclear weapons and other alleged military nuclear activities must be satisfied. Iran has stalled on this for years. Iran is also expected to address satisfactorily all provisions of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Normally, this would mean that Iran would also need to suspend its centrifuge program for some period. Alternatively, it could mean that if Iran accomplishes enough tangible steps to alleviate concerns about its nuclear program and a suspension is seen as unnecessary to satisfy these resolutions, the United States might support undoing the resolutions at the Security Council.

Despite all the potential progress, tough issues remain. The Geneva agreement does not grant Iran the right to enrich uranium, but it accepts that in a comprehensive agreement Iran will maintain a mutually defined centrifuge program with mutually agreed parameters. Iran conceded that for a not-yet determined period any such program would be subject to limitations on the number of centrifuges, the location of any centrifuge plants, the level of enrichment and the size of stocks of enriched uranium.

Important questions remain about the limitations in a final deal: What would be the exact limits on the size and scope of Iran’s centrifuge program? Iran has 18,000 to 19,000 installed centrifuges. Under a final deal, would Iran have, say, 5,000 to 10,000 IR-1 centrifuges and a breakout time closer to six months? How long would these limits last? Would the enrichment plant at Fordow, buried deep in a mountain, close?

The interim deal froze essential work at the Arak reactor, but its fate remains unsettled. Will that reactor be shut down or converted into a light-water reactor? If it operates as a heavy-water reactor, one day Iran could secretly separate weapons-grade plutonium produced there for nuclear weapons.

To be credible and justify significant sanctions relief, any long-term deal would need to ensure that Iran’s centrifuge capacity is highly limited and that these limits will further increase breakout times, preferably toward six months. It should be limited to one enrichment site, which means Fordow should be closed. These limitations should last for more than a decade. Stocks of domestically produced enriched uranium should be minimized, particularly since Iran would be able to buy enriched uranium fuel commercially far cheaper than it could make it. The Arak reactor will need to close or be converted to a more benign reactor.

Iran will also need to accept greater IAEA inspections to ensure that it is not cheating on a long-term agreement.

Given its track record, Iran can be expected to resist these limitations, but U.S. officials must remain firm. The Geneva deal should be lauded for the strong limitations it places on Iran’s nuclear capabilities for the next several months. But if there is to be a genuine, final settlement of the Iran nuclear issue, the real struggle is just beginning.

This op-ed is available here.